RADIO PROJECT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02640708
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-00574
• Publication Date: June 2, 1972

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO The Director
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DATE 2 June 1972
George A. Carver, Jr.
Radio Project
REMARKS Attached are two papers dealing
with the radio project. Attachment A,
which you can read at your leisure (if you
care to) is the concept paper I taWied at
the 1 June WSAG, where it was discussed
and endorsed. (Irwig asked a few ques-
tions, Moorer pointed out the cost factors
involved in using CORONET SOLO--1.5-2.0
million of Air Force money--but the gen-
eral atmosphere was warm endorsement
ranging upward to positive enthusiasm.)
Haig then directed that a memorandum be
prepared for the President outlining all
aspects of the project so he could render
a decision thereon. Attachment B, at
which I would appreciate your taking at
least a quick glance, is my draft of the
memo for the President, prepared per NSC
staff (Holdridge) request as a memo to the
SRG Chairman (Kissinger) from Sullivan
(the chief psychological warrior). I
propose to dispatch it to Sullivan prompt-
ly if you have no objections.
0
A
IN.tevt ib �04-ef
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RADIO OPERATION CONCEPT PAPER
I. Assumption
This paper is based on the assumption that Radio Hanoi's six
transmitters in the Hanoi area are silenced through military action. A
separate JCS paper discusses the military aspect of the problem, which
in itself should prove a major psychological initiative.
II. Proposal.
We propose to preempt Radio Hanoi's two medium wave
frequencies (677 and 1010) for a period of time in order to:
(1) Shock the North. Vietnamese public into a sense of
the reality of their position, shaking their conviction
that they will eventually win the war.
(2) EcpioiL the psychological. power of the suggestion of peace .
to stimulate the North Vietnamese people to take a different �
view of the struggle.
(3) Create confusion and generate psychological
pressure on the North Vietnamese leadership and .
'(4) Generate questioning doubts about the official DRV
leadership line that North Vietnam's goals can only be
achieved through n7Lilitary victory.
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(5) Encourage the belief that peaceful negotiations
are a better method, from every perspective, for
achieving the North Vietnamese people's legitimate
aspirations.
III. Thematic Approach
(1) If Hanoi's transmitting facilities are indeed silenced, we have
no way of knowing, or guaranteeing, how long Hanoi will be off the air.
The time lapse before the DRV can begin rebroadcasting via repairs or
some form of jury rig may be measured in minutes, hours or days.
The concept here advanced involves preempting Radio Hanoi's frequencies
. and coming up on them the minute Hanoi's own broadcasts are silenced.
Our broadcasts would be black in the sense that they would be structured
to convince the North Vietnamese listening public that they were hearing
an official voice of the Lao Dong, Party or at least some faction thereof.
(2) This black braedcast would begin with straight news portraying
a grim picture along these lines: "You are already aware of the great
escalation in the bombing being conducted on North Vietnamese soil. You
also know.of the American and GVN efforts to cut off supplies from outside
our country by mining our ports and destroying our railroads and highways.
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In addition many of our people have already discovered at first hand
that power plants and factories are also being destroyed from the air.
This has moved the battlefront into our own country. The problems this
presents for us are very real. For example, supply ships from nations
that have helped us in the past have turned away from the port of
I1[aiphoiig and other ports because of the mines present and because of
the American threat to take other steps to prevent delivery of supplies
to our country.
"For about two months we have committed every available division
of our army to a massive invasion of South Vietnam. Despite. our great
effort, our forces have advanced only 20 miles into :...iouth Vietnam. Over
400 of the tanks provided us by the Soviet Union have been destroyed by the
South Vietnamese militia and by the South Vietnamese armed forces.
Much of our artillery provided us by the Soviet Union has also been
destroyed. Although they have fought. very bravely, tens of thousands
of our soldiers have been killed or wounded.
"The people of our country have worked hard and courageously,
carrying out the slogan that the rear supports the front. The actions of
the US and the Government of Vietnam in cutting off outside supplies and
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e �
bombing all means of supply and transportation within our country have
created a situation where there no longer is a rear to support the front.
