SOME REFLECTIONS ON MAO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02913946
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-01277
• Publication Date: January 31, 1972

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Some Reflections on Mao
Con
31 January 1972
No. 0824/72
114
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmissioo or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
OROUP
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DICLAsSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Direr;torate of Intelligence
31 January 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Some Reflections on Mao
1. Any assessment of Mao Tse-tung begins with
the obvious: he is a charismatic leader who has
dominated nearly the entire history of Chinese Com-
munism and who views the Chinese revolution as his
own creation. One cf the original founders of the
Chinese Communist Party in 1921, Mao has been its
sole chairman since 3935. He has guided all impor-
tant aZfairs of state since the founding of the Peo-
ple's Republic in 1949. At
78, Mao can look back on a
career in Caich he has been
the Chinese Communists'
principal ideologist, po-
litical organizer, military
leader, and government
chief. Mao clearly con-
siders himself a world
historical figure, both in
the Chinese context and in
that of the Coomunist move-
ment, where the Chinese
claim that Mao ranks in
the pantheon of Communist
immortals on a par with
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and
Stalin.
2. Mao is, in a sense,
a philosopher-statesman
whose "thought," in his
view, embodies the aspira-
tions of the majority of
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office
of National Estimates.
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the people and provides China with a sure guide to
national greatness. But Mao is also a hard-bitten
politician constantly preoccupied with military, po-
litical, and economic realities not always easily
reconciled with the major tenets of his ideology--
and with his own political survival as well.
3. For most of his tenure as a revolutionary
and national leader, Mao has been able to stay on
top and to adapt his vision of what China ought to
be to objective circumstances. Since the 1958-60
Great Leap Forward era, the policies with which Mao
has been most closely identified have in many ways
hindered China's transformation into a modern in-
dustrial state, and his own power interests and
ideological predilections have often proved a major
disunifying factor in Chinese politics. It i6
therefore possible tha' many of his ideas may not
long survive him. Paradoxically, however, the lives
of the Chinese people have been bound up with Mao's
revolutionary vision for 22 years, and in a basic
sense, no one can really replace him.
Mao's Self-Portrait
4. In his December 1970 interview with Amer-
ican journalist Edgar Snow, Mao characterized him-
self as essentially a simple man who wished not to
be remembered as China's "Great Leader, Great Helms-
man" but rather as the "Great Teacher." This self-
assessment is less humble than it sounds. By arro-
gating to himself the title of the nation's "teacher,"
Mao is asserting that he knows better than any of his
compatriots the path China should follow to achieve
both the goals of national power and the "Maoist"
vision of the good society--a selfless collectivity
which will eventually surpass the advanced West with-
out losing egalitarianism and revolutionary elan.
His Political Style
5. We have some evidence of how Mao conducts
himself from reports on small informal party meet-
ings prior to and during the Cultural Revolution.
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These gatherings were, and presumably still are,
the main arena of decision-making in China. Mao's
talks frequently betrayed a didactic approach and
a condescending air. Deliberately, he projected
an image of a passionate, slightly humble, earthy,
irascible, and shrewd man. As a good "teacher,"
Mao would often say that his "student-colleagues"
could correct him if he were 'wrong. From what we
know of such meetings, they were freewheeling, with
hiuch blunt talk and ample policy debate in which
opposition to Mao's view was indeed expressed, al-
though rarely in terms personally insulting to Mao.
6. Nevertheless, Mao played more than the role
of teacher and sometime pupil. His presence was in-
timidating, and he was a formidable adversary, fight-
ing cleverly and hard. Often he would employ sardonic
humor and invective drawing on the strengths and weak-
nesses, past and present, of his colleagues. On the
whole, the record shows Mao as a master of attack,
retreat, and counterattack--in effect, a guerrilla
strategist--in party debates. In addition to the
forcefulness of his personality, Mao used various
stratagems: manipulating rivalries among his asso-
ciates, attacking his enemies when he was politically
secure, calling for his comrades to unite in a common
cause when he was weak, and even threatening to with-
draw from the political system to build a new revolu-
tionary movement.
7. Thus, in inner-party circles Mao brought
his will to bear not merely as an elevated "teacher"
but as a political antagonist ready to confront his
colleagues and to intervene actively in day-to-day
decision-making. Although in December 1970 Mao told
Snow that he formulates policy guide2ines and issues
general directives leaving the details cf execution
to others, it is likely that he still frequently in-
terjects himself into the daily political process and
attempts to exercise his personal authority in carry-
ing out given programs.
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The Cult of Mao
8. A further illustration of Mao's personality
and his political style is the manner in which he
has employed his doctrine--"Mao Tse-tung Thought"--
and its attendant personality cult. As Mao has aged,
he has been increasingly deified. In his 1970 con-
versation with Snow, Mao deplored the slogans and
other forms of worship carried to excess by the Red
Guards. He said there should be a cooling down.
But Mao acknowledged that, because a great deal of
party power had been out of his control in the early
1960s, he had deliberately fostered the personality
cult in order to stimulate the masses to dismantle
the "anti-Mao" party bureaucracy. In short, Mao not
only uses his personality cult as a device for en-
suring his political survival but in effect claims
that he does personify the unity and hopes of the na-
tion.
