IRAN: THE NATIONAL FRONT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02985493
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2021
• Case Number: F-2017-00841
• Publication Date: November 30, 1978

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
30 November 1978
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
IRAN: THE NATIONAL FRONT
Summary
The organized political opposition to the Shah of Iran
centers around the National Front--a coalition group estab-
lished by former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1949 on
a program of opposition to Britain's exploitation of Iran's
oil. After the Shah removed Mossadeq from power in 1953 the
Front went into a long decline. It existed tenuously with
parts of it splitting off only to rejoin later.
The Front has reappeared in the last year as a loose
association of intellectuals and political activists. It
includes a wide range of parties from moderates to radical
leftists, but not Communists. Ideological and personal feuds,
some decades old, weaken its cohesion and have damaged its
ability to negotiate during the current disorder.
The National Front has not put forward a formal program
other than calling for a return to the 1906 constitution.
This memorandum was prepared by the Iran Analytical
Center of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.
Questions and comments may be addressed to
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In general, most National Front leaders advocate a reduced
role for the Shah, civil liberties, an end to corruption,
some form of socialism, and a non-aligned or independent for-
eign policy that would loosen ties with the US. The more
specific demands of the various elements of the Front range
from abolition of the monarchy to acceptance of a figurehead,
but since early November most leaders in the Front have moved
closer to the hardline views of the exiled leader of Iran's
Shia Muslim clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini, ,who insist S on abolition.
Although the Front does have some popular support--
especially among intellectuals and the middle class--and has
drawn large crowds to some of its rallies--it is Khomeini who
has the largest backing among the demonstrators and rioters
who have plunged Iran into chaos. The power of Khomeini has
disturbed some of the Front's leaders who have tried to
arrange an accommodation between the Shah and Khomeini with-
out success.
Should the Front come to power, ideological and personal
divisions would probably widen and prevent a realistic program
or an effective administration. A Front-dominated government
would be likely to drive hard bargains on oil issues, press
for a non-aligned foreign policy, and turn away from the
Shah's support for conservative regimes in the Persian Gulf
area.
Mossadeq--The "Golden Age" of the National Front
Since the late 1940s the major organized political oppo-
sition to the Shah has come from the National Front, a wide
assortment of political activists who maintain that the last
legal government in Iran was that of Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadeq, removed from power by the Shah in 1953.
The Front came into being in 1949 when Mossadeq, then
a deputy in the Majlis (the lower house of parliament) joined
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eight other deputies in promoting a vague but popular program
calling for neutralism, independence from foreign domination,
a fight against corruption, and a reduction in the powers of
the Shah. Mossadeq's immediate goal was the elimination of
British influence in Iran and the nationalization of the oil
industry.
The original nine parliamentary members were soon joined
by other nationalist-minded groups and individuals, and the
association became the strongest grass roots political organ-
ization in Iran since the constitutional movement around the
turn of the century. Mossadeq showed a keen awareness of
the fears and prejudices of the Iranian people. The National
Front did not create the program it advocated but gave voice
and direction to feelings that were, and still are, widespread
in Iranian society. Mossadeq was appointed Prime Minister in
April 1951. A prolonged struggle for power ensued between
Mossadeq and the Shah--ending in Mossadeq's ouster in August
1953. In early August Mossadeq demanded control over the
military. The Shah fled briefly to Rome but was reinstated
by the army, led by General Zahedi.
By the time of Mossadeq's downfall in 1953, his popu-
larity had begun to ebb. Many nationalists had come to
realize that Mossadeq was incapable of producing the reforms
the country needed, and some were frightened by what was per-
ceived as a growing threat from the Communist Tudeh Party.
Nonetheless, the National Front today looks back on the
Mossadeq period as its period of greatest strength and in-
fluence. Moreover the widely accepted Iranian belief that
Mossadeq was overthrown by the CIA has tended to blur in
retrospect the negative elements of the period.
The Shah cracked down on the Front after 1953. The
Front was declared illegal, Mossadeq was kept under house
arrest in internal exile, and many other members of the
organization were imprisoned. Mossadeq's Foreign Minister,
Hossein Fatemi, was executed.
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Realignments and Quarrels
The post-Mossadeq years have been chaotic for the
National Front. The Front initially dedicated all its
efforts to restoring Mossadeq to power. It split several
ways, between professional white collar workers on one side
and religious and bazaar elements on the other, and between
radical activists and moderates.
The Shah's announcement in 1960 that elections would
be held encouraged a revival of the National Front. A new
Front was organized on 27 July 1960 under the leadership of
Allahyar Saleh, an old-line supporter of Mossadeq. During
the elections the Front appeared weak, disunited, and even
apathetic, but the organization gained strength because of
the public reaction to the government's rigging of the elec-
tions. It gained more ground in January 1961 when Saleh was
elected to the Majlis in a second round of elections.
Divisions continued to plague the Front as the various
wings of the organization quarreled. In May 1961 the
cleavage deepened as a significant wing of the coalition
split off to form the Freedom Movement of Iran led by Mehdi
Bazargan. Bazargan gained the support of Mossadeq but re-
joined the Front in a loose alliance in September 1961.
