INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR IRAN TASK FORCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850280
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 11, 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NAIIONAL ESTIMATES
11 May 1961
Memorandum for: Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Subject: intelligence Support for Iran lask Force
Attached is another paper in the complicated matter of
intelligence support for the Iran Task Force. This morning
a couple of DD/P men, and one from OCI, met with ONE Board
members and staff. They were very cooperative throughout
and were obviously anxious to supersede the earliest draft
they had made. ThqFpleaded for a complete paper for a
2:30 meeting. It is attached. Since it was drafted in
committee and haste, it is not polished or even well proof..
read.
One of the DD/P men (and an ONE staff man,
took copies to the Task Force meeting at 2:30. w1:1 be
presented as "CIA Draft, supersedes previous draft).
State INR people wanted to attend our meeting this
morning but were rebuffed. State has written another paper
"Iran's Foreign Relations," which Critchfield has asked
us to comment on. We will do so to him.
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I. BASIC ELEMENTS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION
1. The final meaning of the events which led up to the
fall of Sharif Emamits government and the Shahls appointment of
Ali Amimi is not yet clear. These developments must, however, be
viewed in the context of lon-term trends in Iran, which were
assessed in the recent NIE 34.61, Prospects for Iran, 28 Februnry
1961. The relevant portions follow:
"...Iran is still largely traditionalist in its social
and political structure, with authority concentrated almost
exclusively in the hands of the Shahs who relies for support
on the army, the security forces, the larp;e landowners, tribal
chieftains, the old line leaders of commerce and finance, and
the senior bureaucracy. The "establishment" and many of its
policies are unpopular with most intellectuals and with much of
the growing middle class. It is out-of-step with the dynamic
political ideas and movements which are afoot in other parts of
Asia and Africa. The nationalist forces remain unmillinr to
cooperate to any significant degree with the present "establish-
ment" but as yet lack the power to supplant it and probably even
the ability to run the country in its stead. (Para. 17)
oess profound political and social
change in OM form or another is virtually inevitable; this, we
believe, is the most important estimate to stress in regard to
Iran. It is possible that the chan.e will be evolutionary with
the Shah making concessions to the urban groups and bringing
some of the more moderate nationalists into the governmental and
administrative apparatus. The nature of Iranian politics and
the personal characteristics (1 the Shah, however, appear to
make gradual evolution unlikely. (Para. 18)
"The Iranian Communist Party (the Tudeh) remains
neutralized under the constant surveillance and harassment of SOLK.
-BESREr
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Practically all its leaders are in jail or in exile. In these
circumstances, Moscow is apparently relyin,. more on direct
propaganda and political pressure to promote its objectives in
Iran than on the internal activities of the Tudeh. We do not
believe that for some time to cone the Tudeh will be able to
exert much influence on the Iranian scene. The possibility will
remain that it may over the loner term be able to manipulate
nationnlist groups. In the event of a sustained political
disturbance, the party probably would be able to reconstitute
itself." (Para. 15)
In the present situation, the Tudeh will probably become more
active in penetrating nationalist groups but it will not come out
in the open as it did in 1951.as-a-aembei4-arm-ef-Softet-pel-loy.
The Soviets realize that they made serious errors in over-
estimating the strength of Tudeh in Iran in 1945-1946 and 1953
and will probably direct it initially to merge itself in the
general agitation against the status quo.
II. THE MO& CM'S
2. The growing political unrest of the urban middle class
has been manifested openly in the past year. The first set of
elections for the 20th Majlis held in August 1960 were cancelled
by the Shah in response to widespread dissatisfaction over the
blatant rigging. Despite strong professions of his good intentions
in regard to permitting a relatively free second round of elections,
SECIR&S
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the January-February 1961 elections were as thoroughly controlled
by him as those in August. This resulted in popular demonstrations
in some provincial centers and in Teheran and the arrest of a
considerable number of students and some nationalist leaders. A
teachers strike for higher pay on 2 May precipitated the recent
crisis.
3o In the demonstrations that followed, a teacher was
killed and several others wounded by the police. On 3 May, a
demonstration estimated at between 15 and 30 thousand persons
carried the corpse of the "martyred" teacher through the streets
of Teheran. On 4 May a similar demonstration was joined by
workers. National Front Groups were scheduled to join the
demonstrations on 5 May, but these plans were cancelled when
Ali Amini was appointed Prime Minister.
4. On 3 or 4 May General Tiemmr Bakhtiar, former SAVAK
Chief, was closeted several hours with the Shah. General Hasan
Alavi-Kia� Deputy Chief of SAVAK, conferred with the Shah for
three hours late 4 May and is supposed to have pressed for the
appointment of Ali Amini. Reportedly extremely upset and ready
to flee the country, the Shah offered Amini the Prime Minister's
post late that night. It was accepted the next morning, 5 May,
on Aminils conditions that he be given broad powers.
