SHARING SECRETS WITH LAWMAKERS: CONGRESS AS A USER OF INTELLIGENCE

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06924190
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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2021
• Case Number: F-2018-02686
• Publication Date: February 1, 1997

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iv
4 Center for the Study of Intelligence
An Intelligence Monograph
Sharing Secrets With
Lawmakers: Congress
as a User of Intelligence
by L. Britt Snider
Central Intelligence Agency
CSI 97-001
February 1997
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This publication is prepared for the use of US Government officials The format, coverage, and
content are designed to meet their specific requirements
ISBN 1-929667-03-5
This publication is also available on the Internet at
www.cia.gov/csi
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis
expressed in this monograph are those of
the authors. They do not necessarily reflect
official positions or views of the Central
Intelligence Agency or any other US Government
entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents
should be constructed as asserting or implying US
Government endorsement of an article's factual
statement and interpretations.
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Center for the Study of Intelligence
An Intelligence Monograph
Sharing Secrets With
Lawmakers: Congress
as a User of Intelligence
L. Britt Snider wrote this study in 1996-97 as a Visiting Senior Fellow at
CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. Mr. Snider was Staff Director
of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence
Community in 1995-96. He served as General Counsel (1989-95) and
Minority Counsel (1987-89) of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, as Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(Counterintelligence and Security) (1977-86), as Counsel to the Church
Committee (1975-76), and as Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee
(1972-75). He is currently the CIA's Inspector General.
CSI 97-001
February 1997
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Introduction
The intelligence services of the United States, like their counterparts in most
countries, exist principally to serve the needs of the executive authority. The US
intelligence apparatus, however�unlike that of most countries�also makes a
large part of its output available to the legislative branch.
It has not always been so. Before the mid-1970s, Congress was given relatively
little intelligence, and access to it was limited. The Congressional investigations of
US intelligence agencies in 1975-76 by the Church and Pike Committees
fundamentally altered this situation. For the first time, voluminous amounts of
intelligence were shared with the investigating committees. When permanent
oversight committees were subsequently established in both Houses, the trend
toward ever-increasing disclosure continued.
Ground rules to govern intelligence-sharing were agreed to shortly after the
oversight committees began operations, but none were written down, and over time
these understandings often gave way in the continuing tussle between the
overseers and the overseen. Twenty years later, the system still operates without
formal rules of the road.
In 1992, Congress amended the National Security Act of 1947 to spell out specific
duties for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), among them the obligation to
provide intelligence "where appropriate, to the Senate and House of
Representatives and the committees thereof." In enacting this language, however,
Congress shed no light on what it regarded as an "appropriate" level of intelligence
support for itself. Nor did the executive branch use the occasion to specify what it
thought was "appropriate" to provide to Congress.
The absence of precision on this point did not slow the flow. Since 1992 the volume
and scope of intelligence support provided to Congress have grown steadily. More
Members and their staffs are aware of what intelligence can do for them and are
availing themselves of it. Not only is most finished intelligence available; Members
and staff are able to obtain briefings from intelligence agencies at the drop of a hat
on virtually any subject they choose. Although the provision of such support has
the potential for overwhelming the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to the
detriment of its customers in the executive branch, neither side thus far has seen
fit to set parameters for this support.
Indeed, serious problems appear to have been avoided, for the most part, because
intelligence agencies have sought to accommodate Congressional requests in
some manner. Congress, in turn, has generally demonstrated a willingness to
protect the intelligence it has been given. While there have been bumps along the
Not only is
most finished
intelligence
available;
Members and
staff are able to
obtain briefings
from intelligence
agencies at the
drop of a hat on
virtually any
subject they
choose.
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As intelligence-
sharing with
Congress has
grown. . . so too
have tensions
between the
Intelligence
Community and
the rest of the
executive branch.
way, none has been cause for fundamentally altering the relationship. Nor have
they led, for the most part, to internal changes by either side to prevent their
recurrence. Intelligence producers and their Congressional consumers continue to
muddle along from one episode to the next, accommodating where they can,
bending where they must.
As intelligence-sharing with Congress has grown, however, so too have tensions
between the Intelligence Community and the rest of the executive branch.
Congress's increased access to intelligence often provides it with ammunition for
challenging administration policies. By the same token, intelligence information
may lend support to administration initiatives, causing executive officials to see
intelligence agencies as allies in their political struggles with the Hill.
Although the changes in the political dynamic brought about by expanded
intelligence-sharing are commonly acknowledged, relatively little has been done to
structure intelligence support in a manner that would reduce tensions between the
Intelligence Community and the rest of the executive branch while preserving the
analytical independence and integrity of the Intelligence Community itself.
Policymakers fear being accused of politicizing the intelligence process should they
make any attempt to manage it. Intelligence producers shy away from policymakers
who they know will be displeased by what they plan to say to Congress. As the
demand for intelligence support increases, moreover, practical considerations
further reduce opportunities for consultation.
Pitfalls also are apparent for Congress in this relationship. Members who succumb
to the temptation to use intelligence to do political battle risk embarrassment,
criticism, and even legal consequences. Members who rely on intelligence that
subsequently proves wrong may be chagrined to find themselves on the wrong side
of a politically significant vote.
Part I of this study describes in general terms how intelligence-sharing with
Congress has developed since 1947. It does not try to analyze every significant
interaction during this period, but rather seeks to identify the features that have
characterized the relationship over time and to examine key milestones. It is not
intended as an analysis of how Congress performed oversight of intelligence
activities (including covert actions) during this period, although, as a practical
matter, Congress's access to substantive intelligence has to a large degree been
a function of its attitude toward oversight.
Part II contrasts Congress as a user of intelligence with consumers in the executive
branch.
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Part III describes how intelligence-sharing with Congress is carried out today.
Part IV assesses the effects of intelligence-sharing on the work of the legislative
and executive branches�including the work of the Intelligence Community itself.
Part V discusses difficulties in the relationship for the Intelligence Community, for
the rest of the executive branch, and for Congress itself.
Part VI contains the author's conclusions and recommendations as to how the
relationship between the Intelligence Community and Congress might be made
less contentious and more predictable and, at the same time, better satisfy the
needs of both branches.
Much has been published about Congressional oversight of intelligence, but
relatively little has been written about the meaning and impact of intelligence-
sharing with Congress. While the historical analysis in Part I relies primarily on
written sources (including an unpublished draft CIA History Staff study), the
remainder of this monograph draws principally on interviews with more than 50
knowledgeable individuals, including present and former Members of Congress
and their staffs, Intelligence Community officials, and executive branch officials
outside the Intelligence Community. In the interest of encouraging candor, each of
these interviews was conducted "off the record"; thus, in all but a few cases, the
views attributed to individuals are not attributed by name.
This monograph is Unclassified in its entirety.
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Table of Contents
Page
Introduction iii
I. How Intelligence-Sharing With Congress Has Evolved 1
1947 to 1974 1
The Church and Pike Committees (1975-76) 7
The SSCI and HPSCI: The Early Years (1976-80) 9
Intelligence-Sharing in the 1980s 12
Developments in the 1990s 14
II. What Distinguishes Congress as a Consumer of Intelligence? 17
Congressional Responsibilities 17
Comparing Congressional With Executive Consumers 18
How the Intelligence Community Relates to Congress as a Consumer 20
III. How Intelligence-Sharing Works at Present 23
In General 23
Access to Finished Intelligence 24
Access to Intelligence Through Briefings 26
IV. Impact of Intelligence-Sharing With Congress 29
Impact on Executive-Legislative Relations 29
Impact on the Work of Congress 31
Impact on the Work of the Intelligence Community 34
Impact on Relations With the Rest of the Executive Branch 35
V. Problems and Pitfalls in the Relationship 37
The Intelligence Community's Handling of the Relationship With Congress 37
Intelligence Community Handling of Relations With the Rest of the 44
Executive Branch
How Congress Uses the Intelligence It Receives 48
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 53
The Need for Written "Rules of the Road" 54
The Need for a More Systematic Effort To Integrate Intelligence Into 59
Congressional Decisionmaking
The Need To Discourage Political Use of Intelligence 60
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I. How Intelligence-Sharing With
Congress Has Evolved
1947 to 1974
The Early Years
The National Security Act of 1947 charged the
Central Intelligence Agency with responsibility
"to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to the national security, and provide for the
appropriate dissemination of such intelligence
within the government. . . "'While other
intelligence agencies were authorized to
produce and disseminate "departmental"
intelligence, CIA was, for all practical
purposes, the focal point for intelligence
analysis at the national level.
Although the 1947 Act did not specifically
identify Congress as a consumer of
intelligence, CIA appears to have regarded
Congress from the very beginning as a
legitimate, albeit limited, user of the intelligence
analysis it produced. Indeed, the CIA attorney
who was principally involved in setting up the
initial arrangements with Congress, Walter
Pforzheimer, did not recall the issue of whether
the CIA should share intelligence with the
Congress ever having arisen.2
From 1947 until 1966, Congressional requests
were handled through a single Legislative
Counsel in CIA's Office of the General
Counsel. The Legislative Counsel reported
directly to the DCI. (The Office of the General
Counsel itself was initially part of the Agency's
Directorate for Support.) Pforzheimer, the first
Legislative Counsel, recalls that DCI Roscoe
Hillenkoetter stopped him in a hallway after
passage of the 1947 Act to say that he did not
think he could afford to keep him on as
Legislative Counsel because there would not
be enough business between the CIA and
Congress to justify a full-time attorney.
The position of Legislative Counsel endured,
nonetheless, to ensure enactment of the
Agency's annual funding request and to handle
1 Section 103 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U S C 103-3).
2 Interview with Walter Pforzheimer, 15 October 1996
the other aspects of the Agency's relations with
Congress. During this period, handling
Congressional relations largely meant
satisfying the needs of the four Congressional
committees that at the time provided oversight
and funding for the CIA: the two armed
services committees and the two
appropriations committees in each House.
Over time, each of these committees
established small, handpicked subcommittees
responsible for the CIA.
The "CIA Committees"
Typically, the relationship between the CIA and
the four committees was dominated by the
chairman of each full committee, who usually
doubled as chairman of the CIA
subcommittee.3 For the most part, these
chairmen were part of the "old guard" in their
respective Houses�powerful Members who,
by virtue of the Congressional seniority
system, were able to retain their positions for
lengthy periods of time.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Senator Richard
Russell of Georgia was the dominant figure in
the Senate where intelligence was concerned,
regardless of what position he happened to
occupy. Russell chaired the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) in 1951-53 and
again in 1955-69. He also served as a member
of the Appropriations Committee (SAC) for
most of this period, and he chaired that
committee in 1969-71�during which time he
also chaired the CIA subcommittees of both
the SAC and SASC. The SAC was chaired by
only three Senators between 1947 and 1969�
Styles Bridges, Kenneth McKellar, and Carl
Hayden�with Hayden serving considerably
longer than the others (1955-69).
A similar situation existed in the House of
Representatives. The House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) was controlled essentially
3 Not infrequently, these committees would choose not to
publish the names of the Members who served on the CIA
subcommittees
Although the
1947 Act did not
specifically
identify Congress
as a consumer �
of intelligence,
CIA appears to
have regarded
Congress
from the very
beginning as a
legitimate user.
1
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In general, [the
committee]
chairmen were
strong supporters
of intelligence
and did not see a
need for intrusive
oversight by
Congress.
by three chairmen (Carl Vinson, Mendel
Rivers, and Edward Hebert) from 1947 until
1974. The House Appropriations Committee
(HAG) also had three chairmen (John Tabor,
Clarence Cannon, and George Mahon) during
the same period, with Cannon serving the
longest (in 1949-53 and 1955-64).
In general, these chairmen were strong
supporters of intelligence and did not see a
need for intrusive oversight by Congress.
Senator Russell typified this attitude in a 1956
letter written to the chairman of the Rules
Committee, opposing a resolution offered by
Senator Mike Mansfield to create a new joint
committee on intelligence:
It is difficult for me to foresee that
increased staff scrutiny of CIA operations
would result in either substantial savings
or a significant increase in available
intelligence information. . . If there is one
agency of the government in which we
must take some matters on faith, without
a constant examination of its methods
and sources, I believe this agency is the
CIA.4
His Republican colleague, Senator Leverett
Saltonstall of Massachusetts, who chaired the
SASC in 1953-55, expressed similar
sentiments during the floor debate on the
Mansfield proposal:
It is not a question of reluctance on the
part of CIA officials to speak to us.
Instead, it is a question of our reluctance,
if you will, to seek information and
knowledge on subjects which I
personally, as a Member of Congress and
as a citizen, would rather not have . . . "5
4 Quoted in Smist Jr, Frank J, Congress Oversees the
United States Intelligence Community 1947-94, second
edition (Knoxville. University of Tennessee Press, 1994), p
6.
5 Quoted in Ranelagh, John, The Rise and Decline of the
CIA (New York Simon and Schuster, 1996)
Faced with the opposition of Senators Russell,
Saltonstall, and Hayden, the Mansfield
resolution was defeated by a 59 to 27 margin
in April 1956.
From the outset, CIA adopted the policy that it
would give the four committees any
intelligence reports they might seek and would
respond to their requests for briefings. In
practice, as Saltonstall's comment suggests,
few requests were received. The committees
had no place to store intelligence information,
and therefore nothing could be left with them.
Members or staff who wanted to read
intelligence analysis had to do so by having it
brought to them or by visiting the CIA. The
committees employed small staffs during this
period (typically five to seven professionals to
serve a full committee and its subcommittees),
and not all of these staffers were cleared for
access to intelligence.
CIA's formal appearances before "its
committees" were relatively infrequent. One of
the CIA officials involved in this period recalled,
"[In] the early years, we practically had to beg
them to hold hearings. Years would go by
sometimes without any hearing at all being
held on the Agency's budget."
The "CIA committees" would hold occasional
oversight hearings as well as receive briefings
on world events. For example, each of the four
committees held hearings in 1950 on CIA's
performance in predicting the outbreak of the
Korean war. Later, DCI Walter Bedell Smith
regularly briefed the committees on the
progress of the war. In 1958 the CIA's
Legislative Counsel reported a "stepped-up
interchange between the Agency and
Congress," citing a total of 23 briefings during
the year to Congressional committees.6 In
1959, each committee received briefings from
6 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study on relations
with Congress
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DCI Allen Dulles on Soviet strategic strength.
In 1960 all four committees, plus the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), held
hearings on the Soviet shootdown of U-2 pilot
Francis Gary Powers.
On the whole, however, CIA's appearances on
the Hill, even before "its committees," were
relatively rare. As late as 1968, for example,
CIA records reflect only one briefing that year
to the HASC, three to the HAG, and two each
to the SASC and SAC. Attendance typically
was limited to Members only, and often no
record of the proceedings was kept.
Sometimes, reportedly, no questions were
asked at al1.7
The amount of sensitive information imparted
to the four committees during these briefings
was minima1.8 For example, although DCI
Dulles briefed the committees in 1959 on
Soviet strategic capabilities, they were not told
how information on these capabilities was
principally being collected�that is, by U-2
flights over the Soviet Union. Indeed, they were
not apprised of this until Francis Gary Powers
was shot down a year later. When Dulles
apologized for not having informed the
committees earlier due to security concerns,
most Members expressed understanding
rather than anger. Nevertheless, Dulles was
sensitized by the U-2 episode; he later directed
that the CIA subcommittees be advised of the
planning for the Bay of Pigs operation several
months in advance of its execution in 1961 by
CIA-trained Cuban exiles.8
Despite the substantial criticism levied against
CIA by other committees and individual
Members in the wake of the U-2 episode and
the Bay of Pigs debacle, the "CIA committees"
became more determined than ever to protect
7 Ibid.
8 According to the unpublished draft CIA History Staff
study, no records could be located at CIA that indicated
these committees had been briefed on CIA's involvement
in covert actions during the early 1950s.
'Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
their own power bases. In 1962, Senator J.
William Fulbright, chairman of the SFRC,
complained publicly that his committee needed
access to intelligence in order to fulfill its
responsibility to oversee foreign policy. He
suggested that a joint committee on
intelligence might help solve the problem. But
Senator Russell remained staunchly opposed,
even rejecting a compromise suggested by
DCI Dulles that one or two members of the
SFRC be allowed to sit with the CIA
subcommittee.10 Efforts to resurrect the joint
committee proposal were beaten back in the
House in 1964 and in the Senate two years
later, due to the efforts of the powerful leaders
of the CIA committees.
In 1966, to soften the blow of having lost the
Senate vote to create a joint committee,
Senator Russell invited Senator Fulbright and
several other Senators who had cosponsored
the failed legislation to attend the meetings of
the CIA subcommittee of the SASC. Senator
Fulbright attended one or two such meetings,
but he soon found they were not worth his time,
complaining, "they (CIA) never reveal anything
of significance."11
Still, membership on the "CIA committees"
carried a certain aura. Members had access to
the secrets of the CIA and could, if they chose,
cite such access to justify positions they were
taking on particular issues�that is, "if you
knew what I know, you would understand why
I'm taking this position."
Relations With Other Congressional
Committees
The chairmen of the "CIA committees" for the
most part kept their colleagues on other
committees at bay. As indicated above, efforts
in the House and Senate to create joint
10 Ibid.
11 Smist, pp. 6-7.
Senator Fulbright
attended one or
two meetings
[of the Armed
Services
Committee's CIA
subcommittee],
but he soon
found they were
not worth his
time,
complaining,
"they [CIA] never
reveal anything of
significance."
3
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From 1947 until
the mid-1960s,
Congressional
demands on CIA
for substantive
analysis were
light.
committees on intelligence were repeatedly
and decisively beaten back. Requests by other
committees or individual Members for
intelligence briefings normally had to be
cleared with the House or Senate chairman
concerned. CIA was advised, for example, that
other Senate committees were not to be
briefed unless Senator Russell approved, and
all such briefings were to be limited to
Members. Similarly, HAC chairman Cannon
did not want CIA to share intelligence beyond
his CIA subcommittee.12
In practice, however, CIA was permitted to
provide substantive briefings to other
committees so long as they did not include
information on intelligence operations or
funding. For some of these entities, notably the
Joint Atomic Energy Committee (JAEC) and
the Joint Economic Committee (JEC)�neither
of which had budget, oversight, or legislative
authority�CIA's analytical assistance was
substantial.
Almost immediately after passage of the 1947
Act, for example, CIA began providing
classified written reports on a semiannual
basis to the JAEC on the Soviet atomic
program. The committee occasionally held
hearings to receive the DCI's testimony on this
report. At this time, the JAEC maintained the
only storage facility on Capitol Hill for classified
information (located on the fourth floor of the
Capitol). Former Legislative Counsel
Pforzheimer also recalls, "they [the JAEC]
were our only regular customer for many years.
We received occasional requests from other
committees [for substantive briefings] but they
are hardly worth mentioning."
In late 1959, CIA also established a new and
uncharacteristically open relationship with the
JEC. DCI Dulles agreed to testify for the first
time in public on the Agency's view of the
Soviet economy. Beginning in 1960, CIA
started contributing unclassified articles on
12 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
aspects of the Soviet economy to compilations
of economic research periodically published by
the JEC and known as the "Green Books," a
practice that has continued to the present. In
1974, DCI William Colby reinstituted the
practice of providing annual testimony to the
JEC on the Soviet economy; the committee
subsequently published the testimony in
sanitized form.13 There also were occasional
briefings to the SFRC and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee (HFAC) on matters pending
before them, as well as scattered appearances
by CIA officials before other committees.
On the whole, however, from 1947 until the
mid-1960s, Congressional demands on CIA for
substantive analysis were light. The flow was
limited and hardly routine.
This began to change in the late 1960s as
Congress grew more assertive in foreign policy
and military affairs. Prompted in part by
growing public mistrust toward the executive
over its handling of the Vietnam war, Congress
began to assert itself more forcefully on how
the war was being prosecuted as well as on the
arms control and defense initiatives of the
Johnson and Nixon administrations. As a
result, Congressional demands for intelligence
increased.
In 1966, to handle an increasing level of
involvement with Congress, DCI Richard
Helms created a separate Office of Legislative
Counsel with a staff of six. It was the first time
the head of any US intelligence agency had
seen fit to establish a separate office to handle
Congressional relations.
Later, this office reported having handled
1,400 contacts with Members and/or staff
during 1969. These included 60 substantive
13 The DCI's practice of appearing annually was continued
by Colby's successors, George Bush and Stansfield
Turner DCI William Casey continued to provide annual
testimony but sent subordinates to deliver it.
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briefings before individual Members and
various committees, among them the SFRC,
the JAEC, and the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics.14 While the large
number of contacts and briefings in 1969
stemmed to a great extent from growing
Congressional involvement in national security
affairs, it also reflected CIA's substantial
involvement in the Congressional debate that
year over funding the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) System.
CIA Involvement in the 1969 ABM Debate"
The SFRC held hearings in March 1969 on the
Nixon administration's request to fund a new
ABM system known as Safeguard. Testifying
publicly on the need for such a system,
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird disclosed
that the Soviet Union was developing a new
missile, the SS-9, which, if deployed in
sufficient numbers, could give Moscow a first-
strike capability�that is, a capability to wipe
out all US land-based missiles�within five
years. This testimony was at odds with the
conclusions reached in a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) concerning the SS-9, prepared
six months earlier, which had previously been
briefed to the SFRC.
