MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI, 27 OCTOBER 1978

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03122690
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2021
• Case Number: F-2017-00841
• Publication Date: October 30, 1978

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/.78.73739
30 October 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Brzezinski, 27 October 1978
1. Zbig asked me to drop by on Friday afternoon late. He
requested a special analysis of the opposition to the Shah. He would
like to know things such as:
a. Who are the various opposition groups?
b. What does each of them represent?
c. What would each of their programs be if they were
able to come to power?
d. Who is financing each of them?
e. Are there any connections between any of these
groups and the Iranian military?
2. Overall, he wants to catalog the various alternatives to the
Shah that lie ahead should the Shah fall out of power. Basically, he
wants to try to demonstrate that it is not a simple question of either
the Shah or democracy, but that a move away from the Shah would not be
a move towards democracy.
3. I told him that I thought your briefing for the President
last Wednesday was most of what we had on this. He felt that that had
not gone into as much detail as he desired with respect to financing
and specific programs. I told him I doubted that we really had that
much more detail. He said maybe the Chief of Station did, particularly
now that the Iranian press has been opened up for a few weeks.
I assured him we would check and have been checking with the Chief of
Station's views on this.
4. I request that you supplement your briefing with whatever
additional detail we do have available and focus it on what the alterna-
tives to the Shah are and how we would characterize them.
5. Assuming we establish that he is right that a move away from
the Shah would not be towards democracy, he would then like to undertake
to disseminate to the world the true undemocratic
character of the Shah's opposition. I pointed out to him that I thought
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there would be real problems with the Congress
so many liberal Members of Congress believe the Shah was so
undemocratic that they would not tolerate a program to help keep him
in power. Nonetheless, I said that was no bar to our developinq the
analysis that he wanted
\ I felt
outline potential is in the area of informing the
Iranians ana others as to the character of the Shah's opposition.
CC:
STANSFIELD
Deputy Director for Operations
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3 November 1978
The Opposition to the Shah
The Shah's opposition is fragmented into many groups.
None is well-organized, the various groups do not cooperate
in any systematic way and indeed, if they did not have the
Shah as a common target, there would be great areas of dis-
agreement among them. No single group or coalition gives
any promise of a genuinely democratic government should it
come to power; although it might have popularity--at least
in the early stages--it would lack the power to impose its
will, it would be inexperienced and dependent on the same
bureaucracy that has failed the Shah, and it would be a
constant target for other ambitious elements, including the
military.
The Opposition Muslim Clergy
Most of the demonstrations and riots have been the
work of that segment of the population that is strongly
influenced by the religious leaders. These demonstrations
seem to be based on local grievances and inspired immediately
by local religious leaders. Two factions can be identified,
although the distinction is somewhat- artifical because of
constant interaction.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, now living in France, is
looked to as a guide by most of the demonstrators. He repre-
sents the view that the Shah must go and b,e, replaced by an
"Islamic Republic". He has presented no specific program
but is rich in pious generalities. Concrete measures can
be inferred from statements made by other religious leaders.
Education would be segregated, women would be veiled to
avoid temptation, nothing contrary to Islam would be published
or broadcast. This could lead to extensive censorship but
the argument of religious leaders would be that censorship
is the prohibition of what is wrong. and not of what is right.
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Ayatollah Shariatmadari is the most influential opposition
clergyman living in Iran. He has sometimes taken a somewhat
more moderate line than Khomeini, for example, willingness to
tolerate a Shah as a figurehead. He has, however, been moving
closer to Khomeini in recent weeks apparently feeling that
Khomeini has such a strong following that he cannot risk getting
, out of step with him. Doctrinally, Shariatmadari's would not
be much different from Khomeini's but left to his own devices
Shariatmadari might be more willing to compromise.
Both groups are funded in the traditional way, by donations
from the pious, especially rich bazaar merchants. There is no
known connection with the military but it is likely that both
religious leaders have some followers in the rank and file of
the armed forces.
The nationalist opposition, generally called the National
Front, is a disparate group which traces itself back to former
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq's group of the same name in
the early 1950s. Its members range from left of center to
far-left. They are mostly white collar, middle class, pro-
fessionals such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and writers.
They call for a return to the constitution, although like
others, it is only selected features they favor. The national-
ists can be divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into a right faction,
which would be willing to make a deal with the Shah and expect
to win a portion of power in next summer's elections; a center
faction which wants to accept the government's plans for election
and would like to see the Shah's powers reduced and a leftist
faction which wants the Shah overthrown. The leftist faction
is in touch with both Ayatollah Khomeini and one of the two
terrorist groups. The center and right factions appear to have
caved in to the leftist faction, feeling that they could only
lose by continuing to advocate a moderate line.