Our own country is being heavily bombed, even our concrete plants,
our -factories, our power plants, our railroads, bridges and our
petroleum storage points. The mining of our harbors and the cutting
of overland communications into our country prevents our socialist
allies from providing us with the means to continue the war. The pacification
program in South Vietnam, of which you have heard so much, prevents
us from relying on any support within that .C'ountry. "
(3) Once a hzd news picture of the true situation had been
presented, our prdposed broadcast would then move to stimulate internal
stress by broadcasting the (notional) communique of the "2.15t Plenum of
the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee" (a meeting which has
not taken place the last was the 20th Plenum). In typical North
Vietnamese jargon this communique will lay the blame for the present
crisis on the 3rd Party Congress (which was in effect their declaration of
war in 1960 on South Vietnam) and state that "Peace has now become the
single guiding objective of the Party. " (Full illustrative text attached).
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IV. Follow-on and Ancillary Action:
(1) Radio Hanoi also masquerades as Liberation Radio (PRG)
- the Voice of the Pathet Lao as well as the Voice of FUNK. Plans can
be drawn up to broadcast to those audiences in their languages on other
radios with a simple message of the destruction North Vietnam is suffering.
No twists are planned.
(2) All other white, black and grey radios will maximize their
broadcasting during the period that Radio Hanoi is down on the assumption
that people with radios will be searching their dials for any news, even
proscribed news.
(3) If this project is approved, we propose to activate another
project which could lend it verisimilitude -- the ostensible mailing from
Hanoi of a "letter from flo Chi Minh" to exiles in Paris. This letter
would be ostensibly written at the same time that Ho wrote his will and
contain his reservation about the leadership qualities of Le Duan and
his fear that Le Dua.n.'s dogmatism, stubborness, and lack. of sophistication
- could lead the Party into a cut de sac in the future; in which case it is
Hots wish' that his reservations be surfaced.
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.L`rsi /
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V. Implementation. CORONET SOLO appears to be the only feasible way
to implement this operation, for the following reasons:
(1) There are no two alternate medium wave transmitters which
could be made available quickly.
(a) The VOA medium wave Lra.nsmitterLin Hue cannot
be heard in Hanoi in the daytime -- when the bombing has
to take place � nor are they on the correct frequency.
(b) The VOA. medium wave transmitter in the Philippines
would require time consuming retuning of the antennas to
employ Hanoi's frequencies and during this period could not
be used. for VO.A.'s own programming,
(c) Other extant medium wave trans.mitters.present
similar technical (and in some cases political) problems.
(2) CORONET SOLO can be ready and come on the air on Hanoi's
frequencies the moment Hanoi Radio goes down.
(3) CORONET SOLO's medium wave broadcasts can be heard
in the Red River Delta but not in other world cities where Radio Hanoi is
monitored internationally. This fact could help minimize the blow back
in world and U. So opinion which thus may not learn of the operation until
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it is over. (This is the reason that we do not plan to broadcast on. short
wave which can be heard, outside of North Vietnam.)
(4) A final reason for trying to confine the broadcast to North
Vietnam for a limited time is to prevent any unpredictable side effects
in South Vietnam.
(5) The bombing will perforce be carried out during daylight hours.
Therefore our preemptive broadcasts would start during the daylight and
-carry over into the evening. For planning purposes we consider that the
operation will continue only for these first few hours. We assume that
the DR.V will (1) broadcast denials to the Hanoi City populace on its
closed, circuit- broadcasting system and (2) activate backup equipment
and deny the broadcasts on a countrywide basis in a matter of hours
- if not minutes. While our operation may last only a few minutes, the
total. plan will include a two to three Clay contingency if Radio Hanoi
remains off the air for that length of time.
(6) To use CORONET SOLO for more than one or two Clays would
require considerable expense in MILE) cap and diverted strike sorties.
Therefore', we would plan to shut down our black operation after three
days, pleading inapossibility to carry on because of, allied military pressure.
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Communique of the 21st Plenum of the
Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee
The Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party has held
an emergency meeting, its 21st plenary session, to discuss and de-
cide on the immediate tasks facing the Party and people in the
present situation. The plenum heard a number of reports and adopted
a resolution on the new strategic lines which are to be implemented
by the entire Party, army and people.
The characteristics of the present situation in our country
are that North Vietnam is striving to advance toward socialism
under extremely difficult wartime conditions while assisting the
South in achieving the people's national democatic revolution.