A few days after Laird's testimony, the
conclusions of the NIE were leaked to the New
York Times, and CIA found itself drawn into a
contentious Congressional debate by those
Senators who opposed funding the new ABM
system. Senator Fulbright, who chaired the
SFRC, requested CIA testimony on the ABM
issue�including an assessment of the SS-9�
as well as copies of all pertinent NIEs. CIA
checked with Senator Russell, who approved
CIA's briefing the contents of the NIEs but not
handing over copies of them.16
14 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study
15 For an excellent case study of this episode, see
Lundberg, Kirsten, The SS-9 Controversy: Intelligence as
a Political Football(Cambridge: John F Kennedy School of
Government, 1989)
16 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
In June, DCI Helms testified in closed session,
at the side of Secretary Laird, regarding the
Intelligence Community's assessment of the
SS-9. While the partially declassified record of
that hearing reflects an effort by Helms and
Laird to close ranks on the issue, Senator
Fulbright subsequently wrote to Laird
expressing continued objection to Safeguard
on the basis of the earlier NIE.17
In July, in preparation for the vote on funding
Safeguard, the full Senate met in closed
session to debate the issue, and CIA prepared
a classified briefing paper for use by each
Senator. On 6 August 1969 the Senate agreed
by a narrow margin to fund the Safeguard
system.
Growing Restlessness in the Early 1970s
In the following year, Congress became
agitated by press leaks, attributed to
administration officials, concerning possible
expansion of the Soviet submarine base at
Cienfuegos, Cuba. When the HASC asked to
see the overhead reconnaissance
photographs of the Soviet base, President
Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry
Kissinger, put his foot down, saying he did not
want anything on this subject shared with
Congress. Helms, however, wanted to
accommodate the HASC, one of CIA's
oversight committees, and allowed the
photographs to be shown to it. HASC chairman
Mendel Rivers took the occasion to seek out
Kissinger and tell him he would brook no
interference with his committee's right to see
intelligence.18
17 Kennedy School Case Study, pp 16-17
15 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
The large number
of contacts and
briefings in 1969
. . . (partly)
reflected CIA's
substantial
involvement in the
Congressional
debate that year
over funding the
Safeguard ABM
System.
5
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Although. . .
the Intelligence
Community
largely avoided
being-drawn into
the Watergate
affair, that debacle
nonetheless had a
profound effect
on the willingness
of Congress to
defer to executive
authority.
The number of CIA's appearances on the Hill
reached a low point in 1971,19 in part because
of Senator Russell's death that year. Relations
between CIA and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee heated up in 1972 when
the SFRC, as part of its inquiry into the
Vietnam war, requested copies of all NI Es and
Special National Intelligence Estimates
(SNIEs) relating to Southeast Asia since 1945.
CIA objected to the request but offered to
provide briefings to the committee on issues of
concern to it.
In reaction to CIA's perceived stonewalling,
Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky
introduced a bill requiring that intelligence
information and analysis be provided to
Congress; he argued that Congress could not
carry its constitutional responsibilities in the
foreign policy area without such intelligence
support. The SFRC held hearings on the
proposal, and witnesses from the Nixon
administration and the Intelligence Community
testified in vigorous opposition. The bill died in
committee.
President Nixon signed the SALT I treaty with
the Soviet Union in May 1972. The treaty
capped the total number of strategic weapons
on both sides and provided a framework to
govern future deployments of such weapons. It
was ratified by the Senate later in the year by a
wide margin. Congress had been kept well
apprised of developments in the negotiation of
the treaty since 1969 and had received an
assessment from DCI Helms that the
Intelligence Community would be able to verify
compliance. But Congress was not given (nor
did it request) the data to enable it to make its �
own independent assessment on the
verification issue.
19 The unpublished draft CIA History Staff study indicated
there were no briefings to the SASC during 1971 and only
one each to the SAC and HASC.
Once the SALT I treaty was signed, the
administration clamped down on the flow of
intelligence on this issue to the Hill. A high-
level committee was established in the
National Security Council to monitor Soviet
compliance. At Dr. Kissinger's behest, all
intelligence reporting on this subject was
ordered channeled to this committee without
further dissemination within the executive
branch or to Congress. Ford administration
officials later explained to the Pike Committee
(see below) that Kissinger wanted to preserve
the ability to raise troublesome issues with the
Soviets directly rather than have them surface
in the press or be exposed to Congress, thus
limiting the administration's flexibility in dealing
with such problems.2�
In time, however, Congress began to question
why it was not receiving CIA assessments of
possible treaty violations. In 1975 the Ford
administration permitted CIA to give its first
closed-session briefing to the SASC on Soviet
compliance with SALT 1.21
Congress grew increasingly restive in the early
1970s concerning the existing oversight
arrangements for intelligence. Senator
Russell's death in 1971 had removed the
personification of the old system from the
scene. During the same year, legislation was
offered in both houses that would have
required CIA to report on its overseas activities
to the SFRC and HFAC. Although both bills
were beaten back, they did represent a sense
of growing dissatisfaction. CIA's Legislative
Counsel advised DCI Helms that the "aging
and harassed protectors and benefactors" of
the Agency could not be expected to "hold the
lines" much longer against increasingly
aggressive Members with different outlooks
and temperaments.22 In fact, when the
chairmanship of the HASC subcommittee on
20 Ranelagh.
21 Ibld
22 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
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CIA became vacant in 1973, younger House
members rebelled, demanding broader
accountability for intelligence activities. They
succeeded in having a younger, more
assertive House Member�Lucien Nedzi of
Michigan�named chairman of the
subcommittee.
Although CIA and the rest of the Intelligence
Community largely avoided being drawn into
the Watergate affair, that debacle nonetheless
had a profound effect on the willingness of
Congress to defer to executive authority.
Where Congress had previously acquiesced, it
was now deeply skeptical, and the press fed
this skepticism. Sensing that the time was ripe,
reporters began to dig into US intelligence
activities, producing a number of sensational
exposes.
Among the revelations were reports in
September 1973 of alleged CIA involvement in
the military coup in which Chilean President
Salvador Allende was overthrown and killed.
DCI William Colby managed to turn aside a
request for testimony from a House Foreign
Affairs subcommittee in the fall of 1973, but the
CIA subcommittee of the HASC took up the
issue in April 1974, requiring that Colby
describe CIA activities undertaken in 1970 with
the intent of preventing Allende from assuming
the presidency. The leakage to the New York
Times of much of Colby's testimony sparked
an outcry in Congress and among portions of
the public, prompting various legislative
proposals to restrict or terminate CIA's
involvement in covert actions. One of these
initiatives, the so-called Hughes-Ryan
Amendment, was enacted into law; it required
that future covert actions be approved by the
President and reported to the armed services,
appropriations, and foreign affairs committees
of Congress.23
23 Enacted as Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
(22 U S C 2422)
The Senate Government Operations
Committee began hearings in October 1974 on
a new proposal to create a separate oversight
committee for intelligence. Deliberations on
this proposal were overtaken in December
1974 when the New York Times ran another
front page story, this time charging that the CIA
had conducted "a massive, illegal domestic
intelligence operation . . . against the antiwar
movement and other dissident groups in the
United States" in violation of its statutory
charter.24 The Ford administration reacted by
creating a special commission led by Vice
President Rockefeller to look into the charges.
This action did not preclude Congress,
however, from establishing separate
investigative bodies.
The Church and Pike Committees (1975-76)
The Senate acted first in January 1975 by
creating a special investigating committee led
by Senator Frank Church of Idaho. The House
followed suit a month later, establishing a
separate investigating committee under
Representative Nedzi. It subsequently came to
light, however, that Nedzi had previously been
advised of certain alleged misdeeds by the CIA
when he was chairman of the HASC
subcommittee and had done nothing about
them. Nedzi resigned amidst the furor, and a
new chairman, Otis Pike of New York, was
appointed in July 1975.
The Church Committee initially focused its
attention on allegations that intelligence
agencies had engaged in assassination plots,
collected information on the political activities
of American citizens, withheld information from
24 Hersh, Seymour, "Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S
Against Antiwar Forces," New York Times, 22 December
1974,p 1
[The Church
Committee]
attempted to
evaluate the
quality of NIEs
and to determine
whether the
process of
producing NlEs
was free of
analytic or
political bias.
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1111=1111111111111111=
The draft [Pike
Committee]
report was
extremely critical
of the Intelligence
Community's
performance
in each of
the episodes
examined by
the committee.
the Warren Commission, and conducted "dirty
tricks" aimed at discrediting and harassing US
individuals and groups. The committee's final
report, however�issued in May 1976�
addressed a much broader agenda, looking at
the role of the DCI and the operation of the
Intelligence Community generally. Among
other things, the report specifically attempted
to evaluate the quality of NIEs and to
determine whether the process used for
producing NIEs was free of analytic or political
bias. In addition, it addressed the problem of
retaining qualified analysts.25
The Church Committee report also discussed
the provision of intelligence to Congress. It
pointed out that the National Intelligence Daily
(NID) had often been shown to the SFRC and
the SASC but that NIEs had not been provided.
It noted, however, that in the preceding year
CIA had begun publishing a daily "Intelligence
Checklist," specifically tailored to what the
Agency perceived were the substantive needs
of Congress. The committee concluded with a
strong plea for better, more consistent
intelligence support:
With the resurgence of an active
Congressional role in the foreign and
national security policymaking process
comes the need for members to receive
high-quality, reliable, and timely
information on which to base
Congressional decisions and actions.
Access to the best available intelligence
product should be insisted upon by the
legislative branch. Precisely what kinds of
intelligence the Congress requires to
better perform its constitutional
responsibilities remains to be worked out
between the two branches of
25 See Church Committee's Final Report, Book I,
pp. 257-277.
government, but the Select Committee
believes that the need for information and
the right to it [are] clear26
The Pike Committee chose a different tack
from that taken by its Senate counterpart. The
Pike group focused on the performance of the
Intelligence Community in warning of
international crises during the preceding 10
years: the 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam,
the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
the 1972 declarations of martial law in the
Philippines and South Korea, the 1973 war in
the Middle East, the 1974 coup in Portugal, the
1974 nuclear explosion in India, and the 1974
Cyprus crisis.
The committee subpoenaed intelligence
analysis on each of these topics and
proceeded to hold public hearings on most of
them. After classified information was
disclosed at one of these hearings, President
Ford halted the flow of information to the
committee altogether until a process could be
agreed upon for deciding what information
would and would not be made public.
The Pike Committee also explored the earlier
clampdown by the Nixon administration on
reporting evidence of SALT I violations to the
Hill and within the executive branch. (See
preceding subsection of this study.) Although
the Pike Committee appeared motivated more
by a desire to attack Dr. Kissinger personally
than by a concern for Congressional
prerogatives, it did establish that a clampdown
had occurred. Kissinger admitted to having
delayed the flow of intelligence on Soviet
compliance with SALT I for as long as two
months. The committee ascertained that some
had been withheld for as long as six months.27
26 'bid , p 277.
27 For a description of this episode, see Smist,
pp 201-202.
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The final report of the Pike Committee was
never officially published. A draft was leaked to
newsman Daniel Schorr and printed in the
Village Voice newspaper before the security
review of the document had been completed.
In reaction to this unauthorized disclosure, the
House of Representatives voted to block
publication of the report altogether and to
disband the committee. Not surprisingly, the
draft report was extremely critical of the
performance of the Intelligence Community in
each of the episodes examined by the
committee. Notable among its
recommendations was a proposal that all NIEs
be sent to the appropriate committees of
Congress.28
Although the Pike Committee's report was not
officially approved and the Church Committee
report only touched on the provision of
intelligence to Congress, it was clear that the
old way of doing business with Congress would
no longer suffice. Oversight would no longer be
limited to a few senior Members in each body,
nor would they control the flow of intelligence
to the rest of Congress. Blind deference to the
executive where intelligence matters were
concerned would no longer be acceptable.
The SSCI and HPSCI: The Early Years
(1976-80)
In May 1976, shortly after the Church
Committee issued its final report, the Senate
adopted one of the Committee's main
recommendations by creating a permanent
oversight committee, the Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI). The resolution creating the
committee contained, among other things,
nonbinding "sense of the Senate" language
that department and agency heads should
keep the SSCI "fully and currently informed
with respect to intelligence activities" carried
out by their respective department or agency.29
28 See Pike Committee Report, pp 259-260
29 Sec 11(a) of S.Res 400, 94th Congress
Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii was named
chairman, heading a committee of 17
Members and 50 staff (including 14 holdovers
from the Church Committee staff).
Events moved more slowly in the House of
Representatives, which had been left with a
sour taste from its experience with the Pike
Committee. CIA began providing Speaker Tip
O'Neill daily intelligence briefings in 1977, but,
without a committee to turn to, the Speaker
had no vehicle for dealing with them. In June
1977 the Senate passed the first intelligence
authorization bill developed by the SSCI, but in
the absence of a counterpart committee in the
House the measure was never enacted.3� At
the urging of President Carter and new DCI
Stansfield Turner, O'Neill moved to create a
counterpart to the SSCI. The House, taking
great care to distance itself from the record of
the Pike Committee, voted to create a
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI) in July 1977. The new committee,
with 12 Members and a 20-person staff, was
chaired by Congressman Edward Boland of
Massachusetts.
The resolutions establishing oversight
committees contained language allowing
these new entities to adopt procedures
governing access by other committees, and by
individual Members, to classified information
held by the oversight committee. Both
oversight committees were structured to
ensure that some of their Members also
served on other committees with jurisdiction in
the national security area�such as the foreign
relations or armed services committees�in
order to provide a bridge to (and avoid conflict
with) these committees.
Initially, the creation of the two intelligence
committees�with broad charters to oversee
intelligence agencies and operating under
stringent security requirements�tended to
3� Smist, pp. 214-215.
Intelligence
agencies began
to regard the
oversight
committees
as "their"
committees,
and other
Congressional
committees . . .
looked to the
oversight
committees
as having the
predominant
role [concerning
intelligence].
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To this day, there
are no written
agreements
governing access
by the oversight
committees
to intelligence
information.
diminish the contacts between the Intelligence
Community and the "nonoversight"
committees of the Congress. Intelligence
agencies began to regard the oversight
committees as "their" committees, and other
Congressional committees, in turn, looked to
the oversight committees as having the
predominant role where intelligence was
concerned. In 1977, DCI Turner noted this
phenomenon and directed his staff to make a
point of expanding CIA's substantive briefings
beyond the oversight committees. He
specifically rejected a suggestion, however,
that the CIA develop special unclassified
publications for Congress on topics of current
interest. 31
Both oversight committees were conscious of
the need to develop an atmosphere of trust
between themselves and the agencies they
were to oversee if oversight was to work.
Unlike other Congressional committees, the
intelligence committees were completely
dependent upon information provided by
intelligence agencies to carry out their
functions.
For their part, the intelligence agencies geared
up to do business with the new structure. The
Office of the Legislative Counsel at CIA
expanded to a staff of 32.32 The National
Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) established offices
to deal with the new committees, and smaller
agencies designated liaison officers.
According to several people interviewed for
this study, NSA's new Director, Admiral Bobby
Ray Inman, instituted an arrangement for
passing sensitive SIGINT and "monographs"
on SIGINT activities to the staff directors of the
two oversight committees, with the proviso that
storage and handling of such information
would be strictly limited to the leaders and staff
directors of each committee.33
31 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study
32 !bid
In 1976, representatives of CIA met with senior
SSCI staffers to discuss access for the
committee to CIA information. A CIA
memorandum on the meeting indicates verbal
agreement was reached that CIA would deliver
the NID each day to the committee but that it
would not be stored there. The committee
would be furnished copies of certain finished
intelligence reports at the Secret level, but
more sensitive intelligence, classified at the
Top Secret Codeword level, would be read at
CIA headquarters and would not be stored at
the committee. NIEs could be reviewed as
needed, but the committee would not retain
copies. The committee would not have access
to the President's Daily Brief or other reporting
tailored to high-level officials, nor would it
receive "raw" (that is, unevaluated), single-
source intelligence reports. Finally, CIA
indicated its intent to protect the identity of its
clandestine sources from the committee
staff.34
Similar arrangements were worked out in 1977
with the senior staff of the HPSCI. CIA records
reflect agreement that access to especially
sensitive intelligence would be limited to the
two staff directors, the chief counsel, and the
chairman of the HPSCI.35
Both sides acknowledge that these
arrangements never amounted to more than
informal understandings. Indeed, to this day,
there are no written agreements governing
access by the oversight committees to
intelligence information.
A Deepening Relationship
An executive order issued by the Carter
administration in 1978 instructed the
intelligence agencies to keep the two
33 This practice did not extend beyond Admiral Inman's
tenure as NSA Director
34 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
35 !bid
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committees "fully and currently informed" of
their activities; this wording was carried over
from the nonbinding language in the Senate
resolution creating the SSCI. The order also
directed the DCI to "facilitate the use of
national foreign intelligence products by the
Congress in a secure manner."36 For the first
time, a President had imposed specific
obligations on intelligence agencies regarding
their support of Congress.
Later, as part of the Intelligence Oversight Act
of 1980, the "fully and currently informed"
language was enacted into law. Although this
language was intended to create an obligation
to provide information for oversight purposes
as opposed to providing substantive
enlightenment for the Congress, for the
intelligence committees this was a distinction
without a difference. The committees asserted
a need for access to substantive intelligence in
order to oversee the Intelligence Community's
performance.
In 1977 both committees created
subcommittees to deal with issues related to
intelligence analysis and production. These
subcommittees undertook a number of
comprehensive inquiries during the late 1970s.
The SSCI evaluated the so-called "A-Team,
B-Team" process for assessing the CIA's
position on Soviet strategic capabilities and
produced a number of recommendations for
improving the NIE process. The SSCI also
evaluated the integrity of the analytic process
used to produce NIEs on Soviet oil production.
The HPSCI, for its part, conducted a far-
reaching inquiry into the Intelligence
Community's performance in predicting crises.
When the Shah of Iran's regime fell apart in the
36 Sec 1-601(c) of Executive Order 12036, 24 January
1978 The same language was included in section 1.5 (s)
of Executive Order 12333, issued 4 December 1981,
which is still in effect
37 See Title IV of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1981 (50 U.S.C. 501[a] [1)).
late 1970s, the Committee shifted its focus to
that country. In 1979 it undertook a study of the
Community's performance in warning of
China's invasion of Vietnam. At around this
time, the HPSCI also produced a study of the
NIE system as it related to indications and
warning of hostilities, recommending creation
of a new National Intelligence Officer for
Warning. CIA subsequently adopted this
recommendation.
Each of these studies was done in the name of
oversight and involved access to substantial
amounts of intelligence analysis. For the
inquiry into the Shah's fall from power, for
example, CIA provided its entire production on
the subject to the HPSCI.38
A few months before the signing of the SALT ll
treaty in June 1979, the SSCI launched an
extensive inquiry into the ability of the
Intelligence Community to verify the treaty. The
committee made a request, unprecedented in
its scope, for detailed information on all
intelligence collection capabilities available to
monitor treaty compliance. In the end, the
committee received what it asked for, albeit
with certain handling restrictions. Even today,
the SSCI staffers involved in that inquiry regard
it as a watershed in terms of the committee's
access to intelligence. The committee
previously had not been permitted to receive
and store highly sensitive information.
Ultimately, the SSCI produced a brief,
unclassified report of its findings for the Senate
as a whole, as well as a detailed classified
report that was made available to Senators on
request. Although consideration of the SALT II
treaty was halted at President Carter's request
in December 1979 because of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the SSCI's work on
38 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study
In 1977 both
committees
created
subcommittees
to deal with
issues related
to intelligence
analysis and
production.
. . . The HPSCI
conducted a
far-reaching
inquiry into
the Intelligence
Community's
performance in
predicting crises.
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111111111�1111
The trend toward
ever-greater
sharing of
intelligence
continued
through the
1980s.
the treaty contrasted sharply with the manner
in which SALT I had been handled seven years
before when the SSCI did not exist.
By 1980 it was clear that the relationship
between Congress and the Intelligence
Community had fundamentally changed. As
indicated above, the obligation of intelligence
agencies to keep the oversight committees
"fully and currently informed" had been
established by law. A general obligation to
"facilitate the use" of intelligence products by
Congress had been established by executive
order.
Not surprisingly, CIA records reflect a major
upsurge in the information going to Congress
during the last half of the 1970s. In 1975,
before the oversight committees were
established, the Agency gave 188 substantive
briefings on the Hill and furnished 204
classified intelligence products (excluding the
NID). In 1979 the number of substantive
briefings had risen to 420 and the number of
classified intelligence products to
approximately 1,800.39
Principally through its oversight committees,
Congress thus had become a major consumer
of intelligence and had won access to
information of unprecedented scope and
sensitivity. The intelligence oversight
committees had supplanted the armed
services and foreign relations committees as
the principal repositories for substantive
intelligence and had, for the most part,
established themselves as responsible
partners who could be entrusted to protect
sensitive information.
Intelligence-Sharing in the 1980s
The trend toward ever-greater sharing of
intelligence continued through the 1980s,
despite both sides' preoccupation with covert
39 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
actions undertaken during the Reagan
administration, especially the so-called Iran-
Contra affair.
When William Casey became DCI in 1981, he
sought to play down the importance of the
Agency's relationship with its Congressional
overseers. He combined the Office of
Legislative Counsel with the Office of Public
Affairs, renaming the new entity the Legislative
Liaison Division. The chief of the division was
a career officer from the Directorate of
Operations, who was perceived by Members
and staff alike as being less than forthcoming.
Even so, the oversight committees continued
to receive most of the finished intelligence
produced by the Intelligence Community and
could call upon analytic elements within the
Community�in particular, CIA, DIA, NSA, and
the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR)�for briefings and other
types of substantive support. In the early
1980s the oversight committees began
receiving copies of NIEs, which they previously
had been allowed to read but could not store.
This development, in turn, led the committees
occasionally to seek�and obtain�access to
"raw" intelligence to verify judgments
presented in the NIEs. Increasingly
preoccupied with the CIA's covert action
program in Nicaragua, the committees also
sought and received access to "raw"
intelligence on that country in order to learn
what impact the CIA's program was having.
