(EST PUB DATE) THE SALVADORAN MILITARY: A MIXED PERFORMANCE

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00760157
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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2021
• Case Number: F-2017-00184
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Salvadoran Military:
A Mixed Performance
An Intelligence Assessment
(-t
--Seeret-
-Secret�
ALA 84-10060
June 1984
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0." Directorate of
Intelligence
*
The Salvadoran Mi1ita77
A Mixed Performance
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America�Caribbean
Division, ALA,
Secret
Secret
ALA 84-10060
June 1984
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Scope Note
Note
This paper tracks the progress of the Salvadoran military's transformation from a
traditional Central American institution into a counterinsurgent force. As a
building-block effort, it does not comparatively assess the performance of the
Salvadoran military against that of the guerrillas. A companion study now under
way will examine the record of the guerrillas and evaluate their capabilities.
Following that, the Directorate will undertake a net assessment of the direction of
the Salvadoran conflict.
This information is
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�Seeret�
The Salvadoran Militarr
A Mixed Performance
Key Judgments
Information available
as of' I June 1984
was used in this report.
El Salvador since 1979 has made significant progress in expanding,
reorganizing, and equipping its armed forces to fight a counterinsurgent
war. These force improvements, achieved with assistance from the United
States, have enabled the military to hold an increasingly well-armed
guerrilla force at bay while improving its own field performance. These
achievements, however, have not led to overall gains on the ground, as the
guerrillas still dominate at least as much of the country as they did two
years ago.
The experience with force development over the past few years suggests to
us that Salvadoran military leaders will be capable of continued gradual
progress and partial success in molding the armed forces into a more
effective counterinsurgency force over the short term. Other observers,
most notably some in our Embassy in San Salvador and at the US
Southern Command, perceive the Salvadoran military to have made more
substantial progress in the past few months and foresee a relatively steadier
and more rapid improvement in the future. They point to a variety of
factors such as a radical shift in attitude and increased creativity among
the Salvadoran military leadership, greater receptivity to US recommenda-
tions, and more units responding effectively to battlefield pressure.
Emergence of a tough, independently capable modern military is, in our
view, many years away. Efforts to push force development even more
rapidly than presently planned could prove counterproductive, undermin-
ing the traditional military system before new approaches can become
accepted and take root. By the same token, sustaining at least present
levels of US support is essential to El Salvador's holding the insurgents at
bay until political, economic, and social changes can better contribute to
turning the tide.
Force development to date has been substantial. Overall troop strength has
more than tripled since 1979 to almost 40,000. This includes some 28,000
personnel in the three armed services and over 11,000 in the public security
forces. The increased troop strength generally enables deployments against
guerrilla concentrations without leaving less contested areas of the country
unprotected. A much expanded junior officer corps, the availability of
mobile communications gear and light infantry weapons, and improved
reconnaissance capability are encouraging adaptation to leader-intensive
small-unit tactics. About 14,000 Salvadorans have received US training in
areas ranging from counterinsurgent operations to equipment maintenance,
although not all of the US-trained troops remain on active duty.
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Improved strategic planning has given the Salvadorans a framework for
concentrating limited resources in key areas, integrating civic action with
the military effort, and developing civil defense forces.
recent advancement of officers with field experience is
beginning to strengthen command authority, while intelligence collection
has increased dramatically as a result of strong US support.
Government campaigns over the past two years have shifted but not
reduced the overall area under guerrilla domination, however. In fact,
National Guard troops have been pulled back from numerous outposts,
leaving more villages now without a regular government presence than two
years ago. Nevertheless, during the recent election the military successfully
conducted operations aimed at preventing the guerrillas from disrupting
the balloting.
While the military is showing an increasing ability to address some of its
shortcomings, we believe the combat effectiveness of the Salvadoran armed
forces has been impeded by a number of factors:
� Some of the force improvement programs are still under way or are being
modified and have not yet had their full battlefield impact. Limitations
on the numbers and duties of US training personnel also temper combat
expectations.
� Funding shortfalls have weakened combat support and prevented the
development of peripheral programs, such as incentive pay and support
for civil defense units, needed to sustain combat gains.
� An institutional reluctance at times to proceed with US-sponsored
programs has delayed conversion of the military into a counterinsurgency
force.
Continued force improvements will allow the armed forces to maintain
military pressure on the insurgents and prevent the situation from deterio-
rating sharply in the year ahead, in our view, but they are not likely to pro-
vide the basis for a military breakthrough, as long as external support for
the guerrillas continues. On the basis of performance to date, we expect
leadership attitudes to continue to evolve during the coming year, though
somewhat slowly and unevenly. We believe that expansion and reorganiza-
tion will continue to strain available officers and training programs,
resulting in the fielding of some units poorly prepared for combat, and a
substantial casualty rate. There are likely to be further losses�if at a
diminished rate� of weapons and supplies to the enemy.
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Military development will continue to suffer from budget constraints.
Furthermore, with no significant military industries or alternative suppli-
ers, the government will probably have to continue to spend a large
proportion of US aid on ammunition and other expendibles at the expense
of longer term investments in military hardware and training. We expect
financial pressures to grow as the war intensifies, the payroll expands, loans
come due, and medical and death benefits burgeon.
Since a breakthrough appears unlikely on the battlefield over the short
term, political factors may hold the key to the strategic balance. The
actions of the new Christian Democratic government of Napoleon Duarte
will influence both the level of US aid and the amount of attention the de-
fense leadership gives to the war effort. Certainly, continued indications
that the armed forces are resigned to a new relationship with civil authority
would permit military leaders to concentrate more fully on the war; on the
other hand, if top leaders become preoccupied with political events in San
Salvador for an extended period of time, they would be unable to
orchestrate combat actions, and potential tactical opportunities could be
dissipated.
Washington's leverage in further accelerating the development of the
Salvadoran armed forces is constrained by Salvadoran culture and institu-
tions. Considerable strides have been made in the technical modernization
of the Salvadoran military, but, in our judgment, leadership attitudes and
institutional procedures still require significant additional changes to meet
the guerrilla threat. These have shown the least improvement over the past
few years, both because of the slow pace of institutional evolution and
sensitivity over the US role. Recent reorganization and reassignments of
military commanders, combined with changes in civilian leadership as a
result of the 1984 elections, may result in some acceleration of the needed
changes.
We believe US pressure to promote force development can, if not carefully
orchestrated, strain El Salvador's capacity to absorb new technology and
force-management ideas and nurture a counterproductive dependence on
the United States. Greatly expanded or more sophisticated assistance
would probably require the United States to increase its advisory presence
substantially to enable the Salvadorans to make use of the aid, thus risking
leaving Salvadoran officers feeling that they were not in control and
weakening the resolve of the High Command.
This information is
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Introduction
Military Traditions
Battlefield Performance to Date
Force Development
Combat Record
Performance Outlook
Implications for the United States
Appendix
iii
1
3
3
4
8
Development of a Counterinsurgency Force
Force Size .
II
Troop Quality 12
Leadership 15
Military Equipment I:7
Structure 20
Strategy and Tactics 23
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Figure 1
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�Seega.L.
The Salvadoran Military:
A Mixed Performance
Introduction
Despite several years of substantial US assistance, the
battlefield situation in El Salvador is stalemated.
Tactical swings and nonmilitary variables obscure the
long-term direction of the war. Definite progress has
been made in the technical modernization of the
Salvadoran armed forces, but a number of factors�
military traditions, incompleted programs, funding
shortfalls, and enemy improvements�has limited the
translation of force improvements into battlefield
gains. This paper focuses on the period since January
1982 and examines the extent to which the Salvador-
an armed forces�with little previous experience
fighting guerrillas and with limited resources�have
been able to conduct a counterinsurgency war.
Military Traditions
El Salvador's military leaders, backed by a relatively
small but generally cohesive armed force, have long
dominated the country's political affairs despite con-
stitutional efforts to promote civilian governments,
This heavy involvement in politics, we believe, has
prevented full attention to professional military mat-
ters and in recent years has impeded the Salvadoran
defense establishment's ability to conduct the war.
According to numerous academic and intelligence
studies, the 20 to 30 officers who graduated each year
from the Salvadoran military academy in recent
decades formed an elite clique. Class members were
promoted together, protected each other's careers,
and made decisions as a group, largely ignoring the
formal chain of command. Departmental posts were
awarded for political favors more than for profession-
al competence. A personalistic style of leadership
where authority was rarely delegated discouraged
� Our analysis draws extensively on US attache reporting, with
supplemental information from US Embassy
The study also benefits from interviews with a variety of
Defense Department personnel who have been in
El Salvador or are currently involved with Salvadoran programs
and issues.
Regular troops comprised less than 0.2 percent of El Salvador's
4.6-million population in 1979. ranking the country behind most
other Latin American nations in terms of a military-to-civilian
:atio
initiative and prevented the development of military
staffs. Institutional cohesiveness was reinforced from
time to time through purges of officers whose political
views deviated too far from the conservative norm.
Lacking a real external threat, the armed forces
occupied themselves with maintaining domestic order.
Tensions with neighboring states flared from time to
time, but open hostilities, such as the brief war with
Honduras in 1969, were rare. The growth of public
security forces resulted in overlapping functions and
institutional jealousies but did not reduce the internal
security interests of the regular services. Use of force
to control political dissension and social protests made
the armed forces unpopular over the years.
