SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03118703
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2021
• Case Number: F-2021-01715
• Publication Date: August 31, 1951

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TS 64936
31 August 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Jackson
SUBJECT : Survey of the Office of Special Operations
1. The attached report on the Office of Special Operations
is based upon my participation in certain parts of your survey of
OSO during July-and August 1951, plus independent conversations which
I have held with Staff, Division and Branch Chiefs, reports which I
have had prepared, and research into various OSO files.
2. Certain discrepancies in personnel figures may
noted. These are attributable to personnel in transit from head-
quarters to the field and vice versa.
B. KIRKPATRICK
DeplIfy Assistant Director
Special Operations
7.7,1 0
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APR
AZ,"1:11
DATE t_ .SEViEWECA,054540,
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I. INTRODUCTION
HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION. The Office of Special Operations is
a direct carry-over from the Office of Strategic Services. When that
organization was disbanded at the end of the war, the Secret Intelli-
gence Branch and the X-2 Branch (Counterespionage) were retained as the
Strategic Services Unit under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
War. When the President created the Central Intelligence Group in
January-19146, the Strategic Services Unit was transferred to that
organization and became the Office of Special Operations.
II. FINDINGS - GENERAL
1. There is a high degree of professional competence among the
Division and Staff Chiefs in OSO, although it is apparent that this
professional competence has not always been utilized to its fullest
extent in the development of an espionage service directed at the
principal targets of intelligence.
2. I
3. There is an extreme shortage of personnel in all classes,
ranging from the Branch Chief level to the clerical level. Further,
it is obvious that a considerable amount of valuable OSO effort is
lost as a result of a shortage of clerical personnel to handle the
paper work.
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Germany.
1. In the autumn of 1946 complete information was obtained on
the deportation to Russia of German scientists and technicians,
virtually at the moment of the occurrence. These deportations were
among the first clear signals of Russian long-range intentions.
During the next two years intelligence collected reflected phase by
phase the Russian economic strangulation of Eastern Germany and
Eastern Austria by means of reparations from current production and
the seizure of key industries which were combined in Russian-owned
corporations and ruthlessly exploited. In this connection it is to
be noted that the inauguration of these corporations (SAGs in Germany,
USIA in Austria) was reported in the inceptive phase (in the case of
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USIA, the original Soviet plan was procured) and coverage has been
maintained to the present. The above provided useful background
information for the Four Power conferences held during that period.
2. Penetration of the East German police led to early detection
of the second significant Russian move in East Germany, the formation
of a paramilitary police force (HVA) intended to be the nucleus of a
future German army. Continuing intelligence covered development of
HVA through a series of reorganizations to the present static stage.
3. Penetration of the East German Foreign Ministry was also
accomplished during this period.
4. A highly successful operation developed out of a plan to
sabotage some phase of the nickel wire mesh production program in the
Soviet Zone of Germany, following establishment of the fact that the
mesh was a vital component in the Soviet atomic energy effort. The
intelligence requirement for this operation encompassed all phases of
mesh production from procurement of raw materials, specialized machin-
ery and machine parts, through the techniques of production of the
finished mesh, and finally, to the personnel associated with the wire-
weaving industry. After intensive collection of further information
from the field and a study of all possible applicable sabotage tech-
niques, physical sabotage itself was eventually ruled out as not
permanent enough in effect, and instead the course of denial of key
technical personnel was chosen. This was in February 1951. From
that date until 21-23 April when the so-called Master Plan was put
into action, our bases in Germany, working chiefly through Berlin
into the Soviet Zone, recruited and arranged for the defection of eleven
technicians and craftsmen from three wire-mesh plants, the loss of whom
would cripple the plants in question for the foreseeable future. The
actual evacuation operation was successful to the last detail and was
followed by the originally-unplanned desertion of eight further tech-
nicians. It was estimated that this operation would delay from three
to six months the completion of the first Soviet isotope separation
plant using the mire mesh process and would delay Soviet production
of atomic bombs during 1951-52 by a number estimated at six or more.
In addition to its denial phase, the operation has produced a wealth
of information leading to an important revision in our estimate of
Soviet capabilities in the atomic energy field and has opened the way
to further operations of a similar and perhaps still more effective
nature. It should be emphasized that the above operation was the
result of combined OSO-OPC planning in all its phases.
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TOP SECRET
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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
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CIA CONTROL NO.
64936
DOC. NO. .. ...
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE
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