When identities of sources became relevant to
committee investigations of alleged
malfeasance, the CIA occasionally even made
exceptions to its policy against revealing them.
After the Iran-Contra affair exploded in the fall
of 1986, thousands of additional CIA
documents were turned over to Congress,
initially to the intelligence committees
themselves and later to the special
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Then Deputy Director Robert Gates appearing before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the
mid-1980s.
investigating committees appointed in each
House. The Iran-Contra problem consumed
the CIA and Congress for more than a year.
In late 1986, after the disclosure of arms sales
to Iran, CIA took a noticeably more forthcoming
position on support to Congress. The
Legislative Liaison Division was once again
given a separate identity and renamed the
Office of Congressional Affairs, and a new
director with a background in intelligence
analysis was appointed. One of his first
Initiatives was an attempt to institute weekly
intelligence briefings for each of the oversight
committees to keep them abreast of world
developments. The HPSCI agreed to such
briefings, but attendance soon fell off and the
briefings were discontinued; the SSCI was too
busy to schedule them at all. Even so, a
marked increase occurred in the number of
substantive briefings requested by both
oversight and nonoversight committees during
the mid-to-late 1980s, prompted largely by the
changes taking place in the Soviet Union.
In 1987 the Senate leadership, in response to
SSCI recommendations, established an Office
of Senate Security to serve as a secure
repository for classified documents sent to
Senate committees other than the SSCI; this
office also was to serve as a central point for
processing security clearances for Senate
staff. A similar initiative was considered by the
House of Representatives but was not
implemented.
Also in 1987, the SSCI undertook another in-
depth examination of an arms control treaty�
the INF Treaty. The result was a 350-page
classified report on the Intelligence
Community's ability to monitor this treaty. As a
result of the SSCI's work, aspects of the treaty
relating to on-site inspections had to be
renegotiated. In the end, the SSCI's work
played a major role in the Senate's "advice and
consent on ratification.
As a result of
the SSCI's work,
aspects of the
pNF] Treaty
relating to on-
site inspections
had to be
renegotiated.
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"Politicization"
took on a new
meaning for the
managers and
overseers of
intelligence
agencies. . . [as]
an evil to be
avoided at all
costs.
The level of analytical support furnished to
Congress as a whole continued to be high. In
1988, CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs
reported that more than 1,000 substantive
intelligence briefings had been provided to
Members, committees, and staffs during the
year. More than 4,000 classified publications
had been sent to the Hill, and Members and
staff had made more than 100 visits to CIA
facilities abroad."
Developments in the 1990s
The cataclysmic events on the world stage
between 1989 and 1991�the fall of
Communist governments in Eastern Europe,
the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the
Persian Gulf war, and the collapse of
Communism in Russia itself�produced heavy
demands on the Intelligence Community to
provide information to Congress. Requests
became particularly intense in the runup to the
Gulf war when President Bush asked
Congress to approve the commitment of US
military forces in the Gulf (discussed in part V
of this study).
In 1991 the confirmation hearings of Robert
Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence
provided the first-ever public setting for a
Congressional examination of intelligence
analysis. The principal issue explored by the
SSCI was whether CIA analysis had been
distorted or slanted for political purposes
during Casey's tenure as DCI and Gates' years
as DDI and DDCI. After a long and wrenching
inquiry into more than 20 disputed cases, the
committee recommended approval of Gates'
nomination and the full Senate concurred.
But the Gates hearings left an indelible imprint
on the Intelligence Community, Congress, and
the rest of the executive branch. While the
production of objective, unbiased analysis had
42 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study
long been a precept of intelligence analysts,
"politicization" took on new meaning for the
managers and overseers of intelligence
agencies, who were profoundly sensitized by
the Gates hearings that "politicizing"
intelligence was an evil to be avoided at all
costs.
In the year following Gates' confirmation, both
intelligence committees considered new
legislation offered by their respective chairmen
(Senator David Boren and Congressman Dave
McCurdy, both of Oklahoma) to reform the
Intelligence Community. While the more
radical elements of these proposals fell by the
wayside, in October 1992 Congress did
enact�with the acquiescence of the executive
branch�a major restatement of the duties and
authorities of the DCI vis-a-vis the rest of the
Intelligence Community.'" Among other things,
the legislation spelled out the DCI's
responsibility to provide substantive
intelligence that was "timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and
based upon all sources available to the
Intelligence Community" to customers in the
executive branch, and "where appropriate, to
the Senate and House of Representatives and
the committees thereof" (italics added)." This
was the first time that the requirement to
provide intelligence to Congress had been
expressly stated in law.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the bill
provided no elaboration of Congress's intent
with respect to this aspect of the DCI's
responsibilities. Although the qualifying phrase
"where appropriate" cried out for clarification,
41 See Title VII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993
42 Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended
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the language sailed through without debate by
the Congress and without formal comment by
the executive branch.43
In the first year of the Clinton administration,
Congressional votes on sending US troops to
Haiti and on legislation to implement the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
generated increased Congressional demands
for intelligence briefings on these subjects.
Early in 1994 a 30-year employee of the CIA's
Directorate of Operations, Aldrich Ames, and
his wife Rosario were arrested for espionage
on behalf of the Soviet Union and later Russia.
Ames's activities had gone undetected for
almost nine years and had resulted in the
death or imprisonment of virtually all of the
CIA's Soviet agents in the mid-1980s. After
Ames pled guilty in May 1994, the CIA's
43 Permitting myself a personal note here, as author of this
language and principal coordinator of the legislation, I was
advised by representatives of the executive branch that
they did not see this language as anything more than a
codification of the existing practice, and, so long as some
type of qualifying language was present, they would not
object to it. Indeed, they preferred not to tackle the thorny
issues involved in specifying what support would, from the
executive standpoint, be "appropriate"
Inspector General and both intelligence
committees initiated extensive inquiries into
the case.
In the public's mind, what emerged from these
inquiries in the fall of 1994 was a picture of an
agency whose professionalism was suspect
and whose employees ,seemed to be
unaccountable for their deficiencies. Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York
introduced legislation to do away with CIA
entirely; other legislators called for a
reexamination of the Agency's missions and
functions. Fairly or not, other intelligence
agencies were also tarred by the case.
Paradoxically, perhaps, the demand for
intelligence by the Congress did not diminish.
The impression of several Congressional
staffers interviewed for this study was that,
after the Ames debacle, CIA and other
intelligence agencies were more intent than
ever on restoring their image by proving
themselves responsive. When new Republican
majorities came into power at the beginning of
the 104th Congress, both Houses found an
Intelligence Community ready and willing to
support their needs.
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twoo.
II. What Distinguishes Congress as
a Consumer of Intelligence?
Congressional Responsibilities
The Constitution assigns functions to
Congress that are clearly facilitated by access
to intelligence. Among other responsibilities,
Congress must provide "advice and consent"
on treaties with other governments, approve
the appointment of ambassadors, declare war,
regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and
raise and support the armed forces. It also
must appropriate the funds necessary for the
conduct of the government's business,
including support for US military deployments
abroad, development and fielding of weapons
systems, provision of financial assistance to
other governments, and defense of the United
States from threats outside its borders. The
legislative power itself can be used to mandate
or curtail defense and foreign policy initiatives
by the executive.
Clearly, the information collected and analyzed
by intelligence agencies can have a bearing on
the conduct of these responsibilities. But
intelligence agencies are part of the executive
branch, created by law and executive order
principally to serve that branch in the execution
of its responsibilities. Moreover, a great deal of
information about "things foreign" is available
to Congress without resort to intelligence
agencies. For example, it has its own highly
capable research arm�the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress�
to provide information and analysis using
publicly available sources.
Still, US intelligence agencies often develop
information pertinent to Congressional
responsibilities that is not found in publicly
available sources. Although the flow of this
information to Congress has varied over time,
it appears that the Intelligence Community, if
not the executive branch itself, has�at least
since 1947�accepted as a matter of principle
the right of Congress to have information that
bears upon its constitutional functions, albeit
under sometimes controlled and limited
conditions.
Some observers suggest that the executive
branch provides intelligence to the Congress
out of "comity"�that is, the executive
recognizes that it controls information needed
by another branch of government to perform its
functions, and therefore provides it. Others
regard the 1980 law requiring that the
executive branch keep the intelligence
committees "fully and currently informed of
intelligence activities," and the 1992 law
requiring the DCI to provide intelligence
support to Congress "where appropriate," as
legislative mandates to share intelligence.
Neither the constitutional responsibilities of
Congress nor the two statutory mandates cited
above, however, have been interpreted by the
executive to require that all intelligence be
turned over to the Congress, nor has Congress
historically sought such access. As one
intelligence official put it: "None of our
customers has a right to all of the intelligence
that is produced, not even the Congress. We
will give it to them in due course if they need it.
But they cannot see everything that is
produced. The President has the right, if not
the responsibility, to control it."
No case has reached US courts that involved a
refusal by the executive to turn over
intelligence information requested by
Congress for the performance of its functions,
whether pursuant to the Constitution or a
statute. Thus the courts have never addressed
the boundaries between the executive and
legislative branches where Congressional
access to intelligence is concerned.
In addition to the functions specified in the
Constitution, the Congress carries out other
duties implicit in these constitutional roles,
which are also cited as justification for access
to intelligence. The most significant of these
functions is oversight, which entails keeping
track of how appropriated funds are spent and
whether the activities of the executive branch
The courts have
never addressed
the boundaries
between the
executive and
legislative
branches where
Congressional
access to
intelligence is
concerned.
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As more Members
have become
accustomed
to receiving
intelligence, their
first reaction (to
a breaking story]
is increasingly:
"What does the
Community have
on this?"
are consistent with the law." The committees
of Congress expressly charged with oversight
of US intelligence activities�the SSCI and the
HPSCI�assert in principle the right of
unrestricted access to intelligence information,
including all substantive analysis, in order to
perform their oversight function. The statute
establishing this right of access recognizes no
exceptions." In practice, however, the
oversight committees have not sought access
to all intelligence information.
Members also say they need access to
intelligence to serve their constituents. Where
constituents are concerned about a specific
foreign threat�for example, narcotics
smuggling, illegal immigration, or terrorism
against Americans�or about the actions of a
foreign government (such as denial of a
contract to a local US firm), Members of
Congress assert a right to know what the
government knows, including pertinent
intelligence�even if they cannot pass it along
to their constituents�in order to be able to
advise and counsel them properly.
Finally, Members of Congress as public figures
and officeholders simply need to be able to
comment knowledgeably with respect to
international developments, whether to the
news media, to foreign visitors, or to foreign
officials whom they meet in the United States
or abroad." Members are frequently asked for
their reactions, perhaps even as a story is
breaking or before the reliability of a press
report is established. Naturally, they do not
wish to appear ill informed. As more Members
44 The courts have recognized oversight of the executive
branch by Congress as a function implied in its
constitutional responsibilities. See McGrain v. Daughtery
273 US 135 (1927), Watkins v. United States 354 US 178
(1957).
46 Section 502-2 of the National Security Act of 1947.
46 Some interviewed for this article would distinguish
between the House and Senate in this regard, with most
Senators being seen as "public figures" whose comments
were sought on foreign affairs, whereas only a small
percentage of Representatives fell in this category.
have become accustomed to receiving
intelligence, their first reaction is increasingly:
'What does the Community have on this?" In
this regard, they are not different from
policymakers in the executive branch. In many
other respects, they are quite dissimilar.
Comparing Congressional With Executive
Consumers
Few Members of Congress have expertise in
national security matters at the time they are
elected. To the extent that they acquire such
expertise, it usually comes from service on a
committee or committees with jurisdiction in
the area or, occasionally, because a Member
takes a personal interest in an issue. Most
consumers in the executive branch, by
contrast, have been selected for their positions
precisely because of their expertise in some
aspect of national security affairs.
Members' time is necessarily spread across
the gamut of public affairs, from local to
national to international. It is not unusual for a
Member to start the day meeting with
constituents who want a federal job for their
child, then listen to a group of lobbyists who
want favorable tax treatment for their trucking
union, testify at a hearing on the AIDS
epidemic, go to the floor to cast a vote on
sending troops to country X, and return to meet
with the ambassador of country Y. Mixed in
may be meetings with their respective party
organizations, speeches on the floor and
before various private groups, media
interviews, and fundraising activities.
Intelligence consumers in the executive branch
typically have well-defined areas of
responsibility within the national security
arena�some broader than others. Although
their schedules may be as busy as those of
Members of Congress, there is usually a
clearer focus to them.
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Throughout the day, Members of Congress are
bombarded with information: press clips and
notes assembled by their staffs, staff briefings,
hearings, conversations with their colleagues,
phone calls from constituents, and so forth.
Every Member's office monitors what is
transpiring on the floor. One person
interviewed for this article likened Members to
"360-degree phased-array radars, constantly
whirling, picking up blips of information here
and there on their screens."
Policymakers in the executive branch are
equally as likely to be bombarded with
information, but on a more confined range of
topics and by a smaller, less diverse group of
interlocutors. They also are more apt to
distinguish between the sources of the
information coming to them and are more likely
to challenge them.
The needs of policymakers for intelligence also
tend to be more regular and action oriented.
They use intelligence to make daily decisions:
to vote at a meeting, to determine the direction
of their program, to decide on the next step in
the dialogue with a foreign counterpart, or to
respond to a crisis. Within their respective
areas of responsibility, policymakers are
constantly updating their databases, factoring
in pertinent day-to-day developments
disclosed in intelligence reporting. If they are
policymakers who make good use of
intelligence, they are engaged in a constant
dialogue with intelligence producers, refining
their requirements for information.
Members of Congress, on the other hand,
rarely have the time to keep abreast of day-to-
day developments. Votes that might be
influenced by intelligence reporting do not
come down the Congressional pike with much
regularity. While some committee staffers and
a few individual Members may attempt to keep
up with the daily intelligence reporting on
particular topics, the needs of most Members
are likely to be episodic and reactive. As one
intelligence official put it: "They are observers,
rather than customers in the usual sense. They
get energized once in a while but, for the most
part, we don't have the same ongoing dialogue
with them that we have with customers [in the
executive branch]."
On the other hand, another intelligence official
noted, "there are times�usually when crises
occur�when [Congress's] appetite [for
intelligence] is insatiable. It's during these
times that they just about overwhelm us."
Members' appetites invariably grow when they
are faced with a vote on a national security
issue that is politically controversial, such as
whether to send US military forces into a
hostile situation. Such votes sometimes arise
on the spur of the moment�for example, when
an amendment is offered unexpectedly on the
floor�but more often they occur with sufficient
advance notice that Members who want to
educate themselves are able to do so. It is on
such occasions that intelligence agencies are
usually called upon for their information and
expertise. As one intelligence official noted:
"Over the last five or six years, the Hill has
developed a far greater appreciation of
intelligence, of what intelligence sources and
methods can do for you. There has been a
quantum leap, for example, in what Congress
now expects to know before a vote to commit
US military forces abroad."
Another important distinction is the milieu in
which each branch operates. Policymakers in
the national security arena are accustomed to
operating in a secure environment when
dealing with classified information, whereas
most Members of Congress are not. Members
who serve on committees with responsibilities
in national security matters ordinarily come to
appreciate the rules governing the disclosure
of intelligence and why they are important. But
Members who have not served on these
committees often lack such understanding.
One analyst interviewed for this study
described a briefing he had provided to a
particular Member of Congress who had no
One person
interviewed
for this article
likened Members
to "360-degree
phased-array
radars,
constantly
whirling, picking
up blips of
information here
and there on their
screens."
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If briefings do not
lend support to
Members' own
positions, one
analyst noted,
"they are apt to
bash you over the
head for it."
background in national security. At the end of
the briefing, the Member told the analyst that
"the American people need to know what you
have just told me." When the analyst reminded
the Member that the briefing was classified,
she replied, "Well, I'm declassifying it." [In this
case, staff was able to restrain the Member
from disclosing the intelligence.]
Far from living in an environment where
information is tightly controlled, Congress does
most of its business in public. It is, first and
foremost, a political institution. Members
constantly seek opportunities to get
themselves and their positions before the
public. Moreover, they are constantly sifting
through the information that reaches them to
find ammunition for use in their political battles.
At hearings or briefings, their questions
frequently are aimed at eliciting information
that supports a position they have taken or
plan to take, at times straining to the point
where the connection with the substance of the
hearing or briefing is totally lost to the witness.
Indeed, if briefings do not lend support to
Members' preordained positions, as one
analyst noted, "they are apt to bash you over
the head for it."
If a Member becomes aware that the executive
branch possesses intelligence that
undermines the administration's position on a
particular issue or lends credence to the
Member's own position, he or she will be
especially anxious to have it. And once in
hand, the stronger the implications of such
information for their position, the greater will be
the temptation to use it. "The public," the
Member will contend, "has a right to know."
Policymakers also are looking for ammunition
to use in their bureaucratic struggles, but these
are not ordinarily played out in public view.
Occasions arise when the executive branch
decides to disclose intelligence to the public
(either officially or unofficially) in order to make
its case to Congress. However, the ability that
the executive once had to make selective use
of intelligence with Congress has been
substantially eroded by the independent
access that the legislative branch now has.
For policymakers, intelligence information
usually forms but one element�and perhaps
not the most important one�in their
decisionmaking process. US capabilities,
diplomatic considerations, domestic
implications, and public sentiment all will be
factored in and may indicate a course of action
different from that indicated by the intelligence
reporting.
Congress, on the other hand, is usually more
inclined' to give credence to intelligence
reporting and to attach less significance to
other factors. As one policymaker put it,
"Congress regards intelligence as plaster of
paris, while we regard it as clay." Intelligence is
viewed as untainted by political bias and
therefore as more reliable than the information
provided by policymakers, who are seen as
touting the administration's political line. As
one observer in the executive branch ruefully
noted, "The good news is, Congress takes
intelligence very seriously. The bad news is,
Congress takes intelligence very seriously."
How the Intelligence Community Relates to
Congress as a Consumer
By most accounts, intelligence agencies have
come to regard substantive support to
Congress as an important part of their mission.
As one CIA analyst explained, "Until recent
years, we did not see our mission as helping
Congress make decisions. There were no
coherent objectives which governed our
relationship with the Hill beyond the protection
of the DO's [Directorate of Operations's]
equities. . . Most people in the Agency now
have come to appreciate Congress as a
partner, that Congress has important roles to
perform, and it's silly for us not to help them
execute those roles."
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11�111.1111111111111111111111111
Others are not so sanguine. As one
intelligence official noted, "intelligence
agencies pay lipservice to enlightening
Congress on substantive topics, but what
really motivates them are the oversight and
funding responsibilities of the intelligence
committees. They want to show what they can
do in order to get funding for their programs."
Several analysts interviewed for this article
conceded as much.
Whatever may motivate intelligence agencies,
they do not relate to Congress in the same way
they relate to consumers in the executive
branch. For one thing, intelligence officials
worry more about what Congress will do with
the intelligence it is given than they do about
what policymakers do with it. While most
acknowledge that Congress has a good track
record on protection of classified information,
they also recognize that they will have very
little control once the intelligence is imparted.
One intelligence official said, "Wittingly or not,
this affects what analysts say on the Hill and
how they say it. They are more guarded." Such
hesitancy will be especially apparent when the
audience for a briefing has a track record of
making political use of intelligence information.
'The tendency," said one intelligence official,
"will be to be a little less forward-leaning."
_
The Intelligence Community also does not
involve Congress in the same way as other
consumers in setting requirements and
priorities for collection and analysis. In the
executive branch, a formal process exists
whereby consumers are consulted about their
requirements and priorities for intelligence
collection. These are translated into detailed
collection guidance for the Intelligence
Community as a whole. Beyond this formal
process, executive branch consumers are
frequently consulted as part of the ongoing
process for tasking collection assets.
Congressional consumers, on the other hand,
are not consulted as part of this process. Nor
are they consulted about potential topics for
intelligence analysis, such as NIEs. Moreover,
while the DCI is charged with evaluating the
utility of intelligence to consumers within the
government, this role has never been seen as
extending to the utility of intelligence to
Congress.
Many interviewed for this study pointed out,
however, that whether or not the needs of
Congress are formally considered in setting
requirements and priorities for collection or
analysis, Congress can obtain "whatever it
wants whenever it wants it" from the
Intelligence Community. Indeed, some in the
executive branch believe Congress's needs
receive preferential treatment from the
Intelligence Community over those of
consumers in the executive. As one executive
official noted: !The Community will not accept
requirements from us unless they come from
an Assistant Secretary. Whereas where
Congress is concerned, they will do whatever
any staffer says he or she wants them to do�
whatever it takes . . . For Congress, the
Intelligence Community is the candy store
that's always open."
Others contend that it would be impractical in
any case to attempt to integrate Congressional
needs into the process used to identify and
satisfy the needs of executive branch
consumers. Congressional needs are, for the
most part, impossible to predict in advance,
and no process exists within Congress for
producing an agreed-upon set of requirements
for collection and analysis. Many in the
executive branch suspect that, if such a
process were to be attempted, it would be
"your worst nightmare," driven by
Congressional staff rather than Members and
overwhelming the capabilities that now exist to
support the needs of the executive branch.
Notably, the Congressional staffers
interviewed for this article did not disagree.
While some pointed out that there were events
on the Congressional calendar requiring
While most
[intelligence
officials]
acknowledge that
Congress has a
good track record
on protection
of classified
information, they
also recognize
that they will have
very little control
once the
intelligence is
imparted.
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intelligence support that could be anticipated,
such as votes on "most favored nation"
treatment for China or arms control treaties,
they also acknowledged that most intelligence
was provided in response to events and
developments that could not readily be
predicted. So long as they could continue to
get what they need when they needed it, they
were content to rely on intelligence that was
produced for use by executive branch
consumers and leave themselves out of the
requirements and priorities process.
