FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON`S 25 JANUARY TV ADDRESS ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05081529
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-01277
• Publication Date: January 2, 1972

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
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SPECIAL ME '\O
FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
UM
TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S 25 JANUARY TV ADDRESS ON VIETNAM
For 01 Use Only
1 February .1972
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CONTENTS
SUMMARY ..... .
I. COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
North Vietnam and the Front 1
Pathet Lao 6
Sihanouk's "Government" 8
The PRC 10
North Korea 13
The USSR 14
Eastern Europe 18
Cuba � � � 23
II. NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
West Europe 24
Asia 32
Middle East and Africa 39
Latin America . . 42
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FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S 25 JANUARY TV ADDRESS ON VIETNAM
SUMMARY
COMMUNIST- MEDIA
NORTH VIETNAM AND THE FRONT: Hanoi promptly acknowledged the
President's 25 January TV speech in a radio commentary which
dismissed the eight points as a plan designed to quiet his
critics and thus aid him in the presidential election next fall.
However, this initial commentary ignored the President's
revelations about the series of U.S.-DRV private meetings, and
it was not until the 31st that Hanoi released its version of
what had caused the breakdown of the talks. Hanoi was also slow
in offering press comment on the President's speech, with
Commentator articles in the party paper NHAN DAN on the 29th and
in the army daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 31st. Both the
communist delegates at the-Paris session on the 27th, where the
allied side formally submitted the eight-point peace plan, and
Hanoi commentators focused their criticism on the proposals
for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam and the holding
of South Vietnamese presidential elections six months after an
agreement is reached. There have been passing references to
the release of POW's and a cease-fire throughout Indochina, but
the other points have been ignored.
PATHET LAO: Attacking the President as "warmongering and
cunning" and registering concern lest "one be misled into
believing his propaganda," a Pathet Lao broadcast insisted that
the U.S. peace plan is "no different" from past ones. Another
broadcast stated that the Pathet Lao hews to its awn plan for
settling the conflict in Laos and also declared that "the only
way to bring peace and independence to our country is to fight
and defeat the enemy."
SIHANOUK: The Information and Propaganda Ministry of Sihanouk's
government denounced the proposals of the "international
gangster Nixon" as designed to "continue U.S. imperialist
aggression" and sustain the U.S. "colonialist yoke" in
Indochina. Scoring the United States for having "trampled"
on the Geneva agreements, it neglected to mention the points
in the U.S. proposals on respect for the Geneva accords and on
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international guarantees and an international conference. In a
brief statement of his own, Sihanouk said the President's proposals
have been "unanimously" rejected by the DRV, the PRG, the RGNU,
and the Pathet Lao.
THE PRC: Peking has denounced the proposal as an attempt to
Impose "truculent and unreasonable conditions" for a U.S. troop
withdrawal and "a new strategem" for prolonging the war. In its
most authoritative reaction to the President's address, a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article reaffirmed Peking's support for the
PRG's seven-point plan and warned the United States that neither
f*peace fraud" nor "military blackmail" can save it from failure.
A charge in an accompanying NCNA commentary that U.S. "war
blackmail" is a provocation against the Chinese suggests concern
over a possible intensification of hostilities in Vietnam as
the time for the President's visit to the PRC approaches.
NORTH KOREA: Typically intemperate Pyongyang comment denounced
the President's proposals without discussing them in any detail,
complaining only that he offered no guarantee of an end to U.S.
military operations in Indochina and assailing his "heinous" plan
for South Vietnamese elections contrived to protect the
"puppet clique."
THE USSR: Taking care not to get out ahead of the Vietnamese
communists, Moscow reacted to the President's address somewhat
belatedly and only after the DRV and PRG Paris delegations had
issued their statements. Moscow has criticized the troop
withdrawal, election, and cease-fire points in the President's
plan while ignoring the provisions on international guarantees
and an international conference on Indochina. Soviet comment
has linked the President's proposal with the U.S. election and
has publicized critical remarks by the President's opponents.
Moscow has also taken the occasion to play the theme of Sino-U.S.
collusion in denigrating the President's proposal.
THE EAST EUROPEAN BLOC: Comment from Moscow's allies in East
Europe has pervasively linked the revelation of the U.S. peace
plan to domestic political motivations. An early dispatch in
the Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU quoted Washington "observers" as noting
that the President "has not slammed the doors on further
negotiation," but the bulk of the comment and reportage has been
unrelieved in its critical treatment of the eight-point plan.
The media of Moscow's hard-core allies--their leaders fresh from
the Warsaw Pact coordinating session in Prague--have also played
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the theme that the President's speech laid propaganda groundwork
for Sino-U.S. "collusion" at Hanoi's expense during President
Nixon's talks in Peking. Romania, of course, has shunned this
theme, but Bucharest's reportage on the U.S. plan is more
than usually slanted and negative.
YUGOSLAVIA: Freewheeling Yugoslav comment has included a
suggestion that the U.S. peace plan includes points on which the
Vietnamese communists might conceivably negotiate. But more
authoritative Belgrade comment has been more critical, along
the lines of the Soviet bloc reactions, on the issues of
Vietnamization and guarantees of free elections.
ALBANIA: Not for the first time, Tirana has betrayed fear that
Peking may put its relations with Washington ahead of its support
for the Vietnamese communists. In a shrill commentary decrying
the President's "treacherous plot" to induce the South Vietnamese
communists to sign "a humiliating agremeent" at gunpoint, the
Albanian party organ made plain its view of what Peking's role
should be: The Indochinese people, it said, enjoy "the aid and
powerful and continous support" of the Chinese in a cause that
will be won "on the battlefield."
CUBA: Havana media played the theme that the President
publicized the U.S. plan in an "insidious and sly maneuver" to
"deceive" the American voters into believing the Administration
is ready to solve the Indochina problem through peaceful
negotiations.
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NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
WEST EUROPE: Most official spokesmen, newspaper editorialists,
and radio commentators in West Europe regarded the President's
.initiative with a measure of approval, although few saw much hope
for an early end to the conflict. Some observers alleged that
the release was timedfor domestic political effect, while others
commented that the timing was keyed to the President's forthcoming
visits to Peking and Moscow. Only a handful, however, argued
that the proposal has no significance outside such contexts,
and a number of commentators perceived serious concessions in
the cause of peace. The principal distinction is between those
who saw an advance, however small, on the road to peace, and
those who felt that the conflict is no nearer an end than before.
ASIA: Most Japanese commentators described the plan as representing
a considerable U.S. concession, and there has been some criticism
of Hanoi's failure to react in a positive way. Indian comment was
largely critical of the plan for not going far enough, especially
in regard to the total withdrawal of air and naval forces. The
only available Pakistani comment was also critical. Saigon press
comment has been mostly favorable, although it includes complaints
that the plan yields too much to the communist side. Some Thai
commentators also expressed the view that the plan concedes too
much to Hanoi, and one paper called for a realinement of Bangkok's
position on world affairs.
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: The only monitored Arab comment, from
Cairo and Baghdad, has been sharply denunciatory. Cairo declared
that the U.S. position is like that of Israel toward its Arab
neighbors--no withdrawal until a complete agreement is signed.
Algerian papers have condemned the proposal as a propaganda exercise,
while Tunisian commentators credited the United States with a
serious quest for peace. Other press and radio media have provided
news coverage but almost no comment.
LATIN AMERICA: The press and radio of Latin American countries
have reported the President's proposal fairly extensively, but
comment has been slight.
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COMMUNIST MEDIA
NORTH VIETNAM AND THE FRONT
Hanoi was quick to react to the President's 25 January speech,
with a radio commentary--broadcast a few hours after the speech
was delivered--dismissing the eight points as a plan designed
to "hoodwink" the public and help the President in the U.S.
elections next fall. However, Hanoi was slow to acknowledge
the details of the President's revelations about the series of
private meetings between Dr. Kissinger and DRV representatives
Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy. And it was not until the 31st that
Hanoi supplied its version of what had caused the breakdown of
the talks and acknowledged that the DRV had introduced a
nine-point proposal privately, five days before the PRG
introduced its seven-point proposal at Paris on 1 July. On
31 January, the DRV delegation in Paris called a press conference
and issued a communique explaining that it was releasing relevant
documents so as "not to permit the United States to mislead public
opinion." VNA in its English-language transmission at 1732 GMT
on the 31st carried a report of the communique; the communique
and the other documents were carried by VNA in French on the
31st beginning at 1752 GMT, but VNA English did not carry the
nine points until 1 February.*
Despite the rapid reaction to the President's speech by Hanoi
radio, press comment came only belatedly on the 29th in an
article signed Commentator in the party daily NHAN DAN--Hanoi's
standard vehicle for responding to Presidential pronouncements.
There was even greater delay in comment in the army organ
QuAN DOI NHAN DAN, with a Commentator article published in that
* VNA's Paris office transmitted the documents--the DRV nine-point
plan, the U.S. eight-point plan, and the exchange of messages
between the two sides regarding a November meeting--to Hanoi in
French and Vietnamese in its service channel on the 31st. The
transmission of the DRV''s Aine-point proposal concluded with the
sentence: "We are not sending you the PRG seven-point proposal,
since you already have this at home." It is puzzling that the
other documents would not be available to VNA in Hanoi. A
message sent in VNA's service channel from Hanoi to Paris at
0413 GMT on 1 February, addressed to VNA's Paris and Moscow
offices, said: "We suggest that you immediately send us the
documents released on 31 January in English. We hope to receive
them soon in order to transmit them."
