NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626220
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: August 2, 1979

Director of
Central
Intelligence
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r
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
2 August 1979
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COMMUNIST AND GUERRILLA GROUPS .
IN NORTHERN CENTRAL AMERICA
Country
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Group
Farabundo Marti Popular
Liberation Forces
Armed Forces of National Re- 600-800
sistance
Popular Revolutionary Army
Communist Party of El Salvador 300-500
Guerrilla Army of the Poor
Rebel Armed Forces
Guatemalan Labor (Communist) 1,000
Party
Guatemalan Labor (Communist)
Party�Militant faction
Communist Party of Honduras
Popular Unity Movement
Estimated Description
Strength
800-1,000 Has long record of terrorist activities; some
50 members have recently received training
in Cuba; supported Sandinistas with men,
arms, equipment, and money; controls Pop-
ular Revolutionary Bloc, an antigovernment
peasant-worker-teacher-student coalition.
Has committed numerous kidnapings for
ransom; has had contacts with Cubans; pro-
vided funds to Sandinistas; has a front orga-
nization, the United Popular Action Front.
500-600 Has carried out bombings, seizures of radio
and TV stations; provided arms, funds, and
possibly combatants to Sandinistas.
Follows generally cautious policy, but has
received Cuban advice and possibly pro-
vided handful of men to Sandinistas.
300 Founded by dissident Communists; has car-
ried out a variety of terrorist operations;
members have received training In Cuba;
supported Sandinistas with materiel, propa-
ganda, and a small number of combatants.
Under 100 Has recently stepped up propaganda activity
and claimed credit for a kidnaping; has
received a Cuban offer of training.
Follows cautious policy; has received advice
from Cubans.
Under 100 Has undertaken occasional guerrilla action;
has received Cuban financial help and
advice.
Up to 1,500 Follows generally cautious policy, but mem-
bers have received guerrilla and other train-
ing in Cuba; provided considerable logistical
aid to Sandinistas.
Small University-based; has contacts with Cubans;
supplied financial assistance and funneled
arms to Sandinistas.
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Guatemalan Guerrilla Groups
The Guerrilla Army of the Poor, the country's most
potent insurgent force, was formed in 1974 and now has
about 300 guerrilla members and a larger number of non-
combatant supporters. Like most of Guatemala's guerrilla
groups, it was first organized by dissidents from the
Communist Guatemalan Labor Party. It is well-structured
and has the advantage of a unified national leadership
unacir Tulin rpqar MA cias Mayora, alias "Cesar Montes."
The Rebel Armed.Forces has emerged from years of
inactivity and become increasingly active in recent months,
but it probably has fewer than 100 members now. The
dissident wing of the Guatemalan Labor Party has under-
taken some guerrilla activities in the past but now seems
preoccupied with a power struggle with the leadership of
the orthodox party.
The Case of Honduras
The insurgent building blocks are not yet in place
in Honduras. The Moscow-line Communist Party and small
organizations on the far left would require at least six
months under the most favorable circumstances to build
a viable support structure for insurgent action.
Several factors have helped insulate Honduras from
an immediate insurgent threat. There have been three
military coups in the past decade, but the country has
had relatively benign military rule. Land distribution
in Honduras is more equitable than in El Salvador and
Guatemala. At the same time, backwardness and poverty
are so pervasive that Honduras is free of the sharp
economic 71arization that exists, for example, in El
Salvador.
The tangential involvement bf the Honduran left in
the Nicaraguan-revolution, however, .has provided poten-
tial insurgents with valuable experience and has improved
their prospects in the years ahead. The military's de--
cision to hold a national election next April could pro-
vide a political opening to the left.
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2 August 1979
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Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626220