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III. PROSPECTS FOR AN AMINI GOVERMENT
Background:
S. For several years various groups have tried to convince
the Shah that he should reign and not rule; that by ruling he
draws hostile criticism to himself as the person solely respon�
sible for the shortcomings of the government. They have likewise
urged that he transfer the burden of government to a strong
Prime Minister who would be responsible, as the constitution
provides, for the conduct of government, and replaced if he
fails. It is possible that the Shah followed this line of
reasoning when he selected Amini, because it is clear that he was
genuinely frightened by the deteriorating situation and realized
that a "conventional" prime minister i.e., one dominated by him,
could not establish contact with and accommodate opposition
elements at this time.
6. Amini has been grooming himself to be prime minister
for many years but only in recent years out of public office has
he been able to devote full time to accomplish this end. The
image of himself which Amini has fostered has three facets:
1) the smart, energetic administrator with a special competence
in finance and economics; 2) the man who is so rich he can afford
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to be honest and will go all out against corruption; and
3) the man who is uniquely qualified to act as the bridge between
the moderate nationalists and the government. He is certain to
project these three facets by trying to take effective steps to
control the financial crisis, by trying to make examples of
corrupt elements in high places and by attempting to satisfy
certain nationalist demands.
Ardni
does not possess a commanding
presence, and is not an inspiring speaker, He is not a master
politician: and has no organized devoted following, but in the
past two years he has systematically made contacts among both
nationalist and conservative elements, and obviously made progress
in selling himself as a bold administrator whose program coincides
with the self�interest of these groups.
80 He will work with moderate but not with extremist
nationalist elements. He will probably not lead an attack
on the oil consortium, but will talk behind the scenes to obtain
special favors which can be presented publicly as nationalist
victories. He will be reluctant to make significant concessions
to the old power elite to win its support*
-SEGRET
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90 Amami likely
will make a
more serious effort than his predecessors to play an independent
rolw as prime minister, In the event of a deadlock with the
Shah, he might resign in the hopes of maintaining his political
stature for a later return to power.
10. Aminits tenure will probably depend to a large degree
on the Shah's willingness to withdraw from the day to day conduct
of government business. Although the Shah has been frightened
in political crises before, and relaxed his control of the
government, experience has shown that after regaining equilibrium
he has always succeeded in dominating the prime minister. Since
Mossadegh� none have been able to stand up to the prestige of the
throne and the Shah's skill at manipulating factions and leaders.
The fact that Iran is now in serious economic difficulty may
induce the Shah to allow Dr. Amini, who is a competent economigA
and financier, initial independence of action in these fields.
U. Aminits position will also be influenced by his success
or failure in winning the support of the military. Amini is
known to have had friendly contact with a number of senior
officers. Apart 7rom this, there are several groups within the
military who have for some time been contemplating an effort to
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-SERER'
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change the the governmental structure, although not necessarily
to eliminate the Shah. In addition, many of the junior and
middle grade officers are probably sympathetic to the kind of
reform government represented by Amini. However, many of the
upper echelons of the military have acquired a vested interest
in the status quo and are apt to be hostile to Anini to the
extent he tries to introduce drastic reforms.
l2e Nationalist groups, which have been increasingly
active politically in the past years are unlikely to identify
their cause directly with that of Amini. Howavers the more
moderate of them at least will probably be prepared to cooperate
with them as long as they retain hope that he will implement part
of their objectives. Should they become convinced that he is
not moving rapidly enough, they are likely to oppose him as
well as the Shah.
2.30 US policy toward the new Iranian government will have
an important effect on future develorments. Should the Shah
become convinced that the US is strongly supprting Amini as
an independent prime minister to the detriment of his own
position, his reaction would be sharp.
.7.
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140 It is 1-mpoosible to est-I./nate precisely the form this
woad take. The Shah
is constantly haunted by
the fear that the US might abandon him for one reason or another
and has been particularly uneasy over the new US 'nistratiOWN
attitude toward him. It is possible that he might move rapidly
to disengage Iran from its close ties with the US. We believe
it more likely that for some time at least he would accept the
situation. However, he is unlikely for very long willingly to
permit to PPlini a position of primacy in dealing with the United
Stateso
1.5. As far as Aminits continuation in office is concerned,
the Shah faces a difficult problem. He has now taken a significant
step toward liberalization of the government. To try to cancel
it by replacing Amini with 5qbal or some other old line politician
would merely increase the unrest which brought Amini to power.
It might also provoke a move by military elements to take control
of a deteriorating situation. If, on the other hand, the Amini
government were to move sharply left or to be replaced by a more
radical nationalist one, this too might provoke a military and
conservative reaction. Neither development would make for stability
in Iran.
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