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paper on the 31st. Both articles were sharply critical of the
President for having unilaterally revealed information on the
secret talks, and both questioned his motives and ridiculed his
sincerity regarding a political settlement. But both were
notable for the absence of the personal abuse that is a normal
staple'of Hanoi propaganda; abusive epithets had appeared as
recently as 23 January in articles in both NRAN DAN and QUAN
DOI NI-IAN DAN pegged to the State of the Union message. Hanoi
presumably felt that a personal attack now would be inconsistent
with the acknowledgment that secret talks had been going on with
the President's emissary.
While VNA's transmission in French on the 31st carried the text
of the eight points, Hanoi propagandists have not acknowledged
many of the points. The only substantial comment has been on
the proposals for U.S. troop withdrawal and the holding of
presidential elections in South Vietnam within six months of
an agreement. Of the other points, Hanoi has mentioned only
the release of POW's and a cease-fire throughout Indochina.
The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 29th, after a lengthy
attack on the issues of the U.S. troops and the holding of
elections in South Vietnam, implied that aid was one of the
eight points when it said: "Other questions like the exchange
of prisoners, cease-fire, aid, and so on are but roundabout
and deceitful offers which the United States has tried to
sell many times before."
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF The initial Hanoi radio commentary on the
PRIVATE MEETINGS 26th ignored the President's disclosures
about the private U.S.-DRV meetings.
Cryptic acknowledgment of private meetings did appear in the
statement on the President's speech issued by the DRV
spokesman in Paris on the 26th--though not released in the
media until the next day--and by Xuan Thuy at the Paris session
on the 27th. The spokesman referred vaguely to private meetings
as well as to the Paris talks in saying that. the DRV has always
shown its wish to reach a political settlement, that many
proposals were put forward, but that the United States in both
forums has always refused to respond to the two "basic points"
of the communist proposals. The spokesman set the line for
subsequent comment when he said that the fact that the President
unilaterally made public the private meetings which his
representative proposed and promised to keep secret is another
proof of "foul play" on the part of the Nixon Administration.
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Xuan Thuy took the same tack at the Paris session on the 27th.
After reporting Thuy's criticism of the proposals in the eight-
point plan on U.S. withdrawal and South Vietnamese presidential
elections, the VNA account of the session quoted him only as
saying "Nixon has once again divulged the tenure of the meetings
which the U.S. delegate himself had requested be kept secret.
Since he has not kept such a promise, how can his other
statements be trusted?" But Hanoi radio broadcast the full
text* of Thuy's formal statement, in which he also remarked
that the communist side's assertions that the Nixon Administration
talked one way and ted another had been illustrated in 1969:
"We held private meetings with Ambassador Lodge, and the U.S.
delegate proposed to keep these private meetings secret. Yet
on 3 November 1969 Mt. Nixon made them all public."
The NHAN DAN Commentator article also pictured the President's
revelations about the private meetings as casting doubt on
any U.S. commitment. Repeating the line used in the past,
Commentator said the DRV "holds that what matters is to reach
a correct settlement, not the form of the meeting, public or
private," and that with "good will and the full approval of
the PRG," the DRV delegation has held meetings with the
United States. It went on to say that while the two sides
agreed not to make public the private meetings, "now Nixon
himself and Kissinger have grossly reneged on their promise
by unilaterally divulging the tenure of those private meetings.'
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 31st,
initially broadcast at. 0330 GMT that day, referred to the
issue of private talks more cryptically, saying only that
"the fact that Nixon deceitfully announced the secret talks
is more proof that he is trying every means possible to
undermine the Paris conference and to impede its progress."
It was not until later on the 31st, after the DRV delegation
in Paris released the documents relevant to the private
talks, that Hanoi media acknowledged any of the dates of
the meetings or the fact that the DRV had presented a nine-point
proposal at a secret meeting on 26 June. The delegation's
communique complained that the President in his TV speech on
the 25th and Kissinger in his press conference the next day not
* Vietnamese communist media also carried the full text of the
DRV delegate's statements at Paris, as well as those of the PRG,
at the sessions of 8 May 1969, 17 September 1970, and 1 July
1971 when PRG proposals were formally introduced.
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only leaked information about the meetings but "distorted the
facts," The communique said it was the United States which
cancelled the meeting on 20 November.* And Hanoi sought to
document this claim by releasing the exchange of U.S.-DRV
letters beginning with the 11 October U.S. message and
culminating with the 19 November U.S. message which, as
reported by VNA, said that in view of the DRV's message
announcing that Le Duc Tho was ill there was no point in meeting
on the 20th as previously agreed.
HANOI PRESS The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 29th-- ,
COMMENT which atypically was carried in full text by VNA
as well as by Hanoi radio--seemed at pains to
gloss over the fact that private talks had been going on with
the United States. Taking the offensive regarding the U.S.
eight-point proposal, Commentator proceeded to deliver a
diatribe against the Nixon Administration's Vietnamization
policy. The article began by ridiculing the President's
description of the U.S. proposal, asking: "Is this really a
'generous, far-reaching, and most comprehensive offer' as
Nixon claimed?" It added that the circumstances under which
the plan was put forward and its aims must be clarified, and
it recalled that the President took office three years ago
with a promise to end the war.
As evidence that the President has not stilled his critics,
Commentator quoted Congressman McCloskey as criticizing the
U.S. proposal for presidential elections in South Vietnam six
months after an agreement is reached. McCloskey was quoted as
asking: "How could free elections be possible in South Vietnam
when the police there were dedicated to the elimination of the
NFLSV infrastructure in the 'Phoenix' program? This factor
makes it impossible to consider free and full elections going
forward." NHAN DAN's Commentator also quoted Senator Alan
Cranston as saying that the President's proposal was not a plan
for peace but was intended to prepare American public opinion
for a war escalation.
* In the post-session briefing at Paris on the 27th, DRV
press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le similarly charged the United
States with calling off the meeting; consistent with general
practice, Hanoi media did not report the press briefings.
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QUAN,DOI NHAN DAN's Commentator on the 31st followed NHAN DAN's
lead and said the Administration has been unable to overcome
the Vietnam problem. The army paper claimed that the Vietnam
situation is the principal cause of "all U.S. difficulties and
,deadlocks in the political, military, economic, financial, and
social fields.."
The article went on to say that
the initiative on Vietnam which Nixon has
exhibited early in 1972--a year when the
United States will see its incumbent President
end his term and when Nixon's political future
will be decided--is a deceitful trick that was
premeditated as regards timing and methods in
order to be able to cope with his worsening
situation and to divert the attention of
public opinion that is demanding that Nixon
end the war of aggression and the
Vietnamization policy.
The army paper seemed to obliquely acknowledge the President's
explanation that one reason for his disclosure of the fact of
the secret talks was that U.S. citizens had been misled by
Hanoi's attacks on U.S. ,policy. It said cryptically that
"Nixon also hopes to be able to cope with opposition factions
that are criticizing him." Going on to claim that the U.S.
troop withdrawal plan is solely aimed at continuing the war
through Vietnamization, the paper quoted Senator Kennedy as
saying that "the United States does not need an eight-point
peace plan, but rather needs a one-point peace plan--that is,
that all U.S. infantry, air, and naval forces must be
withdrawn."
In claiming that the Administration is still "plotting to
perpetuate the existence of U.S. military bases, U.S. supply
and command system, and particularly the U.S. air and naval
forces," the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article claimed
that 'while elaborating on the troop withdrawal proposal,
Ambassador Porter at the 27 January Paris session bluntly said:
'no provisions therein deal with military personnel and equip-
ment or with the use of military bases in South Vietnam.'"
(In additional remarks at the session, aimed at clarifying a
point raised by the communists, Ambassador Porter said that
"concerning which forces are to be withdrawn, our proposal
contains a provision for total withdrawal. Total is not a word
which requires much explanation. There is no provision for
military personnel, military equipment, or the use of bases in
South Vietnam after that withdrawal is complete.)
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� PATHET LAO
The Pathet Lao has, reacted with routine-level radio and press
agency comment and thus far has issued no official statement.
The first reaction, a 27 January Pathet Lao radio commentary, a
shorter version of which was disseminated by the Pathet Lao news
agency on the 30th, said that the President's plan is "no
different" from past "shopworn proposals" and is "full of
warmongering, obstinate, and arrogant statements." It observed'
that the publicity for the plan was aimed at countering the
Democratic Party's criticisms of the President's "crimes" in
Indochina, and it added that the President hopes to use the
"Vietnam issue" to defeat the Democrats in the forthcoming
Presidential elections.
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Scoring President Nixon as a "warmongering and cunning person,"
the commentary seemed to exhibit concern that "one might be
misled into believing his propaganda." It took issue ,
specifically with the points on U.S. troop withdrawal and
exchange of prisoners, the cease-fire throughout Indochina, and
the South Vietnamese election. Complaining that the cease-fire
proposal is surrounded by numerous conditions for the total
withdrawal of troops, it scored President Nixon's "threats" that
he will maintain troops in South Vietnam and continue the
bombing of the. DRV and it decried the continued stationing of
army and air forces in other Indochinese countries and Thailand.