As a conventionally organized peacetime force, the
Salvadoran military was unprepared for the rigors of
rural guerrilla warfare. Years of calm encouraged a
casual attitude toward military duties, lack of strate-
gic planning, absentee leadership, a garrison-oriented
lifestyle, and the use of local reserve personnel more
for political intelligence work than security duties. A
large national manpower pool reduced the need for
reenlistments, and almost all recruits left the service
after their I8-month tours,
either to take better paying jobs in the public
security forces or to return to civilian life. Training
focused on classroom instruction rather than hands-on
experience and field maneuvers. Textbook tactics
stressed large-scale sweep operations. Only cursory
attention was paid to tactical intelligence and recon-
naissance skills. Even companies garrisoned together
rarely operated together, providing scant exercise of
command and control procedures and no joint-service
experience. The Salvadoran equipment inventory con-
sisted of limited numbers of infantry weapons, air-
craft, patrol boats, vehicles, and support items from
different epochs and different countries. There were
no notable domestic military industries. The armed
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�
The Sal Salvadoran Defense Establishment
(Total Strength: 39,800)
Military Services (28,300)
Army. The Salvadoran Army comprises 70 percent of
men under arms, having expanded from about 7,000
troops in 1979 to 27,300 in early 1984. It is the
government's best equipped military force. The cur-
rent close relationship with the United States has
replaced historic ties with the Chilean and, most
recently. Israeli militaries. The Minister of Defense
has traditionally been chosen from among top Army
officers. Through its Chief of the Armed Forces
General Stall, the Army has operational control over
all other military and paramilitary components. The
Army is organized into six military zones and subdi-
vided into 14 departmental commands plus a number
offunctional commands. It has borne the brunt of the
counterinsurgent struggle.
Air Force. The Salvadoran Air Force has improved
its reputation in recent years as US training and
equipment facilitate a wider role in support of ground
operations. Although still constrained by too few
pilots for its 85 operational aircraft, overall Air
Force size has tripled since 1979 to 500 personnel.
All operations stage out of Ilopango Air Base near
the capital, although helicopters are sometimes de-
tached to field commanders for temporary duty.
Navy. Although it has grown more than sixfold since
1979, the 500-man Salvadoran Navy remains the
weakest service branch. Operationally headquartered
at the port of La Union in the Gulf of Fonseca, and
with fewer than 30 boats, the Navy still cannot
adequately patrol the coastline or support the Army
through blocking actions or interdiction.
Public Security Forces (11.500)
National Guard. The Salvadoran National Guard
was created in 1912 and modeled after the Spanish
Civil Guard; it functions mainly as a rural police
force throughout the country. The Guard has been
traditionally better paid, better trained, and with
more experience than Army recruits, but it is not
benefiting directly from US training and new equip-
ment which goes exclusively to the regular forces.
The Guard is administered from San Salvador and
divided into Jive regional commands; its 4,200 mem-
bers provide the first line of defense in many outlying
towns and actively participate in counterinsurgent
actions technically under the operational control of
the local Army commander.
National Police. The National Police was formed in
1945 as the urban counterpart to the National Guard.
Its 5.500 personnel take action against terrorists, but
still spend most of their time on routine police
matters. Reforms in recent years have increased
police professionalism, but lack of officers has forced
a reduction to only three command centers through-
out the country.
Treasury Police. The small size of the 1,800-man
Treasury Police, which was organized in 1926, belies
its reputation as the most aggressive of the public
security forces and the worst abuser of human rights.
Dispersed into five operational zones, Treasury per-
sonnel collect intelligence from local informants and
participate on occasion in military actions under
Army direction
forces relied on fixed rather than mobile communica-
tions networks. Under the peacetime logistics system,
garrisons bought food and fuel through local commer-
cial channels but depended entirely on depots in the
capital for weapons and ammunition supplies and
equipment maintenance
�Street�
The growth of the armed insurgency in 1979-80 '
forced the government to reassess its military pre-
paredness. The junta increased the defense budget,
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began to expand the size of the armed forces, convert-
ed some military school staffs into combat units,
accelerated the graduation of officers from the acade-
my, improved relations with neighboring countries to
try to stem the flow of arms reaching the insurgents,
and solicited US aid. The mobilization of existing
resources allowed government forces to weather nu-
merous attacks�including a countrywide guerrilla
campaign in January 1981�but left the Army on the
defensive. By the end of 1981, the need for additional
resources became increasingly apparent.
Battlefield Performance to Date
The mediocre performance of government forces in
1981 plus new developments in early 1982�the de-
struction of much of the Air Force during a January
raid and the heavy security requirements for the
March Constituent Assembly elections�led to urgent
requests for increased United States assistance. To
improve battlefield performance, the United States
sharply increased military aid for programs to up-
grade the size, training, equipment, support systems,
intelligence capability, and combat planning of the
Salvadoran forces.'
Force Development. In a number of areas El Salvador
has made progress toward retooling its armed forces
for a counterinsurgent war:
� Troop strength has more than tripled since 1979 to
almost 40,000, with five immediate-reaction (IR)
battalions created to respond and reinforce when
local forces engage the enemy. These units, as well
as the airborne battalion, form a strategic reserve
that generally has enabled the government to focus
deployments against guerrilla concentrations with-
out leaving less contested areas of the country
unprotected. Local forces have been expanded�and
are being reorganized�in an effort to strengthen
the defense of important installations, while simul-
taneously making more troops available for aggres-
sive patrolling and offensive operations.
� Almost 14,000 Salvadorans have received some US
military training, although only about 50 percent
are still on active duty. More than 150 US training
� For an in-depth discussion of the problems and progress of the
Salvadoran military over the past two years, see the appendix to
this paper. "Development of a Counterinsurgency Force."
3
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teams have rotated to El Salvador to provide in-
struction in command and control, small-unit tac-
tics, combat medical care, logistics, naval and air
skills. communications, and equipment mainte-
nance. Salvadoran units have trained at Fort Bragg
and at the Regional Military Training Center in
Honduras, while individual soldiers have been sent
to US facilities in Panama to acquire specialized
skills.
� The addition of almost 900 US-trained junior offi-
cers has plugged critical gaps in lower level leader-
ship and is enabling the Army gradually to move
toward leader-intensive small-unit tactics. The gov-
ernment also has moved a few combat-proven mid-
level officers to key command positions to take
advantage of their experience.
� Recent personnel shifts at the top have fostered
better communications between the General Staff
and field units. The outstanding reputation of the
new leadership team among combat commanders is
bringing some improvement in command authority.
Procedural changes have included 24-hour staffing
of the national operations center; formal investiga-
tion of combat losses; the increased incorporation of
air force, artillery, and naval personnel into the
planning process; and more regular liaison with US
advisers.
� The simultaneous realignment of military zones to
coincide with enemy fronts reduced the guerrillas'
opportunities for slipping through corridors between
operational commands. It also has encouraged the
brigades to function as links between battalions and
the High Command.
� Modern infantry weapons and communications gear
of US manufacture have begun to be standardized
throughout regular units. New equipment could be
introduced rapidly because weapons have not been
technically complex and training packages have
accompanied procurement. The acquisition of new
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aircraft has has drawn the Air Force more fully into the
counterinsurgent struggle. and the Navy has begun
to increase its patrolling to try to discourage enemy
resupply by sea.
� In cooperation with the United States, new efforts
at strategic planning have given the Salvadorans a
framework for concentrating limited resources in
key areas, integrating civic action with the military
effort, and developing civil defense forces to en-
hance local security.
� Improved tactical planning and the restructuring of
local forces into light battalions is encouraging more
aggressive small-unit operations. The reorganization
is shaking the lethargy out of some garrison units
and providing commanders with a potentially more
flexible structure to anticipate or respond to guerril-
la actions.
� Technical intelligence collection has increased dra-
matically as a result of substantial US assistance.
Salvadoran observer aircraft have improved the
military's visual reconnaissance capability, while
US aircraft provide photographic and signals-inter-
cept support. Elite US-trained long-range recon-
naissance patrols have undertaken productive mis-
sions into enemy-controlled territory. The armed
forces' ability to use intelligence is growing as a
result of expanded staffing both at the High Com-
mand and in field units. Modifications in all-source
tactical operational planning packages from Wash-
ington are improving their usefulness for Salvador-
an commanders.
Combat Record. The considerable progress of El
Salvador's armed forces in attaining their manpower,
equipment, and training goals has not been matched
by their overall effectiveness on the battlefield, how-
ever. Despite gradual improvement in combat per-
formance�visible, for example, during the spring
1984 election period�government campaigns over
the past two years have not reduced the total area
under guerrilla domination, although they have
caused relocation of a number of insurgent camps.
National Guard troops have been pulled back from
numerous outposts, leaving more villages without a
regular government presence than two years ago.
Furthermore, the government's past piecemeal ap-
proach to operations had little effect on the overall
level of enemy hostile activities, according to attache
reporting
Wide tactical swings in the Salvadoran war have
tended to obscure the overall strategic trend (see
diagram). The combat initiative has shifted back and
forth with neither side able to achieve a decisive
breakthrough. During implementation of the National
Plan in summer 1983, for example, government
forces�on the offensive in nine out of 14 depart-
ments�forced the guerrillas to pull back and re-
group. After a series of successful guerrilla counterat-
tacks during the fall, however, the insurgents capped
off the year by overrunning, for the first time, a major
Army garrison and destroying the remaining highway
bridge over the Lempa River. The military, however,
has shown an ability to address some of its shortcom-
ings. Most recently. aggressive offensive actions con-
tributed to the guerrillas' inability to disrupt either
round of the presidential election.
In our view, lack of greater government gains on the
Littlefield can be explained in part by improvements
in the enemy's combat capability. The Intelligence
Community believes that the overall size of the
guerrilla movement has remained about the same over
the past two years but that guerrilla combat strength
has now reached 9,000 to 11 ,000 because of the
upgrading of militia forces through training, experi-
ence, and the acquisition of vreaporta.' Tactical coordi-
nation between guerrilla factions has also improved
somewhat. Furthermore, insurgent forces have shown
increasing sophistication in tactical planning and the
use of intelligence and can now stage well-executed
conventional attacks�often at night�against compa-
ny-sized or even larger units.
' For a fuller discussion of guerrilla strengths and weaknesses, see
the Special National Intelligence Estimate 83.1-2-83
pecember 1983, Near-Term Military
Prospects for El Salvador.