The Maoist Vision
9. Mao's "thought," about which the Chinese
speak so often, is a complex thing. Somewhere in
tha "collected works" is a passage suitable to sup-
rt any cjiven policy. It is often contradicted by
another passage. Certain recurring themes, however,
do s;:and out. In general, Mao sees all social proc-
esses in terms of struggle, conflict, and combat.
The concept of the law of contradictions--the dia-
lectical struggle between antithetical forces--is
one to which he has given special emphasis. Mao
sees China as progressing to its rightful place in
the world by struggling constantly against its ene-
mies abroad, and progressing toward ideal communism
by struggling constantly against enemies within. He
seems to feel that progress stops when struggle ends,
and he is suspicious of the motives of those who
appeal for periods of internal peace and social har-
mony. Thus, ever since achieving power Mao has at-
tempted--when the traffic would bear--to contrive
conditions of tension and struggle in order to create
the type of man, preserve the sort of values, and
promote the processes that are essential for con-
tinuing revolution.
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10. Maoism also lays heavy stress on the crucial
role of subjective factors in history, the role of
the individual human will as a force capable of re-
shaping the material, objective environment. This
attitude is obviously linked to Mao's guerrilla ex-
perience and to his conviction that men, not weapons,
are the decisive factor in revolutionary war. Sub-
jective emphasis carries over into Mao's prescriptions
for modernizing China and is expressed in his almost
mystical faith that China's mobilized masses can
transform their world through collective, labor-
intensive action. This also happens to be convenient
theory for an underdeveloped, over-populated nation
unable to motivate its people with substantial ma-
terialrewards,and Mao implicitly acknowledged as
much some years ago when he declared the fact that
China was "poor and blank" was a revolutionary virtue.
11. These factors have led Mao to place a high
value on ideological motivation--the "spiritual trans-
formation" of men. In Mao's ultimate vision, the
good society is one united by something approaching
total consensus and marked by radical collectivism.
To oversimplify, men will be "freer" because they
have submerged their individual selfishness in a kind
of mystical collectivism. To achieve this internalized
consensus, however, blind obedience is not enough.
Instead, the spiritual transformation of the entire
Chinese people is to take place through the study of
Mao's works, thought reform, and education through
labor.
12. This emphasis on spiritual transformation
is closely linked to a populist theme in Mao's
"thought." For him, the masses of peasants and
workers are the repository of the wisdom and inge-
nuity which will enable China to forge ahead in its
economic and technical development without heavy re-
liance on specialists steeped in foreign knowledge
and foreign theories (concessions being made in the
fields of nuclear technology and advanced weaponry).
In fact, in Mao's "thought" there is a definite anti-
intellectual bias and a fear that a bureaucratic and
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technical elite will undermine his populist revolution.
This element of his vision was a major factor in Mao's
effort during the Cultural Revolution to undo bu-
reaucratic stratification by destroying respect for
the special status of the party member or the special
knowledge of the expert. The Cultural Revolution
was a failure from most points of view, but Mao does
not discourage easily and it may happen again.
13. Although Mao's emotional commitment to the
idea of continuing revolution is strong, he realizes
that everything is not possible at a given time and
that one must therefore distinguish between stages.
Although he may find it increasingly distasteful as
he grows older, Mao has certainly been known to com-
promise in both domestic and foreign policy when he
finds it in his interest to do so. His imprimatur
on the recent developments in Sino-US :c.lations, for
example, shows that he can subordinate ideological
considerations to the 1.,?.ed for a flexible diplomatic
posture, in hopes of turning China's weakness into a
strength in the triangular Sino-Soviet-US relationship.
There is also no sign that Mao has lost his philosophic
capacity to take the long view of China's destiny.
His sardonic comment to Premier Kosygin in 1969 that
Sino-Soviet polemics would be carried on for 10,000
years if necessary conveys Mao's sense that history
will favor China, that "good" will triumph over
"evil."
Mao's Current Role
14. Mao remains the dominant political figure
in Peking. Major changes in policy and personnel
assignments require his approval, and no individual
leader or combination of leaders appears able, or
anxious, to overthrow him. But this is not the whole
story. We now know, for example, that Mao's control
over party affairs was seriously weakened in the
early 1960s, and that he felt threatened prier to the
Cultural Revolution because other leaders began to
doubt the validity of his prescription for building
a selfless and classless China.
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15. Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to
remove his dissident "revisionist" colleagues from
power in the party, government, and military. In
the process, he undermined the authority of the
party, sat himself above the party as the incarnation
of the will of the Chinese people, and came to rely
on a small personal entourage of radical advisers.
16. Mao's victory over his opponents was signif-
icant but far from complete. He intimated as much to
Edgar Snow in December 1970 in acknowledging that the
Cultural Revolution still continued in the form of
the struggle for power at the national level. The
struggle had been dramatically illustrated only a
few months earlier by the purge of one of Mao's closest
advisers, the radical Chen Po-ta. At the same time,
Mao also indirectly admitted that he had serious res-
ervations about the success of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, particularly as it applied to the upper levels
of the bureaucracy. This odd refusal to claim success
suggests that Mao may feel that not all of those hold-
ing the principal levers of power in the country today
are entirely responsive to him.