The commentary also asked how a just election can be held in
South Vietnam under these conditions and while Thieu's "lackeys
from the top down to the local levels are still in power."
The Pathet Lao commentary did not mention tlie points on respect
for the Geneva agreements or on international guarantees and
an international conference. It concluded by insisting that
peace can be achieved in the Indochinese countries through the
PRG's seven points, the NLHS' five points, and Sihanouk's
"various peace solutions," and that to restore peace President
Nixon does not have to make any more proposals: "He can discuss
any problems at the Paris talks." The commentary did not
acknowledge the disclosure of the secret DRV-U.S. talks.
A 30 January weekly "conversation" broadcast by Pathet Lao
radio was at pains to emphasize that the eight-point proposal
is nothing new and that four of the points "may have misled
some people." It-took isgue with the points on U.S. troop
withdrawal and prisoner exchange, the cease-fire, and the
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South Vietnam elections in terms similar to the first commentary,
and it dismissed the other points as "no different from previous
proposals"--again avoiding mention of the Geneva agreements,
international guarantees, and an international conference. It
concluded with the assertion that the Pathet Lao will continue
to adhere to its five-point proposal and will continue its
military defeats of the "puppet troops" in Laos. "The only way
to bring peace and independence to our country," it declared,
"is to fight and defeat the enemy."
ft
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SIHANOUK'S "GOVERNMENT�
A 28 January statement by the Information and Propaganda Ministry
of Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU), broadcast
by the radio of Sihanouk's front, the FUNK, on the 31st, denounced
the speech by "international gangster Nixon" as aimed at "a sham
Indochina peace in order to continue U.S. imperialist aggression
and its colonialist yoke in Indochina."
The statement commented specifically only on the proposals on a.
cease-fire and elections in South Vietnam and on the U.S.
undertaking to remain neutral in the elections. The points on
the cease-fire and the elections, it said, were merely an effort
to "gain time" to improve the situation of the U.S. "puppet"
regimes in Indochina. As for U.S. neutrality in the elections,
the statement observed that the United States has never been
neutral in Cambodia since the days of John Foster Dulles and
the 1954 Geneva conference. That agreement, which indicated that
no big power should interfere in Indochina, has been "trampled"
by the United States, the statement said. It did not directly
acknowledge the points in the President's statement regarding
respect for the Geneva agreements and international guarantees
and an international conference.
The RGNU statement accused the President of repeating the "tricks"
he had used in the 1968 election to prolong "agression" in
Indochina for another four years. He publicized the peace plan,
it said, because the United States and its "lackeys" are being
"heavily defeated" in Indochina, "especially in Cambodia," and
in the hope that he could strengthen the position of the "puppet"
regimes and at the same time continue his "reactionary rule" over
the American people. The RGNU went on to charge President Nixon
with attempting to mislead world opinion by "exerting pressure":
on Washington's "henchmen"--pressure that is.especially obvious
in Phnom Penh, where Ambassador Swank "makes everything
available" to the "clique" and where he "ordered" Minister of
Information Long Boret to make -a statement supporting the
President's speech. The statement concluded with a pledge to
launch "greater offensives",in the military, political, economic,
and diplomatic fleas, force the United States and its "lackeys"
to withdraw from Cambodia', and "crush" the "clique" in Phnom
Penh.
A brief statement by Sihanouk reported by AKI, the press agency
of Sihanouk's government and front on the 31st said the U.S.
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proposals have been "unanimously" rejected by the DRV, PRG, RGNU,
and NLHS. Complaining that they are not aimed at ending the
Indochina war, he specified that there is "no satisfactory
provision" concerning the air raids; that Thailand will continue
as a base for attacks on Indochina; and that President Nixon
reserves the possibility of insuring the survival of the
Indochinese "renegade" regimes. (AFP on the 27th reported that
Sihanouk told its Peking correspondent he was "shocked" that
President Nixon seems to be addressing only the Vietnamese when
he talks about Cambodia and all of Indochina. Stressing that
the President cannot settle the problem of Cambodia with Hanoi
or Peking, he reportedly insisted that solutions must be reached
with the Indothinese countries individually.)
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THE PRC
Responding to the President's TV address with a 29 January PEOPLE'S
DAILY Comeentator article and a companion NCNA commentary dated
the 28th, Peking has denounced the President's peace proposal as
an attempt to impose "truculent and unreasonable conditions" for
U.S. troop withdrawal and as "anew strategen"for "prolonging and
intensifying" the war. Beginning on the 27th, Peking had first
acknowledged the President's proposal by carrying the 26 January
statements by the DRV and PRG Paris delegations' spokesmen and
other foreign comment. Peking's reaction to the President's
previous major peace proposal, delivered on 7 October 1970,
took, a similar form of publicity for critical foreign reaction
followed by Chinese comment on the level of a Commentator article.
The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article interpreted the President's
eight-point proposal as providing that the United States will
withdraw its troops "on condition" that the POWs be released,
the Saigon "puppet regime" be maintained, and a cease-fire be
realized, which. 'means that the Indochinese people have to lay
down their arms and 'stop their war." Both the Commentator
article and NCNA came down hard on the issue of conditions for
a troop withdrawal, declaring that the United States has no
right to impose any conditions. As for the election proposal,
Commentator argued that the result of such an election could
only be the same as "the fake election" held in South Vietnam
last October and that the United States is trying to impose "a
puppet regime" on the South Vietnamese. The NCNA commentary
added the complaint that the President's proposal on. an election
made no mention of the FRG.
According to the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator, the President's'
eight-point proposal means that he actually wants to pursue
his Vietnamization plan. Explaining the timing of the proposal,
Commentator said the President offered the plan in order to
deceive the American people and world opinion at a time when
the United States has suffered heavy defeat on the battlefield
and has encountered strong opposition at home and abroad. NCNA,
ma4e the additional point that the United States has been
"exposed repeatedly at the conference table" and that the
President's proposal reflects the bankruptcy of the U.S.
"counterrevolutionary dual tactics."
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The NCNA commentary, but not the CommentatOr article, took note
of the reference to the Geneva agreements in the President's
proposal. Repeating Peking's standard formulation, NCNA claimed
that the Geneva agreements "have long been torn to pieces" by
the United States. There was no reference by either NCNA or
the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator to the President's proposals
on international supervision of an agreement and an international
conference on Indochina--matters on which Peking presumably
would- not wish to move ahead of its Indochinese allies.
Peking has not mentioned the secret meetings held in Paris or
the nine-point plan submitted by Hanoi. According to the
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator, the PRC Government and people firmly
support the PRG's seven-point proposal as "the correct way" to
solve the Vietnam question. Taking Peking's standard line,
Commentator said the Vietnam and Indochina questions can only
be settled by their peoples themselves. Commentator expressed
confidence that the Vietnamese people, uniting and fighting
shoulder to shoulder with the Laotians and Cambodians, will
certainly achieve victory. A similar prescription in the
13 October 1970 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the
President's Indochina proposal then had included a call for
the Indochinese to persist in "protracted people's war," a
formula that dropped out of Chinese propaganda after Peking
judged the situation in Indochina to be "unprecedentedly fine"
following the Lam Son 719 operation.
Concern over a possible deterioration, of the situation seems
reflected in a passage in the NCNA commentary containing the
sharpest retort to the President's proposal and the most
direct reference to Chinese interests. Taking exception to ;
the President's assertion that he would take action to protect
the remailing American forces if the enemy responded to his .
peace proposal by stepping up military attacks, NCNA accused
the President of "naked war blackmail and intimidation" against
the Vietnamese. Reiterating Chinese determination to support
the Vietnamese in a fight to the end, NCNA claimed that the
."war blackmail of U.S. imperialism" is a "provocation" not
only against the Indochinese peoples but also against the
Chinese. This represents the first such charge by Peking
since the t,ime of Lam Son 719 last winter. The more authoritative
Commentator article did not, however, contain the charge of a
provocation against the Chinese.
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Peking's concern over an intensification of hostilities in
Indochina is one of the aspects of its reaction to the President's
proposal that seems related to his impending visit to the PRC.
In addition to increased fighting in Indochina around the time
of the visit, another possible source of embarrassment to the
Chinese may be speculation over the timing of the President's
initiatives. Thus, unlike Hanoi and in contrast to its own
reaction to the President's October 1970 peace plan, Peking has
not cited this year's U.S. elections as a factor in the timing
of the President's proposal--a reticence suggesting sensitivity
to speculation linking the President's Vietnam proposal and his
China trip to the electoral campaign.
In keeping with its treatment of the President since plans got
underway for his visit, Peking's reaction to his Vietnam peace
proposal has avoided personal abuse. This circumspection was
evident even in Peking's account of a harsh Albanian denunciation
of the President: NCNA sanitized an Albanian article to delete
references to the "blood-stained hands" of "the chieftain of
U.S. imperialism." The 13 October 1970 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article on the President's peace plan that month called "the
chieftain of U.S. imperialism" a "god of plague of war."