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"Stew.,
Figure 2
Fluctuations in the Salvadoran Conflict, January 1982-June 1984
Favoring
Gosernment
Strategtx 'frend Line
Fin oring
Guerrilla%
� Guerrillas fail to disrupt
eke lions
� I training programs
expand
� New aircraft delivered
� Raid on Iltipangn
irlield
19112
J one
I 9!12
� New Defense Minister
� Strategic planning improved
� Multiple offensive Govern-
ment operations
� Deaths disrupt FMLN
leadership
� US training center in
Honduras
� Amnesty: elections promised
�GarclaiOehoa faecal within
armed forces
� Pace of US training slows
� Guerrilla control of certain
areas acknowledged
� New president elected
� Countr%wide militar% opera-
tions provide security for
balloting
� Increased insurgent
fact ionaliSM
� Significant deliveries of com-
munications and medical
equipment
� Guerrilla counteroffensive
� National Plan falters
� Elections rescheduled
� Garrison taken over
� Major bridge destrtned
I 1 I 1
ianuary June Janitors . June
1983 1983 l9114 1984
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307282 4-114
Many of El Salvador's military improvement pro-
grams are still under way, thus delaying an assess-
ment of their ultimate battlefield impact. Nonethe-
less, it is already clear that training and funding
bottlenecks have slowed efforts to expand total forces
and restructure individual units. Understandably,
some disorganization and lack of understanding of
new missions and tactics have dogged the government
effort during the transition, according to attache
reporting. Furthermore, standardization into 350-man
light battalions has now been scrapped in favor of
somewhat larger units with heavier weapons support.
The new structures will strain equipment and person-
nel resources over the short term, but may lead to
greater battlefield flexibility in time
The funding shortfalls during the early stages of the
war also weakened combat support and prevented the
development of peripheral programs needed to sustain
combat gains. Lack of a major program to upgrade
mobility, we believe, has reduced potential gains from
the improvements in the size, organization, and tacti-
cal training of the ground forces. The scramble for
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resources has exacerbated rivalries between the ser-
vices at a time when cooperation is deemed vital and
contributed to the reluctance of the logistics com-
mand to distribute supplies to the field. Lack of funds
has also prevented commanders from cultivating local
informants, thus handicapping operations by poor
tactical intelligence. Programs to encourage reenlist-
ment through incentive pay, to reward defectors, to
improve the military's image through civic action, and
to develop civil defense units to maintain security once
government forces have retaken rural areas have
languished because of the fiscal squeeze
Reflecting chronic budget shortfalls despite US aid,
the Salvadoran Government has had to spend a large
proportion of available defense funds on consumables
to keep the day-to-day war going rather than on
investments for long-term force improvement. US
ammunition deliveries are critical to keeping Salva-
doran forces in the field. Defense Minister Vides
acknowledged El Salvador's dependence in this area
when he told a visiting US Senator that troops could
not fight three months without US munitions support,
according to a US attache present. With no military
industries and no alternative foreign sources of sup-
ply, the government has had to use about 30 percent
of US military aid in recent years for ordnance to
keep the war going.
Even so, ammunition shortages affecting the level of
combat have occurred from time to time
Shortages have occurred because
of aid ceilings, the difficulty of ordering in advance
and stockpiling under the irregular appropriations
timetable, and fluctuations in Salvadoran tactical
activity and fire discipline that have made forecasting
difficult. El Salvador required an emergency ship-
ment of 5.56-mm ammunition at the end of 1983, for
example, after the government's summer offensive
and the fall guerrilla resurgence depleted stocks more
rapidly than expected. Even when stocks are on hand,
worry about future availability�especially during US
Congressional debates over aid legislation�has
caused Salvadoran commanders to hoard supplies and
reduce operations, according to the US Embassy. The
growing need for spare parts as new equipment ages
has also begun to increase the pressure to use more
aid funds for short-term expendibles.
Institutional rigidity and leadership resistance to
change, in our view, also have considerably weakened
the envisioned payoffs from programs set in place. In
each case, areas of gain have been undercut by areas
of continuing weakness:
� The government has expanded the armed forces, but
lost the benefit of much training and combat experi-
ence through short enlistment tours and poor reen-
listment rates.
� Training in counterguerrilla tactics has been insti-
tuted, but officers have not always trained with
their troops, units have been pulled from training
for operations, and Salvadoran training programs
have been slow to supplement US efforts.
� The number of inexperienced junior officers has
ballooned, but the High Command has not effec-
tively moved to increase critical middle ranks
through merit promotions or endorsed the develop-
ment of an NCO corps.
� US equipment and supplies have arrived, but ineffi-
cient distribution and requisition procedures often
have prevented items from getting to where they are
most needed on a timely basis. Furthermore, domes-
tically produced items have often been in critically
short supply.
� The government has undertaken to reorganize local
forces into smaller battalions without the units
themselves embracing the appropriate tactics in
most cases.
� Army zones have been redrawn to match combat
realities, but public security forces, which constitute
more than one-fourth of the Salvadoran defense
establishment and play a significant combat role,
have not reorganized along parallel lines.
� Strategic plans have been formulated, but weak
command authority has handicapped
implementation.
6
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� Far more technical intelligence has been collected
by the United States than the Salvadoran armed
forces can react to, and Salvadoran collection ef-
forts of all types have improved only slowly.
� Defense Minister Vides has encouraged more pro-
fessional attention to the war, but the top leadership
has remained vulnerable to political pressure from
both within and outside the military
Performance Outlook
Salvadoran and US planners forecast continued force
improvements in 1984. According to attache report-
ing, the Salvadoran Government expects to add at
least 6,000 troops, set up one more I R battalion, and
finish the consolidation of local forces into light
battalions. Another large class of junior officers is
expected to graduate. US training teams in El Salva-
dor and orograms outside the country will provide the
bulk of combat preparation for Salvadoran forces,
although government training efforts are likely to
increase somewhat utilizing the training center in La
Union. According to a US attache report, service
tours might be extended beyond two years in 1984 as
draft laws are revised following approval of the new
Salvadoran Constitution. Much of the current mili-
tary aid appropriation is likely to be spent on ammu-
nition, according to military assistance personnel.
although orders for communications gear, artillery,
and trucks have been processed. Plans to upgrade
tactical intelligence and further improve medical care
are also under consideration.
In our view, weaknesses in the Salvadoran system�as
well as enemy strengths�are likely to continue to
reduce the potential impact of force improvements,
however. On the basis of performance to date, we
expect leadership attitudes to continue to evolve dur-
ing the coming year, but only slowly and unevenly.
The strengthening of the command and control appa-
ratus how under way is likely to contribute gradually
to more efficient resource management and raise
officer morale. We expect expanded military staffs at
all levels to become increasingly familiar with the use
of tactical intelligence. although El Salvador will
continue to rely heavily on the United States for
intelligence collection and evaluation.
7
--"Serse.L.
Manpower expansion and the establishment of new
units will improve the combat potential of the armed
forces by providing additional troops for offensive
operations, beyond static defense requirements. We
believe, however, that the needs of the new troops will
continue to strain available training programs, result-
ing in the fielding of units poorly prepared for combat.
a substantial casualty rate, and further loss of weap-
ons and supplies to the enemy. Because of economic
constraints, operational priorities, and national sensi-
tivities, San Salvador,
may also cut back on its use of the cgiona itary
Training Center in Honduras in 1984. The next influx
of junior officers will provide expanded lower echelon
leadership, encouraging small-unit operations, but
persistent officer shortages at company and field
grade levels will weaken management of the expanded
force.
Furthermore, even if forces grow at projected rates,
the size of the military is not expected to dramatically
outstrip the size of opposing forces. So far, the
Salvadoran military with its ratio of only 4:1 has done
well to hold its own in the field considering the very
heavy manpower commitments that are required in
counterinsurgent struggles to search out an elusive
enemy. Government forces have benefited somewhat
from force multipliers�such as better mobility and
firepower than guerrilla forces�to achieve some suc-
cesses beyond what their numbers alone would pro-
vide.
Assuming no dramatic change in insurgent capabili-
ties, improvements in mobility and weaponry during
the coming year will strengthen the government's
ability to maintain military pressure on the insur-
gents. The armed forces will be able to make immedi-
ate use of the trucks on order and could benefit from
some additional helicopters of types already in use.
However, any potential offer of large numbers of
helicopters, even if they are of a type already in the
Salvadoran inventory, or of additional items, such as
C-47s converted to gunships or Chinook heavy-lift
helicopters, would face absorption problems, we
judge. The substantial leadtimes for pilot, crew, and
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-Veer.<
mechanic training and the development of tactical
expertise would limit battlefield impact during 1984,
in our view, if the systems were to be Salvadoran
manned.
The Salvadoran Government is trying to keep force
expansion plans in line with anticipated revenues, but
overall military development, we judge, is likely to
continue to suffer from serious budget constraints
which limit cupporting services. We expect financial
pressures to grow as the war intensifies, the payroll
increases, loans come due, and medical and death
benefits burgeon. Foreign economic aid will probably
continue to relieve some of El Salvador's fiscai pres-
sures, and military aid may contribute hardware and
training. Nevertheless, domestic revenues are unlikely
to increase substantially, and we see few encouraging
signs that the reluctant Salvadoran private sector is
increasing its support for the military effort.