The Shah cracked down on the National Front again in
1963 after the Front rebuffed his offer to participate in
a coalition government. The Front had demanded that the
Shah return to constitutional rule and give up many of his
powers. Saleh and Bazargan were imprisoned.
Throughout the later 1960s and early 1970s the National
Front--like most opposition groups in Iran--was largely
dormant. Mossadeq died on 5 March 1967.
An external Front organization appeared during the 1960s
with branches in the United States and Western Europe. A key
figure in the external Front is Ali Shaygan. In general terms
the external organization has been more radical than the
domestic group and has been more closely tied to leftist and
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student groups. There is little evidence available on the
strength of the expatriate organization in the Front or in
Iran.
Appeal and Constituency
The National Front since its inception has always been
vague in its political message--a reflection of the disparate
elements in the coalition. The Front has, however, tradi-
tionally espoused constitutionalism as its main theme--
harkening back to the constitutional movement of the early
20th century in Iran that produced the 1906 revolution.
By espousing a return to the 1906 constitution, the
National Front has consistently found a receptive audience
in Iran. A return to the 1906 constitution would mean a
significant reduction in the Shah's powers. The constitu-
tion stipulates that the Shah act as a constitutional monarch,
subject to the control of the majlis and the religious lead-
ership, and gives the latter the power to review all legis-
lation to ensure compatibility with Islamic law.
In recent years the Front's spokesmen have also been
actively involved in promoting the human rights cause in
Iran. Such groups as the Committee for the Defense of
Human Rights and Freedom are closely affiliated with the
Front. Front spokesmen repeatedly have blasted the Shah
for his "dictatorial, absolutist regime" that has imposed
a "reign of terror." The excesses of SAVAK, the Shah's
security and intelligence force, have been widely publicized
by the Front.
The Front has also long advocated a change in Iran's close
relationship with the West. Mossadeq made an end to Britain's
influence over Iran's oil wealth the centerpiece of his
platform. In a public statement on 24 August 1978 National
Front spokesman Karim Sanjabi outlined three principles:
--the protection of human rights and the restoration
of constitutional rule;
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--true independence from the influence of foreign powers
over Iran's natural resources; and
--an independent (non-aligned) foreign policy.
By labeling the Shah a creature of foreign interests,
especially Britain and the United States, the National Front
exploits a deepseated Iranian popular belief that the Shah
was placed in power and is kept there by the United States,
especially the CIA.
Most of the members of the Front also espouse some form
of socialism. There is no unified Front approach to the
issue other than general calls for democratic socialism.
Because many of the Front's most prominent leaders have been
educated in Western Europe, especially France, their concept
of socialism is close to that of European social democrats.
The Front has consistently refused to allow the Commu-
nist Tudeh Party to join and has generally rejected coopera-
tion with the Tudeh. Nonetheless, most Front spokesmen have
argued that the Tudeh should be free to participate openly
and legally in Iranian politics.
The National Front has never been a mass-based organ-
ization. None of its constituent elements appears to have
any viable organization. Although the Front has been able
to attract large crowds to some of its rallies, it is the
religious leadership that can bring out the demonstrators
and mobs, not the National Front.
While the Front does have supporters in the clergy,
bazaars, and lower classes, it draws its greatest support
from middle-class professionals, students, and intellectuals.
Front spokesman Sanjabi told an interviewer that the Front
"is composed of liberals, traders, intellectuals, and stu-
dents, who want democracy, real independence, and a human
form of socialism".
We know little about the Front's relationship with the
Iranian military. Senior officers are said to hold the
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Front's leaders in contempt as coffeehouse politicians sus-
ceptible to Communist penetrations and influences, but
junior officers may be more susceptible to the Front's appeal.
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Rivalries and the Future
The personal interrelationships among the various
leaders of the National Front have a significant influence
on its activities.
In general terms, the Front can probably be divided into
three broad factions. The rightist and centrist groups, com-
posing the bulk of the Front, would probably favor a compro-
mise settlement and might participate in elections. The left
wing of the Front, however, rejects anything short of the
overthrow of the Shah.
Since early NovemhPr
been in the ascendanc
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We doubt that the
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moderate elements will break with Khomeini and the left in
the near term.
The ideological divisions and personal quarrels that
have plagued the National Front since its inception would
probably grow larger if the Front came into power. A purely
National Front government would probably be unable to pro-
duce an effective administration or a realistic government
* program.
Quarrels would probably develop between leftist leaders
* of the Front like Beheshti and the rightists like Foruhar.
How much socialism to adopt, the role of the clergy in formu-
lating day-to-day policy, and other contentious issues would
surely disrupt a National Front government.
Judging by its past performance and statements, a Front
dominated government is likely to press for hard bargains
on issues related to Iranian oil. The Front would demand a
greater Iranian role in the oil industry and higher prices.
Most National Front leaders would probably press for
a non-aligned foreign policy that cut many of Iran's rela-
tions with West--CENTO, for example, would be an early
casualty. Some of the leftist leaders in the Front might
push for a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.
We suspect that a Front government might also be less
inclined to pursue the Shah's policy of supporting conserva-
tive Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf area, like Oman. If
leftist elements in the Front came into dominance, they might
even encourage dissident groups in Bahrain and Oman.
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