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III. How Intelligence-Sharing Works
at Present
There are no written rules, agreed to by both
branches, governing what intelligence will be
shared with the Hill or how it will be handled.
The current system is entirely the product of
experience, shaped by the needs and
concerns of both branches over the last 20
years. While some aspects of current practice
appear to have achieved the status of mutually
accepted "policy," few represent hard-and-fast
rules. "Policy" will give way when it has to.
In General
All Members of Congress have access to
intelligence by virtue of their elected positions.
They do not receive security clearances
per se.
Congressional staffers who require access to
intelligence in connection with their official
duties receive security clearances based on
background investigations conducted by the
FBI. They are not required to take polygraphs.
As a general rule, only committee staffers
receive clearances; those in Members'
personal offices do not.
Classified intelligence reports47 are routinely
provided only to the committees that have
responsibilities in the national security area."
Members of these committees receive
preference from the Intelligence Community in
satisfying their requests on an individual basis.
Among the national security committees, the
intelligence committees and their Members are
accorded preferential treatment, as discussed
below.
47 More than 30 Congressional committees have electronic
access to an unclassified computer service, FBIS Online,
operated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service of
the CIA, which provides access to foreign media and other
information derived from publicly available sources.
48 These include the Senate Appropriations Committee,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate
Armed Services Committee, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, the House Appropriations Committee, the
House International Relations Committee, the House
National Security Committee, and the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
The leadership in each chamber�the Majority
and Minority Leaders of the Senate and the
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives�are ex officio members of
their respective intelligence committees and
have access to intelligence held by the
committees. Typically, a member of each
leader's staff serves as liaison to the
intelligence committee, keeping up with the
committee's activities and serving as a conduit
for information to his or her boss. Each of these
Congressional leaders also has staff
responsible for national security issues who
can make independent requests to the
Intelligence Community for support�which
may include briefings and/or written analysis.
While Congressional leaders rarely have time
to get involved in intelligence matters
themselves, there are exceptions. Speaker
Newt Gingrich, for example, has made a point
of scheduling regular meetings with the DCI to
cover substantive as well as operational
matters.
Committees that do not have national security
responsibilities and individual Members who
do not serve on national security committees
may request intelligence support but are
typically given a lower priority. Intelligence
agencies do, nevertheless, try to
accommodate them in some fashion, usually
by providing briefings. On occasion, typically in
connection with a vote in either House on a
national security issue, the Intelligence
Community will be asked to provide briefings
that are open to the entire body. These are
ordinarily arranged at the request of the
leadership in either House and are held in a
secure briefing room on the fourth floor of the
Capitol.
The two intelligence committees are the
repositories of most intelligence shared with
Congress. Their offices and hearing rooms are
physically located in "vaulted" areas that meet
the DCI's standards for storage and discussion
of information relating to intelligence sources
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While the
intelligence
committees
receive the
lion's share
of intelligence
provided to
Congress, the
trend over the
last two years has
been toward
expansion of the
amount going
to the (other]
"national
security"
committees.
and methods. They are guarded around the
clock by the Capitol Hill police. Visitors must be
cleared into these areas and escorted while
inside.
The other "national security" committees, by
contrast, have offices that are not secure and
that are open to the public. In the Senate the
Office of Security serves as the storage
repository for SCI material made available to
the SASC, SFRC, and SAC. In the House,
individual committees (the HNSC, HIRC, and
HAC) have small repositories for storing SCI
material. Typically, the senior staff of these
committees, and/or staffers with responsibility
for issues to which intelligence may relate, are
cleared for intelligence information.
The 104th Congress saw a marked increase in
interactions with these committees, especially
with the HNSC, HIRC, SASC, and SFRC.49
Some of the people interviewed attributed this
increase to the fact that the new Republican
majorities on these committees were anxious
to find a source of information with which to
challenge the incumbent Democratic
administration. Others pointed to the fact that
certain staffers on these committees had
served in previous Republican administrations
and were more attuned to what they could
obtain from intelligence agencies. In any event,
while the intelligence committees continue to
receive the lion's share of intelligence provided
to Congress, the trend over the last two years
has been toward expansion of the amount
going to the "national security" committees
other than the intelligence committees.
Access to Finished Intelligence
The intelligence committees today receive
hard copies of most finished intelligence
published by the Intelligence Community for
49 From statistics compiled by CIA's Office of
Congressional Affairs.
general circulation. What is given to one
chamber's intelligence committee is given to
the other.
When new publications are created or new
analytic "art forms" are developed for general
circulation, they usually are made available
sooner or later to the intelligence committees,
either because someone on one of the
committees hears of them or because
someone in an intelligence agency realizes
that the intelligence committees should be
included on the distribution list. There is no
systematic process, however, for deciding
which publications should and which should
not go to the two intelligence committees.
Intelligence agencies also make no effort to
screen the publications provided for content; if
the publications are on the list to go to the
committees, they go. At present, these
publications include current intelligence,
notably the National Intelligence Daily (NID)
and DIA's Military Intelligence Digest (MID), as
well as estimative intelligence, including all
NIEs. In 1995 approximately 5,000 such
publications were delivered to each of the
intelligence committees.
In addition, both intelligence committees in
1996 installed computer terminals linking them
to an Intelligence Community network
(PolicyNet) that provides electronic access to
most finished intelligence and, in some cases,
to intelligence reports that are not provided in
hard copy�for example, certain analysis done
by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at
the State Department. Daily digests of NSA
SIGINT reporting�"single-source reports,"
referred to as "product" by NSA�also are
available via PolicyNet. The committees
expect to link up in the ndar future to another
Intelligence Community computer network that
will provide electronic access to an even
broader range of reporting.
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By contrast, the other "national security"
committees receive copies of the NID and the
MID but must request copies of other finished
intelligence (including NIEs) from lists that are
regularly provided by the principal production
agencies (CIA and DIA). These lists are keyed
to the particular jurisdiction and level of
clearance of each committee. At this juncture,
none of these committees has electronic
access to intelligence reporting.
Committees with responsibilities outside the
national security area do not receive
intelligence publications at all, nor are they
given lists of such publications from which to
choose. If such committees request
intelligence support, it is ordinarily provided to
them through briefings rather than in the form
of classified documents.
Use of finished intelligence provided to the
Hill�either in hard copy or by electronic
means�appears limited. Although the MD
and MID are read regularly by staff of the
national security committees, Members rarely
take the time to do so. If they are informed at
all, it usually occurs when staffers brief them or
show them items of interest.
Most of the finished intelligence furnished to
the two oversight committees is, in fact, read
by no one, and only occasionally does that
which is read prompt a followup. Staffers of the
oversight committees will, at the direction of
Members or on their own initiative, follow the
intelligence reporting on topics known to be of
interest to Members. When Members have
questions or crises occur, the availability of the
previous reporting also gives the staff a means
to quickly check the Community's
performance. Staffers sometimes also consult
previous reporting to prepare a Member for a
foreign trip or a meeting with a foreign
dignitary. Generally speaking, though,
Members and staff say they are too busy to
read the voluminous number of intelligence
reports that come in each day. As one staffer
conceded, "I cannot, in good conscience,
recommend to my Member that it is worth his
time to come in here and read this stuff.
Frankly, it is not even worth my time."
Staffers of the other national security
committees also concede that they may or may
not read the intelligence publications they
request, depending upon circumstances at the
time the requested publication arrives.
Finished intelligence that is not published for
general circulation is not routinely shared with
Congress. For example, the Hill does not
receive copies of the President's Daily Brief
(PDB), prepared daily by CIA. Nor does it
receive copies of the daily intelligence
summaries prepared for the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, or the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Moreover, it does not receive "memo dissems"
prepared by CIA for use by White House
principals on various topics or tailored
materials requested by top-level officials
during their daily briefings. Occasionally, as
part of an oversight investigation, intelligence
committee staffers are shown portions of such
tailored reporting�including the PDB�but
regular access has not been accorded.
Intelligence officials distinguish this type of
publication�tailored to the needs of the
President and other high-level officials�from
other finished intelligence that has a more
general circulation. Tailored analysis is keyed
to the needs and interests of the officials
concerned: their contacts with foreign
counterparts, the reactions of those
counterparts to what the US officials have said,
events on their schedules, and particular
interests they have voiced. This analysis is so
tied to the functioning of the executive branch,
said one official, that distribution to Congress
would be "inappropriate."
Although the NID
and MID are read _
regularly by staff
of the national
security
committees,
Members rarely
take the time
to do so.
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What intelligence
is assimilated by
Congress comes
principally
through
briefings, which
are provided by
one intelligence
agency or
another virtually
every day when
Congress is in
session.
The Members and staff interviewed for this
study generally acquiesced in this
arrangement. Most believed that
Congressional needs were satisfied by access
to finished intelligence intended for general
circulation, particularly the NID, and that
access to intelligence reporting tailored for
high-level officials in the executive branch
would not substantially improve their
knowledge base. While access to this analysis
might satisfy their curiosity, they did not see it
as worth the "pitched battle" that pressing for
routine access would inevitably trigger.
Congress also does not routinely see "raw"
intelligence�unevaluated intelligence
reporting, usually from a single source. The
intelligence committees, however,
occasionally receive "nonstandard"
distributions of single-source intelligence on
matters in which they have expressed a
particular interest, such as satellite imagery of
suspected mass grave sites in Bosnia. They
also are occasionally granted access to "raw"
intelligence for purposes of carrying out an
oversight investigation.
Intelligence officials note that, as a practical
matter, the volume of "raw" intelligence is such
that the intelligence committees would be
incapable of storing it. They also justify the
current policy on security grounds�the need
to avoid jeopardizing sensitive source
information�as well as on the grounds that it
would be "dangerous" to give Congress
unevaluated, single-source reporting that has
not been placed in context by analysts who
have "all-source" access. As one official noted,
"It's bad enough that policymakers get this stuff
and run with it. Can you imagine what would
happen if we gave it to Congress?"
Intelligence committee staffers, for their part,
acknowledge the impracticality of receiving all
of the raw intelligence produced by the
Intelligence Community. Some chafe,
however, at the suggestion that "raw
intelligence" should, as a matter of principle,
not be available to them because of security
concerns or their inability to evaluate its
significance, noting that such reporting is
widely available to consumers in the executive
branch.
Some of those interviewed believe Congress
receives a skewed impression of the
performance of the Intelligence Community
because it sees only finished intelligence
intended for general circulation. As one
Congressional staffer noted: "What we see up
here is the reporting that deals with macro
issues, that tries to predict outcomes, etc. The
real strength of the Intelligence Community is
in producing tactical information�hard
information that people can act on. Very little of
this kind of information gets into the NID, and
consumers who only read the NID really have
very little appreciation for what the Intelligence
Community is actually doing."
A former Congressional staffer was perhaps
more realistic: "It's really irrelevant what kind of
published intelligence is sent to the Hill.
Nobody has time to read it anyway."
Access to Intelligence Through Briefings
What intelligence is assimilated by Congress
comes principally through briefings, which are
provided by one intelligence agency or another
virtually every day when Congress is in
session. These may occur in formal settings�
open or closed hearings�or in informal
settings where no records of the proceedings
are maintained. Briefings may be presented to
committees, individual Members, committee
staffs, or individual staff members, as the
situation requires. While most briefings are
performed at the request of Members or staff,
intelligence agencies also provide briefings on
their own initiative when they have information
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IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
they believe should be shared with the Hill. The
agencies especially feel such an obligation
toward the intelligence committees, but
increasingly they also have a sense of
commitment to other committees that have
explicitly asked to be kept informed of
developments in particular areas.
Intelligence briefings are requested for various
purposes. Committees want to stay apprised
of developments in their areas of responsibility.
Often Members simply want to understand
developments abroad in order to be able to
comment knowledgeably about them. Not
infrequently, such requests are prompted by
events reported in the press or seen on CNN.
Briefings are also requested to help Members
decide how to vote on particular issues or to
provide background to Members crafting
legislative initiatives in the foreign policy area.
Individual Members, moreover, may request
intelligence briefings in preparation for foreign
trips or for meetings with foreign officials. CIA
records reflect 39 briefings of this nature in
1995.5�
Intelligence agencies attempt to accommodate
all requests for briefings they receive from
Congress, but they give priority to the
leadership in both Houses and to the
intelligence committees and their Members.
Next in priority come the other national security
committees and their Members and then,
finally, the rest of Congress. A list of the
substantive briefings given by CIA in 1995
suggests that Congress concerns itself
principally with foreign policy issues on the
"front burner" of public concern. Some 71
briefings, for example, were provided on
Bosnia, 40 on Iran, 35 on Haiti, 33 on weapons
proliferation, 29 on Iraq, and 27 on North
Korea. 51
5� I bid
51 Statistics supplied by the Office of Congressional Affairs,
CIA
Briefings to the intelligence committees are
likely to contain more information about the
sources and methods involved in reaching the
analytical conclusions presented than briefings
to other committees. Briefings to other than the
intelligence committees are more apt to
include facts and analytical conclusions with
little, if any, information regarding how the
underlying evidence was gathered.
Occasionally, even in the intelligence
committees, an analytical judgment or
conclusion will be based on very sensitive
information that analysts feel uncomfortable
imparting to a large audience. Agencies
typically deal with such situations by briefing
the chairman and the ranking minority member
separately, or perhaps the majority and
minority staff directors acting in their stead.
When the full committee is subsequently
briefed, the analyst usually states that certain
extremely sensitive information has been
conveyed separately to the chairman and the
ranking minority member.
Whether sensitive information is conveyed
beyond the intelligence committees�either to
committees with overlapping jurisdiction or to
the leadership�depends on circumstances.
Both intelligence committees operate under
resolutions that require them to adopt
procedures governing access by other
committees or Members to intelligence
received by the committee.52 The Senate
committee opted to implement this provision
by resting authority in the chairman and vice
52 Each intelligence committee is required to maintain
records of all disclosures of intelligence information to any
Member who is not assigned to the committee Members
who receive such information are prohibited from
disclosing it to anyone except in a closed session of their
respective House. Members who violate this prohibition
must be referred by the intelligence committee concerned
to the ethics committee for investigation and disposition.
Intelligence
agencies attempt
to accommodate
all requests [from
the Hill] for
briefings, but
they give priority
to the leadership
. . . and to the
intelligence
committees.
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chairman (the title used by the SSCI's ranking
minority member) to make this determination.
The House committee chose to require a
formal vote of the entire committee before
intelligence could be conveyed to other
committees or Members.
This difference in the rules of the two
intelligence committees has led to somewhat
differing roles vis-a-vis their respective
institutions. The SSCI considers that it has an
obligation to keep the Senate leadership and
other committees with overlapping jurisdiction
aware of significant intelligence that is relevant
to their responsibilities. It will brief (or have
intelligence agencies brief) the leaders of the
Senate and/or other committees in appropriate
circumstances, or invite them to attend
briefings given to the intelligence committee or
its staff. There are no criteria governing this
practice. It is done to the extent the leaders of
the SSCI believe it should be done.
The HPSCI, in contrast, does not routinely
brief other House committees on sensitive
information provided to the committee, nor
does it invite members or staff of other
committees to briefings of the committee. The
HPSCI does make sure that the House
leaders�who are ex officio members�are
appropriately informed on intelligence matters.
On occasion, it also advises briefers that other
committees need to hear a particular briefing,
but in practice, it makes little if any effort to
ensure that this actually happens.
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IV. Impact of Intelligence-Sharing
With Congress
Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1988, then Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates
described the impact of intelligence-sharing
with the Congress in sweeping and�from the
standpoint of the executive�problematic
terms:
As a result of [intelligence-sharing with
the Congress] . . . many Senators and
Representatives are often as well, if not
better, informed about the CIA's
information and assessments on a given
subject than concerned policymakers.
Moreover, this intelligence is often used
to criticize and challenge policy, to set
one executive agency against another,
and to expose disagreements within the
administration . . .
Most specialists writing about the change
in recent years in the balance of power
between the executive and Congress on
national security policy cite Watergate
and Vietnam as primary causes. I believe
there was a third principal factor: the
obtaining by Congress, in the mid-1970s,
of access to intelligence information
essentially equal to that of the executive
branch.
This situation adds extraordinary stress
to the relationship between the CIA and
policy agencies. Policymakers'
suspicions that the CIA uses intelligence
to sabotage selected administration
policies are often barely concealed. And
more than a few Members of Congress
are willing to exploit this situation by their
own selective use of intelligence that
supports their views. The end result is a
strengthening of the Congressional hand
in policy debates and a great heightening
of tensions between the CIA and the rest
of the executive branch . . .
The result of these realities is that the CIA
today finds itself in a remarkable position,
involuntarily poised nearly equidistant
between the executive and legislative
branches. The administration knows that
the CIA is in no position to withhold much
information from the Congress and is
extremely sensitive to Congressional
demands; the Congress has enormous
influence and information, yet remains
suspicious and mistrustfuL Such a central
legislative role with respect to an
intelligence service is unique in American
history and in the world. And
policymakers know it."53
This chapter seeks to evaluate how
intelligence-sharing with Congress has
affected key areas of concern: relations
between the two branches, the work of
Congress itself, the work of the Intelligence
Community, and, finally, the relationship
between the Intelligence Community and other
parts of the executive branch. In doing so, it
addresses the issues raised by Gates as well
as some he did not raise.
Impact on Executive-Legislative Relations
Of those interviewed for this study, few would
take issue with Gates' contention that
intelligence has made Congress a smarter,
more effective critic of the executive branch,
often complicating the lives of policy officials.
Many note, however, that intelligence analysis
provides support for the policies and proposals
of an administration as often as it undermines
them. Perhaps even more often, it provides
ammunition for both sides of a policy debate.
Indeed, it is not unusual for Members to draw
different conclusions from the same
information. Although, as Gates points out,
Members of Congress are not above making
selective use of intelligence to support their
positions on particular issues, many of those
interviewed noted that policymakers suffer the
same affliction.
53 Gates, Robert M., The CIA and American Foreign
Policy," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1988, pp 224-225
"CIA today
finds itself in
a remarkable
position,
involuntarily
poised nearly
equidistant
between the
executive and
legislative �
branches."
�Robert M.
Gates
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Several
[interviewees]
noted that,
because
Congress has
access to
intelligence, it
has sometimes
managed to
avoid irrational
legislative
responses to
world events.
Most of those interviewed for this study
seemed to believe that intelligence-sharing
has, on the whole, improved relations between
the two branches. Many pointed out, for
example, that, with or without access to
intelligence, it is the role of Congress to
criticize. "Even if Congress got no intelligence,"
said one observer, "they would be seen as
meddling. And they would be relying in those
circumstances upon information provided by
policy agencies that might be slanted or
incomplete or what have you. Intelligence, on
the other hand, is supposed to provide an
unbiased, complete version of the facts. If
Congress is going to meddle anyway, isn't it
better they at least have the facts?"
Giving Congress the facts, this observer went
on to say, actually decreases its propensity to
meddle: "While it is true that access to
intelligence gives Congress something against
which to test the President's actions and
policies, it usually ends up giving credence to
those actions and policies. While the [political
opposition] cannot be expected to defer to the
President, at least they will have essentially the
same information and can understand what is
motivating the President. They may disagree,
but they start with the same information base."
In a similar vein, one Congressional staffer
thought that having access to intelligence at
times had actually discouraged leaks of
classified information. "If an agreement can be
worked out [with the Intelligence Community],"
the staffer noted, "with respect to what can be
used in public and it gives both sides of an
issue enough to go on, I think it actually
discourages people [Members and staff] from
resorting to leaks."
Several also noted that, because Congress
has access to intelligence, it has sometimes
managed to avoid irrational legislative
responses to world events�responses that
would undoubtedly have created serious
diplomatic problems for the incumbent
administration. As one current Member put it:
"Because the leadership has had immediate
access to intelligence reporting, they have
sometimes been able to stop the panic and
craziness up here."
Others noted a salutary impact on the use of
intelligence by policymakers. Because officials
are aware that Congress has access to
intelligence information, they are more likely to
take it into account themselves when
formulating a particular policy or proposal. If
their policy choice should run counter to the
intelligence reporting, they realize that one day
they may find themselves defending their
choice to their Congressional overseers (who
have access to the same intelligence).
From this perspective, Congressional access
to intelligence is seen not as a problem for
policymakers but rather as a help to them. "Any
policymaker worth his salt," said one
intelligence official, "should be able to explain
to the Congress why he or she is advocating a
policy that does not appear supported by the
intelligence." Although intelligence may
provide ammunition for a particular Senator or
Congressman to criticize, the policymaker,
having weighed such information in arriving at
a chosen policy, should be able to defend his/
her position more effectively.
Some policymakers are not so sanguine,
however, pointing to instances where they
believe intelligence analysis unnecessarily
provoked, rather than assuaged, an unruly
Congress. They fault analysts for frequently
providing intelligence (especially in briefings)
that is unduly alarmist because it does not take
into account ongoing US actions and/or
because it is based on unreliable or incomplete
reporting. As a result, Members become
needlessly agitated and resort to legislative
actions that are unjustified by the
circumstances, creating fires that require the
involvement of busy policymakers to
extinguish.
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111111111111111011111111111111111
Many analysts do, indeed, believe they have
an obligation to present the "worst case"
scenario in their briefings so that Congress will
know the outer limits of the downside facing the
United States in a given set of circumstances.
Members and staff interviewed for this study
also expressed a desire to know the "worst
case" as the Intelligence Community perceives
it (as well as what the Community considers
the "most likely" scenario) in order to calibrate
their positions on issues.