Political factors may hold the key to the strategic
balance over the short term. The actions of the new
Duarte government will influence not only the level of
US aid but also the amount of attention Salvadoran
defense leaders will focus on the war effort. Contin-
ued signs that the military is comfortable in its new
relationship with civilian authority would permit the
High Command to concentrate more fully on prosecu-
tion of the war. In that event, the armed forces might
be able to hold their own for several years, providing
both the time and the incentive for force improvement
programs to take root and for leadership attitudes to
adjust to counterinsurgent realities. On the other
hand, if top defense leaders were to become preoccu-
pied with political events in San Salvador for an
extended period of time, their inability to direct and
coordinate combat actions would weaken the impact
of both force improvement efforts and any tactical
successes by local commanders
Implications for the United States
El Salvador's reliance on the United States for sup-
port in its military struggle against the insurgency has
grown dramatically over the past few years (see figure
3). By 1983. US military aid provided one-third of all
Salvadoran defense outlays. As the sole supplier of
ammunition�and with budget constraints preventing
El Salvador from either stockpiling or diversifying
through commercial channels�US actions exert con-
siderable influence over the government's ability to
"Steceet�_
Figure 3
Growth of US Military Assistance to
El Salvador, 1980-83
N1111100 t S
2:5
Sc)
55
50
45
40
35
25
I 5
30228, 6-41
83
ironing
Weapon, .01LI
ennimuntcations
�ar
Air lice old Nit
equipment
Ground trAnspor1.1�
.1011 susidining
.tipporl
NIuntlions And
other e�pend.thle�
keep troops in the field. Furthermore, El Salvador
receives a substantial portion of its military intelli-
gence, strategic and tactical advice, counterinsur-
gency training, and general military supplies from US
sources. The Salvadorans' anxiety about the fragility
of this relationship has caused a decrease in combat
operations during US Congressional aid debates. Ac-
cording to US ficld reporting, concern about a poten-
tial aid cutoff strongly influences the political, as well
as military, decision making of the Salvadoran de-
fense leadership.
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Although US influence has increased, the application
of leverage to accelerate armed force development is
limited by a number of factors inherent in the Salva-
doran system. First, the quick fixes, such as reequip-
ping the Salvadoran Army and training elite units to
form a strategic reaction force, are already largely
accomplished. The areas that still require consider-
able change to meet the guerrilla threat, such as
leadership attitudes and institutional procedures, are
those aspects that have shown little development until
recently. Progress in the future, therefore, is likely to
be both slower and less quantifiable, with accompany-
ing difficulties of evaluating and readjusting pro-
grams on a timely basis.
Historically slow patterns of institutional change are
complicated at times by resistance to US influence.
The Salvadoran military leadership has tried to hold
the United States at arm's length during the past
several years, resisting, for example, for more than six
months US importuning to replace ad hoc military
actions with a comprehensive strategy for winning the
war. Top leaders similarly avoided taking a public
stand on human rights abuses until Vice President
Bush's visit in December 1983 made it impossible to
ignore the issue. As US efforts begin to concentrate
more on remolding the character of the military
system rather than technical modernization of the
armed forces, we believe Salvadoran national sensitiv-
;ti, cirply to be increasingly irritated. Moreover,
in our view, the end product inevitably will be a
hybrid approach to the counterinsurgent struggle: a
modification of the US tactical model, toward larger
somewhat less mobile units, to fit the Salvadoran
outlook.
Increasingly strong foreign pressures for change,
when added to the considerable domestic tensions
from open warfare and political instability, run the
danger of further skewing the pattern of Salvadoran
military development. Over the past few years, sectors
of the military system and individual leaders able to
adapt quickly to the counterinsurgent threat have
performed dramatically on the battlefield, while those
less able to adapt have lagged. This disparity in rates
of progress has tended to undercut the impact of the
many improvements made. According to attache re-
porting, commanders willing to employ US-inspired
small-scale aggressive patrols at night, for example,
9
have found it difficult to coordinate operations with
nearby forces reluctant to move out of garrisons in
less than company-size units even in daytime. If an
idea surfaced to turn the IR battalions into advanced
air assault units, for example, such a move would not
reap maximum benefit if elite units were unable to
mesh their actions with local forces in the area of
operation.
We believe that US pressure to accelerate force
development can, if not carefully orchestrated, strain
El Salvador's capacity to absorb both technology and
force-management ideas, and nurture a counterpro-
ductive dependence on the United States. It is widely
acknowledged by US observers that the Salvadoran
military already has not been able to make optimum
use of the voluminous technical intelligence made
available over the past two years. Use of secure
communications systems has similarly been shackled
by the low level of technical expertise and lack of
security consciousness among Salvadoran troops. Giv-
en present limits on US advisory presence, we judge
that the Salvadorans would have considerable diffi-
culty in making use of greatly expanded or more
sophisticated assistance than they have received in
recent years. Moreover, any significant increase in US
advisory presence could leave officers with a feeling
they were not in control of their own military situation
and weaken the resolve of the armed forces High
Command.
These problems suggest that Salvadoran military
leaders will be capable of only incremental progress
and partial success in molding the armed forces into a
more effective counterinsurgency force. Emergence of
a tough, independently capable modern military is, in
our view, many years away. Efforts to push force
development even more rapidly than presently
planned could prove counterproductive, undermining
the traditional military system before new approaches
can become accepted and take root. By the same
token, sustaining at least presently planned US sup-
port is essential to El Salvador's holding the insur-
gents at bay until political, economic, and social
changes can better contribute to turning the tide.
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Appendix
Development of a
Counterinsurgency Force
The mediocre performance or government forces in
1981 plus new developments in early 1982�the de-
struction of much of the Air Force during a January
raid and the heavy security requirements for the
March Constituent Assembly elections�led to re-
quests for substantially increased US assistance. To
improve battlefield performance, programs were un-
dertaken to substantially upgrade the size, training,
equipment, support systems, intelligence capability,
and combat planning of the Salvadoran forces
Force Size
Since 1979, El Salvador has more than tripled its
armed forces�that is, the military services and public
security forces--to 39,800, adding strategic reserve
units to respond and reinforce when local forces
engage the enemy (see table I I. New resources have
gone into creating five 1,000-man Immediate Reac-
tion Units: the Atlacatl. Belloso, Atonal, Arce, and
Bracamonte Battalions. Airborne, long-range recon-
naissance and naval commando units also have been
added. Although a large proportion of the augmented
force is still being used for static defense, we judge
that more than 15,000 additional troo s should be
available for offensive operations.
Reerritmeat. The government appears to have had
little trouble finding recruits to meet manpower goals
to date. Because El Salvador is the most densely
populated country in Central America and because
the current economic downturn has swollen the ranks
of the unemployed, sufficient youths have usually
registered with local garrisons to meet the thrice-
yearly induction quotas. According to the Constitu-
tion, a military tour is compulsory for all men from 18
to 30 years old. In practice, however, according to
attache reporting, deferrals for students and corrup-
tion in the system have spared sons of the middle and
upper classes from serving, contributing to rumblings
of discontent about the inequitable burden of the war.
There have been some roundups
and forced conscription, most recently in the north-
east, but we do not believe such abuses are wide-
spread.
Each of the 14 departmental commanders in El Salvador uses his
own system to keep personnel records, making countrywide analysis
difficult
ii
.."3"evtegL
El Salvador's manpower needs are relatively high
each year not only because of force expansion, but
also because of rapid turnover among enlisted person-
nel. According to a variety of Defense Department
sources, as a result of the government's political
reluctance to declare national mobilization and arbi-
trarily extend all military tours, the majority of
recruits still leave the regular Army after only two
years, although some then join public security units.'
A program of salary incentives announced in March
1983 has encouraged some senior enlisted personnel to
stay on. according to attache reports, but the funds
have not stretched far enough to benefit most first
timers. In the absence of a strong national incentive
program, reenlistment varies greatly depending on
unit leadership and morale. The US defense attache
reports, for example, that the Belloso Battalion was
able to sign up 60 percent of its troops for another
tour, while nearby units in San Vicente retained only
a handful of eligibles. A high casualty rate also
contributes to recruitment pressures (see table 4).
Effects of Buildup. So far, military force expansion
has not had a commensurate effect on the conduct of
the counterinsurgency, in part because the number of
armed guerrillas has also risen in recent years so that
the government manpower advantage actually de-
creased from 5:1 in 1981 to 4:1 in 1983.' Although the
expanded size of the force permits the government to
conduct large operations in several areas simulta-
neously, the guerrillas' ability to strike throughout the
country on their own timetable often has kept the
armed forces off balance. Due to insufficient mobility,
strategic reserve units have not always been able to
react on short notice. Although definite improvement
has occurred in recent months, in our view, maximum
use is still not being made of local troops, in large part
As a result of CS pressure, service obligations were modestly
' increased to two years in early 1983. For a discussion of the sire. organization, and strategy of the
guerrilla fumes see the Special National Intelligence Estimate
83.1-243 December 1983. Near-
Term Military Prospects for El Salvador.'
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Secret
Table 1
El Salvador: Force Expansion
Military Services
Public Security Forces
Defense
Establishment
Total
Army
Navy
Air Force
Subtotal
National
Guard
National
Police
Treasury
Police
Subtotal
Mid-I979
7.126
80
154
7,360
2,750
1,500
1.100
5,350
12,710
Mid-198I
9.170
351
178
9,699
3.462
2,833
1.320
7,615
17,314
Mid-I983
22.456
385
436
23,277
3.392
3.584
1.786
8.762
32,039
Januar)
27,300
500
500
28,300
4,200
5.500
1.800
11.500
39,800
1984
This table
because the reorientation of Salvadoran military
thinking from traditional static defense concepts to
mobile offensive warfare is taking longer than efforts
to restructure the Army into smaller combat units.
Growth of the armed forces has also proceeded faster
than the development of supporting services. The
government has found it more difficult to come up
with housing. food, pay, and personal equipment for
the rapidly expanding force than to sign up recruits.
Such support costs have placed an enormous burden
on already strained government resources. US mili-
tary advisers, for example, report that the Salvadoran
Government encountered serious difficulties meeting
its 1983 military payroll. Foreign economic aid has
relieved some of El Salvador's fiscal pressures and
military aid can provide hardware and training, but
the United States is legally prevented from offering
direct budget support
Troop Quality
US Training Program. The Salvadoran Army, Air
Force, and Navy have received substantial training
assistance, mainly from the United States, in recent
years. At the outset. the United States faced the
daunting task of converting El Salvador's standing
conventional army, with little field experience, into an
active counterinsurgency force. Force expansion, rap-
id turnover in personnel, and the fielding of new
equipment systems subsequently added to training
Secret
tic
���
,
requirements. Despite limited funds and rigid person-
nel quotas, US trainers had taught critical skills to
about 14,000 officers and troops by early 1984 (see
tables 2 and 3). US efforts were supplemented by a
15-man Venezuelan team that trained two light bat-
talions in 1982 and by others, such as Argentina, that
offered special courses in their own countries to small
groups.
