COMPARISON OF IRAN TASK FORCE PAPER WITH STATE CABLE 1379 (TEHRAN TO SECRETARY OF STATE)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850273
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 16, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
SUBJECT
16 may 1961
: Comparison of Iran /lask Force Paper with
State Cable 1379 (Tehran to Secretary of
State)
1. The following comments are based on the semi-final draft
of the Iran Task Force Paper. According to the CIA member the
final version is substantially the same.
2. Ambassador Wailes cautions that the US Government should
not support Amini personally nor identify with him to any greater
extent than with any other friendly Prime Minister. He points
out that the Shah remains the focal point of power in Iran and
that Amini's staying power is unknown. The Task Force paper
goes further. It recommends that we take vigorous action to
support Amini and to impress upon the Shah that his stake in
Amini's success is greater than our own. It urges that we not
be deterred from backing Amini by the fear that he will fail
and calls the new government the best instrument in sight for
promoting evolution in Iran. However, the paper does caution
that we should act discreetly to protect Amini against under-
cutting by the Shah and states the US must maintain some
freedom of action in the event that Amini fails.
3. The cable does not consider Amini as the last chance
for the Mosadeclists and the paper agrees. The paper also
states, however, that Amini may be the last hope of averting
political chaos and possible loss of Iran to the West.
I. The cable states that we should be cautious about
giving the Shah desirable but unwelcome advice. The paper
urges that we encourage the Shah to move toward a more
constitutional role,which is clearly one of the cases where a
cautious and careful approach is desirable.
5. The cable states that the US should not urge the
devolution of local government powers to local elected
assemblies because elections cannot be expected for the
foreseeable future to produce responsible representatives.
The paper agrees.
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6. The cable and the paper are substantially agreed that
the US political objectives should be political, social and
economic development which will promote a strong, stable
government with popular support and ability to resist subversion.
7. The cable recommends that the US not join CENTO but that
it inform the CENTO countries the US has plans for allocating
nuclear weapons outside the ':CENTO area to support CENTO in
the event of hostilities with the USSR. The paper states
that it would be militarily desirable for the US to join CENTO
but agreed that the US should not do so for political reasons.
It recommends that the US make plans to dispose military forces
in support of Iran and inform the government of Iran of these
moves.
8. The cable recommends a reduction in Iranian armed
forces from about 200,000 men to perhaps 150,000 men with an
accompanying improvement in quality. The paper concludes
that even larger military forces would be militarily desirable
but recommends only the present force level be maintained.
9. The cable states that cash grants are the only way to
insure timely receipt of new aid. The paper emphasizes the
urgency of timely aid but does not specify a method of insuring it.
10. The cable states that forty million dollars will be
required by the plan organization to complete the second plan.
The paper believes that it may be as little as twenty-five
million dollars.
11. The paper discusses US assistance for the Iranian
Third Plan. This discussion appears to be consistent with
comments in the cable)which do not go into any detail.
LCUIS MARENGO
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itC,OMING TELEGRAM
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FROM: TEHRAN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1379, MAY 10, 6 PM (SECTION ONE OF THREE)
PRIORITY
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"ACC REFERENCE: DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 1229.
JO P
SC TELEGRAMIlIR
CIA z 1 pm.) ct_y,�,NELTtiut SUPPORT Ay,":W..LPESONALLY NOR' .
NSA 1 raiikr,.t,t,.:sti,g, ANY GEATE1i1rXICLMT THAN WAS'rN
OR SHOULD BE, ?RprE13,Ly DONE WITH ANY OTHER PRIM MtN1SITtra'qfp
tus cr-FrirribrY�-fd---GSAND WHO SEEMS TO BE DOING HIS Ittf 3014�
PAWITK_,�,,�471WFX,t40,:�Iitg.' AL-m-606i SHAH'S litirSmitTai"-' A _
ottIZlIiNsa PAST TWELVE MOTM--AND7ILTHOUGH HE PROBABLY
APPOINTED AMINI RELUCTANTLY AND OUT OF SOME MEASURE OF FEAR,
AT TURN OF EVENTS, HE REMAINS FOCAL POINT OF POWER IN IRAN' 'AND.
HEAD OF REGIME IN WHICH AMINI IS AND A Lf WILL REMA N A
SUBORDINATE THERErORE; WE spouLD NEITHER IDENTIFY US GOVT VIIH
A PR I ME P41 N STER wo05,Lautitig_paituLls� UNKNOWN NOR GET; INT o
44,
posfirTbrrruOp---oR atg�,tutAGAIN5T THEHAH. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER,
WE SHOULD BE symPATAIN�,jo,,,Amutt_EacjimAnisamEs) sama.,
se-ojy__r..a.mxFIYI.,ggisTsik"--.m5�,,��ctgticBzj.,jtfg..uts, MOST,..,ms�j Np,. OF THESE
ARE ECONOM IC IN AND WHAT HE WI LL EXPECT FROM US 15
FINANCIAL ASS I STANCE WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MENTIONED, WHICH
HE ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL NEED AND WHICH WE SHOULD GIVE HIM
IN SUCR A WAY THAT HE CAN MAKE I MMED I ATELY EFFECTIVE USE IT.OF-
(EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1371) .
FOLLOWING ARE EMBASSY COMMENTS M ON NUBERED QUESTIO
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MAY 10, 1961 44449646.64.1
2:17 PM
REFERENCE
2. AMINI APPOINT NT IS SIGNIFICANT AS INDICATION OF SHAH'S
,V4,,,..5.1,44 =0, 1/14106.4.