Whether intelligence-sharing with Congress is
seen as ultimately facilitating or impeding
relations between the executive and legislative
branches, it has, as Gates suggests, clearly
complicated them. Still, for all the
complications, many see intelligence as having
provided, and as continuing to provide, a firmer
footing for the dialogue between the branches
on national security matters. No one expects a
return to the days when Congress deferred to
the executive. Given this reality, many say,
ways must be found to facilitate collaboration
between the branches, rather than allow
polarization to grow, so as to ensure that the
military and foreign policies of the United
States have the support of both branches as
well as the American people. They see
intelligence-sharing as one means�an
important one�for bridging this gap.
Impact on the Work of Congress
Taking the Congress as a whole, however,
intelligence analysis (whether in written or
verbal form) actually reaches only a small
percentage of its Members and bears upon a
small proportion of its work. A survey of
lawmakers conducted by the CIA's Office of
Congressional Affairs in late 1988 not
surprisingly found them "overwhelmingly
disinterested" in intelligence insofar as the
execution of their legislative duties was
concerned.54
54 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study
Apart from the intelligence committees,
relatively few Congressional staffers have the
security clearances needed for access to
intelligence, and, for many who hold such
clearances, what they see is minimal. As one
legislative aide put it, "most staff up here does
not have a clue in terms of what is available [in
the Intelligence Community]. They see a few
documents, but what they see is only the tip of
the iceberg. They have no idea what is going
on.,,
Members' lack of interest can be attributed
partly to the fact that intelligence does not lend
itself to use in a public process. As one SFRC
staff member noted: "We [the committee] are
part of the public debate. We deal in the realm
of the overt�in what actions other
governments take and what actions they don't
take. While it is still useful to understand what
their plans or intent may be, most of what the
committee needs to know can be obtained
from the New York Times or CNN. And the
committee will respond overtly to it."
On occasion, access to intelligence does
become important to Members. This occurs,
for example, when votes are scheduled on
issues that are important to them politically and
on which intelligence has a significant
bearing�such as, a vote to send US troops
into hostilities abroad or a vote to ratify a
controversial treaty. Members look to
intelligence analysis not only as a source of
substantive guidance but also as a way to give
them political cover should their vote turn out to
be the wrong one.
Intelligence has its greatest impact on
Congress, however, through the work of its
committees, particularly the committees with
national security responsibilities. Most
Members and staff of these committees have
come to value the analysis provided by
intelligence agencies both for its own sake and
as a check on the information coming from the
Many analysts. . .
believe they have
an obligation
to present the
"worst case"
scenario in their
briefings so that
Congress will
know the outer
limits of the
downside.
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policy agencies under their jurisdiction. In this
regard, intelligence often provides a "handle"
for a committee's oversight activities.
Quite often intelligence will also figure into the
consideration of legislation handled by these
committees. Such legislative measures
include:
� Resolutions supporting or condemning the
actions of foreign governments or
international bodies.
� Legislation imposing conditions on the
executive branch regarding the conduct of
foreign policy.
� Legislation imposing diplomatic or trade
sanctions on the governments of other
countries.
� Legislation to implement treaties and
international agreements.
� Legislation to commit, or fund the
commitment of, US forces abroad.
� Legislation to counter threats to US security
emanating from outside the United States,
such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
� Legislation providing advice and consent for
US ratification of treaties (Senate only).
� Legislation authorizing appropriations or
appropriating funds to build and equip US
military forces, provide security and
economic assistance to other governments,
and develop US intelligence capabilities.
Finally, intelligence serves simply to inform
Members with respect to world affairs. One
Member suggested, in fact, that this was the
greatest benefit of intelligence-sharing:
"Members do not have to react simplistically [to
world events] any longer without the benefit of
knowing what the facts are."
Relatively few opportunities exist in the Senate
and even fewer in the House of
Representatives for Members to educate
themselves on international affairs issues. For
many Members, service on one of the national
security committees is important not because it
gives them an opportunity to oversee the
operations of the Defense Department or learn
the intricacies of the Intelligence Community,
but rather because it provides access to
information about world affairs they would not
otherwise have. In 1992, then Chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee David L. Boren
put it this way:
/The benefit of service on the Intelligence
Committee] is not just a matter of
understanding the Intelligence
Community The insights that it gives you
in terms of our relationship with the rest of
the world are just enormous. I found that
now, whenever we are talking about how
we deal with the Russian state, what kind
of economic aid might be effective, what's
really happening in the Middle East, how
much of a danger is Islamic
fundamentalism to us, and many other
issues, that my service on the intelligence
committee broadened my horizons . . .
the more Members who have a chance to
have that experience, the better for the
country. 55
Some Members request intelligence briefings
to educate themselves; others seek out
intelligence analysts on a personal basis and
establish an ongoing dialogue with them on a
topic of interest. The best informed are likely to
carry the most weight where international
affairs are concerned�with their colleagues,
the media, the administration, their
constituents, and the public. Their opinions are
more apt to be sought and their advice more
55 Quoted in Smist, p. xvii
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Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) luncheon in 1993. The committee's chairman at that time, Senator David Boren, is
seated In the center. Seated second from the left is the SSCI's then staff director, George Tenet (now DDCI). The author of
this study is seated at the right. Others shown are SSCI staff members.
likely to be heeded. By being informed, they
are better able to make a reputation for
themselves.
There are, however, pitfalls in all this, even for
individual Members. Staking themselves to a
position on the basis of intelligence that later
proves to be wrong can be embarrassing at
best and politically disastrous at worst. (See
the discussion concerning the Senate vote on
the Persian Gulf resolution in part V below.)
Surprisingly, the intelligence analysts
interviewed for this study tended to downplay
their influence with Congress. Most seemed to
believe that Members usually had their
positions staked out and minds made up long
before receiving an intelligence briefing. If the
briefing lent itself to their views, the Members
would take it on board. But few Members were
seen by analysts as having changed their
positions based on what they heard in an
intelligence briefing. Members and staff who
were interviewed, on the other hand, generally
thought these analysts were selling
themselves short.
As a practical matter, it is impossible to
quantify the extent to which intelligence
information has influenced the oversight or
legislative responsibilities of Congressional
committees or has affected the actions (or
political fortunes) of particular Members.
Viewed in the context of the totality of
Congress's activities, the information provided
by the Intelligence Community could be said to
[Members]
staking
themselves to
a position on
the basis of
Intelligence that
later proves to
be wrong can be
embarrassing
at best and
politically
disastrous
at worst.
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One of the
problems cited
was the potential
that intelligence
support to
Congress could
overwhelm
the available
analytical
resources to
the detriment of
consumers in the
executive branch.
have hardly caused a ripple. But viewed in the
context of specific legislative actions�or its
influence from time to time on individual
Members�intelligence could as easily be
seen as having played a key role in
determining and shaping Congressional
actions and reactions on particular issues.
Impact on the Work of the Intelligence
Community
In 1989 the head of the CIA's Office of
Congressional Affairs told Deputy Director
Gates that, in his view, Congress had an
"unquenchable appetite" for intelligence that,
in the long term, could pose serious problems
for CIA management.56
One of the problems cited was the potential
that intelligence support to Congress could
overwhelm the available analytical resources
to the detriment of consumers in the executive
branch. As one executive official noted: "There
are not enough resources in the Intelligence
Community to provide intelligence support to
535 Members of Congress. They are going to
have to draw some lines somewhere."
Most Members of Congress have little
appreciation for what these resources are. '
They ask and they receive. Most perceive a
large and faceless bureaucratic machine
(funded by taxpayer dollars) with an unlimited
capability to churn out analysis and provide
briefings on demand.
The reality, of course, is that a relatively small
corps of intelligence analysts cover a vast
gamut of national security issues for
consumers in both the legislature and the
executive branch. Together, the analysts
comprise a formidable capability. Considering
the number of issues they are expected to
cover, however, it is clear that this capability
actually is spread quite thin. It is not unusual
56 Unpublished draft CIA History Staff study.
for major areas to be covered by a handful of
analysts in a particular agency and for more
obscure areas to be covered by only one or
two analysts. Although special analytical
teams are sometimes put together to deal with
looming or ongoing crises, they too usually find
themselves stretched to the breaking point,
given the demands placed on them in such
situations.
For the most part, the analysts interviewed for
this study regarded Congress as a legitimate
and important recipient of their work. They
welcomed the opportunity to support the
elected representatives of the people and
influence the Congressional role in public
policy debates. Indeed, some saw Congress
as more open to their influence than
policymakers in the executive. Several also
noted that, because analysts know their work
may someday be scrutinized on the Hill,
greater quality control is introduced into it.
Some analysts, however�while they regarded
Congress as a legitimate consumer�did not
see it as a "serious" one. They thought most
Members had neither the time nor the interest
to understand or probe what was being briefed
to them. They viewed Members' reactions as
often shallow and superficial. Some analysts
resented having to brief staffers, whom they
often saw as "nonplayers." The time and effort
required to satisfy Congressional demands
took time and effort away from the analysts'
first priority: satisfying the pressing needs of
decisionmakers in the executive branch.
A number of analysts also pointed to what
appeared to be Congress's growing inclination
to bring intelligence analysis out into the open,
which the analysts saw as imposing additional
(and unnecessary) burdens and strains. This
occurs either when analysts are required to
appear at public hearings of Congressional
committees or when intelligence agencies are
asked to "sanitize" classified analysis so that it
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can be made public by a committee or an
individual Member (sometimes for a thinly
veiled political purpose). Such requests, often
couched in such terms as "the American
people need to know this," are difficult for
intelligence agencies to resist.
These requests also are often difficult for
agencies to accommodate. When giving public
testimony, analysts frequently are left to make
generalized assertions without being able to
explain�for security reasons�the intelligence
reporting that led to them. Sources and
methods must be talked around. If Members
press with questions that call for classified
responses, analysts fret about appearing rude
or uninformed if they decline or limit an answer.
Requests to "sanitize" classified analysis for
public release do not increase personal stress,
but they do involve time and effort that, from
the standpoint of an analyst, is unproductive
and a diversion from more important work.
Going to this extra effort is especially galling
when it is seen only as allowing a Senator or
Congressman to score a political point against
an opponent.
Several analysts interviewed also deplored the
growing number of occasions when Congress
insists on having the views of the Intelligence
Community before the Community is ready to
present them. This has happened several
times within the last two years, when portions
of draft estimates have been leaked to the
press or when Congressional committees
have otherwise become aware of their
existence. If the Community balks, analysts
may be required to present their agency's view
or even a personal view. Analysts involved in
these episodes say they have been highly
disruptive of ongoing work. Either the
estimative process has to be drastically
accelerated to accommodate the .
Congressional timetable or individual agencies
have to go it alone, forcing them to take
positions prematurely without the benefit of the
give-and-take of the estimates process.
Impact on Relations With the Rest of the
Executive Branch
Whatever frustrations analysts may feel about
their relationship with Congress pale in
comparison with the frustrations felt by many
elsewhere in the executive branch.
Policymakers often find their policies and
initiatives undermined on the Hill by
intelligence briefings. Sometimes the briefings
are at odds with what the President or
administration spokespeople have said. As a
result, policymakers face hostile questioning
from the press or from Congress itself.
Sometimes they are confronted with
intelligence they did not know existed or with
analytical conclusions they do not know the
basis for. Sometimes other governments are
annoyed�diplomatic initiatives are disrupted
and negotiations are broken off. "Policymakers
should see intelligence agencies," said one
intelligence official, "as simply purveyors of
information, produced by professionals outside
the political arena. Instead, some see us as
trying to make trouble for them."
"Policymakers are often frustrated," said one
intelligence analyst, "when they have to
explain to the Hill why they made a decision on
other than the basis indicated by the
intelligence. While intelligence is always just
one vector in the decisionmaking process, and
analysts never advance it as anything more
than that, it is not perceived that way on the Hill
. . . Policymakers may understand all this
themselves, but it doesn't make them any
happier when they have to face hostile
questioning from some Senator or
Congressman."
In principle, intelligence agencies
acknowledge an obligation to keep pertinent
policymakers apprised of the intelligence
analysis being shared with Congress in order
to give them time to prepare for and deal with
the consequences that are likely to follow. In
Policymakers
often find their
policies and
initiatives
undermined
on the Hill by
intelligence
briefings.
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"The Intelligence
Community is so
anxious to please
its oversight
committees that
it's hell-bent
to get the
intelligence up
there, regardless
of whether it's
reliable and
regardless of
whether they've
touched base
with the rest
of the executive
branch."
�Former
executive branch
official
practice, however, many policymakers find that
the performance of intelligence agencies falls
woefully short on this score. "The Intelligence
Community is so anxious to please its
oversight committees," said one former
executive official, "that it's hell-bent to get the
intelligence up there, regardless of whether it's
reliable and regardless of whether they've
touched base with the rest of the executive
branch."
Another executive official was even more
strident: "There is a rush to tell Congress
everything, often before it's been notified to us.
Whatever they ask for, they get. . . Although
they would never put it this way, [intelligence
agencies] clearly see themselves as working
for the Congress rather than the President."
Intelligence officials also acknowledge a
problem. Said one: "There is, in fact, a certain
imperative about intelligence. Once it's there, it
goes. The emphasis these days is on getting it
to the Hill as fast as possible when, in fact, it
ought to be on making sure the policymaker is
brought in on it before it goes. I know there
have been many occasions when intelligence
has gone to the Hill without policymakers
knowing about it, causing them to ask 'who are
those guys working for, anyway?' It ought not
to happen but it does."
"The real problem that results from this [failing
to notify what they plan to brief on the Hill],"
said one former executive branch official, "is
that it isolates them [the intelligence agencies]
from the policymakers who then want to close
them out from any involvement in the policy
process, to keep them from knowing where
policy is headed, and so forth. It becomes a
'separate camps' mentality, very destructive of
the overall relationship between producers and
consumers."
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V. Problems and Pitfalls in the Relationship
This section explores difficulties in the
Intelligence Community's handling of its
relationship with Congress, in its handling of
relations with the rest of the executive branch,
and, finally, in the use of intelligence by
Congress itself.
Suggestions for avoiding these problems are
set forth in part VI.
The Intelligence Community's Handling of
the Relationship With Congress
What Intelligence Information Is To Be
Provided To the Congress, and Who
Decides This?
Both sides seem largely content with current
practice regarding the provision of published
intelligence. The Hill has access to most
finished intelligence published for general
circulation but not to finished intelligence
tailored to the needs of high-level
policymakers or to "raw" unevaluated
intelligence, unless a special need exists.
Briefings given in response to Congressional
requests are more problematic in that they
often pose a "sourcing" question: how much
information about intelligence sources and
methods should be cited to explain the
evidence underlying particular analytical
judgments? The analysts responsible for
preparing the briefings typically resolve this
issue themselves, perhaps after consultation
with the collection element(s) concerned.
If the information at issue is, in the view of the
analysts, of marginal significance to their
conclusions, it may be left out of the briefing
altogether. If, on the other hand, sensitive
source information is deemed so pertinent that
it cannot in good conscience be left out of the
briefing, the analyst may attempt to brief the
information separately to the leadership of the
committee concerned or, if the requester is an
individual Member, tell him or her that sensitive
source information is being omitted from the
briefing. The other possibility is that the analyst
will leave out of a briefing sensitive source
information that is relevant, and no one will be
the wiser.
An even more difficult situation arises when an
analyst obtains significant but sensitive
information that is not included in the finished
intelligence that goes to the Hill and is not
provided as part of any briefing specifically
requested by Congress. An example of this
problem was provided by a CIA analyst who
several years ago had become aware of
reporting that, if true, suggested that another
government was attempting to develop
weapons of mass destruction that could pose
a threat to the United States. The analyst knew
that such a report would be a significant
concern for particular Members of Congress
but was also aware that the report, if provided
to those Members, would in all likelihood be
leaked to the press. While there was doubt
among the analyst's colleagues that the
reporting was credible, the analyst was
convinced that it was.
The analyst was torn: "Do I take the report to
the Congress and watch all hell break loose, or
do I keep it to myself and risk being accused
down the line of hiding significant information?
I just hoped and prayed I wouldn't be caught in
a trap." The analyst sought advice from a
colleague in Congressional Affairs who could
only offer: "Do what you think is right."
Fortunately for this analyst, the report was
soon included in a briefing requested by one of
the intelligence committees, thus taking him off
the hook.
But what if the briefing had not occurred? Was
the analyst obliged to present such information
on his own initiative to the relevant
committees? Could he have been held
accountable for a failure to do so? Does
Congress expect to be advised in such
circumstances?
Briefings given
in response to
Congressional
requests
often pose
a "sourcing"
question: how
much information
about sources
and methods
should be cited?
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One Member of
Congress ... said
that Congress
does expect
"sensitive
intelligence" to
be brought to its
attention, but he
conceded there
were no criteria
for identifying
"sensitive
intelligence"
as such.
One Member of Congress interviewed for this
study said that Congress does expect
"sensitive intelligence" to be brought to its
attention, but he conceded there were no
criteria for identifying "sensitive intelligence" as
such. The Member suggested that
"intelligence agencies need to put themselves
in the place of Members and decide what
information would constitute a serious matter.
It might be something that could necessitate
the use of military force or might relate to a
terrorist threat. It may not always be something
that Congress has to act on, though, and it may
not always be bad news."
The Member went on to say that intelligence
agencies also should have latitude in deciding
who in Congress is told of such information, so
long as notice reaches the pertinent Members.
"Not everyone in Congress needs to know
everything, but the Intelligence Community
needs to communicate significant information
in some fashion to the people that matter who
can ensure it is factored into the decisions
being made by the body as a whole."
In 1995, DCI Deutch issued new guidelines for
reporting information to the two intelligence
committees. The guidelines were intended
principally to ensure that operational
information indicating potential oversight
concerns reached the committees in a timely
manner. Where substantive intelligence is
concerned, the guidelines were no more
specific than the existing statutory standard.
While CIA and the other intelligence agencies
that have adopted these guidelines
occasionally report significant substantive
information pursuant to them, the guidelines
themselves do not move this particular train
any further down the track.
On What Basis Are Distinctions Made as to
Who in Congress Is Entitled to What Kind of
Intelligence Support?
As noted earlier in this study, while all
Members of Congress, by virtue of their
elected positions, are entitled to have access
to intelligence, clear distinctions have evolved
regarding the intelligence support provided to
Congressional committees and to individual
Members. What is the basis for these
distinctions?
At one time distinctions evidently were made
on the basis of security considerations. Until
the two intelligence committees were created,
there were no places on Capitol Hill that met
the DCI's standards for storing intelligence.
Now the Senate has a repository that serves
Senate committees as well as individual
Members. The House could establish a
comparable facility if it chose to do so. In fact,
the HAC, HNSC, and HIRC now have small
facilities approved for the storage of
intelligence.
Another possible basis for the distinctions in
intelligence support would be the recipients'
institutional "need to know." This might explain
the more limited support provided to the
Congress's "nonnational security" committees
and to individual Members who do not have
committee responsibilities in the national
security area.
But "need to know" does not account for the
difference in support accorded the intelligence
committees and the other committees with
jurisdiction over national security matters (for
instance, the SFRC, SASC, HIRC, and
HNSC). The explanation most frequently
offe'red is that the funding and oversight
responsibilities of the intelligence committees
necessitate a broader level of substantive
intelligence support. In order to reach
judgments on the funding and effectiveness of
intelligence activities, some interviewees
asserted, the intelligence committees must be
familiar with what has been produced and how.
The needs of the other national security
committees for substantive intelligence, it is
argued, are more limited. They do not need all
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of the intelligence that is produced�only that
which is relevant to their ongoing activities.
Moreover, they need to know only what the
judgments of the Intelligence Community are,
not how the intelligence underlying those
judgments was gathered.
Although it is clear that the Intelligence
Community has made a serious effort in the
last two years to improve the intelligence
support provided to the other national
security committees, the distinctions that
remain still rankle. A staffer for one of these
committees, for example, said he "resented"
the fact that his committee was not given the
same information the intelligence committee
was given. In particular, he could not
understand why his committee could not be
provided with information that would help it
evaluate the reliability of the evidence
underlying the conclusions reached by
intelligence analysts: "[We] are the ones who
have to act on this stuff, not the intelligence
committee."
Agreeing to, Preparing for, and Handling
Intelligence Briefings on the Hill
One intelligence official interviewed for this
article said that, despite 20 years of
experience in briefing the Congress,
"everything is ad hoc . . . every situation is a
new situation ... you would think things would
be thought through by now, but they haven't
been
Three aspects of the briefing process are
discussed below.
1. Agreeing To Provide Briefings. If an
intelligence agency is asked by a
Congressional committee to provide a briefing
for its Members in closed session, the agency
will usually accommodate the request,
assuming that appropriate security measures
are in place or can be put in place prior to the
briefing.
But what about a request to provide an
intelligence briefing under any of the following
circumstances:
� In public session.
� To a committee whose chairman is obviously
seeking the briefing to obtain information for
political purposes.
� To a committee whose jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the briefing is questionable.
� To an individual Member who has a track
record of unauthorized disclosures of
classified information.
� Limited to either the majority or the minority
Members or staff of a committee or the
majority or minority Members of the Senate
or House.
� To an individual Member or group of
Members who obviously plan to use the
information to support their political agendas.
� When the request originates with the
incumbent administration, which wants
certain committees or individual Members
briefed because the intelligence analysis
happens to support its position on a
particular issue.
Intelligence agencies deal with such requests
all the time. How do they respond? The most
realistic answer is, "It depends."
For example, although no intelligence agency
relishes a briefing in open session, it might
agree to provide one, depending on which
committee is making the request, what the
committee's perceived need is, and whether
the subject matter of the briefing can
reasonably be discussed in public. Similarly,
the idea of providing briefings requested by
Although it is
clear that the
Intelligence
Community has
made a serious
effort . . . to
improve the
intelligence
support provided
to the other
national security
committees,
the distinctions
that remain still
rankle.
