REASSESSMENT OF INSURGENT STRENGTH IN GUATEMALA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
05511684
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date: 
January 23, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2016-02132
Publication Date: 
June 23, 1983
File: 
Body: 
-s Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C05511684 ylCI riG) 23 June 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Reassessment of Insurgent Strength in Guatemala REFERENCE: ALA Memorandum ALA-M-82-10151, dated 17 November 1982 1. A revised estimate of insurgent strength in Guatemala during the last halt of 1982 through .May 1983, it includes an .analysis of the extent and intensity of insurgent activity, and probable guerrilla casualties resulting from government actions during that time. Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) 800 to 1,000 Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) 700 to 800 Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) Guatemalan Communist Party/Dissident Faction (PGT/D) Guatemalan Communist Party/Orthodox Faction (PGT/0) Total Strength (full-time combatants) Militia (part-time irregulars) 2. This approx. 400 100 to 200 300 to 400.a 2,000 to 2,500b 2,000 to 2,00c assessment represents a reduction from the previous estithate of 2,000 to 3,000 full-time insurgent., within the country. ALA-M-83-10103 Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C05511684 Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C05511684- (b)(3) SUBJECT: Reassessment of Insurgent Strength in Guatemala 3. Comments and inquiries regarding this estimate encouraged. Responses should be directed to CIA/Central American Branch, Deputy Chie are Central America Branch a The increase in PGT/O strength reflects the most current intelligence information, and not an increase in this group's actual numbers during the past six months. ID While the precise addition of the individual groups totals 2,300 to 2,800, a total strength of 2,000 to 2,500 is recommended to more accurately indicateeinsurjent strength. The BGT/0 is not given consideration within the insurgent totals because it has largely disdained military-related activities, and remains outside the Gautemalan National Revolutionary Union--the guerrilla umbrella organization. The militia figure again reflects an earlier CIA/DIA determination that probably an equal number of part-time supporters could be expected to participate actively in insurgent operations, if so directed and if weaponry were available. Nevertheless, we continue to judge that only a limited percentage of this group could be mustered for any given Operation. (b)(31 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C05511684