The victories achieved demonstrate that the strategic lines, of the
September. 1960 Third National Party Congress and the resolution
of the December 1963 9th plenum of the Central Committee were en-
tirely correct. The long, hard and heroic war of resistance
against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in South Vietnam
has over the years attained notable success and these achievements
of the Vietnam revolution have splendidly contributed to the safe-
guarding of peace in Southeast Asia and in the. world. It is with
these factors in wind and in order to pursue on a more rational
basis the everlasting goal of reunifying Vietnam that the Cont-al
Committee informs the compatriots and combatants of its decision.
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The current situation in Vietnam has reached the point where,
in weighing the earnest aspirations for peace of the entire Viet-
namese people, the well-being and highest interests of all the
people, and the efficacy of the revolutionary cause of the father--
lurid, the Party Central Committee has decided to advance the Party's
strategic lines.
Therefore, the Central Committee has decided the following:
1. Peace in Vietnam will become the single
guiding objective of the Party. The
military phase of the struggle has lasted
too long, too many brave sons and com-
rades have died and become wounded. The
armed struggle line of the Party is no
longer appropriate and correct in view of
the new situation and our people's long-term
interests. Peace is the earnest wish of
all the pe Peace is the earnest wish
of the Party Central Committee. Peace will
return to Vietnam. This is the pledge of the
Central Committee. It is the decision of the
Central Committee to seek to end the war now.
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_2. The binding up the wounds of the war and
the peaceful reconstruction of Vietnam are
the most urgent tasks of the Party, army
and people. These tasks are directly related
to the maintenance of the Vietnamese p ople's
independence, freedom and democracy. The
Party Central Committee will henceforth devote
all its efforts toward fulfilling these tasks.
The Party Central Committee wishes to express
its unbounded gratitude to the Soviet Union,
China and the fraternal socialist camp for
their strong and determined support of the
Central Committee's decision to seek peace.
3. The Party Central Committee has taken the
following actions with regard to leading the
Party:
--Comrade Politburo members will henceforth
discharge their responsibilities solely at
the behest of the Central Committee and be
completely responsible before the Central
Committee.
--In view of Articles 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24
of the statutues of the Vietnam Workers Party
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and pending the holding of the Fourth
National Party Congress, the Central
Committee has decided to lead all Party
activities on a regular basis and collec-
tively to be responsible before the people
in implementing the letter and spirit of
the resolution of the 21st plenum.
Dear comrades, combatants and compatriots,
On the basis of the resolution of ....21st plenum of the
Party Central Committee, peace will finally return and the war
will come to an 'end. The Vietnamese people's will has triumphed
The people.are indeed masters in their own land. �Let all tne
Party, army and people, the people's security forces, the militia
and mass organizations coordinate their actions, firmly grasp the
situation and uphold the Central Committee's 21st plenum resolution,
The Party Central Committee expresses its unshakeable belief
that our people, struggling heroically and perseveringly, will unite
around the Central Committee and achieve the resolution of the
Central Committee's 21st plenum for the sake of the fatherland an,'1,
future. generations of the Vietnamese people.
--Eternal glory to the Vietnamese people!
�
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--Long live the Party!
--Let us rejoice at the peace-loving decision of the Party
Central Committee!
--Long live Vietnam!
/Announcer: You have just heard a major Party proclamation.
It will be repeated at regular and dictation speed. Stay tuned
for further bulletins!I
/The National 2\nthe07
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'A.
1 June 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, SENIOR REVIEW GROUP
Subject: Proposed Radio Operation
GenesiS. The operation and proposal outlined below was
developed by the Psychological Pressure Operations Group (PPOG),
chaired by Mr. John P. Horgan of CIA. The proposal was reviewed
and endorsed by the senior psychological warfare oversight group which
I chair (and under whose aegis the PPOG functions). At my request,
a concept paper on this operation was tabled and discussed at the
1 June meeting of the Washington Special Action Group, which
collectively endorsed the concept and directed that this summary
memorandum be forwarded for the President's consideration.
Assumption. This proposal is based on the assumption that
Radio Hanoi's transmitting capabilities are silenced more or less
simultaneously in a single set of air strikes. A separate JCS paper
will discuss the details of this proposed military operation, which in
itself would constitute a significant psychological warfare action.