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IIIIMIMIIIIIMINME
The idea of
providing
briefings
requested by
Members who
have handled
intelligence
irresponsibly in
the past may well
grate, but most
agencies if
pressed will
provide the
briefing.
Members who have handled intelligence
irresponsibly in the past may well grate, but
most agencies if pressed will provide the
briefing, albeit taking more care than usual
with what they say.
Intelligence agencies normally will seek to
avoid briefing in a partisan setting (that is, one
limited to the Members or staff of one political
party) or in a setting where it is apparent that
their audience plans to make political use of
the information provided. Nonetheless, most
will if pressed provide the briefing, even at the
risk that their information might be disclosed or
their analysts drawn into one side of a public
debate.
An example of what can happen when
intelligence briefings are provided in such
circumstances occurred during the 100th
Congress, which was considering legislation to
ease US export control restrictions. In May
1987, CIA analysts were called upon to brief a
variety of Congressional committees
concerning an alleged sale of "submarine-
quieting" technology to the Soviet Union by a
Japanese corporation, Toshiba, with the
alleged complicity of a state-owned Norwegian
firm, Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, in violation of
Western export controls. (The allegations had
already been alluded to in public testimony by
a Defense Department official and had been
briefed to the intelligence committees several
months earlier.) On 30 June 1987, largely in
response to these intelligence briefings, the
Senate passed an amendment to a trade bill
prohibiting the United States from doing
business with either of the foreign firms. The
same day a group of Republican
Congressmen, wielding a sledge hammer,
obliterated a Toshiba video cassette recorder
(VCR) on the steps of the Capito1.57
57 The Toshiba episode is the subject of an excellent case
study prepared by Anna M. Warrock and Howard Husock,
entitled "Taking Toshiba Public," published by the John F
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA, 1988.
Later the same year, when the Japanese and
Norwegian Governments confirmed that their
respective companies were guilty as charged
and took punitive and preventive actions
against them, the issue for Congress was
whether the sanctions imposed earlier by the
Senate should be retained in the House
version of the bill.
In the meantime, the CIA analysts involved
had found indications of additional export
control violations by Toshiba. While the
Defense and State Departments were
unpersuaded by CIA's new information and
were opposed to maintaining US sanctions
against the companies in the House bill, CIA
was asked to give repeated briefings to a small
group of Congressmen who continued to favor
sanctions against the companies involved. Not
surprisingly, the most damning information
found its way into the press. The principal CIA
briefer was profiled in several major
newspapers, occasionally being referred to on
a first-name basis by the Members who took
political sustenance from his briefings.58 For
many observers, the impression created by the
episode was something less than a politically
neutral CIA.
Intelligence agencies run a similar risk when
they agree to undertake Congressional
briefings at the request of an incumbent
administration if the intelligence happens to
support the administration's position. Yet here
too, agencies are likely to accommodate the
request if they believe a semblance of their
independence and objectivity can be
maintained.
One CIA analyst interviewed for this article
recalled a request by an administration to brief
undecided Members of Congress on a treaty
whose implementation required Congressional
58 "CIA Aide tells of Toshiba Deliveries' Washington
Times, 9 March 1988, p 1
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action. Not surprisingly, the intelligence
happened to support the administration's
position in favor of the treaty. CIA
accommodated the request by agreeing to
provide briefings to undecided Members. For
those interested in receiving the briefing,
analysts were sent to hold one-on-one
meetings with each such Member.59 CIA
rationalized its action because other Members
(on both sides of the aisle) were themselves
encouraging their undecided colleagues to
obtain the CIA briefing�it was not solely an
administration idea�and because the briefers
were careful to steer clear of any policy
prescription. One of the briefers was
nonetheless chagrined when a Member came
up to congratulate him in the hallway on getting
their side "two more votes" as a result of the
briefing initiative.
2. Preparing for Briefings on the Hill.
Preparations for Congressional briefings also
vary widely. Briefings to committees ordinarily
receive the most attention. If the briefings
involve a controversial topic, briefers are more
likely to follow a written text that has been
coordinated beforehand within the agency
concerned and with relevant players in other
agencies. Such briefings are also more apt to
be previewed by managers at the agency
concerned. Senior analysts are more likely to
be tapped to do the briefing or be sent to
accompany a more junior briefer.
If the briefing is essentially informational�
presenting facts rather than judgments�and
does not involve a controversial subject,
analysts may brief on the basis of notes that
are not coordinated with anyone or simply
"wing it" without notes. There is no "dry run" in
such instances.
If the briefing is to an individual Member or
committee staff, few analysts will go to the
trouble of preparing a script. The degree of
59 CIA rejected a suggestion by an administration
representative that all undecided Members be bussed to
the CIA for the briefing.
their preparation will depend upon the
controversy attached to the issue and how
they perceive the sophistication of their
audience with respect to it. Often they will
"wing it" based on their knowledge of the issue.
Whether an analyst doing an intelligence
briefing is "prepped" on the political "lay of the
land" that he or she can expect to encounter
will also depend on the controversy attached to
the briefing as well as the analyst's own
experience and savvy. One Congressional
staffer interviewed for this study saw such
prepping as improper, perhaps leading
analysts to alter their conclusions or the
manner of their presentation to avoid conflict
with Members. Most, however, saw this kind of
preparation as essential, especially where the
analyst was inexperienced in dealing with
Congress. As one former CIA Congressional
Affairs official noted: "Most of [the analysts]
see themselves as intellectually pure, immune
from politics. Then they are sent to the Hill,
many never recognizing what a hornet's nest
they are walking into. . . Often they would not
recognize where a Member was coming from
with his questions, and they would give an
answer that totally confused and complicated
the process. Sometimes it would take us a
month to work out of it."
Whether special attention is given to preparing
an intelligence briefing on the Hill will also
depend on the analyst's recognition that the
briefing is likely to be controversial. Such
recognition does not always occur. In 1993, for
example, in connection with an intelligence
briefing being given to a nonoversight
committee on US-Russian cooperation on the
space shuttle, a former Congressional Affairs
aide related: "The analyst doing the briefing
was unaware that the administration had taken
a public position in favor of this cooperative
venture where they [the White House] had
stated that the Russians had the technology
"Most of [the
analysts] see
themselves as
intellectually
pure, immune
from politics.
Then they are
sent to the Hill,
many never
recognizing what
a hornet's nest
they are walking
into."
�Former CIA
official
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INE1=1111�11
"The Intelligence
Community
always seems
to be saying 'the
sky is falling,
the sky is falling.'
Policymakers are
usually the ones
to say 'not so
fast, let me put
this in context for
you.'"
�Former
executive branch
official
and expertise to make a useful contribution.
The analyst's briefing took much the opposite
view. When staff from the committee later
raised this testimony with the White House,
they went through the roof [with us] because
they hadn't been told about it. The fact is, the
analyst didn't realize he was putting himself at
odds with them."
Analysts also do not always appreciate what
information has and has not been provided to
Congress prior to incorporating it into their
briefings. Some might assume that information
from "raw" intelligence reports or from specially
tailored analysis has been made available to
the Hill when, in fact, it has not. In some cases,
such information may be at odds with the
finished intelligence the Hill has received.
Where the information is especially pertinent, it
may put the analyst in the position of having to
explain why it had not been previously
provided. Whether the analyst is made aware
of these potential pitfalls seems more a matter
of happenstance than systematic planning.
In sum, in most agencies, preparations for
briefings on the Hill are left by and large to
individual analysts and their immediate
superiors. Congressional Affairs staffs will try
to ascertain in advance whether the briefings
being planned satisfy the requirements of the
Hill and whether the presentations are in a
form that can be assimilated by a
Congressional audience. But what the analyst
plans to say and how he or she plans to say it
are normally left to the analytic office
concerned. Whether this office fully
appreciates the circumstances surrounding a
particular briefing is by no means assured
under the current system.
3. How Analysts Handle Intelligence
Briefings on the Hill. Whether briefing
Members of Congress or executive branch
officials, intelligence analysts are trained to
make factual, objective presentations. They
are taught to base their judgments and
conclusions on the available evidence. If those
judgments and conclusions are premised on
certain assumptions, the assumptions are
identified. If the evidence needed to reach a
conclusion is not available, analysts are
expected to say so.
By all accounts, the vast amount of intelligence
analysis presented to Congress substantially
meets these standards. But there have been
occasions, in the view of some observers,
when it has not.
'Too often," said one executive branch official,
"there is a selective presentation of intelligence
to the Hill. .. It may not even be witting. Every
bit of evidence that analysts can construe as
pointing to [a foreign policy calamity in the
making] is pointed out, while very little
evidence is pointed out leading away from
such a conclusion."
As one former executive branch official noted,
this often puts the policymaker in an awkward
position: "The Intelligence Community always
seems to be saying 'the sky is falling, the sky is
falling.' Whereas policymakers are usually the
ones to say 'not so fast, let me put this in
context for you.' Generally they will downplay
the significance of the intelligence. This leads
to suspicions on the Hill that policy agencies
are trying to interpret intelligence for their own
political purposes. Intelligence analysts, on the
other hand, are given more credibility because
they are seen as independent rather than
pursuing the administration's policy line."
A former Congressional Affairs officer also
noted the tendency of analysts to want to
present a lucid picture on the Hill regardless of
the quality of the evidence: "Analysts often do
not go to the trouble of alerting [Members] to
the quality of the information that supports their
conclusions. This happens particularly when
they have a good story to tell. There is a
tendency to want to tell that story rather than
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present the holes or gaps in it." A
Congressional staffer put it this way: "Analysts
are too focused on what the intelligence says
and not what it doesn't say. Rarely will they
point out to the committee when their evidence
is thin."
'There is also a tendency among intelligence
analysts," said another executive branch
official, "to reach analytical judgments which
are not theirs to make. But because they know
that's what the Hill is interested in, they make
them anyway." This official cited as an example
ah intelligence briefing in which an analyst
reached a judgment that, if accepted as true,
would effectively have prejudged a
determination that the President, by law, was
supposed to make.
Intelligence analysts are not, to be sure, in the
policy business. They support policymakers;
they do not make policy, nor do they opine
about what policy is or should be. Indeed, it is
precisely because they are not in the policy
business that their analysis has value.
Members of Congress, however, often do not
appreciate the principled position analysts
occupy, and they attempt to draw them into
policy discussions. This happens most often
when the analysis being offered seems to
indicate a particular policy choice and a
Member wants the analyst to confirm it, or
when the analysis offers no clear policy
direction and a Member wants to know what
conclusion the analyst would draw. Sometimes
a Member's question arises so naturally that
the analyst does not realize what he or she is
being asked to do.
Even if the analyst demurs on the ground that
he or she is not "a policy person," a Member
will often press on with "well, just give me your
personal opinion, then" or, "I know, but you're
the expert. I've got 30 minutes to spend on this
issue and that's it. So you've just got to help us
on this." Or things may turn blatantly political
("So from what you've told us, the President's
policy is a lot of baloney. Is that right?") The
analyst may feel his or her only choice at this
point is to appear rude ("I can't answer that,
sir") or ignorant ("I don't have an opinion, sir.")
If the briefing is being held in open session, the
pressure to respond to such questions is even
greater.
Analysts who succumb to such pressure
usually find themselves (and/or their bosses)
on the receiving end of an angry telephone call
from the policymaker(s) whose territory has
been violated. Their relationship with the
policymaker (whom they normally support) can
be seriously jeopardized as a result.
Analysts may also find that Members who
disagree with the policy that their analysis
appears to support sometimes try to find fault
with the analysis, either by pitting other
analysts against them ("Does everyone else at
the table agree with what Mr. Smith just said?")
or by questioning the weight to be accorded
the analysis ("Does this represent only your
view, Ms. Jones, or only the view of your
office? My understanding is the Secretary of
Defense takes a different view.")
How analysts handle such questions may be
crucial to the success of the briefing. Yet most
analysts are unprepared to cope with them.
While analysts are accustomed to defending
themselves in intellectual combat, most are not
used to this kind of questioning. Few have
experienced the rough and tumble, and at
times downright nastiness, of the political
arena.
To remedy this situation, some interviewees
suggested that analysts who brief Congress be
provided formal training, or at least receive
instruction prior to a particular briefing, in the
foibles of the political process. But it is not clear
how many absolutes there are to imbue. One
Congressional Affairs officer, for example, on
the question of providing an opinion on a policy
Members of
Congress often
do not appreciate
the principled
position analysts
occupy, and they
attempt to draw
them into policy
discussions.
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IIIIIIIIIIMIIIMIIIMMII
As a practical
matter, so much
intelligence is
now shared with
Congress that
it is impossible
for intelligence
agencies to
advise pertinent
policymakers
in the executive
branch. . . of
everything being
provided.
issue, said he advises analysts that, if the
pressure from Members becomes excruciating
enough, "go ahead and answer the man's
question . . . we'll worry about it later."
Intelligence Community Handling of
Relations With the Rest of the Executive
Branch
The tensions that may arise between an
intelligence agency and other executive
branch entities as a result of sharing
intelligence with the Congress were described
in part IV above. How does the Intelligence
Community deal with these tensions?
Providing Advance Notice to Policymakers
of Intelligence To Be Shared With the
Congress
As a practical matter, so much intelligence is
now shared with Congress that it is impossible
for intelligence agencies to advise pertinent
policymakers in the executive branch
(primarily at the White House and the State
and Defense Departments) of everything being
provided. Nor are there any mechanisms for
policy agencies to get "back-briefed" on what
transpires on the Hill. Communications largely
occur by word of mouth. Most policymakers
are aware that the Hill has access to most
finished intelligence and frequently receives
intelligence briefings.
Intelligence agencies say they ordinarily make
an effort to provide specific notice to affected
policymakers if they anticipate that the
intelligence to be shared with the Congress will
cause problems for these policymakers.
Obviously, unless the analyst or others
involved in the process�such as the
Congressional Affairs staff�spot a potential
problem, notice will not be forthcoming.
At other times, notice is provided but, for a
variety of practical reasons, does not "take." To
begin with, notice is usually left until the last
minute. Players in other agencies are not
consulted or notified until the intelligence
agency has itself resolved what its analysts will
say to the Hill. Phone calls to policymakers are
missed. Proposed testimony winds up in the
legislative affairs office rather than with the
relevant policymaker. Or, if it is sent to the
policymaker, he or she is too busy to read it.
Even if the appropriate policymakers do read
what intelligence agencies plan to brief to the
Hill, they may be too busy to weigh in with
comments. Or, if they are uncertain the briefing
will produce a "flap," they may simply decide to
hope for the best. Some are also concerned
that, if they comment on the proposed analysis
or attempt to delay it from reaching the Hill,
they may be accused of "politicizing" the
process, either by the analyst concerned or by
the committee or Member who requested the
analysis.
The fear of subjecting analysis to political
influence also inhibits intelligence analysts
from confronting policymakers. While analysts
insist that, in giving policymakers advance
notice, they do not seek their views or
concurrence, they know that policymakers
frequently do not see the matter that way. If the
policymaker does respond with comments,
criticism, or complaints, the analyst may be left
in a quandary as to how to deal with the
policymaker's views within his or her allotted
time frame.
Various bureaucratic means are currently used
to cope with the notice problem. The DCI
meets regularly with senior White House staff
and the heads of policy departments,
sometimes using these occasions to alert them
to controversies brewing on the Hill. The DCI
and heads of intelligence agencies also
receive calendars that show upcoming
Congressional briefings. Weekly
teleconferences have been instituted between
Congressional Affairs offices in which
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upcoming briefings are identified and
discussed. The principal intelligence offices at
State (the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research) and Defense (the Defense
Intelligence Agency) participate in these
teleconferences and thus are able to advise
policymakers in their respective departments
of scheduled hearings and briefings. On
occasion, where Congressional support for
important foreign policy initiatives of the
administration may be affected, the National
Security Council (NSC) staff has stepped in
and has become the conduit for intelligence
going to the Hill on a particular subject.
In the end, however, nothing short of personal
contact between the analysts involved and the
affected policymakers and/or their staffs is
likely to be effective. By all accounts, making
this connection remains a significant practical
problem.
Perhaps no episode better illustrates the
foibles of the Congressional process and its
potential consequences for analysts and
policymakers alike than the briefings in
October 1993 regarding an NIE on Haiti. Work
began on this Estimate in 1992, which turned
out to be the last year of the Bush
administration. After the US presidential
election in November, the project was
expedited to assist the President-elect in
dealing with an anticipated exodus of "boat
people" from Haiti to the United States.
Intelligence personnel briefed officials in both
the outgoing and incoming administrations on
the draft NIE during the presidential transition
period. The NIE went through the normal
staffing process within the Intelligence
Community and ultimately was approved by
Acting DCI William Studeman and National
Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) principals in
early 1993.
By October, the political cauldron was
bubbling. The United Nations had imposed an
economic embargo on goods going into Haiti in
an effort to force the military rulers there to
accept the return of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, who had been ousted in a military
coup in 1991. An international flotilla, led by the
United States, was assembled to enforce the
embargo. In the meantime, the US
Government was weighing its options should
the embargo fail to bring about Aristide's
return. One of these options was the
introduction of US military forces into the
country. Opposing this idea was the Senate
Minority Leader, who introduced a resolution
severely limiting the President's authority to
send in US military forces. The President, in
turn, strongly objected to this proposed
limitation on his authority, and negotiations
were under way to work out a compromise.
Enter the NIE. In early October, a Republican
staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee asked CIA for a briefing on the
Estimate. The senior analyst responsible for
the NIE was sent to do the briefing. No effort
was made at this point to advise the National
Security Council (NSC) or the State
Department. The briefing was given to about a
half-dozen cleared members of the minority
staff, who homed in immediately on issues
dealing with Aristide. (It was clear to the
analyst concerned that the staff already was
aware of, at least in general terms, conclusions
reached in the Estimate.) At the end of the
briefing, according to one participant, the staff
said the Estimate should be "briefed up to the
Member level," but no specific request was
made at the time.
A few days later, CIA received another
request, this time from the HPSCI, to brief on
Haiti. The briefing was to include responses to
specific questions about Aristide. This request
prompted the senior analyst involved to
prepare a carefully worded classified
statement describing the judgments and the
supporting evidence contained in the NIE. The
NSC and State Department were not advised
Perhaps no
episode better
illustrates the
foibles of the
Congressional
process. . .
than the briefings
in October 1993
regarding an ME
on Haiti.
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of the impending House briefing, however, until
the morning of the late-October day on which it
was to occur.
Earlier that day, unbeknownst to the analysts
involved, Senator Jesse Helms, Ranking
Minority Member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, had asked the White
House, in the name of the majority and
minority leaders, for a CIA briefing to take
place as soon as possible for all Senators on
the portions of the NIE pertaining to Aristide.
The White House staff agreed to the request
and instructed CIA to arrange such a briefing.
Because the Agency's two senior Latin
America analysts were already on the Hill to
brief the House intelligence committee early
that afternoon, the decision was to send them
over to brief Senators after the House briefing
had ended.
The briefing to the House committee proved an
immediate sensation, provoking many, often
hostile, questions. One Congressman
reportedly said he intended to take the subject
up with the President immediately after the
hearing was over.
At the end of this grueling session, the analysts
learned that they had to give a repeat .
performance to the Senate. It was now late
afternoon, and they were exhausted, but a
commitment had been made by the White
House.
When the analysts arrived at the briefing room,
they found that the Assistant Secretary of State
with responsibility for Haiti was there, along
with the Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs. When the briefing began, about 15 '
Senators, including Senator Helms, were
present. The senior analyst briefed from the
same script that he had used earlier before the
House committee. As time wore on, additional
Senators entered the room. Each time a new
Senator arrived, the analyst would be asked to
summarize what he had briefed earlier from
the prepared script. According to one observer
who was present, this happened four or five
times, with the analyst using progressively
more succinct "shorthand" to describe the
judgments contained in the Estimate. "By the
end of the briefing," said this observer, "all
nuance had disappeared."
The State Department officials in attendance
were immediately put on the defensive by the
Senators present and were unprepared to offer
a convincing rebuttal. Senator Helms
announced that the information was
"something the American people needed to
know about." Eight or nine Senators remained
behind at the briefing to question the analysts.
One of them put in a call to the White House to
tell it that "the administration has a real
problem on its hands."
In the weeks that followed, numerous briefings
and hearings were held on the NIE. Some of
these sessions involved lengthy, painstaking
appraisals of the evidence that formed the
basis for the Estimate's conclusions. Although
the President subsequently came forward with
a defense of the administration's position
concerning Aristide, the wounds left at the
White House and at the State Department did
not soon heal.
Responding to Complaints and Requests
of Executive Branch Officials
As noted in the preceding section, intelligence
agencies acknowledge the need to provide a
"heads-up" to policymakers with respect to
intelligence going to the Hill that is likely to
create a problem for them. The purpose of
such notice is to ensure that policymakers are
not "blindsided" and have adequate time to
formulate a rejoinder.
Intelligence agencies are not looking for the
policymakers' concurrence or comments on
the substance of the briefing. Nevertheless,
this is often what they receive, especially if
policymakers see their program, policy,
proposal, or initiative in danger of going down
the drain as a result of the material being
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provided to Congress. Policymakers may
question whether the evidence underlying the
analysis is accurate or complete, whether the
judgments reached by the analyst are sound,
or why this is something Congress needs to
know. They sometimes ask if briefing
Congress can be delayed until an ongoing
initiative with an affected foreign government
can be completed or until that government can
be officially advised. It is not uncommon for a
policymaker to elevate these issues directly to
the top of the intelligence agency concerned.