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NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang attacked the President's proposals in the customary ,
intemperate terms in a domestic radio commentary on 28 January.
The radio talk described the President's speech as "replete with
hypocrisy, deception, political tricks, threats, and blackmail
from beginning to end." It has "nothing to do with a genuine
peace" in Indochina, said the commentary, but only unmasks U.S.
"aggressive ambitions." The radio did not discuss the content of
the O.S. plan in any detail, simply complaining that the President
."set no date for a final troop withdrawal and remarking that this
shows that the United States is unwilling to commit itself to
withdraw its troops--a "prerequisite" for an end to the war. It
added that he also made no guarantee of. an end to U.S. military
operations in Vietnam or in the rest of Indochina. Instead, the
commentary said, the President expressed his intention to protect
the.South Vietnamese "puppet clique," even putting forward a
"heinous" plan for elections to attain his "criminal objectives"
in Indochina.. The proposal was also publicized, the broadcast
charged, with an eye to the U.S. elections in November.
Pyongyang concluded its commentary with the demand that the
United States withdraw its troops and those of its "satellites
and mercenaries," dismantle its bases, stop all acts of support
for the South Vietnamese "puppets," and end all aggression
against the Vietnamese people so that they can solve their
problems themselves.
A brief KCNA summary of an article in the party organ NODONG
SINHUN the next day indicates that the paper's comment was in
the same vein.
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THE USSR
'Soviet media reacted to the President's speech belatedly and only
after the DRV and PRG Paris spokesmen had placed the Vietnamese
communist reaction on record in their 26 January statements. The
first Soviet mention cane in Moscow radio's domestic service
broadcast at 1900 GMT on the 26th�the main evening news show--
some 14 hours after Hanoi's initial radio commentary on the speech.
TASS' transmission in Russian carried a brief report on the DRV
statement in Paris about a quarter of an hour after the radio
broadcast, and followed up with an account of the PRG statement.
TASS subsequently carried both statements in English�the DRV
statement at 2116 GMT on the 26th and the PG's at 0726 on the
27th. Only at 2005 GMT on the 26th, � after it had transmitted
the accounts of the Vietnamese communist statements in Paris,
did. TASS Russian carry a commentary on the lines of the Radio
Moscow broadcast no such commentary appeared in TASS English
transmission at all. .The TASS Russian commentary appeared in
PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA�on the 27th, and subsequent press comment
included a commentary by Matveyev in IZVESTIYA on the 28th.
TAGS' notable failure to carry its normal, prompt news report
of a major speech by the President suggests indecision on how
to react even on a reportorial level, at least until Hanoi's
reaction became known. It may have also been related to the
absence from Moscow of Brezhnev and Kosygin, who were in. Prague
for the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Coam'littee session.
The session issued a statement on Indochina--coincidentally
carried by TASS at. the same time as the domestic radio broadcast
reporting the President's speech�which complained that
"Washington continues to bid not on a political but on a
military solution of the problems" of Indochina. The statement
did not mention the President's speech. Some subsequent radio
comment, however, did cite the President's address as bearing
out the Warsaw Pact �statement's claim and invoked the statement's
promise of 'continued support for the Indochinese.
The initial Moscow domestic service broadcast and TASS
commentary set the tone of Moscow's reaction in complaining
that the President's plan for. the withdrawal of U.S. and
allied troops from 5outh Vietnam and exchange of all prisoners
of war within six months of an agreement tailed to fix an
exact date for total U.S. withdrawal or to mention U.S.
readiness to withdraw armed forces from other Indochinese
countries and to remove air and naval forces. Noting that
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the President said the United States would never agree to the
.overthrow of its Saigon ally, the commentaries said the speech
indicates that the United States intends to preserve "a pro-
American regime" in. Saigon while professing readiness to hold
new elections there. The commentaries noted that the President
said "in essence" that the United States intends to conduct the
Paris talks "from a position of strength" and insists on "the
unqualified acceptance" of its plan, citing him as stating that
it the opponent rejects the proposal Washington will proceed
with the Vietnamization policy.
� Subsequent Soviet comment has dismissed the President's proposal
as an election-year .maneuver and played up critical remarks by
. Democratic Presidential candidates and other Congressmen. A
Washingtondatelined dispatch in PRAVDA on the 28th, for example,
reported that the speech "is being assessed" as an attempt to
pull hthe rug out from under the President's political opponents
and that the President hopes to stifle criticism of his Vietnam
policies.
In reporting DRV reaction to .the proposal, Moscow has cited
"authoritative circles in Hanoi" as pointing out the "unaccepta-
bility" of the proposals. A Serbin dispatch from Hanoi, published
in PRAVDA on 28 January, said that "outwardly these proposals
might seem to be something new," hut that in "Hanoi political
circles their real content is being thoroughly analyzed and that
which is concealed behind this new cover is being noted." A
participant in the 30 January domestic service roundtable
discussion similarly noted that, "as reported from Hanoi," the
proposals are "being carefully studied by our Vietnamese comrades,"
but he cautioned that the proposals are "crafty" and "have drawn
criticism from the beginning." A foreign-language radio
commentary on the 29th went so far as to say that the DRV and
PRG'"unequivocally reject" the plan.
While responding to the provisions in the President's plan � .
relating. to troop withdrawal and prisoner exchange, the holding
of an election in South Vietnam, and a cease-fire throughout
Indochina, Moscow has ignored the points regarding international
guarantees and an international conference on Indochina. There
has, however, been a passing reference to the provision on
international supervision of the proposed election. IZVESTIYA's
Matveyev, in the course of an 'attack on the President for
intending to preserve the "pro-U.S. puppet regime," observed
that although the proposal "speaks hazily" about international
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supezvision of the election it would still lye Lee ThiL.11 regime
that would prepare the election, U.S. to,07::, would remain, and
. the Saigon army would eontinue to implement Vie::.namizatioa, thus
resulting in an election met the point of z,uns."
.SECRET TALKS Moscow was the first co=rjst source to mention
the secret talks and the D-Z;'s nine-point plan.
A TASS dispatch on 27 January reporting chat day's post-session
press conference in Paris by Nguyen Thanh Le--as usual, not
publicized in Hanoi's media�quoted him. as complaining that
"neither at plenary meetings nor at private meetings between
representatives of the DRV and the United States" had the
United States clearly stated an intention to withdraw troops
and liquidate bases in South Vietnam. TASS also quoted him
as mentioning a 26 duly 1971 private meeting with Kissinger as
showing that the United States uses the POW issue only for
"proPaganda purposes." According to the TAGS account,
Kissinger asserted that the DRV should not expect the United
States to agree to a settlement solely for the purpose of
solving the POW question. TASS also cited Le as having
"flatly rejected" allegations that the ?RC had had contacts
with representatives of the Saigon regime.
The dispatch from Hanoi in PRAVDA. on 26 January alluded to
the secret talks in criticizing the United States for having
.ignored the PRO's seven points. The dispatch noted that the
President only...now has announced counerproposals that were
made "secretly" about three months ago.
On 31 January TASS promptly reported the Paris press conference
at which the DRV delegation circulated a communique censuring
the U.S. Government for unilaterally revealing the contents of
the secret, meetings. While reporting. the EIRV's nine-point plan
and noting that the delegation had decided to publish the
documents turned over during the private meetings, TASS did
not mention either the U.S. eight points cr the exchange of
letters regarding the canceled November secret meeting.
ATTACKS ON . � In its reaction to the President's proposal
PEKING Moscow has again taken the occasion to attack
Peking's "collaborationist" .policies. Several
conmlentaries, including a Washington dispatch in PkAVDA on
28 January, have cited a Karnow article in. the Washington POST
as noting that the President disclosed his peace plan shortly
before his trip to Peking and that the Ch:inese have revealed a
tolerant attitude toward the President's policies�such as
toward the bombing attacks on North Vietnam.
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It has been left to the purportedly u-noff1C_al P,a(ao ?ice and
Froress to carry this line on Sino-U.S. co'Llusion Lila furthest.
.In broadcasts to the Chinese on 29 and "il January, ReEe Peace
,and Progress wanL so far es Lo charge Lliatigtcn nave the
�Peking leaders "advance notice not only of the bombings but
:also of the eight-point 'plan.
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:AST EUROPE
SOVIET BLOC Reactions from the tsVttL bloc in Eastern Europe
have been limited Lnd zative, with :most comment
characterizing the President's disclosure of the secret negotiations
and the peace plan as �a propap_anda ploy designed. to assnage domestic.
public opinion in an election year. Sustainn.z L:heir proxy role
in the Sino-Soviet conf1ici, Yoscow's orthodox allies�with the
notable exception of East Grmany�have the timing of the
President's revelations with his impending trip to Peking and
suggested that a Sino-American "conspiracy" is unfolding to the
detriment of North Vietnam's interests. Specific censure of the
peace plan has focused on the President's ailege,J failure to
renounce Vietnamization and to set a d_ate for total U.S. troop
withdrawal and on the alleged .inadecluecy o. the proposed
guarantees of democratic elections in South Vietnam. The tone
of most of the criticism has been relatively restrained, but
here again East German media diverged from the general pattern,
airing vitriolic comment replete with personal attacks on the
President.