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Proposal. As soon as Radio Hanoi's own transmitters and/or
antennae are knocked out, we propose to pre-em.pt Hanoi's domestic
frequencies with our own broadcasts on these frequencies. These
broadcasts would be black in the sense that they would be carefully
designed to convince the North Vietnamese listening public (at least
initially) that it was hearing an official voice of the DRV/Lao Dong Party
or some faction thereof.
Objectives. This operation would have the following objectives:
To create general confusion and generate
psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese leadership.
. To shock the North Vietnamese public into a sense
of the reality of the DRVis position and shake the
population's belief in eventual DRV victory.
To exploit the psychological power of suggestion
by playing the theme of peace to stimulate the North
Vietnamese people to take a different view of the struggle.
c�-.704
To generate &se encourage questioning
doubts about the official DRV leadership line that North
Vietnam's goals can only be achieved through military
victory.
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To encourage the view that peaceful negotiations are,
from every perspective, a better method than continued
military struggle for achieving the North Vietnamese
people's legitimate aspirations.
Thematic Approach. Our black broadcast would lead off with straight
news giving a stark, realistic description of the DRV's situation couched
in the right sort of jargon to sound like an official voice levelling with
the populace. The news would cover and ma0,e clear (by direct statement
or implication readily recognizable through the jargon's code-word
phraseology) the lack of Communist progress in South Vietnam, the
ferocity and effectiveness of South Vietnamese resistance, the fact that
North Vietnamese forces are regarded as invading aggressors, not
liberators, the heavy material losses and horrendous personnel
casualties incurred to date by Hanoi's forces, the effectiveness and
mounting impact of the mining of the ports and the accompanying aerial
bombardment of North Vietnam, the unreality of expecting enough Soviet
or Chinese aid to arrive soon enough to improve the DRVis situation and
prospect's, etc., etc.
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Once a hard news picture of the DRV's true situation had been
presented, our proposed broadcast would then move to stimulate
internal discord and encourage thinking along the lines outlined
above. This effort would be built around a (notional) communique of
the "21st Plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee"
(the last real Plenum, the 20th, was held early this year). The pitch
would be that the 21st Plenum had been convened on an emergency
basis in light of the worsening crisis situation. Its official communique
(patterned on the legitimate communiques of previous plena) in typical
Party jargon, would lay the blame for the present crisis on the now
"incorrect" line laid down by Le Duan at the 1960 3rd Party Congress
(which was, in effect, the Lao Dong's official declaration of war on South
Vietnam). After levying transparently veiled criticism on the current
Politburo leadership, particularly Le Duan, the 21st Plenum.'s
communique would build up to the new line that "peace has now become
the correct guiding objective of the Party. "
Follow-on and Ancillary Action:
Radio Hanoi also masquerades as Liberation Radio
(PRG the Voice of the Pathet Lao as well as the Voice of
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FUNK. Plans will be drawn up to broadcast to those
audiences in their languages on other radios with a
simple message of the destruction North Vietnam is
suffering, without further twists (which might be
counterproductive).
All other white, black and grey radios will maximize
their broadcasting during the period that Radio Hanoi
is down on the assumption that people with radios will
be searching their dials for any news, even proscribed
-news.
If this project is approved, we propose to activate
another project which could lend it verisimilitude --
the purported (and plausibly documented) mailing from
Hanoi of a "letter from Ho Chi Minh" to exiles in Paris.
cd,3404 t1c,Irt.
This letter ostensibly ha-s been written at the same time
that Ho wrote his will and would reflect his reservations
about Le Duan analagous to Lenin's deathbed reservations
about Stalin. The letter would reflect "Uncle Ho's" concern
that Le Duan's stubborn dogmatism, ambition and lack of
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sophistication could one day lead the Party into a cul
de sac and "Uncle Ho's" wish that these reservations
be surfaced if such a situation ever began to develop.
Implementation. The actual broadcasts would be made from tapes
produced by CIA employing the proven skills of its controlled assets
who already have considerable experience in rnimicing Hanoi's radio
output
For several reasons, implementation of this operation would
require the use of CORONET SOLO aircraft of the (Pennsylvania) Air
National Guard.
