GOLITSYN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05258950
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2021
• Case Number: F-2016-00877
• Publication Date: May 27, 1984

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
Wilding. Agency/Post)
Initials
Ai
Date
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/Action
File f
Note and Return
iApproval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
As Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
Circulate
For Your Information
See Me
Comment
Investigate
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REMARKS
/co-x-0e
.zr�
vy
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. symbol. Agency/Post)
Room No.�Bldg.
Phone No.
5041-102
* GPO : 1983 0 - 381-529 (301)
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Fresexibed_kt GSA
ITIAR (41 CFR) 101-11.206
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Golitsyn
FROM:
A I MS
EXTENSION
1901
NO.
I
DATE
27 May 1984
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
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INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
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FORM 61 0 USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
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GPO : 1983 Oa) Atb-6ilif
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1 7 MAY
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff
Chief, Publications Review Board
FROM:
Acting Chief, Information Management Staff
SUBJECT: Apatoliy Golttsyn's )'ns%ers To Questions
Submitted By E. D. E. Publications Inc.
At the request of the CI Staff, the attached manuscript was
reviewed for classified information within the DO. The
manuscript contained no classified information.
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DODD, MEAD & (2()NIPANY
-9 MADISON VENLI
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016
Publishers Sina I S 3 9
Yay 2+, 1-;d4
Dear Anatoliy:
have ,..,uat nad ir.cwit.n Hd E7,:steih
who is writing a :7)ver tTry ar�.:ut
OLD for Parade Yagazine,
my letter dated Aprll "(D. m
He naa asked me to pass tne encl.ised
questions for wia-r. tewooid 11.ke
Yu an, ccur!le, get yo.,:r reply tack
to me and I will pass it on to nim Immediately.
I am also en-) --4,ng a copy ?f tLe
ad for the bock wnich appears in today' s
Review
ilitn ail ..Tt wiJhes.
Yours since
, 7
Ellen Klots
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5cQ ee-ic
E.J.E Publications,Inc.
430 East 86th Street
New York City 10028
May 4,1980
Allan Klotz
Dodd Mead
79 Madison
New Yor City 10010
Dear Mr. Klotz
I am enclosing below nine questions for Mr. Golitsyn.
I would greatly appreciate it if he could answer them. My
phone number is 212-249-4003.
1.To what extent did the first and second chief
directorates cootbinate their activity? Was there rivalry?
2.Why was a KGB officer, Shitov, chosen to be USSR
ambassador to Cuba? Did Shitov have a special relation with
Castro?
3.In 1959, a second chief directorate officed named
Rumantsyev attempted to defect during the trade exhibition?
Was he stopped because of a leak? Did this incident have
ramifi;;ations for Soviet intelligence?
4.What would the 13th Department of the First Chief
Directorate, and General Rodin, have known regarding
Oswald's defection?
5.Could Oswald have been recruited by the 2nd Chief
Directorate in the USSR? If so, which Department of the KGB
would handle him when he returned to the US? Would an agent
recruited by the 2nd Chied Directorate be prepared to be
handled by a stranger? By a First Directorate Officer?
Would the 13th Department have any roler?
6.Is there a difference in the way an ideological or
mercenerary recruit is handled?
7. Do you believe Oswald had been in contact with the
KGB? What is the probability--before he defected in 1959?
While in the USSR from 1959-62? After his return to US?
8.John Barron's 1974 and 1983 books on the KGB contain
markedly different organizational divisions in the KGB. Does
this reflect a change in the CIA's picture of the KGB? Or a
change in the KGB itself? Or a change on the defector and
other source material the CIA relies on?
9.When the Trust was studied or discussed in KGB
schools what were the main theoretical lessons drawn from
this deception?
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ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY E. J. E. PUBLICATIONS INC.
The answers are keyed to the questions (attached).
1. There was close coordination of activities between the First
and the Second Chief Directorates. A rivalry, however, did
exist between the two during the period 1947 - 1953 when the
Political Intelligence Committee (the Committee of Information)
and the Security Service (MGB) were separated from each other.
The coordination between the two improved under SEROV.
However, after the reorganization by SHELEPIN, the coordina-
tion between the two directorates has become excellent and
there has been an exchange of officers between them. The
First and the Second Chief Directorates have become Shelepin's
right and left hands. A KGB chairman would not tolerate
rivalry within one house.
2. In my opinion, Castro, at the initial phase from 1960 to 1965,
was regarded by the Soviets as their -Agent of Influence."
Because of the Soviet's special relation with Castro and
because of the U.S. and French intelligence activities against
the Cuban regime, special countermeasures were needed and
therefore Castro was handled by high ranking GRU and KGB
officers under diplomatic cover, even as high as an ambassador.