In specific areas, enhanced training has made a
dramatic improvement in the capabilities of the Sal-
vadoran armed forces. The IR battalions and the
reconnaissance teams trained in Panama have earned
considerable respect from the guerrillas,
Upgrading of the Air Force
has also brought that service fully into the counterin-
surgency effort. On the other hand, the performance
of some of the light battalions, even those trained by
the United States, has been disappointing, often as a
result of weak leadership and the low level of skills
acquired during training.'
The overall impact of US training is limited, having
reached only about 25 percent of the standing force.
Of the approximately 14,000 US-trained personnel,
we estimate that only 7,000�out of a total Army,
� In an effort to correct these weaknesses, training for the light
battalions was increased from five to eight weeks in early 1984.
12
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Table 2
US Training Programs in El Salvador
1981 1982 1983
Number of 23 63 94
training
teams
Focus of Command and
activity control control
Intelligence Small-unit
tactics
This table is
Command and
Small-unit Logistics
tactics
Aircraft and Pilot standard- Humanitarian/
small boat ization medical training
maintenance
Combat Aircraft main- Naval training
support tenance
Command and
control
Battalion
upgrade
Logistics
Navy, and Air Force strength of 28,300�are still on
active duty,rn although some have joined public securi-
ty units after release. In addition, individuals who
receive technical training often have rejoined units
unable or disinclined to take advantage of the new
skills. Even units that train together spend only a
relatively short period under US supervision, not
enough time to guarantee results. Furthermore, the
public security forces, which constitute more than
one-fourth of the Salvadoran defer ie establishment
and play a significant combat role, receive no assist-
ance because of US aid restrictions.
Salvadoran Training Role. Salvadoran leaders have
not always been fully supportive of US training
programs. The High Command has pulled units out of
training for combat operations,
and is unenthusiastic about out-of-country
programs because of their high price and inconve-
nience, despite the advantages of uninterrupted train-
ing. US trainers also report only slow progress in
getting leaders to train alongside their troops; in some
cases officer reluctance has reflected sensitivity over
'These figures are based on the best estimate of military assistance
personnel in 1983 that 50 percent of US-trained troops remained on
active duty.
13
Table 3
Number of Salvadorans Trained
by the United States a
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Subtotal
208
1.480
5.789
6,439
8.369
El Salvador 0
1,274
3.752
3.235
4.000
In Panama 0
208
195
598
1.141
1.774
In Honduras 0
0
0
0
1,550
1.550
In United 0
tin a
11
1,439
513
45
States
Total 1979-83: 13,916
� Although these figures are the best estimates
they should be used only as a general guideline. A lack of
comprehensive recordkceping, the wide geographic distribution of
training sites, and possible double-counting prevent completely
accurate accounting.
b Proposed training.
No figures are available on the number trained. Since only two
survey teams and three small training seams deployed in 1980, it
can be assumed that the number was quite small.
Data not available.
This table is
accepting training from US noncommissioned person-
nel. In addition, some courses have been shortened
because of training backlogs and operational needs.
The Arce IR battalion, for example, received only six
weeks of training in mid-1983�in contrast to the
Belloso's scheduled 18 weeks in mid-I982�in order
to have it return from Honduras in time for the then
expected fall elections.
Salvadoran training efforts, moreover, have not com-
plemented US programs. The government has
dragged its feet, in our view, on the steps needed to
reestablish a comprehensive national training system
after the original training structure was dismantled to
provide additional combat personnel. Some military
schools, such as the Command and General Staff
School and the Aviation School, have reappeared, but
primarily due to US prodding. According to US
military sources, Army basic training largely remains
decentralized at the department level, where, depend-
ing on the approach of the local commander, recruits
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sometimes receive only a few weeks of on-the-job
training before being sent into combat. US teams.
expecting to upgrade experienced units, often end up
providing basic wea ns familiarization and drill in-
struction to novices.
Government promises to establish a national military
training center are only now yielding results. At the
end of 1983, the Minister of Defense began to staff a
training center at a facility used by US advisers in La
Union. It has initially focused on refresher courses for
units as well as some basic training for recruits, but it
will be some time before the center is operating fully.
Salvadoran trainers work alongside most US teams,
and the military has shown some initiative in fielding
two of its own mobile training teams to help with the
conversion of local units to light battalions, but the
overall Salvadoran training program is small and
poorly organized.
Loyalty and Morale. Overall armed forces loyalty is
not seriously in question and the government contin-
ues to be able to put soldiers in the field. Few troops
have gone over to the enemy and some units have
shown outstanding professionalism and bravery. De-
sertion rates ran I to 2 percent in the second quarter
of 1983, which is not considered unusual under
combat conditions, according to attache reporting.
Although losses from ordinary units arc probably
greater than from IR battalions, desertion does not
appear to be a real problem. So far, troop dissatisfac-
tion remains a local issue, we judge. rather than one
of national dimension.
Nonetheless
some troops fleeing in disorder, surrendering easily,
changing to civilian clothes to escape detection, exag-
gerating the size of opposing forces to avoid follow-on
operations, and refusing to go into battle until condi-
tions�including leadership changes�are met. The
US defense attache has reported that two companies
were ejected from the service for insubordination in
Morazan in early 1983 and that the Pipit Battalion
was returned to garrison for poor discipline in Sep-
tember. Slackness and lack of training also contribut-
ed to military disasters at the El Paraiso garrison and
the Cuscatlan Bridge in late December 1983.
a Salvadoran
"troop motivation unit" is constantly on the road
preparing recruits for combat and remedying cases of
poor morale.
Table 4
Armed Forces Casualties
1981
1982
1983
Casualties (killed
and wounded)
3.000
3.500
3.200
Military strength
17.314
28.350
32.039
Midyear,
Percent of forces
killed or wounded
17
12
10
rt We have used Salvadoran Government casualt) statistics for the
sake of continuity. and have rounded them to indicate the general
lack of precision in casualty reporting front El Salvador. Wc
believe, however, that these figures underestimate actual casualties
so that an even greater percentage of the standing force is probabb
lost each year than the table indicates. Al the other end of the
spectrum, the insurgents claim to have inflicted 6.785 casualties
during 1983 and captured almost 2,000 in addition.
This table is
Casualties. A consistently high casualty rate among
government forces has affected troop morale in some
cases. although the
availability of replacements has minimized the impact
of losses forcewide. The government has suffered
heavy casualties each year. with about three-fourths
of these losses occurring in the regular forces and the
remainder in public security units (see table 4).
Government losses remain striking, despite the declin-
ing proportion of forces affected. Casualties remove a
much larger proportion of troops each year than
would be considered acceptable by Western military
strategists. Such high losses result from the large
number of raw recruits in combat and the dismal state
of medical care. According to a US medical team's
evaluation in 1983, one-third of all wounded soldiers
eventually died�in comparison to one in 10 for the
United States in Vietnam�because of poor field
attention and inadequate medical transportation. US
success in training several hundred medics was not
accompanied by increased helicopter and ambulance
medevac support until mid-I984. Furthermore, many
Salvadoran officers continue to consider medics as
infantry troops first, and limit the medical supplies a
medic can carry.
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(b)(3)
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Leadership
Size and Distribution of Officer Corps. The Salva-
doran officer corps was caught short at the onset of
hostilities but has grown rapidly in its effort to match
force expansion and meet the leadership demands of
small-unit counterinsurgency warfare. Because of the
urgency of the war, El Salvador graduated early a
relatively large military academy class of 85 cadets in
August 1981, enrolled an unprecedented class of 450
cadets in October 1981, and commissioned the next
senior class two and a half years early in February
1982. Two groups of about 450 officer candidates
each underwent two to four months of intensive
training at Fort Benning, in spring 1982 and mid-
1983, receiving a rank of cadet, below that of second
lieutenant, upon completion. Owing to these pro-
grams, more junior officers entered the Salvadoran
armed forces from 1980 to the end of 1983 than had
previously graduated from the military academy since
its founding in the 1930s, according to attache report-
ing
Despite some growing pains, including initial reluc-
tance of senior officers to entrust raw cadets with
combat reponsibili ties and a high attrition rate among
new officers," US military observers consider that the
critical shortages at the junior ranks have now been
eased.
The infusion of junior officers, however, was not
accompanied by increases in experienced officers at
the field and company grade level. Reformist ele-
ments in the junta forced the retirement of some
senior officers in 1979, and a knowledgeable US
military observer estimated in late 1983 that the
Salvadoran armed forces were still short at least 50
majors and 250 captains. Few units have full comple-
ments of officers.
Despite considerable US pressure, the High Com-
mand has resisted filling out middle and upper ranks
through accelerated promotions. The traditional
peacetime promotion policy based on time in grade
and schooling has not given way to a wartime system
" In late 1983.
15 percent of the first Fort Benning class was no
longer on active duty, although only 4 percent of the second class
had left the service.
15
Table 5
Size and Distribution
of the Officer Corps
1978,
1983 -
Total
561
1.697
Generals
3
Colonels
99
SI
Lieutenant colonels
58
82
Majors
56
144
Captains
113
5?
1st lieutenants
104
153
2nd lieutenants
125
5(12
Cadets
()
739
�Considered representative of the traditional officer structure.
Yearend figures.
This table i
based on combat performance, despite the Minister of
Defense's acknowledgment of the need for change and
the availability of several outstanding candidates. The
recent accessions of a combat-seasoned major to
acting command of the Atlacatl Battalion and a
lieutenant colonel to a full brigade/zone command,
however, suggest that some evolution may be occur-
ring in the system, although neither has been promot-
ed to the rank commensurate with his new command.