What are the obligations of the Intelligence
Community to policymakers in these
circumstances? How far can intelligence
agencies go in terms of shaping the content
and timing of analysis without subjecting
themselves (and policymakers) to charges of
politicizing intelligence?
Most intelligence agencies say that, if a
policymaker complains about the accuracy or
completeness of intelligence analysis to be
briefed to the Hill, the agencies will, in fact,
review the preparatory work their analysts
have done. As one senior intelligence official
noted: "Policymakers who complain about
intelligence going to the Hill are crying wolf
most of the time, but about 20 percent of the
time they may have a point. Let's face it.
Analysis can be shoddy and unprofessional.
[Intelligence producers] have an obligation to
make sure it's accurate and complete before it
leaves here." This may entail a de novo review
of the evidence supporting the analyst(s)'
conclusions and/or sending the analyst(s)
involved to meet with the complaining
policymaker in an effort to discern what the
policymaker knows that apparently the
analyst(s) do not. lithe analysis proves to be
inaccurate or incomplete, changes may be
factored in. Ultimately, however, what is briefed
to the Hill will remain the intelligence agency's
call.
If, on the other hand, the policymaker's
complaint is that he or she simply disagrees
with the analysis or that it will adversely affect
an ongoing initiative, intelligence producers
typically will provide a polite turndown. "If you
tell us it's wrong," said one intelligence official,
"we'll fix it. But if you just say you don't like it, it
goes."
Intelligence agencies sometimes will honor a
request to delay providing intelligence to the
Hill, depending on the circumstances. Why has
the delay been requested�to avoid a
legitimate diplomatic problem or because the
policymaker simply wants to put off the
inevitable conflict? How urgent are the needs
of Congress? To what extent does the
intelligence bear upon pending Congressional
action, as opposed to being sought by a
particular Member for a limited political
purpose? Intelligence agencies recognize that,
the longer they delay in responding to
Congressional requests, the more likely
Congress is to perceive their action as
politically inspired. As one intelligence official
noted: "Information that undermines an
administration's policies and initiatives is
precisely what Congress most wants to know
about. Any effort to delay it is going to [incur] a
heavy political cost."
Understandably, many policymakers are not
altogether happy with this state of affairs. One
who was interviewed for this study said bluntly
that "the system is broken and no one can fix
it�not the DCI, not the White House, and not
[the policy departments] .. . What intelligence
is briefed to the Hill is decided by analysts. . .
Much of what goes up there is irrelevant as far
as the Hill is concerned and much of it is crap.
But because everyone is worried about
politicizing intelligence, nobody will stop it. . .
In the end, it is the analysts who are the ones
that politicize intelligence by deciding what will
be provided and how."
Most intelligence
agencies say
that, if a
policymaker
complains about
the accuracy or
completeness
of intelligence
analysis to be
briefed to the Hill,
the agencies will,
in fact, review the
preparatory work
their analysts
have done.
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Some in
Congress also
fear that, if policy
officials are
invited to
intelligence
briefings, the
end result is
likely to be a
"homogenized"
presentation
rather than a
"gloves off"
intelligence
briefing.
A former policymaker expressed similar
frustrations: "Intelligence agencies work for the
President like everybody else in the executive
branch. But the intelligence they produce is not
seen as subject to his control. Once it is
created, a certain imperative attaches to it. No
one can stop it, even if it creates political
problems for the President and even if its
assertions and conclusions are dubious.
Anyone who tried to do so would pay a high
price in terms of being charged with cooking
the books. . . So it goes to the Hill where it's
seen as 'ground truth.' The views of the
policymaker, on the other hand, are treated as
suspect, tainted by his association with the
administration . . . Is this good government?
You tell me."
The frustrations felt by these policymakers
may well be overblown. Clearly, administration
policy is often the beneficiary, rather than a
casualty, of intelligence analysis. Nonetheless,
policymakers' concerns about how Congress
will perceive and use intelligence are not
entirely groundless.
How Congress Uses the Intelligence It
Receives
Failure of Congress To Integrate
Intelligence With Other Relevant
Information
Most of the policymakers interviewed for this
study faulted Congress for taking intelligence
analysis too seriously. They noted that
Congress is often unaware of, and does not
take the time to understand, the context of the
issue being addressed in intelligence briefings.
They complain that what Congress often
hears�particularly when analysts do not have
firm evidence one way or the other�is the
worst case scenario and that this, in turn,
skews Congressional perceptions of the issue
being briefed. They also fault Congress for too
readily accepting the judgments of intelligence
analysts without probing the basis for them,
leading to conclusions that the policymaker
regards as unjustified by the evidence.
Most of the Members and staff interviewed for
this article acknowledged the need to obtain
appropriate "context" in order to evaluate the
intelligence they receive and conceded that at
times this does not happen.� Some noted,
however, that the fault often lies with
policymakers who refuse to appear at
intelligence briefings to provide "the policy
side" of an issue. This happens especially
when the committee making the request is not
the "policymaker's committee"�that is, the
committee that exercises principal jurisdiction
over the department to which the policymaker
belongs.
Some in Congress also fear that, if policy
officials are invited to intelligence briefings, the
end result is likely to be a "homogenized"
presentation rather than a "gloves off"
intelligence briefing. Indeed, many intelligence
analysts concede that they prefer briefing
Congressional audiences without
policymakers present in order to avoid
uncomfortable situations.
Members and staff also acknowledge the
frequent failure of Members to probe the
judgments offered by intelligence analysts. As
one Member put it, "Many Members take what
the Intelligence Community says as gospel
when in fact they should look on it as an
educated opinion. . . The real problem is,
Members don't spend enough time probing
what they hear from the Intelligence
Community. If they spent more time analyzing
60 One Member did express a preference for receiving
intelligence briefings without policy officials attempting to
provide "context." This Member also thought Congress
needed to hear "the worst case" from intelligence analysts
if it is trying to weigh the consequences of a particular
course of action
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11�1111111111111111111
what they were hearing, they would know more
what needs to be fleshed out in order to make
their own judgments."
Intelligence analysts usually cannot be
counted upon for such help. They may be
unwilling or unable to comment, even if asked,
about the political context that surrounds a
given issue. As a consequence, Members
often do not receive a complete picture from an
intelligence briefing.
This situation has implications not only for
policymakers but also for Members
themselves, especially when it later turns out
that the intelligence analysis was wrong or
should have been treated more circumspectly.
Members who relied on such analysis in
deciding how to cast a controversial vote or in
formulating a position on a controversial issue
may suffer politically as a consequence. They
may, in turn, blame the Intelligence Community
for producing what they see as shoddy analysis
or, worse, for having deliberately misled them.
A graphic illustration of this problem occurred
in connection with the Senate vote in
December 1990 authorizing the President to
send US troops to the Persian Gulf. For weeks
preceding this vote, the Senate Intelligence
Committee received almost daily briefings
from representatives of the Intelligence
Community, given principally by a senior DIA
analyst, with other Community representatives
also involved. These briefings focused on the
strength of the Iraqi military forces. Staffers
recall the committee being told "the Iraqi
military was the most advanced in that part of
the world, battle-tested by eight years of war
with Iran . . . The Iraqis would use chemical
and biological weapons against the coalition
forces. . . In all likelihood, the United States
was in for a prolonged conflict of at least six
months' duration involving many casualties."
Largely on the basis of these dire predictions,
several Senators on the SSCI�including its
Chairman, David L. Boren of Oklahoma�as
well as the Armed Services Committee
Chairman, Sam Nunn of Georgia, ultimately
voted against the resolution authorizing the
President to send troops to the Gulf. Later,
when it turned out that coalition forces
achieved immediate air superiority and the
ground war ended in a matter of days with
relatively few American casualties, the
Senators who had voted in the negative were
understandably upset. Some had lost
considerable political support in their home
states as a result of their votes. Senator Nunn
later said the vote not only had hurt his
credibility as chairman of the SASC but also
had removed any thoughts he might have had
about running for President, knowing that his
vote would have been a "major debating point"
in any election campaign.61 After all, they were
Senators supposedly "in the know" and yet
appeared to have egregiously misread the
situation. Most felt "sandbagged" by the
Intelligence Community.
"In the end," said a former committee staffer, "it
was apparent the Intelligence Community
didn't know squatola about the Iraqi military�
what they had, how bad they were, or what
they intended to do." A former intelligence
official disputed this view and suggested that
information may have been held back from the
Congress for military operational reasons:
'The Intelligence Community knew how poorly
trained the Iraqi forces were. Some of them
had been dragged out of dancehalls in
Baghdad in their Bermuda shorts. But, for
some reason, this wasn't highlighted to the
Congress. . . perhaps because they were
concerned this information would leak out and
it might suggest which Iraqi forces were the
softest targets."
61 "Nunn Regrets Vote on Gulf War," Washington Post, 26
December 1996, p. Al2
"The Intelligence
Community knew
how poorly
trained the Iraqi
forces were.
Some of them
had been
dragged out of
dancehalls in
Baghdad in their
Bermuda shorts.
But . . . this
wasn't
highlighted to the
Congress."
�Former
intelligence
official
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For those
Senators whose
votes against the
Persian Gulf
resolution were
determined by
the intelligence
briefings they
received, the high
regard some of
them had held for
intelligence
analysis was
seriously shaken.
"But the real problem for the committee," said
a former committee staffer, "was that it was
never given 'blue team' information
[information on US military capabilities]. It was
never advised, for example, that stealth aircraft
were to be used. It was never provided an
assessment of our forces versus theirs."
Senators could, of course, have done more to
seek such information outside the Intelligence
Community. As one staffer said: "A lot of
relevant information was not provided. . . Not
because it wasn't available but because it was
not asked for. . . Much of it could have been
obtained by any legislative assistant in any
Senator's office. But no one asked." Senators
might have sought a Pentagon "net
assessment" of the military forces involved in
the Gulf conflict. 62 Or they might have sought
personal assurances from the Secretary of
Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Indeed, several Senators on the SSCI
did seek out additional information beyond
what they were receiving from the Intelligence
Community. At least one of them changed his
position from opposition to support for the
resolution on the basis of this additional
information.
The administration itself might also have done
more to get this kind of information into the
committee's mix. Indeed, given the closeness
of the Senate vote on the resolution
authorizing the President to commit US forces,
in retrospect it is surprising to some of those
interviewed for this study that no such effort
was made. Some attribute this to a historical
reluctance on the part of the executive to give
Congress advance information about US
operational plans. But a former intelligence
official involved in planning for the operation
said a more likely explanation was that "[the]
administration was so busy at that point, it paid
very little attention to what was being briefed to
62 One former Senate staffer who did hear the briefings to
the Senate Armed Services Committee by US military
officials recalled them as "every bit as pessimistic" as
those presented to the SSCI
the intelligence committees. Had they known
the impact it was having, they might have done
something about it, but this was really not on
our screens at this point."
Several of those interviewed had little
sympathy for the Members who found
themselves in this position. As one noted,
"they are big boys now and can look out for
themselves." Another pointed out that
"Members are never going to get all the
information known to the executive on a
particular issue. . . If they miss something,
they miss something."
When Members are inadequately informed,
however, regardless of who is to blame, the
repercussions can extend beyond the
Members themselves. For those Senators
whose votes against the Persian Gulf
resolution were determined by the intelligence
briefings they received, the high regard some
of them had held for intelligence analysis was
seriously shaken. Such feelings can later
translate into negative votes where intelligence
funding and oversight matters are at issue.
Selective Use of Intelligence for Political
Purposes
It will surprise no one that Members and their
staffs at times use intelligence, or information
derived from intelligence, for political
purposes. The same phenomenon is not
unknown in the executive branch, but
Members of Congress operate for the most
part in an open political environment, whereas
executive officials usually take things public
only after having lost the battle internally.
Neither branch has done much to discourage
the practice. Leakers of intelligence are rarely
identified and even more rarely punished. As
one Congressional staffer noted: "People here
have the sense that, since no one enforces the
rules, they are not to be taken all that seriously.
It's like the tendency people have to speed up
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on a freeway if they never see a cop. Let me
tell you, they aren't writing any tickets on this
freeway."
Members of Congress are protected by the
"speech and debate" clause of the
Constitution, which immunizes them from
criminal prosecution for what they say on the
floor of either House. Nevertheless, because
they are elected officials, they must think twice
before saying anything that might jeopardize
their standing for the next election or subject
them to criticism by their colleagues. For most
Members, these are strong inhibiting forces.
In any case, some Members, when they see a
chance to score political points, will be tempted
to do so, regardless of the source of their
information. Members and staff concede as
much. While most Members take care to
protect the intelligence they are given, some
will seek a way to turn it to their political
advantage without (in their view) endangering
national security. Few will be so bold as to
publicly release classified information
themselves, but there are many subtle ways to
insinuate intelligence information into the
political process. In the end, most Members
and staff do not see a realistic means of
controlling this practice. One staffer regarded it
as "an artifact of the system." Another said, "the
winds up here will blow where they will. . .
Intelligence agencies know it and just have to
factor it into their calculations."
Intelligence agencies, interestingly enough,
actually give Congress high marks for
protecting intelligence information. Apart from
a handful of widely reported and somewhat
dated examples, no intelligence agency
personnel interviewed for this study could point
to instances of compromise by Members or
their staffs. In any event, no one saw the "leak"
problem as sufficiently serious or widespread
to warrant executive branch reconsideration of
the amount or sensitivity of the intelligence
shared with the Hill.
Widespread concern was expressed, however,
over the growing number of cases in which
Members or their staffs demand that
information contained in intelligence briefings
or reports be declassified or "sanitized"63 so
that the Member can make public use of it.
According to many intelligence officials, the
political motivation behind many of these
requests is quite transparent. Many in
Congress apparently have seized on this
technique as a way of making selective use of
intelligence in a legal way. Intelligence
agencies have attempted to accommodate
such requests, which has only encouraged
more of them.
Failure of Congress To Assimilate Finished
Intelligence
Another apparent problem is the failure of the
national security committees of Congress
(including the intelligence committees) to avail
themselves in a meaningful way of the finished
intelligence that is distributed to, or can be
requested by, these committees. This situation
was described in Part III.
Having access to, but not acting upon,
information described in finished intelligence
can become a source of embarrassment. This
happened recently to the SSCI; its chairman
publicly criticized the Secretary of Defense for
failing to respond to finished intelligence
reports indicating a security threat to the
Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, only
to find that the SSCI had received the same
intelligence reports and had done nothing with
them prior to the bombing there in June 1996
that killed 19 US airmen. Although the
committee correctly noted that security for a
military complex was not its responsibility, the
fact that it had not previously raised the issue
with those who were responsible weakened
the impact of its chairman's criticism.
63 This is accomplished principally by removing references
to intelligence sources and methods and recasting the
analysis in more general terms.
[For Congress,)
having access to,
but not acting
upon,
information
described in
finished
intelligence can
become a source
of
embarrassment.
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Both branches recognize the problem, but
neither has been inclined to do much about it.
While the national security committees would
like to do a better job of availing themselves of
finished intelligence available to them, they are
too busy to spend much time worrying about it.
Because they are able to request and obtain
intelligence briefings whenever they need
them, keeping up with developments in
finished intelligence does not claim a high
priority on their time.
Having computer access to intelligence (now
limited to the two intelligence committees) also
does not appear likely to solve the problem, at
least until more terminals become available
and committee staffs become more adept at
using them. Intelligence committee staff now
must take the time to go to a computer terminal
that is located outside the staff's own
workspaces (and that may already be in use)
and search computer files for what may be
relevant. Indeed, one Congressional staffer
said that computer access actually had made it
more difficult for him than having "hard copy"
intelligence.
Intelligence agencies, for their part, recognize
that very little of the finished intelligence sent to
the Hill is actually read. Nonetheless, just the
fact that the material is there or can readily be
made available offers the agencies some
degree of protection. Committees cannot claim
they did not know this or were denied access
to that. If the committees choose not to avail
themselves of the finished intelligence that is
offered or provided, from the standpoint of
intelligence producers, "It's their problem, not
ours."
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1111111111111111111111IIIMMIll
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
Once largely acquiescent in matters of national
security, Congress took on a more assertive
role in the 1970s, reflecting a loss of
confidence in executive branch leadership
after the Vietnam war and Watergate as well as
a desire to establish itself as a coequal branch
of government where national security was
concerned. It is a role the legislative branch is
not likely to relinquish.
To perform this role, Congress requires
information about the rest of the world. For the
most part, its needs can be satisfied (indeed,
they often are beffersatisfied) without resort to
intelligence. Nevertheless, there are times, not
altogether infrequent, when intelligence
agencies provide a unique source of relevant
information. If Congress is to base its decisions
on the best available evidence, it must have
access to ,this information and integrate it into
its own process.
In principle, the executive branch does not
disagree. For at least the last 20 years, a
steadily increasing flow of substantive
intelligence has been provided to the Hill. For
the executive branch, however, the results
have been mixed. On one hand, intelligence
has produced a more informed Congress, one
better able to understand what is motivating
the executive branch on the international stage
and one less apt to make irrational overtures of
its own. On the other hand, intelligence has
provided, and continues to provide, the
Congress with ammunition it can use to
challenge the executive. Thus intelligence-
sharing can be seen as fostering
bipartisanship on foreign affairs and military
issues in some cases and in other instances as
undermining it.
Most of the intelligence shared with Congress
is channeled through its two intelligence
committees. In recent years, however, other
committees as well as individual Members
have increasingly been gaining access on their
own terms.
In practice, the road has been a bumpy one.
While reasonably well-developed, well-
understood practices govern some aspects of
intelligence-sharing, for the most part there are
no formal rules.
Undoubtedly there is virtue in this kind of
system for both sides. It allows maximum
flexibility to deal with circumstances that all
concede cannot be safely predicted. It allows
leaders on each side (for instance, a new DCI
or new chairman of a key committee) to take a
greater hand in constructing and managing the
overall relationship.
But such a system also leads to uncertainty
and conflict. Because little is written down,
existing practices are more apt to be
challenged or violated, unreasonable or
inappropriate demands are more likely to be
made, and confusion is more apt to reign.
What is accepted in one circumstance
becomes precedent for the next. What is
learned must be relearned.
Judging from the interviews conducted for this
study, Congress seems more satisfied with the
present system than does the executive�
largely, one suspects, because in recent years
Congress has been able to get what it wants
from intelligence agencies. Indeed, most
observers believe the Intelligence Community
has bent over backward to accommodate in
some fashion whatever Congressional
demands are placed on it. Some see this
compliant posture beginning to take a toll on
managers and analysts within the Intelligence
Community. Clearly, it is straining their
relationship with the rest of the executive
branch. As demands from Congress continue
to grow, the greater these stresses will become.
Congress itself, though relatively satisfied with
its ability to tap into intelligence information,
still remains at the forbearance of the
executive in terms of the intelligence it is given.
While reasonably
well-developed,
well-understood
practices govern
some aspects
of intelligence-
sharing, for the
most part there
are no formal
rules.
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Written "rules
of the road" are
needed to govern
intelligence-
sharing with
Congress.
Even in the categories it is permitted to see or
hear, Congress cannot request information it
does not know exists.
Congress also has no systematic way for
integrating the intelligence it receives with
other information that bears upon a particular
issue. Committee staffs or individual Members
may attempt to do this, but their efforts are
subject to the vagaries of the Congressional
process. So long as this remains the case, the
greater are the odds that Members will rely on
intelligence and come to the wrong
conclusions.
Some things need to change. The author's
recommendations on this score are
enumerated below.
The Need for Written "Rules of the Road"
Written "rules of the road" are needed to
govern intelligence-sharing with Congress.
They are needed to govern what intelligence is
shared and how such sharing is accomplished.
They are also needed to govern the
Intelligence Community's internal efforts in
support of Congress as well as the
coordination of this support with the rest of the
executive branch.
These "rules of the road" should be put in the
form of "understandings to be generally
observed" rather than "absolutes from which
there is never deviation." They should
incorporate those longstanding, time-tested
practices that have worked and end those that
have not. The author's notions of what has
worked and what has not worked are set forth
in the following three subsections.
Congress, through appropriate
representatives, should participate in the
development of these written
understandings�even those internal to the
executive branch�to alleviate any concern
that the policies and procedures agreed upon
by executive agencies may allow intelligence
support to Congress to be manipulated or
politicized. Congress should understand how
the executive branch plans to develop and
provide such support and should be satisfied
with those arrangements.
Finally, these written understandings should
be subject to ongoing review and amendment.
What does not work should be discarded.
What Should Be the "Rules of the Road"To
Govern the Provision of Intelligence to the
Congress?
1. Published Intelligence. The eight
Congressional committees that share principal
responsibility for national security matters
should continue to have access to finished
intelligence published for general circulation
within the government. The daily current
intelligence publications, the National
Intelligence Daily and the Military Intelligence
Digest, should continue to be provided in hard
copy to these committees, and other finished
intelligence pertinent to their needs should be
available to them electronically, where
feasible, or upon request. The intelligence
agencies that produce finished intelligence
should work directly with the staffs of each of
these committees to determine specifically
what the substantive intelligence needs of the
committees are and how best to satisfy them.
If needs exist that can be predicted at the
beginning of each session�for example,
intelligence relating to a vote on "most favored
nation" treatment for China, renewal of the
Export Administration Act, or ratification of a
particular treaty�intelligence producers ought
to factor these requirements into their planning
at an early stage.
As a general rule, Congress should be content
with the intelligence analysis produced for use
by the executive branch and should not be part
of the formal process in the executive branch
for tasking such analysis. At the same time,
Congressional needs ought to be taken into
account in that process by the intelligence
agencies themselves. In addition, where
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Congressional requests for new analysis
happen to coincide with the needs of
policymakers, intelligence producers should
try to accommodate such requests with
available resources.
