REACTIONS OF THE GVN AND VICE PRESIDENT KY CONCERNING PROPOSED BOMBING HALT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06923734
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-02256
• Publication Date: October 18, 1968

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SEZRET
' WIT/SENSITIVE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTONt D.C. 20505
18 October 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
SUBJECT: Reactions of the Glal and
� ce "resiten '
Concerning the Proposed Bombing Halt
the GVN 's and particularly
Vice President Ky's reaction concerning the proposed bombing halt.
That information is summarized in the following paragraphs:
a. Ambassador Bunker had informed Thieu that the DRY
had offered, in exchange for an American bombing halt, to
respect the DMZ, to launch no attacks against major cities
in SVN, and to accept a GVN presence at the Paris talks. The
DRY had insisted, however, that these concessions remain
secret and Ambassador Bunker had pressed this requirement
on Thieu.
b. At a meeting called by Thieu of key GVN officials
Including Ky, Foreign Minister Thanh "seemed concerned only
with getting his delegation off to Paris" while Thieu appeared
worried and uncertain. Ky called the first two DRY offers
concessions of very limited military value since the DRV was
already unable to cause much trouble in these areas. The
third point, Ky said, was really no concession at all unless the
DRY would also agree to exclude the NLF from the talks. He
asked Thieu if he were willing to talk with NLF representatives
in Paris. When Thieu answered no, Ky advised him to agree to
the bombing halt only if the NLF were excluded from the Paris
GROUP 1
Exclud.r.: adomatle
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talks. It was, Ky argued, neceisary to extract whatever con-
cessions Thieu deemed essential now, since his leverage after
the bombing stopped would obviously be less. Ky also questioned
whether Thieu could agree politically to the bombing halt without
being able to state publicly that the DRY' had offered some con-
cessions in return. Thieu said he would ask Ambassador Bunker
to return and would raise the NLF issue with him.
c. For the past two days Ky has sought to find a policy which
will preserve the "Vietnamese identity" without jeopardizing the
GVN's vital ties to the U.S. or giving comfort to the DRV. Ky
is uncertain over what has motivated President Johnson's latest
initiative. Is he trying to carve his niche in history at the expense
of the GYM Is he trying to pull off the near-miracle which,
according to reports Ky gets from Washington, will be needed
to stave off defeat for Mr. Humphrey and the Democrats in
November? Or is President Johnson genuinely searching for an
honorable peace? Given political realities, Ky wonders whether
this is not a bad time to tie oneself too closely to the present
Washington leadership.
� d. Ky also believes that the timing of a bombing halt so
close on the heels of the spurious coup attempt is unfortunate.
Many people believe that the Americans floated the coup rumors
to divide the GVN and point up to Thieu how dependent he is on
American support so that Thieu could not effectively oppose the
new American initiative. Ky believes that the rumors now cir-
culating have caused near panic among many of the Vietnamese
elite.
e. Ky hopes to see Thieu again and offer other suggestions
which he has not yet firmed up. Ky believes that this is the time
for him and Thieu to join hands in a true government of national
reconciliation. Both should appear on TV together, Thieu to
announce the halt and Ky to say that the DRY offered a significant
quid pro quo. If he cannot say this, the government will be in
trouble, with many believing that it is selling out to the Americans.
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f. Ky is ready to stand by Thieu if Thieu wants a genuine
reconciliation, but Ky has some doubts that he does. Ky is con-
sidering what unilateral steps he might take if Thieu does not
meet him halfway, but emphasized that he will do nothing to
endanger chances for peace or strain relations with the GVN's
allies. One possibility he is considering, if the U.S. stops the
bombing without the GVN's agreement, is the issuance of a GVN
statement reserving the right to bomb or take any other actions
against North Vietnam which is deemed in the GVN national
interest.
� g. Ky would like to have a chance to discuss these important
issues alone with Ambassador Bunker or Ambassador Berger.
2. This report was given to and discussed with Ambassador Bunker
and Berger. They agreed the report should be sent via CIA channels
for passing to the White House and the Secretary of State.
3. In passing the report we noted:
b. Our judgement that nevertheless in matters of such
fundamental importance unlikely to distort and
mislead us in the essentials; and
c. The necessity to keep in mind
4. With Ambassador Bunker's approval, the CIA station in Saigon
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