The military also is reluctant to move seasoned enlist-
ed personnel into leadership positions. reflecting a
strong cultural bias. The existing noncommissioned
officers' course has been upgraded to include six
weeks of US training in Panama, but still turns out
only about 30 NCOs twice a year. Even though the
United States put Salvadoran NCOs in charge of the
new, highly trained, long-range reconnaissance pa-
trols, this practice was not adopted elsewhere in the
Salvadoran forces. In early 1984, a large group of
sergeants received lieutenant's bars, but it is too soon
to tell how efficiently they will be used.
�Seers-
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Readiness. Problems of absentee leadership and lax
prosecution of the war have not afflicted the best units
but are all too characteristic of the many units whose
leaders have not yet received US training or have not
taken the teachings to hcart. Acknowledging the poor
state of readiness, Defense Minister Vides issued new
standing orders in September 1983,
specifying that a com-
manding officer or deputy be on duty at all times, 75
percent of each unit be kept on alert, operations be
conducted around the clock with emphasis on night-
time patrolling, and detailed monthly reports be sub-
mitted to show compliance. Despite the efforts of top
leadership, many units continued to ignore regula-
tions. The reassignment
in early 1984 of a few commanders whose units were
caught unaware by the enemy is providing some
previous lacking incentive to improve readiness, but
punishments for officers remain mild.
Command Changes. The Salvadoran High Command
is paying greater attention to the war effort than two
years ago. The January 1983 mutiny of Lieutenant
Colonel Ochoa in Cabanas Department brought offi-
cer dissatisfaction with the management of the war to
a head and eventually forced the resignation of De-
fense Minister Garcia. His replacement, General
Vides, assumed a more active personal role in the
conduct of the war, visited units in the field, tried to
promote aggressive small-unit tactics, and began to
implement a new "national strategy" for defeating the
guerrillas.
The Defense Minister moved more cautiously in
making critically needed personnel changes, however.
Anxious to avoid political fallout that might jeopar-
dize his own position, factionalize the military, or
endanger continued US aid, Vides followed tradition
and established a commission in October to thresh out
military problems. By November, battlefield revers.!s
throughout the country, increasing consensus within
the military, and strong pressure from the United
States finally propelled him into announcing major
leadership changes
The shakeup provided a dramatic opportunity to
strengthen the traditionally unresponsive General
Staff. Defense Minister Vides brought in the First
Brigade commander Colonel Blandon as Chief of
Staff and Lieutenant Colonel Mendez from the Bel-
loso Battalion as Chief of Operations and shifted 80
percent of staff personnel, according to US attache
reporting. The outstanding reputation of this new
team among combat commanders presaged an in-
crease in the command and control authority exer-
cised by the General Statf. Early changes included
round-the-clock staffing, formal investigation of re-
cent combat losses, the addition of Air Force and
artillery representatives to planning sessions, and
more cordial liaison with US advisers. Nonetheless,
reining in traditionally independent local commanders
and setting priorities for operational support on a
countrywide basis will not be accomplished quickly.
Vides's moves were also designed, we believe, to
revitalize battlefield performance. He changed com-
manders of at least 10 major combat units�including
three of the four US-trained IR battalions�removing
some deadwood, relieving several battle-weary com-
manders, putting a top officer in charge of the
beleaguered easternmost departments, and exposing a
new group of officers to more senior posts. Although
the new lineup represented the first command shifts in
a long time for most of the units, the changes .,ct back
operations for only a short time while the new officers
settled in. In a followup move at the end of 1983, the
corrupt commander of the Navy was finally ousted.
Repatartinn. Even !to. the military is making only slow
progress in improving its dismal public image, al-
though human rights abuses appear to be declining.
according to the US Embassy. US investigators found
creditable the claims of local villagers that govern-
ment soldiers had murdered about two dozen youths
in 1.1sulutan at the end of November 1983. An officer
responsible for an earlier massacre in Sonsonate was
removed but not brought to trial. Few commanders
ha'e chosen to follow the example of Lieutenant
Colonel Ochoa, who established a successful commu-
nity relations program in Cabanas in 1982. Defense
leaders have endorsed socioeconomic reforms, estab-
lished codes of conduct, tried to keep Air Force
bombing away from civilian areas, promoted civic
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action projects, and provided progovernment media
exposure. Lack of full endorsement of these measures
by some local commanders, however, has weakened
their impact. The transfer of a few of the more
notorious rightwing officers at the end of November
from national staff slots to active field units may have
removed the individuals from the limelight but did not
remove them from positions of responsibility. Only
threc were exiled at that time. President Duarte.
however, has recently designated three additional
officers to leave for overseas posts.
Military Equipment
El Salvador has revamped its equipment inventories
over the past few years, taking advantage of US
military aid to begin to standardize weapons through-
out the regular forces and purchase new items geared
for the counterinsurgency threat (see table 6). Defense
leaders maintain contacts with other military suppli-
ers, such as Israel. Taiwan, Chile, and Argentina, but
no country besides the United States has come forth
with substantial aid or long-term credit arrangements.
Weapons. Ground troops now have M-I6 assault
rifles. M-60 machineguns, 90-mm shoulder-fired re-
coilless rifles, and 60-mm and 8I-mm mortars, replac-
ing an assortment of European-manufactured and
older US weapons that were turned over to the public
security forces. The transition for existing units was
largely completed during 1983. while each new light
battalion will receive about $600,000 worth of weap-
ons and equipment as it is formed. San Salvador also
substantially upgraded its field artillery with light-
weight M102 105-mm howitzers in the fall of 1983
and put some of the new weapons in the field before
the end of the year. By May 1984, 24 howitzers had
been received.
The armed forces have been able to put new weapons
into use rapidly because the weapons are not techni-
cally complex and because training packages have
accompanied procurement. However, according to US
military reports, field inspections show that weapons
are not always well maintained because of training
deficiencies and shortages of cleaning kits. Lack of
trained forward observers also often limits the useful
range of support weapons. Furthermore, Salvadoran
17
----Steaets
Table 6
Distribution of US Military
Assistance to El Salvador
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total assistance
5.9
35.5
80.0
81.0
Distribution of aid by
category . (percent)
Total
100
100
100
1011
Training
0
3
13
10
Weapons (including
small arms and artillery)
. .
1
5
14
16
Communications gear
18
.2
5
6
Aircraft and aircraft
supplies ..
0
20
28
Boats and naval supplies
0
3
I
4
Ground mobility
65
13
5
1
Sustaining support
(including fuel storage
and generators)
13
9
4
19
Munitions
1
33
. 21
30
Other expendables
(including medical supplies
and clothing)
2
9
4
7
Miscellaneous
0
4
6
0
4 Because of rounding. components ma) not add to totals shown.
This table is
units have lost substantial numbers of weapons to
enemy actions. Cumulative losses since early 1982
could have equipped more than three additional full-
size IR battalions." The Intelligence Community
estimates that a significant proportion of the enemy's
weapons and ammunition needs arc met throu h the
capture of government supplies."
" According to both Salvadoran Government and PAIN statistics.
about 600 weapons of all kinds fell into erica* hands in 1983
alone.
� For further discussion of arms flows to the guerrillas, see the
Special National Intelligence Estimate 83.1-2-83
December 1983 Near-Term Military Prospects for
El Salvador.
�Seeret�
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Communications. Salvadoran military communica-
tions have shown considerable improvement as a
result of US attention. PRC-77 tactical radios now
form the basis of a forcewidc mobile network, provid-
ing communications capability between commanders
and companies in the field, contact with aircraft
flying in support of ground operations, and some
interface between public security forces and regular
units. Secure telephone, teletype, and radio systems
connect field headquarters with the High Command.
US military officials acknowledge that the armed
forces are still short of PRC-77 sets, but the purchase
of 1,000 radios for delivery in spring 1984 should go a
long way toward solving tactical communications
problems. Too few communications specialists, bat-
tery problems, and a general lack of understanding of
communications skills, however, continue to result in
inefficient use of upgraded equipment
Poor radio discipline, for example,
regularly reveals Army movements to the enemy,
and loss of substantial
numbers of PRC-77 sets has facilitated guerrilla
interference in government communications. In recog-
nition of serious shortcomings, a new General Staff
Department was set up in January 1984 to try to
improve communications performance.
Aircraft and Air Force Supplies. Delivery of more
than two dozen US planes and helicopters in 1982 to
supplement an aging fleet of Israeli-supplied French
planes and replace losses from the llopango raid in
January brought a strong new dimension to the
government's war effort. The Air Force was able to
fly combat runs shortly after the planes arrived and
has lost only one jet fighter and three helicopters
during operations since. Although we do not have
Air Force personnel have turned in an excellent
performance. however, given extremely limited re-
sources. The 15 UH-1H helicopter pilots, less than
half the number El Salvador should have for available
helicopters, bear the brunt of air operations, often
flying 75 hours in seven days, the US attache reports.
The tremendous demand for the use of limited air-
craft to resupply ammunition and food to troops in the
field has meant that other priority missions such as
troop insertion and medevac suffer.
Boats and Navy Supplies. The Salvadoran Navy has
shown the least operational improvement of the serv-
ice branches. The Navy's six new 21-foot patrol
boats--bringing its total inventory to about 26 small
craft�are complicated to maintain, have high fuel
consumption, and are overpowered for Salvadoran
needs, according to a US naval observer. Despite the
establishment of a small naval commando unit
equipped with eight Zodiac inflatable boats, the Navy
has rarely deployed the unit on reconnaissance opera-
tions. Outside interests, including smuggling. rakeoffs
from local fishermen, and the collection of harbor
taxes, have distracted the Navy's attention from the
war. Although El Salvador has participated in occa-
sional maneuvers with Honduras. patrolling of the
Gulf of Fonseca has generally been inadequateLlll
Patrol
activity has increased somewhat in recent months,
however, since the replacement of the naval com-
mander.
