VIEWS OF VICE PRESIDENT KY ON THE PROPOSED BOMBING HALT AS OF 23 OCTOBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06923738
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-02256
• Publication Date: October 24, 1968

Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923738
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
24 October 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. RostowV
Special Assistant to the President
The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
SUBJECT: Views of Vice President Ky on the Proposed
Bombing Halt as of 23 October 1968
I. The following information was obtained on 23 and 24
October 1968
a. The 23 October afternoon meeting between Ambassadors
Bunker and Berger and President Thieu and Vice President
Ky made it clear that a US! GVN agreement on terms of a
bombing halt is unlikely. Ky was struck by the American
refusal to "yield an inch" despite his own efforts to moderate
further minimum GVN conditions. Ky had offered to delete
any reference to a DRY agreement to meet with the GVN in
Paris from the public statement he had earlier proposed,
substituting instead just the GVN's expectation that it would
shortly be patticipating in the talks. Ambassadors Bunker
and Berger refused to accept this proposal, increasing Ky's
belief that the Americans' orders are not discretionary, that
they have been instructed to persuade, not bargain, and that a
firm American commitment must already have been given to
the DRY or Soviets.
b. Ky and Thieu had a lengthy discussion after the American
Ambassadors departed. Both emerged from this session smiling
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and in good spirits and, unusually, Thieu walked Ky back
to his office door. Ky told Thieu in this meeting that whatever
their past differences, the President could count on his support
100 percent on the bombing halt issue. The two seemed
agreed and united on this question as they have never been
before.
Z. The source believes it is useless for the Americans to try
to persuade Ky and Thieu on the basis of what is best for Vietnam and
should argue rather for the need for the GVN to swallow a bad pill
now in return for American assurances of firm future backing on
the question of clear primacy over the NLF in Paris talks.
Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923738