ORIGIN AND DISPOSITION OF THE HUSTON PLAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02455520
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2021
• Case Number: F-2012-01495
• Publication Date: February 18, 1975

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Origin and Disposition
of the Huston Plan
Background
By letter dated June 20, 1969, Tom Charles
Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, addressed
a letter to the Director, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, stating that the President had directed
that a report on foreign communist support of revo-
lutionary protest movements in the United States
be prepared for his study. According to the Huston
letter, the President specifically requested that
the report draw upon all the sources available to
the Intelligence Community, that it be as detailed
as possible, and that the word "support" should be
liberally construed to include all activities by
foreign communists designed to encourage or assist
revolutionary protest movements in the United States.
The letter stated that on the basis of earlier re-
ports submitted to the President on a more limited
aspect of the problem, it was apparent that "present"
intelligence collection capabilities in the area
were inadequate. Huston stated that the President
wanted to know what resources were currently tar-
geted toward monitoring foreign communist support
of revolutionary youth activities in the United
States, how effective they were, what gaps existed
in our (U.S.) intelligence because of either inade-
quate resources or low priority of attention, and
what steps could be taken, if the President directed,
to provide the maximum possible coverage of these
activities.
The request was also sent to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency seeking contributions
relating to this same problem. Pursuant to the
request, the FBI and CIA submitted available infor-
mation on the matter. These responses were handled
unilaterally and without coordination between CIA
and FBI.
On June 5, 1970, Director Hoover met with President
Nixon, at which meeting the President appointed him
as chairman of a special intelligence committee to
February 18, 1975
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coordinate a more effective intelligence-gathering
function. 1/ He also instructed that the FBI, CIA,
NSA, and DYA were to coordinate their efforts to
insure that comprehensive information would be ob-
tained for the President's use which would provide
him with a worldwide picture of the efforts of new
left and subversive groups in directing dissident
activities in the United States. Present at this
meeting were CIA Director Richard Helms; Vice
Admiral Noel Gayler, NSA; General Donald V. Bennett,
DIA; Mr. Tom Charles Huston, White House Staff
Assistant; Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman;
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
John D. Ehrlichman; and Robert H. Finch, Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
An initial meeting of the Interagency Committee
on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was held in Mr. Hoover's
.office on June 8, 1970. This meeting was attended
by Mr. Helms, Vice Admiral Gayler, General Bennett,
and Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover emphasized the President's
keen interest in the problem of intelligence collec-
tion and outlined the general objectives to which
the Committee was to address itself. He instructed
that a working subcommittee composed of representa-
tives of all the member agencies be established and
be headed by FBI Assistant Director William C.
Sullivan.
The first meeting of the working subcommittee
was held on June 9, 1970. At this meeting, Mr. Huston
presented the subcommittee with an outline which
he stated the President desired the subcommittee
to follow in preparing its report. The outline
addressed itself mainly to the purpose, procedures,
and objectives of the subcommittee's review. The
following is quoted from the outline:
1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress,
Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803, "A Resolu-
tion Authorizing and Directing the Committee on the
Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds
Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise
Its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States of America,"
Book VII, Part 1, pg. 375.
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"Purpose:
(A) To define and assess the existing in-
ternal security threat.
(B) To evaluate the collection procedures
and techniques presently employed and
to assess their effectiveness.
(C) To identify gaps in our present col-
lection efforts and recommend steps
to close these gaps.
(D) To review current procedures for inter-
community coordination and cooperation
and to recommend steps to improve these
procedures.
(E) To evaluate the timeliness of current
intelligence data and to recommend
procedures to increase both its time-
liness and usefulness.
(F) To access the priorities presently
attached to domestic intelligence col-
lection efforts and to recommend new
priorities where appropriate.
"Procedures:
(A) Although the sub-committee will be of-
ficially constituted within the frame-
work of USIB, it will in fact be an
independent, ad hoc, interagency working
group with a limited mandate.
(B) Operational details will be the respon-
sibility of the chairman. However, the
scope and direction of the review will
be determined by the White House member.
(C) The sub-committee will submit its re-
ports to the White House and not to
USIB. Report will be due by July 1,
1970.
(D) To insure that the President has all
the options available for considera-
tion, the WH member may direct detailed
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Noe
interrogatories to individual agencies
in order to ascertain facts relevant
to policy evaluation by the President.
Information resulting from such inter-
rogatories will, if the contributing
agency requests, be treated on a con-
fidential basis and not be considered
by the sub-committee as a whole.
"Objectives:
(A) Maximum coordination and cooperation
within the intelligence community.
The sub-committee may wish to consider
the creation of a permanent Domestic
Intelligence Operations Board, or some
other appropriate mechanism to insure
community-wide evaluation of intelli-
gence data.
(B) Higher priority by all intelligence
agencies on internal security collec-
tion efforts.
(C) Maximum use of all special investiga-
tive techniques, including increased
agent and informant penetration by
both the FBI and CIA.
(D) Clarification of NSA's role in tar-
geting against communicaton traffic
involving U.S. revolutionary leaders
and organizations.
