PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05136650
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-00226
• Publication Date: January 8, 1982

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
DDI-144-823
8 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM:
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence
SUBJECT: Perspective on Nuclear Developments During
1982
Attached is a memorandum on the subject that you requested
in your 4 January memorandum for the NI0s.
cc: DDI
All NIOs
D/OSWR
D/ALA
D/EA
D/OGI
D/NESA
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DDI -144 -82
Nuclear Trends: Perspective on 1982
"The United States will seek to prevent the spread of nuclear
explosives to additional countries as a fundamental security
and foreign policy objective . . . and will maintain a strong
intelligence collection and assessment capability as an inte-
gral part of the US non-proliferation policy and actions pur-
suant to that policy."
Extract from National Security
Decision Directive Number 6,
"United States Non-Proliferation
and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
Policy," signed by President Reagan,
16 July 1981
General Perspective
Ongoing and extensive US diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the
Administration's non-proliferation objectives will have to take into
account what is likely to be a continuing--and in some cases a
strengthened--determination of certain countries to move ahead with the
development of a capability to produce nuclear explosives. A corollary
prospect is that countries now able or soon to be able to build nuclear
weapons--India, Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan--could decide for
security and other reasons to demonstrate their capability by conduct-
ing a nuclear test in the coming months. The effectiveness of the
international safeguards system will erode even further in the face of
many such developments. US interests will not necessarily be directly
effected immediately by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional
countries. But over the longer term, the regional tensions and possible
conflicts that they would be likely to spawn inevitably would effect US
policies and commitments toward countries involved. The challenge to
intelligence throughout this year and beyond will be the anticipation and
timely projection of events that effect US nonproliferation objectives
and other interests, and that carry the potential for disrupting inter-
national order.
SECRET
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Regional Developments
South Asia. Pakistan, now a US security partner, will press forward
with its nuclear program and will begin to acquire fissile material--
certainly enriched uranium and possibly plutonium. It thereby will move
closer to a capability to produce and test a nuclear explosive device.
India will continue its close watch on Pakistan's progress and will keep
open its option to strike key nuclear facilities near Islamabad. It
could move to the production of nuclear weapons and their testing as
another means of coping with the emerging Pakistani threat to its
security.
Near East. By destroying the reactor near Baghdad, the Israelis
only postponed what they continue to see as a potential and direct re-
gional nuclear threat to their security. Of immediate concern to the
Israelis is Pakistani nuclear progress and the advances being made by
the Libyans in nuclear research with Soviet assistance. Egypt's commit-
ment to build a large nuclear power industry eventually will give rise
to suspicions about non-peaceful nuclear applications and potential.
Latin America. The nuclear "rivalry" between Argentina and Brazil
will intensify. Each country perceives the other to be on a course
leading to the development of an option to produce nuclear weapons.
Argentina eventually will be able to produce substantial quantities of
unsafeguarded fissile material and may already have acquired enough for
a nuclear device. Brazil will continue its secret military-related
nuclear research, and it could already be embarked on an effort to build
a reactor for the production of plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons.
Africa. South Africa will produce additional amounts of enriched
uranium some of which almost certainly will be used in its weapons pro-
gram. It will free itself from reliance on the US for the supply of
nuclear fuel by virtue of increased French assistance. It could activate
its nuclear test site and prepare for a test, but this will depend upon
evolving security perceptions and needs.
East Asia. Despite its official protestations to the contrary,
the PRC has sold nuclear materials to countries of proliferation
concern--South Africa and Argentina--and is likely to continue to do so
in the coming months to include sales to India. Its insensitivity to
safeguards needs and provisions in conjunction with such sales will
undercut the ongoing efforts of the US and others to ensure that inter-
national nuclear cooperation is limited to peaceful applications. South
Korea and Taiwan are likely to expand their activities and interests in
basic research on reprocessing and uranium enrichment technologies and
this could create new difficulties in bilateral relations with the US.
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Nuclear Terrorism
The possibility that terrorists will attempt to acquire nuclear
weapons or materials will persist as a threat. Rising public appre-
hension, especially in Western Europe over nuclear-power development
and nuclear weapons modernization could be exploited by terrorists.
Some terrorist groups could do so by either attacking nuclear weapons,
power plants, or by perpetrating a hoax.
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