PER T URBAT I ON OVER DETERIORATION POL 1 T AL AND ECONOMIC SIT UAT ON
AS AMINI
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
SECRET
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SFCRET
79, MAY 10 6 Pm FROM TEHRAN (SECTION ONE OF THREE)
NI HAS DEMANDED AND PR0BABLY WILL INITIALLY AT LEAST
GREATER RDWERS THAN CENT PRFDrCrS2RS. IT FrwmYT
TO BE SEEN HOw MUCH AUTHORITY AmINI CAN RUAIN IF SHAH, A3
PECTED, CONTINUES UNABLE REFRAIN FRONJ: INTEIRFTW-NC,-
DAY-TO-DAY AFFAIRS OF GOVT. v!sacLum�ws4.40AmmilikrFz.�-
_
T C4NEfQRE "MO --c " WHICH TERM WE
LISM ISM AND CHAOS.
;In
T LIKELY INTERYITING STEP WOULD 5E
II'967ER WITH FULL P,c,,,,,..�'Vlf-,ALITHER 9Y
A- 'l AR Li7b
INTERPRET AS E T
AT HER, WE CONSIDER
AKHTIAR ASIME P.1
SHAH OUT OFDESP
I:IR TA
Li
EXTENT AND ON THOSE OCCASIONS WHEN .47. U-NSID'R
ERATi
THAN HAVE AS YET OBTAINED
viAtt,at
jANCES CIDADVIC: WOULD BE TAKEN, THIS W.iLD
TH SUGGL.STED ADVICE RE PAHLAVI FOUNDATIc:-. 'LAir-RAT7'
AT Wr: BELIcVE:
-LCOmED"
AEVER BE GIVEN SHA.'
!c; Tfl APPOINT CERTN
ADVICE SHOULD SELDOM BE GIVEN TO FIRE CERTAIN PECIFIED
VIDUAL.
ADVICE INVOLVING PERSONAL. AFFAIRS
DELICATE GROUND OF ALL.
SHAH'S FAMILY IS MOST
T IS NECESSARY SEAR IN MIND AT ALL TIMES THAT ADVICE BY FOREIGNERS
DIFFICULT TO RECEIVE. IT IS OUR OPINION THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH
T ET PLAYED BY EAR BY AMBASSADOR ON SPOT.
DEFINITELY DO NOT BELIEVE y�_sHoup uRGEJA.ANLmAtap
KILASSEISL4E34�
IS COUNTRY DO NOT NOW,AND CANN9T-gLUIRELIEDLIN
E FUTURE TO PRIPPIX(EM�IPIT REPRESENTATIVES OF
�CAL GOVig'-WIE CONTINUE TO BE APPOINTED REGARDLESS
TEM. LOCAL GOVT POWERS 'ARE MEANINGLESS WITHOUT ABILITY TO
T LOCALLY MOST OF REVENUES REQUIRED FOR LOCAL PURPOSES.
IN
SECRET
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11, �
SECRET
m9,.IvAY 10, CPM FROM TEHRAN (SECTION ONE OF THREE)
IN OUR VIEW LOCAL GOVTS WILL CONTINUE MAINLY TO RELY ON CENTRAL
GOVT FOR REQUIRED FUNDS.
9. INTERNAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF US IN !RAN PRESUMABLY
CONTINUES TO BE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
WHICH WILL PROMOTE STRONG STABLE GOVT WITH SUFFICIENT POPULAR
SUPPORT AND WITH CONTINUING RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST � INFLUENCE
AND SUByeRSION. .WHETHER THIS IS REASONABLE, AS OPPOSED TO
HOPEFUL, OBJECTIVE. FOR FIVE YEARS, WE DO NOT KNOW. PROBLEMS
FACING REGIME ON ONE HAND AND THE UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVES TO
THIS REGIME FROM US POINT OF VIEW ON OTHER MAKE IT MORE REASONABLE
IN CUR VIEW TO LOOK ONLY TWO OR THREE YEARS AHEAD AT MOST. WE
KNOW OF NO ACTION BY.US GOVT AND WE ANTICIPATE NO ACTION BY ANY
ANIAN tzfriSInr TirtallfleDrtrtY�TO-1
YEARS AHcAP-0-
6. IT HAS BEEN AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE PRACTICE THIS EMBASSY
ATTEMPT INFLUENCE GOI LEADERS AND MINISTERS TAKE STEPS TOWARD
ACCOMPLISHMENT SPECIFIC REFORMS AND ACTIONS WHICH US IS CONVINCED
ARE BOTH FEASIBLE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT AND IN IRANIAN AND US INTERESTS.
INSTANCES WHERE THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AND THERE ARE A
NUMBER, HAVE PROVEN THAT IN GENERAL THIS PROCESS IS MORE EFFECTIVE
TO EXTENT LEADERS ACCEPT OUR IDEAS AS THEIR OWN AND LESS
SUCCESSFUL AS "PRESSURES" ARE APPLIED BY US ON THEM.
KEA.121
1
� SECRET
WAILES
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Action
NEA
Into
FROM: TEHRAN
SECRET
�
Control: 6342
Reed: MAY 10, 1961
5:49 PM
TO:. Secretary of State
SS
SP NO: 1379, _ MAY 10, 6P M, (SECTION TWO OF THREE)
E UR
PRIORITY
BFAC ,
BIOC I- 8. AL T____LINIGIUM_PRE$T I GE ALREADY COMMUTER �IQ Mal)
71( AND AL THOUGH ,CKNIO � *,,Nor 12.:-OUR:114 I NG*, _4 0NOT,
IOP REco_21LEwilitlittILIHAT- CENTO SHOLLD
NSC SOMEHOW BE INV IGORATED BUT IF THE UN I TEA jTATES JO INS WE BELIEVE
INR US. WILL ACQUIRE TREMENDOUS RESPONS IB IL ITY NOT SIMPLY FOR ITS
CIA SUliV I VAL tWit$34R1,