Committees that have, or acquire, electronic
access to finished intelligence should consider
hiring a computer specialist (preferably with
experience in the Intelligence Community) who
is able to identify and retrieve pertinent
reporting in response to Member or staff
requests. Similarly, committees that lack
computer access should be served by liaison
officers from the producing agencies who can
identify and obtain finished intelligence
pertinent to the needs of Members and staff.
Several of those interviewed for this study
thought the Intelligence Community should go
further by establishing a secure "liaison office"
on the Hill, similar to the office operated by the
military services, that would be linked
electronically to intelligence producers and
provide immediate responses to requests for
finished intelligence from committees and
Members. While this proposal deserves closer
scrutiny, whether the advantages would justify
the costs is not altogether apparent.
Finished intelligence should not normally be
furnished to committees or individual Members
who do not have responsibilities in the national
security area. Requests from such committees
or Members for written analyses should
ordinarily be referred to the Congressional
Research Service, which produces highly
professional analyses using publicly available
information,64 or, if that does not suffice, should
be satisfied by intelligence briefings.
" It is apparent that the CIA and perhaps other
intelligence producers need to establish a working
relationship with the Congressional Research Service.
Both are involved in providing information support to
Congress. Many requests now referred to intelligence
agencies could be satisfied (indeed, should be satisfied)
with publicly available information A mechanism for
handing off such requests to the Congressional Research
Service ought to be created
Access to finished intelligence that has been
tailored to the needs of the President and other
senior officials should continue to be limited to
situations in which such analysis is pertinent to
an oversight investigation or inquiry. "Raw"
intelligence should not routinely be provided to
the Hill, but it should continue to be made
available for oversight purposes and should be
provided to the oversight committees where
relevant to substantive briefings.
2. Intelligence Briefings. Consistent with
security requirements, intelligence briefings on
substantive topics should continue to be
provided in response to the requests of
Congressional committees, so long as the
requests relate to matters within the
jurisdiction of such committees. Intelligence
briefings for individual Members should
ordinarily be limited to matters within the
jurisdiction of a committee to which the
Member is assigned or to issues of specific
concern to the Member's state or district.
Where it appears that a Member's request for
a briefing can be satisfied with unclassified
information (for instance, background for a
foreign visit or for a meeting with a foreign
dignitary, or material relating to a constituent
request), intelligence agencies should try to
ascertain whether the request can be satisfied
by the Congressional Research Service. If the
needs of an individual Member cannot be met
in this manner, intelligence agencies should
provide a briefing under the auspices of the
pertinent intelligence committee. This will
ensure that the briefing is given in a secure
environment, provide an opportunity for the
Member to be educated on the handling of
classified information, and subject him or her to
the intelligence committee's rules prohibiting
disclosure of the information except in a closed
session of the parent body.
Where it appears
that a Member's
request for a
briefing can be
satisfied with
unclassified
information . . .
intelligence
agencies should
try to ascertain
whether the
request can be
satisfied by the
Congressional
Research
Service.
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IIIIIIIII
Intelligence
briefings should
as a rule be
provided in
closed session.
(They] also
should not be
given in partisan
settings.
Substantive briefings should not divulge
information concerning intelligence
operations, budgets, and programs unless the
briefings are being presented before the
intelligence committees. Otherwise,
distinctions should not be made in terms of the
substantive analysis briefed to Congressional
committees, even if this means "sourcing"
relevant information. What is said to one
should be said to all, assuming the requisite
security measures are in place.
Intelligence briefings should as a rule be
provided in closed session. Such briefings
inherently involve the presentation of
information derived from classified information.
Forcing intelligence agencies to present this
information in public jeopardizes security,
places an undue burden on the participants,
and in the end substantially diminishes the
value of the briefing. If a committee sees a
compelling public interest in having an
intelligence briefing made public, a sanitized
transcript of the briefing can be created and
released.
Intelligence briefings also should not be given
in partisan settings. To do so creates the
impression that the Intelligence Community is
lending itself to partisan purposes. It should be
understood by both sides that requests to brief
the Members or staff of one political party on a
substantive issue are not appropriate unless
the requester is willing to open the briefing to
Members of the other political party.
Finally, requests for intelligence briefings to
Congress should come from Congress itself. If
an administration wants Members of Congress
to receive intelligence briefings on a particular
issue, it should suggest this directly to the
Members concerned rather than levying the
requirement upon intelligence agencies to
make such contacts.
3. Intelligence That Is Neither Published nor
Briefed. Some understanding needs to be
reached with respect to the obligation of
analysts (and their superiors) to bring
significant intelligence to the attention of
Congress when such information is not
included in finished intelligence going to the
Hill and is not otherwise being provided in
response to a Congressional request. Clearly,
if the analyst (or producing agency) concludes
that the information is patently unreliable, there
should no obligation to convey it. Moreover,
when the information is "interesting" but has
little significance in terms of US security or the
functions of Congress itself, there should be no
obligation to provide it.
If, on the other hand, the information is
deemed reliable and bears directly on a matter
that Congress is considering or will soon act
upon, the obligation to convey it is strong.
Similarly, if the information is judged reliable
and discloses a development that could pose a
serious national security problem for the
United States (whether or not a Congressional
response is immediately indicated), the
obligation is strong.
It should also be understood by both sides that
intelligence agencies may choose to use a
variety of means and channels for conveying
intelligence to Congress. Especially sensitive
but highly relevant information might be limited
to the Congressional leadership and/or the
leaders of the intelligence committees; less
sensitive but highly relevant information might
be limited to the leaders of the policy
committee(s) concerned; sensitive but less
relevant information might be limited to the
leaders of the intelligence committees.
Committee staff directors could act for their
respective bosses in most circumstances.
Congress needs to understand that a decision
to convey sensitive intelligence that is not
otherwise being reported to it involves a
subjective evaluation of its reliability as well as
its value to Congress. When an intelligence
producer decides not to provide sensitive
intelligence because it meets neither test, that
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decision ought to be accorded reasonable
deference on the basis of the facts that were
known, or should have been apparent, to the
producing agency at the time the decision was
made.
For its part, the Intelligence Community needs
to understand that, if sensitive intelligence is
deemed reliable and Congressional interest in
having such intelligence is strong, someone in
Congress needs to be advised. Close calls
should be resolved in favor of notice in some
appropriate manner. Congress has
traditionally been far more agitated if no one on
the Hill received word of significant intelligence
than if intelligence agencies simply chose the
wrong person(s) to advise.
What Should Be the "Rules of the Road" To
Govern the Intelligence Community's
Preparations for Briefing Congress?
Preparations for intelligence briefings vary
widely. More attention is given to briefing
committees than to briefing individual
Members or staff. In fact, however, briefings to
individual Members or staff often have greater
consequences than briefings to full
committees, or can lead to briefings of full
committees. The degree of preparation should
be roughly the same whatever the audience.
First, when a request for a briefing is received,
the analyst assigned to provide the briefing
should be advised by the Congressional Affairs
office of precisely what is expected by the
Congressional requester. Currently, such
guidance is provided to some degree, but it
often consists of vague instructions conveyed
over the telephone or by electronic mail. Often
the Congressional Affairs office itself has an
unclear understanding. A more routinized,
systematic approach would mean fewer
problems.
Analysts who have never given Congressional
briefings need to be instructed by their
respective Congressional Affairs offices. They
should be told to avoid being drawn into policy
discussions and how to deal with the situations
that commonly arise. In this regard, they
should be given the same latitude they have
with consumers in the executive branch. That
is, if they are permitted to set forth alternative
scenarios for policymakers and opine as to the
likelihood or consequences of each one, they
ought to have the same latitude before
Congress.
Analysts who have never briefed Congress
should also be instructed as to what sorts of
information are appropriate in their briefings
and what sorts, if any, are to be avoided. This
should include being told to make clear and
comprehensive recitations of the evidence
supporting their analytical judgments. If there
are concerns about sourcing some of the
evidence, the analyst should be told how to
handle them. If analysts are appearing before
other than the intelligence committees, they
should be told to avoid giving information that
concerns intelligence operations, programs, or
funding.
Intelligence agencies should require that all
Congressional briefings�to committees, to
individual Members, to staffs, or to entire
bodies�be scripted. These scripts should
contain all the hallmarks of good analysis�
that is, they should set forth the pertinent
background, state the key judgments as well
as the presumptions and evidence underlying
them, and make explicit what is known and
unknown. Scripting takes time and effort, but it
is the only way an analyst's agency has of
knowing exactly what he or she expects to say
to Congress and the only means of
establishing with the rest of the executive
branch what an analyst plans to say or has
said.
A systematic process should also be
established to identify any briefing that is likely
to be controversial. Briefings should be
considered controversial if they present
Intelligence
agencies should
require that all
Congressional
briefings . . . be
scripted.
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Whether or
not a briefing
is deemed
controversial,
analysts who
have not
previously
briefed on the
Hill should be
instructed on the
techniques to
use�and those
to avoid.
analytical judgments (as opposed to reporting
factual material) on a topic where there is
dispute in Congress or among the public about
what US policy should be. Determining
whether this situation exists should, at a
minimum, involve a communication between
the analyst(s) and the Congressional Affairs
staff concerned.
For those briefings identified as potentially
controversial, a special set of procedures
should apply:
� A senior analyst should be selected to do the
briefing or, at a minimum, to accompany the
junior analyst to the Hill. Analysts who are
known to have "axes to grind" on particular
issues�those who have strong personal
differences with the assessments being
briefed�should ordinarily not be selected for
these assignments.
� Thorough internal coordination of the
proposed presentation should take place.
Analysts should not be sent to give briefings
on controversial subjects that their superiors
would not be prepared to give. Where time
permits, "dry runs" of the briefing should be
conducted.
� An analyst conducting a briefing should be
"educated" if necessary by the
Congressional Affairs staff on what sorts of
responses and questions the analyst may
encounter at the briefing so that he or she
can prepare sufficiently. If Members being
briefed have already taken positions on the
issue involved, or have expressed concerns
about the issue, the analyst providing the
briefing should be aware of these factors�
not for the purpose of modifying the briefing
but rather to facilitate a coherent discussion
at the time the briefing occurs.
� Coordination should occur with the other
Intelligence Community briefers, if any, by
telephone, video conference, or face-to-face
meetings. The purpose of such coordination
should not be to reconcile competing
analytical views, but rather to identify likely
areas for questioning as well as to ensure
that appropriate policymakers are aware of
the briefings.
Whether or not a briefing is deemed
controversial, analysts who have not
previously briefed on the Hill should be
instructed on the techniques to use�and
those to avoid�in making oral presentations
to the Congress. For most occasions, analysts
should not read from the prepared script.
Indeed, more often than not, they will not be
allowed to. Analysts should be expressly told
this and should prepare themselves for it. If
they hope to hold the attention of their
audience, oral presentations should come
directly to the point with a minimum of
background explanation. Analysts should take
the key points from their prepared script, and,
where points are known to be controversial,
should use precisely the same wording for the
oral presentation. Otherwise, the briefing can
take on an "Alice in Wonderland" quality. Leave
the details to questioning.
What Should Be the "Rules of the Road"
Governing Coordination of Intelligence
Support to the Congress With the Rest of
the Executive Branch?
As a practical matter, because so much
intelligence is provided to the Hill, it would be
impossible (and ultimately unproductive) for
intelligence agencies to effect coordination on
all of it with the rest of the executive branch. A
more selective approach seems called for.
As a starting point, the National Security
Council staff should identify those (perhaps
five or six) national security issues of particular
significance to the incumbent administration
on which it wishes to be notified before
intelligence on these issues is given to the Hill.
The NSC staff should provide this list at the
start of each session of Congress. If such a list
is not immediately forthcoming, the
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IIIIIMINIIIIMMIIIMIIMIN
Intelligence Community should request it.
Relevant Congressional Affairs staff and
analysts should also be made aware of this list.
Beyond this, advance notice should, at a
minimum, be provided to pertinent policy
officials when the intelligence to be provided to
Congress conflicts with, or otherwise can be
expected to undermine, policies or proposals
under their cognizance. Such notice should be
provided by the analysts involved (or by their
superiors) and should go directly to the
policymakers or to their staffs. Congressional
Affairs channels should not be solely relied
upon for this purpose. Where possible, a copy
or draft of the proposed briefing script should
be delivered in time for affected policymakers
(and/or their staffs) to read it.
If policymakers object to what intelligence
agencies plan to say on the grounds that it will
undermine their policies or proposals,
intelligence agencies must have the intestinal
fortitude to withstand their complaints. If, on
the other hand, a policymaker's complaint
concerns the accuracy or completeness of the
analysis proposed to be briefed, the agency
involved should satisfy itself that the quality of
the analysis is sound by reviewing the
evidence and the reasoning and, where
feasible, interviewing the complaining
policymaker. The determination of the
intelligence producer should be regarded as
final. Once an intelligence agency has
determined that the analytical work is sound, it
should be provided to the Hill and the
complaining policymaker so informed.
If a policymaker asks that analysis be delayed
in going to the Hill, the intelligence agency
ought to ask why. If the analysis simply does
not "suit" the policymaker or if he or she only
wants more time to formulate a rejoinder, delay
is not justified. On the other hand, if there are
demonstrable problems that might be
created�for example, if the United States has
promised a foreign government to treat a
matter confidentially and needs time to consult
this government before briefing Congress�
greater latitude should be shown. If the delay is
expected to be substantial, the Congressional
requester should be consulted about the
situation.
Occasionally, information will be sent to the Hill
without an intelligence agency perceiving its
"flap" potential in advance; the dustup occurs
after the material is presented. In these
circumstances, the intelligence agency
concerned should take the initiative to notify
the policymaker(s) affected as soon after the
briefing as possible, providing a copy of the
script and other information that may be
necessary to understand what transpired.
The Need for a More Systematic Effort To
Integrate Intelligence Into Congressional
Decisionmaking
Congress, like consumers of intelligence in the
executive branch, needs to be able to place the
intelligence it receives into context. Unlike
executive branch consumers, few of its
Members enter service as experts in national
security affairs, and fewer still have the time
and energy outside their normal duties to
become experts.
On any given issue, in addition to the
intelligence they receive, consumers in the
executive branch ordinarily have information
regarding the US posture on the issue (what
the United States is doing about it, what US
capabilities are for dealing with it, and what the
domestic implications of the issue are), as well
as information about the postures of other
governments on the same issue. Moreover,
they are usually in touch with experts in the
private sector, including academics, media
people, "think tanks," and specialists in the
United States and abroad.
If policymakers
object to what
intelligence
agencies plan
to say on the
grounds that it
will undermine
their policies
or proposals,
intelligence
agencies must
have the
intestinal
fortitude to
withstand their
complaints.
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While intelligence
analysts cannot
be expected to
know. . . all the
considerations
weighing upon a
particular policy
decision, . . .
they can alert
Members and/or
their staffs to the
existence of such
considerations
when they are
aware of them.
Lawmakers have access to the same type of
information, should they seek it, but this does
not occur naturally. The flow of information to
Members is haphazard and unfocused. Even
the work done in particular committees will
ordinarily not encompass all aspects of a
particular national security issue�that is,
diplomatic, military, intelligence, and domestic
considerations. For those who have access to
the intelligence, the tendency is to place too
much reliance on this aspect of the
decisionmaking process. As seen in the
Persian Gulf episode described earlier, this
tendency can lead to undesirable
consequences for particular Members when
the intelligence proves to be wrong; it also may
ultimately undermine the relationship these
Members have with the Intelligence
Community.
While intelligence analysts cannot be expected
to know�much less inform Members�about
all the considerations weighing upon a
particular policy decision by the executive
branch (apart from the intelligence analysis
they are briefing), they can alert Members and/
or their staffs to the existence of such
considerations when they are aware of them.
Doing so would at least put Members on notice
that other relevant information exists and help
them discern where to look for it.
Congressional committees themselves should
make a more systematic effort to ensure that
their Members receive a complete picture of
significant issues. In most circumstances, the
preferable alternative is to have policy
witnesses appear at intelligence briefings and
intelligence witnesses appear at policy
briefings. When this is not feasible, an effort
should be made to have separate policy and
intelligence briefings. Policy departments and
intelligence agencies, for their part, need to
recognize the legitimate need of
Congressional committees in this regard and
abandon their predilections to appear before
only "their" committees.
Beyond the briefing process, committee
staffers should be designated to develop
appropriate "context" for their Members where
significant national security issues are
concerned. This might entail establishing
networks of contacts at policy agencies,
military services, other Congressional
committee staffs, the Congressional Research
Service, private think tanks in the United
States and abroad, the academic community,
the media, and other institutions�networks
that could be quickly tapped when "context"
was needed on a given issue. To some extent,
this kind of networking occurs today, but
whether and how well it is done depends on
how much time, energy, and ingenuity a staffer
devotes to it. Higher priority and greater
management attention should be given to this
aspect of staff work.
Finally, Congressional committees should from
time to time assess how well they have been
served in terms of the information (including
the intelligence) they received on a particular
issue. Did the intelligence analysis prove
correct? If not, where did it fail and why? Did
the committee receive all of the relevant
information bearing upon the issue? If not, why
not? What additional information should have
been obtained? At present, this sort of
assessment rarely, if ever, occurs.
The Need To Discourage Political Use of
Intelligence
Operating as part of a political institution,
Members of Congress and their staffs are
frequently tempted to make political use of the
intelligence to which they have access. On the
whole, they do a commendable job in resisting
this temptation. Still, scoring political points on
issues of public importance will be justification
enough for some. Experience has shown that
when these leaks occur very little is done about
them.
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1111�11111M1
While none of this is likely to change, several
preventive actions could be taken to
discourage such disclosures by the legislative
branch. (The executive branch is equally
culpable but beyond the purview of this study.)
One safeguard is simply for intelligence
briefers to be good analysts by giving a
complete, unbiased picture of every issue,
identifying the caveats and uncertainties. If a
Member is tempted to make selective use of
information for political purposes, this
approach by briefers will at least force him or
her to confront intellectually the information on
the other side of the coin. Few Members wish
to be accused of intellectual dishonesty by
their colleagues who heard the same briefing.
If they recognize that the analysis provides
something less than full support for their
political position, they may be less tempted to
make use of it at all.
Another preventive measure is for briefers to
tell Members specifically (if it is not apparent)
of the harm that might result if the intelligence
is disclosed. If an intelligence agency has a
particular concern, it might well work with staff
of the Member concerned, either before or
after the intelligence is conveyed, to explain
what the specific harm might be�for example,
damage to diplomatic relations with country X,
loss of a SIGINT source, endangerment of a
human agent, or countermeasures to thwart
US military operations. Members may not, in
the end, find such warnings persuasive, but at
least they would be using the information with
their eyes open. At present, many Members
simply do not appreciate the possible
consequences of their actions at the time they
use the information.
Disclosures might also be prevented by
adoption of the suggestion earlier in this study
that intelligence briefings for individual
Members who are not assigned to a committee
with national security responsibilities be
channeled through the intelligence committees
of their respective Houses.
Finally, some control ought to be exerted over
Congress's growing practice of requesting that
"sanitized" versions of intelligence reports be
prepared for public use. Such control might
take the form of (1) limiting the initiation of such
requests to the committees that have national
security responsibilities (as opposed to
individual Members or committees without
jurisdiction in the national security area); (2)
establishing as a matter of policy that
intelligence agencies will not "sanitize"
selected portions of documents that support
one side of a political argument without
sanitizing and, if necessary, releasing the
portions that support the other side; and/or (3)
accommodating such requests only when they
meet a higher threshold�for example, when
the issue involves an important matter of
general public interest and sanitization can be
readily accomplished without jeopardizing
sensitive sources and methods.
Congress relates to the Intelligence
Community essentially in three ways: by
annually providing funds for intelligence, by
performing oversight of intelligence, and by
receiving and using intelligence.
Where funding and oversight are concerned,
Congress relates to the Intelligence
Community in much the same way Congress
relates to other departments and agencies of
the executive branch. The third aspect of the
relationship, however, while played out in the
same contentious, complex crucible, has at its
heart a different purpose: namely, to help
Congress carry out its own responsibilities.
Thought of in this way, intelligence-sharing is
not only different from other aspects of the
Intelligence Community's relationship with
Congress but is qualitatively different from the
functions performed by other executive branch
agencies. (Is there another element of the
executive branch whose charter includes
providing assistance to the Congress in the
performance of its duties?)
Some control
ought to be
exerted over
Congress's
growing practice
of requesting that
"sanitized"
versions of
intelligence
reports be
prepared for
public use.
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Thus far, the
players involved
have shown
little interest in
developing an
agreed-upon
framework for
intelligence-
sharing.
By the same token, this particular function�
supporting Congress with information bearing
on policy issues�at times creates tensions
with the rest of the executive branch, which is
unaccustomed to having other departments
and agencies more or less openly undermine
administration policies and proposals on the
Hill.
One would think enough self-interest exists on
each side of this political triangle to drive the
parties toward a mutual accommodation where
intelligence-sharing is concerned. Congress
has an interest in seeing that its needs are met
and that information is not being improperly
withheld. Intelligence agencies have an
interest in ensuring that Congressional
requirements do not outstrip their resources,
that their information is protected, and that
their independence from the political process
is respected. The rest of the executive branch
has an interest in seeing that the intelligence
support rendered Congress is, to the extent
possible, consistent with the executive's own
needs.
Thus far, however, the players involved have
shown little interest in developing an agreed-
upon framework for intelligence-sharing,
preferring instead the rough and tumble, give-
and-take of the political process, uncertain and
contentious as this may be. Their reluctance
may stem in part from an inability to envision
what such a framework might look like and
what the benefits might be for themselves. If a
study such as this one can make a difference,
it is hopefully by providing a vision of the
possibilities.
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