In 1960, he was handled by a GRU officer, namely Sergey
KUDRYAVTSEV. In 1961 he was handled by a KGB specialist in
France and Argentina, one ALEXEEV SHITOV.
3. RUMYANTSEV, an officer of the second Chief Directorate was an
officer of the Moscow KGB Branch. According to information
which I received from an officer of the Second Chief
Directorate, RUMYANTSEV was actually caught trying to make
a contact with an American at the American Exhibition in
SOKOL'NIKI. He approached an exhibition guide whom he
believed to be an American and made arrangements with this
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person to transfer his KGB documents from a train at a
specific train station. I do not know whether this guide
was actually an American or a Russian but I do know he was
a KGB agent who reported the incident. SHELEPIN was
informed about the attempted approach and after review
issued his instruction. The instruction did not mention
that the guide was a KGB agent. RUMYANTSEV was later
tried and executed.
4. The 13th Department of the First Chief Directorate would
be notified about Oswald's background, his connection
with the U.S. army and about his defection. They would
normally take part in Oswald's debriefing and ask specific
questjons about those units of the U.S. Army that Oswald
might have knowledge about.
I believe that Oswald could have been recruited in the
U.S.S.R. by either the Second or the First Chief Directorate
or even jointly. If so, he would have been handled by
either the FCD's Illegal Service or by the 13th Department's
Illegals. I believe that if Oswald was recruited and if
the KGB believed and trusted him - he could have been
handled by a stranger who, however, would be introduced to
him, in the USSR.
6. The KGB usually exercises more caution with a mercenary
recruit than an ideological one. A mercenary recruit is
met in third countries by a foreign agent since they try
to avoid personal contacts between Soviet KGB agents and
mercenary recruits.
7. I learned from reading U.S. press reports that Oswald
received his Soviet visa in Finland in 1959 from the Soviet
Consul named GOLUB. I met GOLUB in Moscow on his return
from Finland and knew him as an officer of the First Chief
Directorate. I was briefed by him on cover activities in
Finland. On arrival I was given the resiwnsibililv at the
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Consulate in Finland of granting visas for KGB contacts
illegals. Normally KGB Headquarters would notify their
Residentura in Finland about the expected arrival of an
illegal and instruct them to give the illegal a visa when
he applies for one. There would be no delay in issuing a
visa for an old, old KGB contact or for an illegal. A
new KGB contact, such as a defector, would experience a
delay of approximately 10 to 15 days in receiving a visa.
During this period he would be thoroughly debriefed and
correspondence exchanged between the Residentura and
Moscow.
I do not know whether Oswald experienced a delay in
getLing his visa in Finland. I believe, however, that if
one could check his passport for his arrival date in
Finland and his departure date, it would indicate whether
he experienced a delay and further clarify whether he
had been in contact before 1959. I further believe that
he probably was in contact with the KGB during the period
1959 - 1962, for debriefing and for verifying his bona
fides. My personal experience in handling one defector in
Finland in 1961 may be helpful. A majorAn the Iranian
Army walked into the Soviet Consulate requesting political
asylum. He stated that he had received training in the
United States. As per my orders, I conducted a debriefing
and notified the Ambassador and the KGB resident, ZHENIKHOV,
who immediately sent telegrams to the Foreign Ministry and
to the KGB Headquarters respectively. We received per-
mission to grant a visa in about 10 to 14 days and then
sent the defector to Moscow in the company of a GRU
officer. He was met at the Moscow Airport by the Chief
of the Eastern Department of the SCD which handles Iran.
After a debriefing which took approximately two months the
request for political asylum was granted and printed in
the Soviet press.
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I do not completely exclude the possibility that
Oswald may have been contacted in the United States.
8. I cannot comment on the CIA's picture of the KGB. I can
state, however, that in my opinion the structural changes
in the KGB as given in the Barron books, do not reflect
the real changes in the KGB. When Shelepin came into
power he decided to get away from the obsession that the
KGB had in the 30's, 40's, and 50's, with internal
security, toward the active political use of its various
assets such as scientists, intellectuals and priests
against the West.
As I have stated in my book, the political direction
of KGB activities under Shelepin has continued and this
makes the KGB very effective and thus dangerous. In my
opinion, Barron's characterization of KGB structural
changes cannot rationalize the new political challAnge
of the KGB to the Western World.
9. During the study of the Trust in the KGB Institute, it
was presented as a valuable historic experience of active
methods, as practiced under Lenin and DZERZHINSKIY during
NEP. The Trust was presented as a model to follow in
helping the party solve political, diplomatic and military
problems. It was presented as an effective method to
get away from routine, petty and wasteful operations and
to prevent professional degeneration of its cadre and to
involve them in a more militant, successful struggle with
capitalistic countries and their intelligence services.
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