COMBINED WATCH REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03162323
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2021
• Case Number: F-2018-00781
• Publication Date: January 31, 1968

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COMBINED WATCH REPORT
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Conclusions
31 January 1968
We believe that, in South Vietnam, Communist military operations utilizing
major units will develop in the two northern provinces and the central highlands, with
diversionary harassment tactics being employed on a large scale elsewhere in the country.
We expect Communist pressure to continue in both northern Laos and the Pan-
handle during the dry season.
I. Communist International Developments
The Soviet Union has given diplomatic and propaganda support to the North
Korean position on the Pueblo incident while treatina it as a matter to be settled be-
tween the US and North Korea.
Soviet tactics
seem to be directed toward delaying or preventing possible US military action, primarily
out of genuine concern to ease a potentially dangerous crisis, but also to build a case
with Pyongyang for having aided the latter. The Chinese have cautiously announced
their support for the North Korean position in the Pueblo incident.
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Soviet and Eastern European Military Developments
Soviet military reaction to the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo has(b)(1)
been mainly limited to moderate naval activity in the Far East. Soviet naval units (b)(3)
continue to shadow the US naval task group in the Sea of Japan off the Korean coast.
Critical Areas
2. Vietnam (as of 1600 EST, 31 January): Communist attacks on 30-31 Januar(b)(1)
throughout South Vietnam, hitting many Allied military installations and population (b)(3)
centers, probably were designed to achieve maximum psychological as well as military
effect.
We believe that Communist military operations utilizing major units will de-
velop in the two northern provinces and the central highlands, with diversionary harass-
ment tactics being employed on a large scale elsewhere in South Vietnam. In the Khe
Sanh area, there has been some evidence of the introduction of Communist armored
vehicles and 37mm AAA weapons. Khe Sanh is also within range of various calibers of
artillery operating from Laos.
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3. Laos: The Communists initiated no major new actions within the past week,
but there are continuing indications that they are preparing for an imminent attack on
Lima Site 85 in Sam Neua Province, an important facility for support of guerrilla
operations in Laos and US air operations in North Vietnam. We have had no evidence
that Communist forces are moving southward toward Luang Prabang, although there is a
continuing potential threat to the area as a result of the heavy FAR losses at Nam I3ac
In southern Laos, the fall of the border post of Ban Houei Sane to the North Vietnamese
was directly related to the Communist buildup at Khe Sanh. While the Communists have
increased their pressures on FAR forces this year as compared with their dry season
operations last year, we see no persuasive signs that they have changed their basic
strategy or that they are initiating a general offensive in Laos.
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4. North Korea: Further incidents in the DMZ area within the past week indicate
that North Korea intends to maintain its militant attitude toward the US and South Korea.
There has been evidence for many months of North Korean preparations for an intensification
of harassment operations, and an increase in infiltration operations began last year. We
would anticipate further North Korean provocations. (b)(3)
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