WARSAW PACT: THE THREAT POTENTIAL OF SELECTED TOXINS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05629398
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2020
• Case Number: F-2020-00133
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Warsaw Pact:
The Threat Potential
of Selected Toxins
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Volume I: Key Judgments and Summary
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NI JIM 85-10002/I
February,1985
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Copy 4 25
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PROPIN�
NFIBONLY�
ORCON�
REL
FGI-
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN� Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT� Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
Caution�Proprietary Information Involved
NFIB Departments Only
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
Foreign Government Information
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NI IIM 85-10002/I
WARSAW PACT:
THE THREAT POTENTIAL
OF SELECTED TOXINS
VOLUME I: KEY JUDGMENTS
AND SUMMARY
Information available as of 24 January
1985 was used in the preparation of this
Memorandum.
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(b)(3)
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE 1
KEY JUDGMENTS 3
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iii
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SCOPE NOTE
Toxins form part of a spectrum of chemical and biological warfare
(BCW) threat agents, with biological organisms at one end and tradi-
tional chemical agents at the other. Toxins are substances which
originate(d) in biological sources and can, without significant chemical
modification, cause damage to a living organism. Toxins are riot living;
they do not reproduce themselves. Many chemicals also produce direct
injury to living systems but differ from toxins in that they are produced
by synthesis outside of living organisms. Because of recent technological
advances there is an increased possibility of also producing toxins in the
absence of living organisms. These synthetically produced products
would still be considered toxins as long as they are identical to the
naturally occurring toxins
Considerable effort is now being expended in the United States to
develop defensive measures against toxins.
Some members of the intelligence and R&D communities believe that
other toxins may in fact pose the greater threat to US and NATO forces.
Therefore, this assessment was undertaken to define the toxin threat to
the United States and NATO as accurately as possible and to provide
background information to the policy community in their dealings with
questions of treaty verification and arms control negotiations
To accomplish this analysis we developed a systematic method that
is applicable to assessment of the BCW potential of any compound and
that also allows ready reevaluation of toxins (or other compounds) as
new data are obtained.
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Why Choose Toxins?
Previous analysis a shows that choice of a toxin vice a
traditional chemical agent most likely depends on the
goals to be achieved and the properties of the material
in question. Vulnerability of the opponent as well as
political considerations, such as the likelihood of detec-
tion, may be deciding factors.
Several toxins have properties that make them com-
petitive with traditional chemical warfare agents:
� Some toxins are as toxic and fast acting (or more
so) as standard CW agents, and can be produced at
least as easily and cheaply as standard CW agents.
� Use of toxins in limited warfare may be difficult
to establish because many toxins occur naturally.
� Storage and handling requirements for toxins are
less demanding than those for standard CW
agents
Toxin weapons may proliferate and their use may
become more widespread. More advanced countries
may consider limited use of toxins an attractive option
because of the difficulty of detection, identification,
and proof of use. Developing countries may come to
view the production and use of such weapons as a
relatively cheap, easy, and effective way to augment
their conventional weapons capability. Some of these
countries may turn to the Soviet Union for assistance in
developing that capability.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Warsaw Pact is capable of fielding some toxins at present, but
there is no single toxin or group of toxins that can be identified
technically or through intelligence as posing the greatest threat to US
forces. Toxins that fulfill the technical criteria (such as toxicity,
persistence, and so forth) required by each possible operational applica-
tion, as well as the intelligence criteria (such as capability, RDT&E
interest, and so forth) that raise the toxins to threat status, come from a
variety of sources and have a variety of physical and chemical
properties.
There is no one toxin that is outstanding for all operational uses,
nor is there any one operational application for which any (or all)
toxin(s) would be totally appropriate. After consideration of both
technical factors and intelligence reporting, we were able to identify
five toxins (of the 30 we selected for inclusion in this analysis) that have
the greatest immediate threat potential. These toxins showed the
broadest operational utility, have been linked through intelligence
reporting to Warsaw Pact biological and chemical warfare (BCW)
interests, and could be produced and weaponized in the Warsaw Pact
using current technology.
These toxins have few similarities beyond their common
satisfaction of likely operational requirements,
We believe that the Warsaw Pact is conducting research, led by the
Soviets, in several areas in an apparent effort to expand its potential ca-
pability to conduct BCW operations employing toxins. We believe that
the composition and magnitude of the toxin threat will change in the fu-
ture as research developments are applied. The diversity of potential
agents and the fluidity of the threat may require development of
generic, rather than agent-specific, countermeasures.
This publication was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer at Large. It was draft-
ed by Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinated within CIA and with the Foreign Science
and Technology Center, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, the Foreign Technology Division, the
Naval Intelligence Support Center, and the Chemical Research and Development Command.
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Because of the potential for change due to technological advances,
we may never be able to define precisely the set of threat agents.
Specific toxins that are in development for, or that have been incorpo-
rated into, weapons by the Warsaw Pact might be identified, but this
would be entirely dependent on intelligence data. Technical assessments
can help focus our intelligence efforts to identify those materials.
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Use Concepts
Considering the various tactical situations in which chemicals might be employed, the
following use concepts were envisioned:
la. Direct attack or defense against an opposing enemy unit.
lb. Softening attack against an opposing enemy unit.
lc. Harassing and interdiction attack against an opposing enemy unit.
2. Offensive use against an enemy unit on the flank of a blocking unit.
3. Offensive or defensive use against a division rear area unit.
4. Chemical barriers to units occupying or traversing critical terrain.
5. Terrain restriction.
6a. Deep interdiction on enemy service logistic centers, naval facilities, and airbases
(harassment).
6b. Deep interdiction on enemy service logistic centers, naval facilities, and airbases
(suppression).
6c. Deep interdiction on enemy service logistic centers, naval facilities, and airbases
(elimination).
7. Strategic use against general population.
8. Strategic use against industrial base.
9. Mopup of military remnants or encircled units.
10. Hit-and-run use by guerilla forces, terrorists, and special-purpose forces.
11. Boobytraps on transportation routes or critical areas.
12. Sabotage of critical-government, military, or industrial installations.
13. Terrorist or punitive action against military or civilian installations.
14. Direct attack against floating platforms, ships at sea.
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