(E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activi-
ties of revolutionary leaders and of
foreign support of U.S. revolutionary
activities.
(F) Maximum coverage of campus and student-
related activities of revolutionary
leaders and groups.
(G) More detailed information about the
sources and extent of financial sup-
port of revolutionary organizations.
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(H) Clarification of the proper domestic
intelligence role of the Armed Services.
(I) Development of procedures for trans-
lating analyzed intelligence informa-
tion into a format useful for policy
formulation."
At a meeting of the working subcommittee held
on June 23, 1970, a consensus was reached on a
final draft of the report to be issued by the Inter-
agency Committee. This report, which was captioned
"Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence
(Ad Hoc)," 1/ dated June, 1970, and numbering g
43 pages, was signed and approved by the heads of
each member agency at a final meeting of the Com-
mittee held in Mr. Hoover's office on June 25,
1970. 2/ The report footnoted several objections
by the FBI to certain options contained in the Com-
mittee's report. 3/ These objections are enum-
erated in a later portion of this paper. A copy of
the "Special Report" was delivered to Mr. Huston
at the White House on June 26, 1970. The "Special
Report" was divided into three main sections: Part
One, a summarized estimate of the internal security
threat; Part Two, a summary of various operational
limitations on certain intelligence collection tech-
niques with cited advantages of maintaining such
restrictions as well as the advantages of relaxing
them; and Part Three, an evaluation of interagency
cooperation with suggested measures to improve the
coordination of domestic intelligence collection.
During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent
the "Special Report" to H.R. Haldeman with a memo-
randum entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelli-
gence Collection." In his memorandum, Huston recom-
mended that the President, from among the options
discussed by the "Special Report," select, in most
areas discussed, the options relaxing the restraints
on intelligence collection. 4/
On July 14, 1970, Haldeman sent a memorandum to
Huston stating that the President had approved
Huston's recommendations for relaxing restraints on
1. Ibid., pp. 384-431.
2. Ibid., pg. 383.
3. =a., pg. 433.
4. YEra., pg. 437.
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intelligence collection and requested that a formal
decision memorandum be prepared. 1/
In a memorandum dated July 23, 1970, addressed
to the Ad Hoc Committee agencies with copies for
the President and Mr. Haldeman, 2/ Mr. Huston ad-
vised that the President had carefully studied the
"Special Report" and had made certain decisions
with respect to issues raised therein. The Presi-
dent's decisions called for a relaxation of certain
existing restraints on intelligence coverage, in-
cluding the following: NSCID-6 was to be inter-
preted to permit NSA to program for coverage of
the communications of US citizens, using interna-
tional facilities; the Intelligence Community was
directed to intensify electronic surveillance
coverage of individuals and groups in the United
States who posed a threat to the internal security;
restrictions on legal mail coverage were to be re-
moved and restrictions on covert mail coverage
relaxed to permit its use on select targets of
priority intelligence; restraints on the use of
surreptitious entry were to be removed on certain
high-priority targets; the coverage of violence-
prone campus and student-related groups was to be
increased; CIA coverage of American students
traveling or living abroad was to be increased;
the restrictions on the use of military undercover
agents were to be retained; each member agency was
to submit a detailed estimate of manpower and mone-
tary needs required to implement the decisions;
and a committee consisting of the directors of rep-
resentative agencies or appropriate alternates was
to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to
provide evaluation of domestic intellige,.:ce, pre-
pare periodic domestic intelligence estimates,
carry out other objectives specified in the report,
and perform such other duties as the President
should from time to time assign. The Director of
the FBI was appointed to serve as chairman of this
committee. An attachment to the memorandum from
Mr. Huston captioned "Organization and Operations
of the Interagency Group on Domestic Intelligence
and Internal Security (IAG)" set forth specific
composition, operations, and duties of this new
454.
committee.
3/
I.
Ibid.,
pg.
445.
2.
YErd.,
pp.
450,
3.
Ibid.,
pg.
456.
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On receipt of the letter from Mr. Huston, the
Director, FBI, addressed a letter to the Attorney
General dated July 27, 1970, pointing out FBI objec-
tions to certain of the decisions reported in the
Huston letter. Mr. Hoover objected to relaxation
of electronic surveillance policy, the implementa-
tion of covert mail coverage, the removal of re-
strictions on the use of surreptitious entry of
embassies to obtain cryptographic materials, the
removal of controls and restrictions relating to
the coverage of violence-prone campus and student-
related groups, and the establishment of a perma-
nent Interagency Committee on Domestic Intelligence.
The Director stated that in the "Special Report"
he had pointed out his opposition to these aspects
of the report and requested of the Attorney General
a prompt expression of his views concerning the
matter. He noted that no action to implement the
instructions contained in Mr. Huston's letter
would be taken pending a reply from the Attorney
General.
No further action to implement the Huston letter
subsequent to the July 27, 1970, letter to the
Attorney General was instituted by the Intelligence
Community. There is no indication that the Attor-
ney General ever responded to this communication.
On or about July 27, 1970, each agency that had
received the memorandum of July 23, 1970, received
a telephone call from the White House instructing
that the memorandum be returned.
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