An article in the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG on.
27 January typified comment on the recurring theme that the
President's speech represented an election 2,:ciabit to neutralize
domestic crieics of the Administration's Indochina policy.
NEPSZABADSAG said the speech "was a step integrally connected
with the President's election maneuvers," specifically designed
to defuse domestic opposition. In a similar vein, a Radio
Uarsaw commentator concluded that the President's peace package
ig directed solely at American voters inasmuch as it fails to
provide a specific date for troop withdrawals and posits
continued U.S. military support for the Saigon regime. A
Bulgarian news' agency .commentator described the President's
proposals as devised chiefly to influence the "politically
uninformed" American voters.
The specifics of Mr. Nixon's eight-point plan have been broached
for the most part in piecemeal fashion in the comment, with the
emphasis generally on what was "left cot.' A commentary in the
Czechoslovak RUDE PRAVO on the 28th, in addition to criticizing'
the President for not setting a date for withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Vietnam, said another "grave" omission was the "bypassing
of the question of withdrawal of the U.S. air force from Thailand
and withdrawal of the Sixth .1Tleet"--a theme echoed in other
comment. The paper interpreted such omissions as evidence that
"Nixon wants to continue the air war and has not renounced the
policy of Vietnamization."
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� A direct reference to possible flexnLity in the U.S. negotiatinp.
position came in a Washington-datcalined PAP carried in the
Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on the 27 lb. :1.i.e ridiculing the
proposed free elections plan, the -,apen said "obscrvers" have noted
that the secret talks in Paris hae shown "some inications of
pregress" and that President Nixonihnas not slaTimed the doors on.
further negotiations should his proposals not withstand the
confrontation with the course of developments." The balance was
weighted more heavily on the negative side in a dispatch from
Duclest.'s MTI correspondent in Hanoi, who said "it is strenly
stressed in the DRV capital that althour. , ixon's proposals have
certain points that may form the basis of discussion, complete
settlement is possible only on the basis of the seven-point proposal
of the PRO."
On the recurring theme that the President's speech was designed
in part to lay Qroundwork for his visit to Peking, the NEPSZABADSAG
article of the 27th cited the paper's '.'7a.shinton correspondent
as reporting that Dr. Kissinger had consulted the Chinese leaders
on the U.S. peace plan. The artic ie lieted unnamed Uashington
sources to the effect that the United States hopes, on the
basis of recent :'cooperation". with Pk:inr on the India-Pakistan
situation,' that the PRG. "will assert its ..nfluence to gain a
diplomatic settlement based on partial acceptance of the U.S.
conditions." Radio Sofia, describj.np ;:he President's plan as
first and foremost a "cunning maneuver" aimed at U.S. domestic
opinion, commented that it is also addressed to Peking as "the
basis on which the U.S. ruling circles are hopi,ng to build
their conspiracy with the Maoists." The ?sulgarian news agency
BTA remarked in the same vein that this Sine-U.S. "conspiracy"
would evolve "at the expense of the Indochinese peoples."
The exceptionally vituperative East German comment has come
largely from the East Berlin radio, with the GDR press confining
itself largely to reports of critical reaction from the DRV and
from selected noncommunist sources. In the only available GDR
press comment to date, a BERLINER ZEITUNC article of 27 January
said the President reiterated his 'well-known blackmailing
attempts" in .attempting to "dictate conditions" and keep Thieu
in power. The most abusive personal treatment of the President
appeared in an East Berlin rcidio talk, also on the 27th, which
stated that the disclosures of the Pentagon papers and other
U.S. Government documents in recent months had. exposed the
President "as a' liar unmasked before the world," This record,
plus the "massive 3-52 raids" on North and South Vietnam, the
broadcast said, "can hardly strengthen confidence in the American
peace plan."
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Romania has been characteristically circumspect, withholding
commentaries on the peace plan to date. Its reportage in the
press and radio, however, has been unusually slanted and negative.
On the 28th the party organ SCINTEIA carried a short AGERPRES
,report on President Nixon's statement beneath a longer treatment
of the North Vietnamese dismissal of the President's plan at
Paris. Selectively and negatively reporting the President's
eight-point plan, the SCINTEIA account said his formulation
"avoids setting a precise date for Withdrawal," reveals the
determination of the United States to continue its support for
the Saigon regime, apd brings up Vietnamization in an "attempt
to justify maintaining the U.S. military presence in South
Vietnam." The paper also carried critical comments by Norodom
Sihanouk and statements by political "observers" in Washington
YUGOSLAVIA Yugoslav reaction to President Nixon's speech
has also been largely negative. A Belgrade
radio commentary viewed the eight-point proposal as "a very
cleverly tuned plan" deliberately presented on the eve of the
President's trip to Peking and coincident with "the heating up
of the U.S. election campaign." Atypically, the commentary
added that judging by the first reaction, Hanoi and the NFLSV
"could perhaps--underline perhaps--be prepared to negotiate
on some points of the Nixon proposal." A more authoritative
view expressed in the semiofficial daily BORBA on the 27th,
however, took a more negative line in noting that though the
President's plan is "a small step forward," "it is hard to see
just how these overtures could help end the war." In line with
other East European comment, BORBA observed that the plan does
not really provide guarantees for a free election and does not
renounce the Vietnamization policy.
ALBANIA The Albanian party organ URI I POPULLIT assailed
. the President's proposals in characteristically
hostile terms, replete with invective about the "blood-stained
hands" of "the chieftain of U.S. imperialism." The U.S. peace
plan, it said, represents "a treacherous plot" to induce the
South Vietnamese communists to lay down their arms and sign a
"dangerous and humiliating agreement" at gunpoint.
Not for the first time, Tirana conveyed dismay at the shift in
Peking's public position away from its once'implacable opposition
to any solution short of a communist military victory. Pressing
the consistent Albanian line, the paper insisted that Indochina's
fate will be decided "on the battlefield" with the expulsion
of U.S. and allied troops. And it lectured, by implication, on
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� the proper role of the Chinese in adding pointedly that the
Indochinese peoples "have the aid and powerful and continuous
support of their great neighbor, the Chinese people." ATA's
lengthy account of the article contains no reference to a
Vietnamese communist peace plan, and other Albanian comment
censures the U.S. plan without mentioning a DRV/PRC alternative.
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CUBA
Declaring that President Nixon's "so-called plan" revealed no
"real concession" and simply "reasserted his war policy in South-
east Asia," Cubanmedia have characterized the proposal as
"hypocritical political maneuvering" designed for domestic
consumption because the President "needs to end the Vietnam
war" in order to be reelected. Apart from passing references
to the fact that the plan had been submitted in secret--in the
context of allegations that it was unveiled by the President
for domestic political reasons--Havana has ignored the
President's disclosures of secret negotiations. Cuban
commentators have expounded on the allegedly unreasonable
and unacceptable nature of several of the eight points,
publicized the statements on the plan by the Vietnamese
communist delegates in Paris, and reiterated Cuba's endorse-
ment of the PRG's seven-point proposal of 1 July 1971.
Leading television commentator Luis Gomez Wanguemert, who
frequently sets the Cuban line on major international develop-
ments, authored the first authoritative Havana commentary on
the eight-point plan on 27 January. Stating that this "most
insidious and sly maneuver of the White House" was contrived
by the President to "deceive the American people by making
them believe his government is ready to solve the Indochina
problem by peaceful negotiations," Gomez Wanguemert observed
that under the U.S. plan "democratic elections would be held
in a South Vietnam occupied by Yankee troops, under a puppet
regime always subservient to the U.S. Embassy and controlled
by the power of armed forces at the orders of Thieu and his
Washington masters." Other commentators echoed this line,
and a commentary on 28 January pointed to another alleged
deception: While the proposal to withdraw U.S. troops in
six months was an "attractive publicity cliche" and a "clever
political maneuver" with the November elections in view,
"this withdrawal is dependent on an agreement which could
take a long time to.conclude."
A number of Cuban commentaries contrasted alleged shortcomings .
of the eight-point proposal with "the full validity of the
seven-point proposal as the base for a negotiated solution."
Thus Gomez Wanguemert suggested that the President's plan,
far from being a response to the PRG's 1 July 1971 proposal,
was designed "to lay a smokescreen over Washington's negative .
attitude" toward the PRG'pran. Charging that the U.S. proposal
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"openly contradicts the overall solution of the Vietnamese conflict
proposed by the FRG and the DRV," a commentary in the domestic
service contended that the eight-point plan "ignores the real
aspirations of the Vietnamese people," particularly since it
"intentionally separates the military problems from the political
ones, thus setting it apart from the Overall solution proposed
by the PRG and the DRV." The commentary concluded that "Nixon's
plan is a virtual declaration by the present American President
of the failure of his Indochina policy."
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IL NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES'
WEST EUROPE
BRITAIN On 26 January the leading morning papers frontpaged the
President's eight-point proposal in'news dispatches,
with initial reaction appearing in the evening papers the same day.
The EVENING STANDARD's Washington correspondent viewed the proposal
within the context of the President's "special flair for the
theatrical" and Said that during his television presentation President
Nixon "showed signs of losing patience with Hanoi." The EVENING NEWS,
said Mr. Nixon had gone on the offensive both to disarm his U.S.
critics and to show up Hanoi's lack of ,sincerity.
