GUATEMALA: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC RULE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626128
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: September 1, 1990

Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626128
Directorate of
Intelligence
Guatemala: Prospects for
Democratic Rule
An Intelligence Assessment
September 1990
C*" 32 1
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Status of the Insurgency
Mendez
Lucas Garcia
Rios
Mejia
Ydigoras r Peraha
Montenegro
Arana
r Laugerud
Mon; t1
Victores
rCerezo
I I I I
III
I I I
I
I I I 11
I
I I
, 1 1
1 1 1
I
I
1962 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
70 71 72
73
74 75 76 77 78
79
80 81 82 83 84 85
86 87 88
89
90
URNG
ORPA
FAR
PGTIO
(1950
IIIIIIIIIIII
1962 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
National Revolutionary Union - URNG
Revolutionary. Organization of People in Arms - ORPA
Labor Party - PGTIO and PGTID
Guerrilla Army of the Poor - EGP
Rebel Armed Forces - FAR
FAR
EGP
PGTID
111111
74 75 76 77 78 79
so
1
PGTIO=
!If
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Guatemala's insurgency, which dates to the early
1960s, grew dramatically from 1979 through 1982 as
a result of a corrupt national government, indiscrimi-
nate military brutality, increased Cuban support to
regional revolutionaries, and the Sandinistas' rise to
power in Nicaragua. The number of full-time insur-
gent combatants rose from fewer than 1,000 to some
3,000 by 1981. The three principal guerrilla groups
controlled substantial tracts of territory in key north-
ern and western departments
a defensive posture. The implementation of this strat-
egy, complemented by an amnesty, effectively reduced
insurgent forces to about 1,500 by mid-1985 and
severely undercut their popular support. Their cur-
rent strength is about 1,100
Despite political and military setbacks, the insurgen-
cy continues to demonstrate its resiliency amid signs
that the war may be intensifying.
nsurgent groups are stepping up attacks
on the country's power and transportation systems�
temporarily disrupting electrical service and critical
harvest operations�conducting harassment opera-
tions along major highways, sabotaging oil facilities,
and assassinating military commissioners and collab-
orators guer-
rilla columns of up to 100 combatants are raiding
large farms and laying siege to military outposts with
The Guatemalan armed forces responded with a
combination of military operations and civic action
programs designed to weaken the guerrillas' popular
base of support. By mid-1982, the Army's use of
small military units, formation of large civilian
militias�an estimated 900,000-man force�and eco-
nomic development projects had put the insurgents in
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rocket-propelled grenades, M-60 machineguns, and
60-mm mortars. Guerrilla groups are also redeploy-
ing forces near Guatemala City and reestablishing
urban networks decimated by security forces in the
mid-1980s.
We believe the traffickers' reach extends into the
judicial system, the military, and the economy.
the prosecuting
attorney and judge presiding over the case involving
Moran's associates have received frequent death
threats, and witnesses have refused to testify for fear
of reprisal. Moran has
The ability of rebel groups to raise the level of
violence may reflect enhanced operational coordina-
tion and support from drug traffickers and foreign
countries for
example, ORPA units in Chimaltenango are spear-
heading military efforts while the Guatemalan Labor
Party and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor focus on
political indoctrination of peasants and liaison with
labor and student organizations
he rebels continue to recruit
peasants for logistic, intelligence, and communica-
tions functions. Some military officers believe insur-
gent ties to drug traffickers account for the rebels'
sophisticated weapons and equipment. In addition,
reporting from various sources suggests that the
insurgents have benefited from Cuban, Soviet, and
Nicaraguan support in the form of training, financial
aid, and military supplies
threatened to assassinate a DEA agent.
some Guatemalan mili-
tary troops protect opium poppy cultivation areas
along the Guatemala-Mexico border and are involved
in drug trafficking. Central Bank officials reportedly
believe that the country's banking system�which is
well protected from legal scrutiny�is increasingly
being used to launder drug revenues and that traffick-
ers may be behind Guatemala's real estate boom.
The Army is stepping up counterinsurgency efforts,
but problems remain.
after almost a year of reacting to rebel
initiatives, the Army is engaging in aggressive patrol-
ing. Special undercover units of 10 to 15 men have
also been formed to penetrate guerrilla ranks, and
military intelligence is reactivating its informant
network in Guatemala City. Even so, we believe the
Army, hampered by severe resource constraints and
logistical problems, is unlikely to show significant
progress over the short term.
Social and Economic Problems
We believe the failure of the civilian leadership to
translate recent economic growth into better living
standards for the majority of Guatemalans has been
another major factor in sapping popular support for
democratic rule. Despite recent economic expansion
and a potential growth rate of 4 percent this year.
72 percent of the nation's
families live in extreme poverty, outside or on the
edge of the money economy. An estimated 20 percent
of the population controls two-thirds of the nation's
income, and 2 percent holds some 63 percent of all
land. Moreover, the purchasing power of Guatemalan
professionals and the middle class has eroded signifi-
cantly over the last year. Various sources report that
the lack of progress in raising living standards has
reinforced the widely held perception, especially
among the poor, that the democratic process favors
the few over the many. Population pressures-50
percent of Guatemala's population is under the age of
15�exacerbate Guatemala's uneven distributi
wealth (see table on Socioeconomic Indicators).
7
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Guatemala's primitive health, education, and welfare
programs compare unfavorably to those of other
Central American countries. International Monetary
Fund and World Bank statistics show, for example,
that Guatemala has one of the lowest literacy rates in
(b)(1)
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