RECOMMENDED LINES OF THOUGHT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03103218
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date:
December 10, 2021
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2017-00953
Publication Date:
October 13, 1949
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
RECOMMENDED LINES OF THOU[16000678].pdf | 176.58 KB |
Body:
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4111rSE ET
13 October 1949
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. FRANK
SUBJECT: Recommended Lines of Thought for
Operational Planning.
1. At the weekly meeting in Yr. Webb's office
Tuesday afternoon I covered practically all of the subject
matter upon which I had been briefed by yourself and the
others who atirzndedthe morning briefing session, and a
considerable amount of interest was shown on the part of
Mr. Webb and General Magruder, in particular. Toward the
conclusion of the session, Mr. Webb began to spark off a
number of ideas and as he warmed to his subject, he began to
produce some very useful thoughts. All of the others present
at the meeting were much impressed by his grasp of the
significance and operational possibilities of the OPC activity,
and General Magruder was especially enthusiastic in his comment
upon Mr. Webbts suggestions.
2. In view of the fact that Yr. Webb has taken this
degree of personal interest and has gotten to the point of
generating some lines of policy guidance to us, I believe
that we would be well advised to do what we can to develop
some refinements, and ultimately to produce some plans and
projects along the lines of Mr. Webb's recommendations. We
will surely be asked from time to time in the future what we
are daiiTabout his proposals, and in addition there is no
doubt that he has got hold of some useful thoughts.
3. The first line of thought developed by Mr. Webb
originated with a discussion of the situation in Yugoslavia,
and the fact that Tito's performance and the Tito heresy are
causing the Cominform more disturbance and woe than any
single thing which has occurred since the war.
_ I He pointed to the possibility that
Tito himself may be knocked off, and that in such an event,
his regime may or may not be destroyed along with him. (Park
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Armstrong
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Armstrong ventured the estimate that the mere assassination
of Tito would not result in the downfall of his administration,
since he has been constantly strengthening the organization of
his Government t t thq it should be able to carr
on without him.
4. Mr. Webb went on from this to propose that we
should put considerable effort into spreading the story of
the Tito heresy, and moreover that we should endeavor to
induce similar developments in other Communist areas &rid
within the Communist Parties of free areas. He suggested the
use of purchasable Communist who might operate within the
Communist parties to proclaim that
they were the leaders or the truo:Communist faith as against
the Moscow-attacheileaders such as TogiAatti. OPC should not
limit its attacks upon the Communists/erforts to wean away
from Communist control or influence the len:wing Socialists
and others whom they have captured, but should set about to
fragment the Communist Parties themselves uSing the Tito
formula as our model.
6. 7:J,r. Webb made reference to the article on Tito by
Hamilton Fish Armstrong in the current issue of the Atlantic
ionthly kagazine, and whereas he agreed that it could not be
effectively used in its present form because of its American
origin and authorship--he said that we should draw material
from it which should be caused to appear in disguised forms.
7. Mr. Webb then proposed that OPC should be able to
employ covert methods toward
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(W(1)
public opinion in the direction of a bettor under- (b)(3)
standing between the peoples of the two areas. He said that
he understood it to be an American policy objective that the
II7l1IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII get over their antipathies (W(1)
and realize that they must work more closely together for their M(3)
common economic benefit and political salvation. Such being
the case, it should be a very useful operation for OPO to
undertake by subtle means the bringing about of states_of mind ODA
favorab e to this result. Or representatives inland
should be able, working through cutouts, to line up a ODA
cons derable number of press and periodical writers who could
go to work on this general theme. Some of these people would
no doubt be willing to do this because they believed in it
while others would certainly require monetary inducement. The
hand of the U.S. Government should remain entirely concealed
and to this end it would be unwise for this kind of operation
to be undertaken. by our overt propaganda people. They should
confine themselves to overt propaganda and should not involve (W(1)
themselves in seeking to induce by subtle means the aPpearance (b)(3)
of articles favorable to this objective in the
press. It was agreed that this should be a feasible
operation and I have asked r. Offie to discuss this matter 0:0(3)
with and when he is in
Offie can report to us the results of this discussion so that 0:0(3)
an appropriate project can be prepared on the basis of this 0:0(3)
and other information which can be assembled. (The thought
has occurred to me that if we were to line up a series of
writers for this purpose, the more promising ones could
gradually be developed into useful instruments for accomplish-
ing other propaganda. purposes. The cost of operating in this
manner would be conspicuously lower than what would be involved
if we tried to buy or initiate entire newspapers or other
periodicals.) To the same end, I believe that influence could
be brou ht to bear upon the labor groups
through existing contacts which we have with (W(1)
those groups. I have asked Yr. Offie to explore this 0:0(3)
possibility with one of our principal contacts.
Lai J
i.DPC/FGW/rap
cc: S DO
Note attached addendum.
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