These are transmitter/jamming aircraft (C-121s)
whose equipment and crews are well tested. (they were
once used to broadcast for Radio Cambodia). Each
CORONET SOLO aircraft can transmit on one medium and
two short wave frequencies. While orbiting over the sea,
CORONET SOLO could monitor Radio Hanoi and begin
broadcasting on that station's frequencies the moment
Hanoi's transmitters leave the air. CORONET SOLO's
signal should be strong enough for easy reception on simple
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transitor receivers from. Hanoi to the Gulf of Tonkin
and on more sophisticated receivers throughout the
Red River delta. The aircraft can remain on station
to transmit from five to eight hours.
Two CORONET SOLO aircraft are ready for
deployment within 12 hours of notification, with volunteer
crews whose participation (consequently) would not
require .federalizing the CORONET SOLO unit. Two
additional CORONET SOLO aircraft are now being
modified. They could deploy twenty days after the two
aircraft now ready, but deployment of these two
additional aircraft would require federalization of the
parent Air National Guard unit.
CORONET SOLO is necessary because there are
no alternate medium wave transmitters that could
feasibly be employed.
The VOA medium wave transmitters in
Flue cannot be heard in Hanoi in the daytime --
when the bombing has to take place -- nor are
they on the correct frequency.
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The VOA medium wave transmitters in the
Philippines would require time consuming
retuning of the antennae..to employ Hanoi's
frequencies and during this period could not be
used for VOA's own programming.
Other extant medium wave transmitters
present similar technical (and in some cases
political) problems.
CORONET SOLO can be ready and come on the air on
Hanoi's frequencies the moment Hanoi Radio goes down.
CORONET SOLO's broadcasts can he heard in the Red
River delta but are not likely to be picked up abroad where
Radio Hanoi is monitored internationally, This fact could
help minimize the blow back in world and U.S. opinion,
which thus may not learn of the operation until it is over.
Time-Frame. If Hanoi's transmitting facilities are indeed silenced,
we have no way of knowing, or guaranteeing, how long Hanoi will be off
the air. The time lapse before the DRV can begin rebroadcasting via
repairs or some form of jury rig may be measured in minutes, hours
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or days. For planning purposes we are assuming that the DRV will
(1) broadcast denials to the Hanoi City populace on its closed circuit
broadcasting system and (2) activate backup equipment and deny the
broadcasts on a countrywide basis in a matter of hours if not minutes.
While our operation may last only a few minutes, the total plan will
include a two to three day contingency if Radio Hanoi remains off the
air for that length of time.
The temporal extent of this operation will have to be played by
ear in light of actual events. We would hit the airwaves with the hard news
to ensure that that word gets through, then move to our other themes.
If we have to shut down our black operation after several days for technical
or other reasons while the real Radio Hanoi is still off the air, we would
plead the impossibility of carrying on because of mounting (i. e.
successful) allied military pressure.
*To use 'CORONET SOLO for more than one or two days would require
considerable expense in MIG cap and diverted strike sorties.
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Potential Political Problems. This project -- which those who
developed it have christened ARCHIE BUNKER -- is based on a hoax.
.The fact that this is a hoax is bound to get out, probably within a fairly
short time frame. Within North Vietnam itself this fact of life is not
necessarily bad. In denouncing the hoax the Party will have to lose face
by acknowledging that it was put off the air and its own frequencies
successfully pre-empted. Furthermore, genies of divisive speculation
and hopes for peace, once let out of the bottle, will not be all that easy
to re-cork. Also, given the innate Vietnamese penchant for paranoid
suspicions and elaborate conspiracy theories, even the Party faithful
will wonder to what extent the hoax drew on, or was stimulated by, the
activities oi .cea1 live dissidents within the Party apparatus.
Once awareness of the hoax has begun to percolate outside of
North Vietnam, carping editorials are certain to be written and critical
questions raised in Congress and elsewhere. If the operation is approved.
the President will have to be braced for the domestic static it is certain
to generate in time.
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Scheduling. Our plans are being developed against a target time
frame of fifteen days from the date of approval, i. e., we would like to
launch on or about D + 15. Given the unavoidable leak potential, it is
clearly desirable on security grounds to move as promptly as possible.
It will require about two weeks after approval is given however, to get
the necessary scripts written and taped, the aircraft deployed, and all
the intricate machinery phased and ready to fire on the necessary
synchronized schedule.
William H. Sullivan
Chairman
Ad Hoc Group
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