Munitions and Expendables. US ammunition deliver-
ies are critical to keeping Salvadoran forces in the
field. Defense Minister Vides acknowledged El Salva-
dor's dependence in this area when
statistics on bombing accuracy,
Air Force operations have
caused concern within the FMLN. Combat com-
manders regularly call for air support, relying on
small Cessna 0-2s for target identification in advame
of air or artillery strikes; A-37 jets for bombing or
strafing; Hughes 500 helicopters with long loiter time
for saturating minigun fire; or UH-1H helicopters for
inserting reconnaissance teams, providing light fire
support, delivering supplies to the field, and evacuat-
ing wounded, response
is sometimes slow due to command and control confu-
sions, limited nighttime and poor weather flying
capability, and competing missions.
troops could not fight three months without US
munitions support. With no military industries and no
alternative foreign sources of supply, the government
has had to use about 30 percent of US military aid in
recent years for ordnance to keep the war going.
Even so, ammunition shortages affecting the level of
combat have occurred from time to time.
shortages have occurred because
of aid ceilings, the difficulty of ordering in advance
18
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(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) (b)(1)
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and stockpiling under the irregular appropriations
timetable, and fluctuations in Salvadoran tactical
activity and fire discipline that have made forecasting
difficult. El Salvador required an emergency ship-
ment of 5.56-mm ammunition at the end of 1983, for
example, after the government's summer offensive
and the fall guerrilla resurgence depleted stocks more
rapidly than expected
Even when stocks arc on hand, worry about future
availability�especially during US Congressional de-
bates over aid legislation�has caused Salvadoran
commanders to hoard supplies and reduce operations,
according to the US Embassy. The high proportion of
aid funds going for munitions has reduced El Salva-
dor's ability to make longer term investments in
military hardware and training. The growing need for
spare parts as new equipment ages has also begun to
increase the pressure to use more aid funds for short-
term expendables.
Transportation. Guerrilla attacks against El Salva-
dor's transport facilities continue to hinder govern-
ment efforts to move supplies overland. The insur-
gents have hit El Salvador's bridges more than 60
times, blowing up the two major spans over the
Lempa River and destroying or damaging numerous
others. Highways and rail lines are vulnerable to
interdiction. Only eight locomotives are still opera-
tional out of 28 in January 1980 because of attacks
and derailments. The guerrillas have been able to
control stretches of major highways, ambushing mili-
tary convoys, holding up and destroying civilian buses
and trucks, and taxing local residents to demonstrate
political strength. Almost all supplies are still moved
on the ground, and the government has been forced to
divert considerable resources to repair routes, install
bailey bridges, and tighten security for convoys. In
addition, the military has improved security at most
major bridges to deter insurgent attacks.
The government does not fully use its air transport
capacity. El Salvador has about 30 transport aircraft,
most of which can land on short, unimproved airstrips,
but the US attache reports that these aircraft are
underutilized because of pilot shortages, slow mainte-
nance, and poor scheduling. The government has not
tapped the almost 20 commercial pilots who are
19
"VrewaL,
available to fly part-time and could relieve the over-
burdened Air Force pilots of some of their noncombat
missions. So far, air delivery has remained relatively
safe, although the mining of a runway at San Miguel
in early 1984 may presage an increase in this kind ol
harassment.
Supply System. El Salvador's supply management
system is only slowly adjusting to wartime needs. US
advisers report progress in familiarizing Salvadoran
staff officers with complex procurement procedures,
but acknowledge little headway in making the tradi-
tional supply-driven system responsive to local combat
demands. The logistic staff often has withheld sup-
plies from the field to hedge against a feared decline
in US aid, according to US military observers. Rou-
tine deliveries are made in equal shares to all major
commands, both to avoid offending politically power-
ful local commanders and to compensate for the
absence of rational inventory and requisition proce-
dures. .he central
staffs reluctance to set priorities and concentrate
resources has led to severe frustration on the part of
combat commanders in the most contested areas,
although improvements are gradually occurring.
Tight central control of supplies clashes with decen-
tralized operational planning. The logistic staff is
reluctant to lose leverage over local commanders by
stockpiling supplies in forward areas and requires that
each request for logistic support be processed through
the national bureaucracy. The system has encouraged
misreporting of needs in order for commanders to
hoard supplies for planned operations. Even with such
informal stockpiling, combat campaigns have been cut
short when supplies ran out. The improved ability of
some units to sustain operations last summer�some
stayed in the field longer than a month�reflected the
resourcefulness of individual local commanders more
than changes in the system, according to knowledge-
able US observers
So far, the government's war effort has failed to
stimulate the development of domestic military indus-
tries or encourage the private sector to adjust for the
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struggle. Although capital is in short supply, the
continuing absence of ammunition plants seems to us
a lamentable production weakness. In addition, de-
spite the need for relatively cheap prepackaged com-
bat rations, negotiations with private Salvadoran
firms have repeatedly foundered. Combat command-
ers still have to purchase large quantities of food
through commercial channels�often compromising
operational security�and deliver bulky items to the
field despite poor transport. Furthermore, lack of
uniforms and other nonweapon items that are too
expensive to import has limited the number of recruits
local commanders can induct and has caused morale
problems, the US defense attache reports.
Maintenance. The military's equipment maintenance
system, traditionally characterized by ad hoc repairs
and extensive cannibalization, has improved in those
sectors receiving US assistance. Standardization of
weapons and equipment in general has facilitated the
development of stocks of spare parts at central depots,
we believe, although many shortages still exist. Atta-
che reporting suggests that aircraft and boat mainte-
nance is becoming adequate. Improved helicopter
maintenance has raised the operational readiness rate
for UH-1H helicopters from about 30 percent in 1982
to better than 50 percent at present, according to US
military reports. While the availability of only about
12 UH-1H helicopters out of 19 frustrates combat
planners, US military sources say that the rate is not
unreasonable considering the heavy combat use of the
aircraft.
The armed forces have made less progress in vehicle
maintenance and small arms repair. Having substitut-
ed new US weapons for older European models in the
regular forces, the country has a large number of
arms that could be reconditioned and issued to civil
defense units, according to US military assistance
personnel. Aid regulations limit US participation in
,this activity, however, and the Salvadoran Govern-
ment has shown little initiative. As a result, only a
small percentage of civil defense personnel�often the
first line of defense in outlying villages�are armed
with anything more than machetes.
Structure
Geographic Organization. El Salvador has geographi-
cal!) reshaped its military structure in recent years to
face the guerrilla threat. The government doubled the
""tstrni,_
number of military zones to six by 1982 (see figure 4).
In practice, however, control continued to rest with
the 14 department commanders, who preferred direct
links with the Ministry of Defense. The need to
coordinate multiunit operations against an increasing-
ly capable enemy led to experimentation with the
theater command concept in late 1982. Although
operationally sound, temporary commands continued
to founder on staff shortages and local jealousies over
the control of forces. In the November 1983 organiza-
tional shakeup. the High Command moved signifi-
cantly closer to aligning the formal Army structure
with operational realities by shifting the boundaries of
military zones to coincide roughly with enemy fronts.
The government has also increasingly concentrated
forces in the most contested areas. Initially, this was
accomplished by borrowing units from the less active
departments. Colonel Flores, then Commander of the
Third Brigade, expressed typical frustration with this
approach, however, when he complained to the US
defense attache in February 1982 that he could not
secure his own military zone around San Miguel while
his troops were off patrolling in lisulutan, guarding
the Cuseatian Bridge, relieving the town of Corinto in
Morazan, and regaining control of a highway in San
Vicente. The expansion of strategic reserve forces in
intervening years has enabled the government gener-
ally to focus deployments against guerrilla concentra-
tions without leaving less contested areas of the
country unprotected (see figure 1).
Shift to Light Battalions. In March 1983 the Defense
Minister announced plans for the conversion of local
garrison units to light battalions. Designed to stand-
ardize unit configuration, provide a structure for
further force expansion, and facilitate more aggres-
sive small-unit operations, the plan envisaged the
creation of 36 350-man battalions countrywide by the
end of this year. mainly by combining existing infan-
try companies and adding staffs and combat support
units. The light battalions were scheduled to alternate
static defense responsibilities with aggressive patrol-
ling.
20
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In thc wake of a series of guerrilla victories last fall. ;n
which several light battalions were mauled by the
insurgents, senior commanders in the east, proposed
that the 350-man battalion concept be scrapped in
favor of battalions having a strength of nearly 600
troops. They argued, according to attache reports,
that the lighter battalions were not strong enough or
well trained enough to engage in operations.
By mid-February, according to our attache. the Gen-
eral Staff had approved the reorganization of the light
battalions into counterinsurgency battalions of over
400 personnel augmented in many instances by a 170-
man combat support company. In the east, where the
fighting has been heaviest, the Army Commander is
reorganizing into 600-man battalions. The US Em-
bassy reported recently that the revamping was pro-
ceeding.
Command and Control. The clarification of command
relationships has barely kept pace with force develop-
ment. With new units added, more than 30 military
organizations became subordinate to the Armed
Forces Staff. This impossibly wide span of control
made the General Staff weak and ineffective in
managing the war effort. With strong encouragement
from US advisers, the Salvadoran chain of command
has been evolving toward a system of intermediate
levels of authority. In announcing the November
realignment of military zones, for example. General
Vides reminded subordinate units to report through
brigade channels at zone headquarters, according to
Embassy reporting. The development of local-force
battalions and gradual downgrading of command slots
because of officer shortages are diffusing the indepen-
dent power of local commanders, encouraging reli-
ance on the chain of command. The government has
also been parceling out helicopter and artillery sup-
port to regional commands on an informal basis.
although stopping short of formal reassignment.
Staffing at intermediate levels has also increased,
strengthening the ability of brigade headquarters to
act as two-way conduits for information between the
High Command and field units.