Beyond calling for a return to the constitution and for
a parliamentary government, the National Font has produced
little that could be called a program. Given the differing
ideologies it is unlikely that a realistic program could be
produced. A purely National Front government would probably
be unable to produce an effective administration. Personal
rivalries, divergent philosophies, and inexperience would all
contribute to an unstable government.
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n!ra.
Financing is probably drawn mostly from the personal
resources of the leaders and their followers. The leftist
faction probably is bankrolled by bazaar merchants. The
National Front does not operate any organization or publica-
tions which would require a large expenditure of funds.
The officer corps generally holds the National Front in
low regard. Although some among the military may be sympathetic
to one or another of the National Front factions there is no
known link with any of the military organizations.
There are two terrorist organizations which seem to have
played little part in the disturbances, although two or three
attacks on police stations may be attributable to them. Recent
anti-US incidents appear to have been the work of unaffiliated
religious fundamentalist or radical leftist fringe groups.
There has been, however, very little reporting on either organ-
ization in recent months.
The "People's Strugglers" has drawn its members from those
who are religiously inclined. They seem to have had a Marxist
leadership originally and perhaps still do. This accounts for
the government's description of the terrorists as "Islamic
Marxists." The People's Strugglers is the group that has been
responsible for assassination of US nationals in the past.
The People's Sacrifice Guerillas is a straight forward
Marxist terrorist group that has targeted only Iranian officials.
Little is known about these two groups. They have cooperated
in the past but have also had some serious differences over
ideology and tactics. Both groups have been quiescent for nearly
two years following theloss of several of their leaders in
clashes with the security forces. Membership of the organizations
is estimted at 2500-3000, however, and there should have been �
little difficulty in finding alternate leadership. The long
quiet period might be a matter of policy. The People's Strugglers
are in touch with an element of the National Front and has been
urged by some National Front leaders to avoid violence for the
time being.
Both groups seem to have received help in the past--training,
money and weapons--from the PLO, the Libyans, and perhaps Iraq
and China, but there is no current information at all on these
relationships.
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(ak'
411.
The terrorists appear to have no political program except
that of eliminating the Shah's regime.
The Tudeh Party is the communist organization in Iran.
In its entire 37 year history it has been a faithful and re-
liable tool of Soviet policy in the country. Tile party has
been nearly unreported for more than a decade but conventional
estimates put the number of party members at 1000-2000 with
perhaps 15,000-20,000 sympathizers. Although the party has
been outlawed since 1949 when an alleged party member tried
to kill the Shah it operated freely until 1955 when it was
smashed by the security forces.
The Central Committee leadership is in the Soviet bloc,
Moscow, Bulgaria, East Germany. Little is known of its
activities except for the occasional'statements and party
programs that it issues. A clandestine radio station speaking
for the Party was located in Bulgaria for many years is operat-
ing now from.:the Soviet city of Baku where it first began
activities in the 1950's.
Details on Party financing are not known but funds are
probably supplied by the Communist countries supplemented by
dues levied on individual members.
Tudeh party policies and programs have always followed.
the Moscow line and have mirrored every Shift in Soviet policy.
The one time when this did not occur--when a faction wanted
to adhere to the more hardline Chinese views on violent revolution--
asplit occurred and the Chinese faction was expelled from the
party.
There is no known connection between the Tudeh party, and
the military. In 1955, however, a 600-man Tudeh organization
was discovered and broken up. It included one-third of the
instructors at the military academy, the prime minister's personal
security officer, the counter-espionage chief of the Police
Department a switchboard operator in the royal palace. Since
that time the military have been under constant scrutiny.
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CONFIDENTIAL
3 November 1978
THE IRANIAN NATIONAL FRONT
The National Front was formed originally in 1949 by
a coalition of nine Iranian politicians each of whom con-
tributed his own prestige and supporters to the cause of
ousting the British from the oil fields. Because of the
popular appeal of this issue, the National Front almost
immediately came to dominate the political scene. Mohammad
Mossadeq, a member of the coalition, became prime minister
in 1951, following the assassination of the previous prime
minister, and the National Front became the major force in
parliament. For the next two years parliament was nearly
paralyzed. Although the National Front was in the minority
it was able to tie up parliament by filibustering or boycott-
ing meetings.