On the following day the TIMES wrote editorially of the President's
"serious search for an agreement" and outlined the history of the
30 months of secret negogations and the growing frustration of
the U.S. Administration. "Mr. Nixon now presents himself in. a much
more favorable light," the paper commented. The GUARDIAN's
editorial said that "the revelation of the plan appears to be more
important than the plan itself." Asserting that the President has been
�
imprecise on such "critical points" as Thieu's association with
the proposed elections, the lack of faith in international commissions,
the ease with which elections can be fixed, and concern that Thieu's
machinery will dominate, the GUARDIAN concluded that the Nixon plan
"does not bring the Indochina problem nearer solution." The
TELEn.APH's editorial said Mr. Nixon's plan has caught his opponents
off balance "en bloc"; "South Vietnamization has worked" and the
President is convincing American public: opinion that it is
succeeding.
The FINANCIAL TIMES carried an article by Far East correspondent
Charles Smith on the "fine print of Nixon's offer" which reviewed
the main objections to the proposals voiced elsewhere. Smith said
the plan was presented with "expert timing," and, expressing a
common viewpoint, he added that the announcement was also aimed at
Peking. Smith concluded by suggesting that the plan could lead to
a general Indochina conference that would include Peking and Moscow.
The communist MORNING STAR said the plan was "theatrical" and
signified continued Vietnamization... The paper attacked the eight
points as "hiding the policy of prolonging and extending the war of
aggression." .
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A SUNDAY OBSERVER editorial on 30 January expressed the view that
although the President's revelation of secret peace talks with
Hanoi "may be a shrewd political move at home," it "seems
unlikely to bring a negotiated settlement of the war any nearer."
But the paper saw some grounds for optimism: Although the
obstacles in the talks remain essentially the same, "the political
gap between the two sides is no longer so wide" and the closing
of this gap may now be a suitable subject for a new international
conference on Indochina, something the President "might try to
discuss in Peking."
FRANCE Official French reaction was limited to remarks by
President Pompidou at a 28 January press conference in
Fort Lamy on the conclusion of his visit to Chad. Asked for his
view of the U.S. peace plan, Pompidou, as reported by the Paris
radio, said he did not think any plan made public could be
characterized as practical, because "a further stage is always
necessary to achieve peace." The French president nevertheless noted
"with satisfaction" certain points in President Nixon's speech
which could be considered "of fundamental importance": withdrawal
within a fixed time limit, "an indication" that the present
Saigon government would stand down to permit free elections,
direct consultation between North and South Vietnam concerning
their future relations, and "the idea that the United States would
pledge to stand strictly aside for this consultation." Two days
earlier the Paris radio had said France was passing "no judgment"
on the peace plan but was stressing two ideas which had "always
guided" the country's attitude: only a political solution could
end the Vietnam conflict, and such a solution must' result from
free elections without outside interference.
The role played by the French Government in arranging the secret
negotiations was duly noted by French officials. It is well
known that France has discreetly played its part in seeking a
solution, Pompidou said at his press conference, and officials
accompanying him on his Africa trip were quoted earlier by the
Paris radio as having said that the French Government "is always
ready for this sort of initiative." However, Roger Massip
commented in LE FIGARO that "our colleagues are somewhat-peeved
at not having smelled a rat during these 30 months and also at
not knowing that Mr. Kissinger was negotiating in the Paris suburbs
with the French Government's help."
The French papers referred to Dr. Kissinger as "Mr. Invisible"
(LE FIGARO) and "the American diplocrat," a cOntraction of
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diplomat and technocrat (LE DAUPHINE LIBERE). The latter's
editorialist, perceiving "some disadvantages" in the apparent
.demise of traditional diplomacy, asserted that Kissinger,
despite warnings from the U.S. ambassador to India about
threatening developments on the subcontinent, "threw all
caution to the winds and revealed brilliant misunderstanding
of the situation."
French editorialists, according to the Paris radio, showed a
measure of agreement in assessing the President's motives in
publicizing his proposals, the merits of the plan, and the
chances for peace in Vietnam. The radio's initial analysis of
the speech suggested that President Nixon had perhaps sought
"only one thing in this affair"--his reelection in November--
and its Washington correspondent lauded the President's political
skill in disarming his domestic opposition and presenting himself
to the electorate as a leader who had done everything possible to
achieve peace.
Radio Paris at first also saw in the speech a "threat" to renew
the war. But a day later the radio was reporting that French
press commentators "in general believe in Nixon's sincere desire
to end the Indochina war, but not at any price--there is no
question of Nixon capitulating. Of course, his peace plan is
not without an ulterior motive; it is of considerable electoral
importance in the United States."
Favorable assessments of the peace proposals were offered by the
financial organ LES ECHOS and the conservative L'AURORE. The
former said the President had driven the adversary in Vietnam
into a corner, since Hanoi's continued intransigence would
weaken its moral position, and that he had "annihilated" the
criticism of his Democratic opponents and had brought about the
most favorable circumstances for a dialog with China. L'AURORE,
stating that Dr. Kissinger had revealed the "duplicity" of the
North Vietnamese, who know only force can impose communism on
South Vietnam, added that President Nixon "could go no further
in his concessions" without bringing about complete capitulation,
which most Americans would consider dishonorable.
LE MONDE's frontpage editorial said the proposals were at least
worthy of evoking a response from Hanoi, but "every step toward
peace . . . by the United States leads to an increasingly rigid
attitude on the part of North Vietnam." Michel Tatu wrote in
the same paper that the President had made an "important
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concessione in agreeing to new elections, but Tatu felt that the
"spectacular" plan marked the failure of previous negotiations,
not a beginning. "Years of negotiations may be needed for a
settlement," Tatu forecast, given Hanoi's rigidity, verging on
"nondiplomacy," plus the fact that it will certainly not call off
the offensive it is now preparing for the sake of negotiations.
But Tatu saw a faint sign of hope in Hanoi's new dependence on
its suppliers for more sophisticated weaponry: "As we have seen
in the Middle East, the more technological the war, the more it
becomes the prerogative of the big powers," and thus Moscow
may in time have both the desire and the capability to force an
end to the conflict.
The major French press criticism of the peace plan, according to the
Paris radio, focused on the "contradiction" inherent in the
,President's public position that the South Vietnamese must decide
their own future while the United States simultaneously maintains
"terrific" military pressure through air raids and deployment
of the Seventh Fleet. "Nixon wants to disentangle himself without
disengaging himself," wrote the Gaullist daily LA NATION, adding
that the President's "silence" about American air strikes
"is eloquent." The leading independent LE FIGARO viewed the
recent massive air raids not only as a preventive move but as a
warning, since it was known in advance that the U.S. plan would
be rejected.
French editorialists in general--again according to the Paris
radio--felt that the DRV and the PRG were "not fully
justified in refusing this peace plan pointblank," but some
provincial papers reviewed by the radio would not concede
total failure. SUD-OUEST and OUEST-FRANCE believed the two
sides' points of view would gradually draw closer, the
latter observing that "much more effort of this kind is needed.,"
The general conclusion of the French press, Radio Paris said,
was that a step has been made but "unfortunately, peace will
not come tomorrow." For the independent COMBAT this was all the
more true because President Nixon "only appears to be weak."
COMBAT said "the two greatest delusions of this year are the
American withdrawal from Vietnam and the weakness of the dollar."
WEST GERMANY
to bring about a
a Foreign Office
The FRG Government welcomed President Nixon's
initiative and viewed it as a "concrete effort"
peaceful solution, according to a statement by
spokesman reported by DPA. Recalling that Bonn
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has repeatedly and emphatically advocated a political solution of
the war, the spokesman added: "It has anxiously observed the
escalation of military confrontation in recent weeks and the
.stagnation of the Paris negotiations."
West German media fully reported the President's peace plan and
provided extensive comment. Although the attitudes of those
assessing the plan varied widely, there was widespread agreement
that the plan per se has little chance of success. Several
commentators saw the peace plan as a political maneuver designed to
bolster the President's chances of reelection in November by
convincing the American voter that he has done everything possible
to end the war. Others could see "no essentially new elements" in
the U.S. proposal.
MUENCHNER MERKUR called the peace plan "a political maneuver which at
this time must necessarily be fully adapted to the presidential
elections." The paper expressed concern about Washington's loyalty
to its allies and asked whether the promises of a U.S. president can
still be taken at face value if he might go as far as to sacrifice
an ally "if this sacrifice would guarantee him reelection."
FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU commented that every point in the plan is
preceded by an "if," which in turn is followed by "the threat of
the bomb, just as in all the years before." In this paper's view,
the plan came too late in that ''what might have been acceptable
to the adversary years ago has perhaps become unacceptable today."
A commentary carried on Mainz TV asserted that Washington raises
military conditions "which Hanoi can hardly accept in this form,
and probably will not accept, and combines them with political
preconditions which sound better than they would really be in
practice." .