The new pattern, however, cannot yet be considered
an institutional norm. The elite IR battalions, for
example, continue to resist operational control by
21
local commanders. So far, a hierarchical chain of
command reportedly has taken firmest root in those
areas such as the 3rd Military Zone in the east where
the brigade commander has been able to exert author-
ity by the sheer force of his personality and profes-
sional reputation.
Interservice Coordination. Some continued operation-
al independence of the Air Force, Navy, and Public
Security forces also handicaps the war effort. Because
of the nature of the counterinsurgency struggle, the
Salvadoran Army has received the lion's share of US
assistance, increasing the disparity between that serv-
ice and other fighting elements. Air Force contribu-
tions to the war have increased dramatically, but
high-level planning coordination is still uneven. Ac-
cording to attache reports, requests for combat sup-
port in the past tended to come straight to the Air
Force from field commanders, often over commercial
telephone lines. With little direction from the General
Staff, Air Force duty officers made their own deci-
sions on mission priorities. Changes in General Staff
procedures are improving coordination. The Navy's
capabilities remain so poor that even when involved in
operational planning�such as during the Jucuaran
operations in September 1983--it has been unable to
close off the enemy's sea routes of escape.
The integration of the Air Force and Navy into the
planning process improved in November 1983 with
the inclusion of service representatives at meetings of
the General Staff. Neither the powerful chief of the
Air Force, Colonel Bustillo, nor a high-level naval
officer is part of the strengthened staff organization,
however, and improvement in day-to-day coordination
has been slow. Despite heavy involvement in the
urban and rural ground war, the Public Security
forces remain outside regular planning channels.
Shunted aside from the US assistance program, the
National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police
have neither consolidated their forces nor realigned
their organizational boundaries with Army theaters to
reinforce the national war effort.
�Seaga_
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Figure 4
Changing Military Zones and Headquarters
Guatemala
6
El Salvador
Sam Sal
(
MIldary Ion. boundary
Debaria,ento boundary
O 30 Kdornedars
O 30 Wes
_San Ali;ual
Honduras
*At a, a lwa
Guatemala
Sole
Ale
El Persil%
E .Salvador
3.. Sairad* 7 '
* I so. v
� �
Honduras
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Strategy and Tactics
Strategic Planning. El Salvador has had difficulty in
adopting and sticking with a comprehensive national
strategy for defeating the insurgents. Having never
fought a counterinsurgency, the government had no
established doctrine to guide its initial response. Some
outstanding individual officers demonstrated energy
and resourcefulness, but most resorted to strengthen-
ing local defensive positions and engaging in occasion-
al unsuccessful sweep operations, according to our
analysis. This piecemeal approach resulted in little
overall progress on the battlefield, and defense leaders
began to explore alternative strategies with VS advis-
ers by early 1983
23
The National Plan that emerged called for the con-
centration of resources to score decisive gains in one
area at a time, the use of aggressive small-unit tactics
to keep the enemy off balance, the integration of civic
action and economic restoration with the military
effort, and the expansion of civil defense forces to
consolidate combat gains. Implemented first in San
Vicente, a well-populated department in the center of
the country where guerrillas had successfully disrupt-
ed agricultural production, the National Plan began
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with great great acclaim in June 1983 and accelerated in
July as parallel but smaller operations were initiated
throughout the country. Despite much planning and
material support from the United States, however,
momentum sagged by fall. The experiment, in our
view, proved too ambitious for the well-meaning but
still inexperienced Salvadoran High Command. The
campaign finally moved on to Usulutan in January
1984, but largely without its economic reconstruction
and civil defense components
Tactical Coordination. In the absence of an overall
strategy, day-to-day operations are determined by a
constantly shifting mix of national directives and local
initiatives. The High Command controls the purse
strings, logistic support, and the flow of intelligence.
It also reviews battlefield plans and performance and
issues recommendations, but less often orders. In
September 1983, for example, defense leaders clari-
fied the procedures for use of close air support in
populated areas following civilian deaths in Tenan-
cingo, and a November directive reviewed the steps
for avoiding ambushes On the other hand, local
commanders determine the size, timing, targets, and
tactics for field operations. In a typical operation, for
example, Colonel Flores mounted a three-battalion
attack against guerrilla bases near Jucuaran in south-
ern Usulutan in August 1983 with no help from the
General Staff in either planning or execution, accord-
ing to US military observers.
The split in decisionmakin2 authority has hindered
combat effectiveness by encouraging local initiatives
while denying commanders the means of consolidat-
ing their gains. Tensions run high on both sides. The
High Command charges that field officers fail to
notify them of pending operations and then complain
when intelligence, logistic, and air and navy support
are not available on a timely basis. Combat com-
manders blame the Command for security leaks that
compromise operational plans, and negligence in de-
nying resources to rescue units under attack or to
sustain field actions.
Counterinsurgent Tactics. Over time the armed forces
have become more aggressive and more willing to
adopt small-unit tactics and occasional night opera-
tions. Nevertheless, at the tactical level, many officers
remain reluctant to fully employ such tactics. Colonel
Bustillo, the Air Force commander and one of the
country's most dedicated leaders, has berated fellow
officers for not understanding that the urgency of the
national struggle demands field operations 24 hours a
day, seven days a week. Although up to 70 percent of
Salvadoran forces remained in the field during the
summer of 1983, this
figure declined by fall. A large number ol units was
once again operating constantly in the spring of 1984,
however, to keep the guerrillas off balance during the
presidential elections
Various commanders have explained that shortages of
officers and troops and inadequate radios and helicop-
ters have made them reluctant to move out of garri-
sons with smaller than company-size units even in
daytimei Although
resource shortages are a reality, it appears to us that
in many cases officers have used them as a crutch for
their traditional defensive philosophy. Manpower,
equipment, and training improvements since 1981
have greatly strengthened the offensive potential of
the armed forces, we believe. In our view, lack of
stronger direction from command authorities, limita-
tions in the size and effectiveness of the training
program, and the ingrained reluctance of middle-level
officers to risk experimentation with new tactics still
inhibit more effective military performance
Inadequate mobility has also reduced some of the
tactical choices open to field commanders. Even the
immediate reaction battalions cannot respond on short
notice. Not only is the number of trucks inadequate in
the field, but the high risk of ambush discourages
ground transport altogether. Although guerrilla am-
bush tactics have become well known, Salvadoran
troops continue to ignore security precautions. In
April 1983, an 86-man unit from the elite Belloso
Battalion, on its way to reinforce a town under attack,
traveled down a road with no scouts or flank guard,
fell into a trap, and lost almost the entire unit. In
November, an Army unit made seven futile attempts
to send reinforcements to Tejutepeque down a main
road without eliminating or circling around guerrillas
at known ambush points.
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With only about 12 helicopters operational at one
time, commanders have not been able to airlift large
numbers of ground troops on a regular basis. Colonel
Bustillo explained to a US Congressional delegation
last September that priority missions such as combat
resupply leave few helicopters available for troop
transport. Because of this, forces have on many
occasions lost the element of tactical surprise, failed
to cut off retreating insurgent units, and had to pull
troops back from threatened forward positions be-
cause they could not be reinforced in time. The Arce
Battalion took 48 hours to get troops into position for
an operation in Morazan in November 1983, for
example, giving enemy forces time to slip away. In
December, after the leadership reshuffle, we began to
see troop transport receive higher priority�eight
UH-1H helicopters lifted troops into action near
Cacahuatique�but the small number of helicopters
available still precludes regular airlift operations.
Despite continuing resource shortages, several out-
standing Salvadoran commanders have proved tough
and resourceful, according to our analysis, providing
models of how the war should be fought. In 1982,
Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa in Cabanas was already
sending out 11-man patrols at night and combining
his military actions with a strong community relations
program. In a major operation in Morazan in early
1983, Colonel Flores tried encirclement tactics, leav-
ing scone forces behind to secure gains after the
pri.nary attack was accomplished instead of large
svieeps toward a static blocking force. Lieutenant
Colonel Cruz periodically sends companies north of
he Torola River in Morazan to flush out insurgent
units. then pulls his troops back, and calls in pre-
planned airstrikes
a Salvadoran intelligence
service was set up in early 1982, and tactical intelli-
gence courses have better prepared officers and senior
enlisted personnel for intelligence staff positions at all
levels in the armed forces. By the end of 1983, almost
all brigades and major battalions had full-time intelli-
gence chiefs, in contrast to only part-time positions at
this level at the end of 1981. With US urging, Army
units have paid more attention to the capture and
25
interrogation of guerrillas.
A long-range reconnaissance company�divided into
18 six-man teams�received intensive US training in
Panama and has undertaken dangerous but produc-
tive missions into enemy-controlled territory, pin-
pointing targets for subsequent air, artillery, and
ground force strikes, the US defense attache reports.
recon-
naissance units discovered and destroyed an insurgent
camp at the mouth of the Lempa River in April 1984.
Salvadoran observer aircraft have increased the
Army's visual reconnaissance capability.
The armed forces' ability to use intelligence has not
kept pace with collection, however. Poor communica-
tions between the General Staff and field commands
have proved a major liability in the dissemination of
strategic and tactical information. Despite the possi-
bility of undermining the General Staff, US personnel
have on occasion felt compelled to deliver data direct-
ly to field commanders when staff bottlenecks have
prevented operational intelligence from getting to the
field
inost of the time-sensitive technical intelli-
gence conies in at night when Salvadoran staff and
troops have not been able to respond. All-source
tactical operational planning packages from Washing-
ton originally were not timely; they took several weeks
to prepare, needed updating in the country, and were
too complicated for local commanders to use.
Modifications in the packages are
improving their usefulness for Salvadoran operations.
Independent local commanders and pilots in some
cases have been overconfident about their abilities
and have failed to heed intelligence produced at the
national level. Although commanders are paying in-
creasing attention to
their immediate areas,
channels still do not function smoothly for
the transmission of local information to the High
Command for analysis and dissemination elsewhere in
the country.
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