When the British were expelled from Iran in 1951 the
main reason for the coalition disappeared and its various
members fell to fighting among themselves and in 1953 when
the Shah's supporters moved against Mossadeq, some of the
National Front swung to the monarch's side. Since that time
the National Front has existed tenuously with parts of it
splitting off only to re-combine later. It has been primarily
a cadre party with little mass membership but whenever political
conditions have permitted, large numbers of sympathizers have
turned out enthusiastically to listen to the National Front
leaders.
The major spokesmen for the National Front, Karim Sanjabi,
Mehdi Bazargan and Shahpur Bakhtiar were associates of Mossadeq.
They tend to be in the right and moderate wings of the party.
Newer leaders such as Mohammad Beheshti, and Mohammad Tavasoli,
were not in evidence in Mossadeq's day. They are in the radical
wing of the National Front.
The National Front has not put forward a program other
than calling for a return to the constitution, although ex-
actly what is meant by this is subject to individual inter-
pretation. At minimum it probably means a separation of
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CONFIDENTIAL
executive, legislative and judicial powers with the Shah's
role greatly reduced. But the constitution also calls for
a Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty and stipulates that the Shah
is the commander in chief of the armed forces, provisions
which the more radical National Frontists would reject.
Ideologically the front ranges from democratic socialists
to far leftists but just short of communism. These dif�
ferences could provide serious problems in a National Front
dominated government.
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itevaed yr, 013�,.,J. .cf Nov
SUBJECT: The Question of Possible Soviet Role in Anti-Shah
Movement in Iran
There is no hard evidence that the USSR or any other
foreign power is involved in fomenting or encouraging the
current anti-government campaign in Iran.
However, it is a matter of record that the Soviets have
successfully recruited high-level Iranian military officers,
several of whom were discovered and arrested within the past
year. These are doubtless not all of the Soviet agents/agent
of influence who are in place in Iran. 1
It is possible the
Soviets have manipulated these agents to bring about whatever
level of destabilization which they perceive in their interest.
Iranian officials including the Shah believe that the
Soviets are behind recent internal strife in Iran. (
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vi ence such as placards, red flags and slogans had been
found which proved that communist elements are working with
religious zroups in fomenting the disorder. According to
the pro-Soviet Communist (Tudeh) party (W(1)
ot Iran has played some role in recent demonstrations in Iran, (b)(3)
particularly at the universities. The Iranians have also.
ordered military units on the Soviet border to be alert for
penetrations of Iranian airspace by Soviet helicopters which,
in one instance, the Iranians suspect were discharging weapons.
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Shou1d the US business community be encouraged to
remain in place in Iran?
Book value of US non-oil direct investment in
Iran totaled $217 million at year end 1977, $90 million
of which was in the manufacturing sector. US oil
companies no longer have an ownership stake in Iran,
although they operate the major oil fields under
contract to the National Iranian Oil Company.
US companies are unlikely to pull out physically
from Iran as a result of the current strife. US
assets could not be easily withdrawn since nearly
all are involved in joint-ventures with Iranian
partners. American corporations more likely would
quietly pull out their personnel and/or their
dependents if conditions worsen. The company
name and domestic organization would be left intact
in the hope that losses could be minimized when
conditions improved.
Planned US investment in Iran is probably dead
for the present. Ford had intended to invest in
Iran and GM had agreed to substantually increase
its interests in the country. These and other US
companies for the present are apt to maintain a
wait-and-see attitude.
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How could the World Bank and the IMF help solve
Iran's economic problem?
The World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) could both serve in an advisory role to
the Iranian government.
O The World Bank provides loans for,
and advises on, specific developmental
� projects such as dams, irrigation schemes,
road building, power grids, etc.
O The Fund deals with the broad economic
conditions of the country in question and
carries out consultations with host
governments, usually on ways to solve
balance-of-payment problems.
The IMF, as an international and supposedly "neutral"
organization, would be the logical choice to play the
chief advisory role to the Iranian government. The
Fund can provide experts on taxation, planning, budgets,
banking, and other general economic areas.
The World Bank also has such experts, but it
tends to focus on specific projects in less developed
countries.
Tehran has rejected planning suggestions and
advice from international institutions in the past
and would probably be particularly adverse to specific
recommendations on allocation of resources -- e.g.
between military or civilian needs -- because of
the foreign policy and domestic political implications.
For their part, the Fund and World Bank also tend
to shy away from direct policy inputs, preferring
to give or withhold their blessing on government-
derived plans. The Iranians might welcome consulta-
tions on less politically sensitive and more specific
areas, however, such as an improvement of their planning
and budgeting organization or on ways to improve
Iranian agriculture.
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