Freiburg's BADISCHE ZEITUNG also felt that the plan, "had it been
advanced earlier, might have turned the tide." As matters stand,
President Nixon has "not made one inch of headway in this matter,"
the paper said, yet psychologically his position has improved
since his opponents can no longer charge him with bypassing
possibilities for a peace settlement that would also free the
POWs. Moreover, the paper added, he will be able to "reply more
freely when asked difficult questions in Peking next month."
BERLINER MORGENPOST, in an editorial entitled "A Plan Without a
Chance," argued that the U.S. proposal "simply cannot be
implemented because it fully ignores Hanoi's interests."
Contrary to what is claimed in Washington, the paper continued,
"Hanoi has time, much time, all it needs to dwis remain
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adamant in its demands and wait patiently for the withdrawal of all
U.S. forces, which will come sooner or later and nearly
unconditionally."
A KOELNER STADTANZEIGER editorial was mildly optimistic, commenting
that the communists' "negative reaction must not necessarily be a
final one" since if they were not prepared to talk about "this or
that, they surely would have rejected secret talks with the
Americans in Paris." A Washington-datelined dispatch broadcast
over Munich domestic service notes that President Nixon "with his
dramatic action surely temporarily pushed onto the defensive both
the communists at the Paris negotiating table and his rivals at
home", yet this is "all that he was able to achieve at the moment,"
the dispatch said, and it is unlikely that he will achieve more.
Commentator Wolfgang Weise, in a talk broadcast three times to
Asia by Deutsche Welle, stated that "Nixon's eight-point plan
and its rejection by North Vietnam, which must be expected, are
only the visible part of the secret negotiations sure to follow. ,
The contact point at Paris, around which things had become so quiet',
becomes interesting once more."
ITALY Limited Italian press comment, as reviewed by the Rome
radio, generally viewed the President's pboposals as
timely and far-reaching, with dissent from the leftwing PAESE SERA.
Milan's rightwing CORRIERE BELLA SERA, asserting that the U.S.
offer on a withdrawal date "should in essence remove the main
obstacle to a solution," declared that the President has a plan
for Vietnam "which is programmed, elaborated, strategic, and
precise." Describing the President's initiative as "something
new" which "goes far in the way of concessions," the center-right
IL TEMPO said Hanoi's rejection of the plan is a "propaganda
embarrassment" for the DRV Government and its supporters, since
they will find it difficult to raise more than "the usual
commonplace arguments" against it. For the independent IL GIORNO
of Milan, rejection of the U.S. proposal will mean an indefinite
extension of the war at a time when the DRV is showing signs of
tiring and the international situation is "not favorable" for
Hanoi. "The United States has committed enormous errors in
Indochina," IL GIORNO observed, "but Hanoi is probably making a
no less serious mistake if it tries to humiliate the United
States, barring to it an honorable way out of Vietnam."
PAESE SERA, in contrast, said the President's proposals contained
"no surprise" for Washington political circles. Seeing little
merit in the withdrawal proposal, the paper argued that it is
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linked with no less important "secondary measures" and that the
President is committed to continuing aid to the Saigon regime
even after withdrawal, a condition Hanoi and the PRO have
already rejected. Two days later, however, PAESE SERA granted
that the Nixon plan, while of "debatable" worth, represented
"a modification of the previous rigid American position." The
plan's "most controversial point," the paper said, is the attempt
to "use" an agreement on Vietnam to "save the collaborationist
regimes" of Laos and Cambodia without offering any pledges
concerning U.S. military bases in the regions from which air
strikes on Indochina are launched. The paper also found
fundamental objections in the President's "wish to protect" the
Saigon regime.
The view of the communist daily L'UNITA was reflected in its
headlines. "The Nixon Scheme Does Not Offer a Serious Answer
on Vietnam" headed a dispatch from Paris citing DRV-PRG
reaction and quoting from a commentary in LE MONDE. A report
on the proposals themselves was headlined "The White House's
Ambiguous Plan," although this report did note that the plan
"offers positive aspects as well as unacceptable proposals."
SCANDINAVIA The Helsinki radio gave prominent and extensive
coverage to the President's speech and to
reaction to the U.S. proposals. On 26 January the radio
reported the "unanimous opinion" of observers in Helsinki that
the President had clearly issued a challenge for peace to Hanoi
and the NFLSV and had even more clearly withdrawn the Vietnam
war as a U.S. election issue. It said the timing of the
President's disclosure showed "a considerable amount of
political calculation" as to its effect on his domestic
opposition, the American public, and the Vietnamese adversary.
Helsinki radio described the President's proposals as meeting �
some of the communist demands, including "abandonment" of the
Saigon leadership, but the radio's correspondent in Paris
concluded that although the United States intends to continue
withdrawing "with as few political losses as possible," the
communist objective is total expulsion of the Americans from
Indochina, militarily and politically.
The Stockholm radio covered the speech and attendant developments
reportorially, noting on the 27th that the peace talks session
in Paris that day was "one of the most fruitful for a long time" and
that the initial rejections of the U.S. proposal were "not as
complete" as they had seemed before. Hanoi's two basic objections,
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the reporter said, were the "vagueness" of the plan on the question
of troop withdrawals and the absence of a clear statement from the
Nixon Administration that it will end its support for President
Thieu.
OTHER COUNTRIES The Swiss paper NEUE ZUERCHER NACHRICHTEN,
according to DPA, commented that the President
would not have made his proposals public and divulged the secret
negotiations if there had been any chance for peace on the basis
of his plan. Mr. Nixon's "slight accommodation" to the other
side by his commitment to a six-month troop withdrawal deadline
"was, like the entire plan, too long in coming," the paper
said, since Hanoi now feels itself in such a strong position that
substantial compromise is no longer necessary.
The Madrid radio's New York correspondent reported that the
President's message was announced as an important foreign policy
initiative and delivered with "all the trappings usually reserved
for great occasions," but that the Administration's critics found
the speech neither new nor decisive. Reviewing what was new and
what "not so new" in the peace plan, the correspondent placed in
the former category the proposed South Vietnamese elections and
relegated the points concerning a U.S. military withdrawal,
release of prisoners, and a cease-fire to the "not so new"
category. The correspondent also noted an apparent absence of
political solutions for the other countries of Indochina. The
chances of success, the correspondent concluded, will be known
when Hanoi speaks, "not by her first words but by her considered.
opinions."
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ASIA
JAPAN The Japanese Foreign Ministry welcomed the President's
proposal as a "quite positive offer" for peace in
Indochina, in an official statement issued soon after the
President's broadcast. The ministry said it respected the
"courageous decision" of the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments
and pledged that the Japanese Government would do its utmost to
help realize peace in Indochina, according to KYODO. Unidentified-
Foreign Ministry sources said it would be difficult for North
Vietnam to reject the plan because both the United States and
South Vietnam had made some important concessions, the JAPAN
TIMES reported on 27 January. "The sources said Nixon's announcement
gave the impression that his forthcoming talks with Chinese leaders
hare every chance of success," the paper added.
The main opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party, said the
fact that President Nixon advanced the plan while continuing the
bombing indicated that the Administration was being driven into a
corner by domestic and foreign pressures, according to KYODO. The
JSP believes it was "arrogant" to attach so many conditions to peace
and feels that the United States has no alternative but to
withdraw unconditionally, KYODO reported.
Most major Tokyo newspapers, which furnished frontpage accounts of
both the peace plan and Kissinger's role, shared the view that the
plan offers significant concessions, but some argued that more are
required. President Nixon's disclosure of the offer was frequently
related, with varying degrees of directness, to his planned trips
to Peking and. Moscow as well as the November U.S. elections.
The English-language JAPAN TIMES on 28 January focused its
editorial on the apparent rejection of the President's "fair
and logical" peace plan. "This regrettable communist action,
however, makes it exceedingly clear once again that it is Hanoi
and the Viet Cong which are desirous of prolonging the war in
Vietnam and which have no interest in bringing peace to the
embattled peninsula," the paper said. It called the offer on
elections "a major step forward," and it added: "The communist
rejection of this compromise proposal can only mean that the
North Vietnamese want the complete repudiation of Mr. Thieu so
that the reins of governmental power will be given to them on a
silver platter."
The ASAHI newspapers, in Japanese and Englishe claimed in a
27 January editorial that the United States failed to reply
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lel-
directly to the 1 July 1971 plan offered by the South Vietnamese
PRG. "Now that the war situation in Laos and Cambodia has
worsened and President Nixon's visit to China is imminent, the
United States has finally submitted a comprehensive counterproposal,"
ASAHI said, and "realistic" elements have been added to the U.S.
proposal. But it added that "there are not a few points which are
ambiguous and which make us suspect the true intentions " behind
the plan. These points concern the question of a date for the
completion of troop withdrawal, the provisions for an election,
situation "which would not assure the will of the people," and the
failure to make clear whether U.S. bases in Thailand and the
U.S. Seventh Fleet will continue their activities. ASAHI's
correspondent in Paris, in a report on the 27 January session of
the Paris talks, commented; "The new Nixon proposal can be said to
have brought into the Paris talks the question of creating a
postwar Saigon government--the central issue in achieving a
Vietnam settlement."
The YOMIURI newspapers, in Japanese and English, in a 27 January
editorial called the plan "the most advanced and promising offer yet
made by the U.S. Government." Although there is little doubt that
the President chose this time to reveal the contents of the peace
package because of his upcoming visit to China and the November
election, YOMIURI said, the proposal is "well worth considering."