17. The general failure of the Cultural Revolu-
tion has been underscored by the upheavals in China's
leadership since the "revolution" was formally declared
to be over at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969.
A considerable amount of maneuvering and purging has
occurred within the 25-member politburo formed at that
congress. About 11 members seem to have been shunted
aside, although a few of these may eventually resur-
face. Some of the purges have involved relatively
moderate civilian and military figures who were on
record as opposing Maoist excesses in the Cultural
Revolution, and their political demise may well have
been instigated by Mao. But other victims, including
Mao's chosen successor, Defense Minister Lin Piao,
were in a broad sense members of Mao's entourage. It
is possible that Mao--who has consistently recognized
the necessity of periods of consolidation after up-
surges of radical change--decided to sacrifice his
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closest colleagues because their usefulness to him
was over. Nevertheless, the downfall of these men
has diminished Mao's prestige and may increase his
own vulnerability to a later attack.
18. In short, Mao--for all his deification--is
a political animal working amid shifting political
sands to enhance his own power and make his will
felt. For example, following the Cultural Revolution,
Mao attempted to ensure his supremacy by rewriting
China's party and state constitutions. Both the party
constitution approved at the Ninth Congress in 1969
and a draft ritate constitution drawn up in 1970 speci-
fied Mao's role as the personal ruler of the nation
and, for the first time in any Communist constitution,
named his successor. The latter provision, by denying
the party its right to choose the next chairman, pro-
vided the ultimate proof of Mao's contempt for the
party.
19. Events since tho drafting of the two new
constitutions, howeve.,� suggest that there has been
strong resistance to Mao's hostility to the party.
The draft state constitution has not yet been ap-
proved, Mao's personal heir has been purged, and
there have been clandestine reports that there is
strong sentiment in Peking for some formula for a
"colleotive leadership" as the best device for
handling the succession to Mao and, at least
implicitly, for restoring the legitimacy of the
party.
20. The present drive to restore the party
organization is almost certainly in part designed
to reduce the excessive authority which the military
acquired in civil administration as a result of the
Cultural Revolution. As such, it may we'l have Mao's
personal endorsement. He is, in fact, on record as
early as 1967 in favor of a properly revitalized
civilian party as a political instrument. Neverthe-
less, the current propaganda emphasis on the party
does not depict it merely as an instrument of Mao'
will. Indeed,
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some cadres abroad were told to note that recent
propaganda formulations on the role of the party
designated Mao as "comrade Mao" rather than the
more usual "Chairman Mao."
21. Even if it is assumed that Mao is not an
all-powerful autocrat, we believe it would be a
serious mistake to deny that he is still the man who
makes the ultimate decisions in all key areas of
China's domestic and foreign policy. Chou En-lai
may be the chief architect of present Chinese policy
toward the US, but his blueprint must have Mao's
approval. Mao is a consummate politician who, if
unable to hlve his way in all matters, is still able
to retain considerable leverage by playing off op-
posing groups against one another. Indeed, much of
the leadership uncertainty in Peking today may stem
from Mao's devotion to this tactic, which avoids the
risks of provoking any direct challenge to his pre-
eminence.
A Final Word: Mao's Health
22. A major problem in assessing Mao's polit-
ical situation is that we do not have an accurate
reading on his health. Rumors in recent years that
he is in poor health have not proved accurate, and
we have serious reservations about diagnoses at long
distance. Eyewitness accounts vary widely. In every
public appearance he has made over the past two years,
observers have described Mao as frail and tired
looking.
23. On the other hand, Mao has given at least
five personal interviews ove_ the past two years
ranging from one and one half hours to five hours.
His interlocutors have all commented that he appeared
well briefed and well informed, that his mental
faculties appeared normal, and that his reactions
were lively. In some of the interviews, he showed
some preoccupation with mortality, but this is prob-
ably due more to his preoccupation with ensuring
that the revolution should endure after his passing
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than to morbidity or mental deterioration. He oc-
casionally treats the subject of death with sardonic
humor, as when he told Prince Sihanouk that he, Mao,
"might soon be called to heavenly peace," adding
with a laugh "for discussions only."
24. It seems reasonable to assume that Mao has
his good days and bad day q and that his working
schedule must be carefully regulated. Mao may not
read as many position papers as he once did, and
he may no longer be able to devote considerable
energy to retaining control of the bureaucracy and
keeping himself informed Past experience suggests,
however, that it would be a serious mistake to under-
rate his physical capacity for action and decision-
making. After all, he launched the Cultural Revolu-
tion at the age of 72, at a time when reports were
widely circulating that his good days were fewer
and fewer and that he was near death.
25. There has been a noticeable absence of
references to Mao's "excellent health" in Peking
propaganda in recent months. On the basis of past
practice, this can be taken as a sign that his con-
dition is good and that the regime is not particu-
larly sensitive on this subject.
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