However, YOMIURI also said the President should be prepared to
make further concessions and should now "prove his sincerity" by
stopping all bombing of North Vietnam.
The MAINICHI newspapers, also in both Japanese and English,
asserted editorially that the plan indicates a "considerable
concession." "There is no doubt that the gap between the
contentions of the two sides has been greatly narrowed," the
editorial said, and it concluded with an expression of hope for a
positive response from Hanoi.
The Japanese-language TOKYO SHIMBUN commented editorially: "This
is a positive proposal in that it has revealed the time of U.S.
military withdrawal." Calling President Nixon's bid to have Thieu
step down "a maximum compromise" by the United States, the paper
concluded: "We hope that the North Vietnamese Government will
take a farsighted view of the situation and prudently examine
President Nixon's new proposal." On 26 January, a Tokyo
television newscaster similarly declared that the proposal for
Thieu's resignation prior to an election can be regarded as the
ultimate U.S. concession to Hanoi on the issue of the Thieu regime.
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AKAHATA, organ of the Japan Communist Party, denounced the plan in
a 27 January editorial as an obvious political gambit concocted by
the President in the face of domestic and international pressure
and in light of his forthcoming trip to China and the U.S.
presidential election. Noting that the proposal was submitted
at a secret meeting in October, the editorial said that "without
waiting for a reply from the Vietnamese side, Nixon announced the
proposal in a resort to sensational means." The proposal
represents "a U.S. plot to maintain the puppet regime in a
different form through Vietnamization," AKAHATA asserted.
INDIA, The President's proposals have been the subject of
PAKISTAN widespread comment in the Indian press, according
to All-India Radio, and most of it appears to have
been unfavorable. The STATESMAN of New Delhi and Calcutta said
the proposal "makes some obvious concessions"--U.S. withdrawal
within six months of an agreement and a general cease-fire tied
to the agreement--but stressed that for the communists a
cease-fire "would mean that the present governments in Vientiane
and Phnom Penh would be without any effective challenge to their
authority." Echoing the same line, the TIMES OF INDIA remarked
that the President "has been pursuing contradictory goals in
South Vietnam," ending direct U.S. involvement but avoiding the
impression of a total defeat. The proposals might have had a
different effect if "Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government were not within sight of their goal," the paper
concluded.
The HINDUSTAN TIMES and the MOTHERLAND of New Delhi both expressed
the view that Hanoi thinks it would have more to lose at the
conference table. The MOTHERLAND observed: "Obviously Hanoi
has come to the conclusion that time is on its side . . . ,
and it can afford to wait until the Nixon Administration is
prepared for a settlement on its terms," The NATIONAL HERALD
of New Delhi and Lucknow and the INDIAN EXPRESS said the plan
does not go far enough in that no mention is made of withdrawing
air or naval forces.
In a lengthy commentary on All-India Radio on 28 January,
PRESS TRUST OF INDIA diplomatic correspondent Wilfred Lazarus
said world reaction indicates that "the proposals have failed
to carry conviction regarding the sincerity of American
intentions." He contended that American sincerity in regard
to Vietnam "hit a new low when President Nixon a few weeks ago
ordered the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam." Lazarus
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observed that "India has fully accepted the realities in Vietnam,
and it raised its diplomatic mission in Hanoi to ambassadorial
-level a fortnight ago because, unlike the situation in Saigon,
there is a stable government in North Vietnam." India wants the
Indochinese states to be left alone, free from outside
interference, he said, and concluded: "If America fails to see
the desire of the people of Indochina to be free and to be left
alone, President Nixon will not only be ignoring the handwriting
on the wall, but will incur the loss of more innocent lives by
prolonging the war."
The may Pakistani reaction monitored so far is a news commentary
by the editor of the MORNING NEWS broadcast by Karachi radio
on 26 January. The editor asserted that Hanoi "has good reasons"
for rejecting the proposals: "To begin with, Hanoi sees no
basic change in the U.S. attitude, and the support of the Saigon
junta for the proposals makes them even more suspect." The
release of the proposals was timed to help smooth the way for
the President's trip to Peking and his reelection campaign,
the editor claimed, "but Hanoi does not want to help the
President by agreeing to a cease-fire or a peace agreement."
He concluded that Washington's desire to keep Southeast Asia
wholly neutral is impractical: "This was possible in the earlier
years when leaders like President de Gaulle used to plead for it.
But now when the North Vietnamese are sure they can have the whole
cake, they are not willing to bargain for only half of it."
SOUTH VIETNAM The Saigon radio broadcast the speeches of
Presidents Nixon and Thieu, but So far no
radio commentaries have been monitored. Foreign Minister Tran
Van Lam, in a radio interview reported by many Saigon papers,
explained that Thieu has sacrificed his own interests in
endorsing the eight-point proposal.
Saigon press comment has been generally favorable, although
there are complaints that the proposals tend to overly favor
the communist side. In a typical comment, the editor of THOI DAI
MOI declared on 28 January: "By comparing the allied peace
proposal to the seven points of the communists, we can see that
the Republic of Vietnam and the United States have made a rather
long step--on the road of concessions . . . . Now the road to
peace has been opened wide unless out of stubborness the Hanoi
communists demand more--for example, complete victory or
unconditional surrender, things they are net likely to obtain
for a long time."
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A somewhat more critical stance was taken by CHINH LUAN. It
explained that while President Nixon's speech had "somewhat
disconcerted the U.S. opposition faction" and perhaps caused
' Hanoi to reconsider its "reckless plans for attack in South
Vietnam," nonetheless "a not very sweet taste remains--the
tastaof the legal South Vietnamese regime being used as
'stake money' in a game on the bargaining table."
On 27 January CONG LUAN carried an article by former General
Ton That Dinh declaring that the two presidential speeches �
had opened a "big turning point for peace in Vietnam." Noting.
that Thieu had said he was willing to make great sacrifices
to gain a lasting peace, Dinh concluded: "That is the
cherished hope of the whole nation because only peace can end
the unhappy tragedy of the Vietnamese people." In CONG LUAN
on the 28th, however, the same author 'spoke harshly of the
peace proposals as "only political and diplomatic tricks
Mr. Nixon played to secure his personal position in the United
States and in the international forum."
CAMBODIA, A Cambodian Government statement broadcast by
LAOS Phnom Penh radio on 29 January lauded President
Nixon's "sincere, noble, and constant effort to
restore peace through negotiations," expressed "profound
admiration and complete support for this peace initiative,"
and congratulated President Thieu on "his courageous attitude
for the sake of peace." Affirming that the Cambodian Government's
stand remains unchanged, the statement said "the Khmer Republic
approves and encourages any initiative or proposal that can
bring about peace in Indochina through negotiation."
The Vientiane radio, in a 27 January report on an interview
with Souvanna Phouma, quoted the prince as terming President ;
Nixon's proposal "correct and very appropriate" and as expressing
hope that Hanoi and the Liberation Front will give it careful
consideration. Reporting the weekly cabinet meeting held on
26 January, at which Souvanna Phouma informed the cabinet of the
new U.S. proposal, the radio said that "the Government of the
Kingdom of Laos maintains that this is a constructive proposal
and hopes the other side will pay attention and consider it in
ordet to bring abeut peace in this region of the world."
THAILAND Although some Thai newspapers were critical, the
official view as offered by the assistant chairman
of the National Executive Council, Pote Sarapin, is that the
President's proposals "seem to be a reasonable solution to the
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37
conflict in Vietnam." However, Pote Sarasin warned that the cease-fire
must be coupled with noninterference in the affairs of all Southeast
.Asian countries. He also stated that "if there should be a conference
on a peaceful settlement among the countries in this area which would
affect their interests and security, naturally Thailand would see no
rtason not to consider participating in such a conference."
The leading Thai-language paper, the DAILY NEWS, commented less
favorably on the proposals: "It is now clear that the hope of
countries in Indochina to lean on the United States in fighting
the communists must end. The United States has left the problem
it has created to the countries there to solve by themselves.
There is nothing for these countries to do but help themselves
by turning to each other and creating better understanding."
The English-language paper THE NATION depicted a "tragic" situation
wherein "the President of the mightiest nation in the world says
he has tried all the military power and all the secret diplomacy
possible while a pipsqueak of a country like North Vietnam could
spurn both." Forecasting that the proposal will surely be rejected,
THE NATION said: "To us in Thailand, the latest peace offer is
extremely important because it is made out of desperation rather
than from constructive diplomacy, which Nixon admits has failed."
The editorial concluded: "It is time for us to reorient our
policies to fit the realities of the situation."
By contrast, the English-language BANGKOK POST, in a 27 January
editorial, saw considerable merit in the new plan and said that
"for once the American politicians should renounce politics and
back their Administration." The POST foresaw further conflict in
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia should the communists triumph
in Indochina, and it called on Hanoi to negotiate sincerely on the
basis of the President's proposal.
OTHER COUNTRIES The ROK Foreign Minister, speaking at a press
conference on 27 January, said his government
would support the proposal advanced by President Nixon and
sincerely hoped for the restoration of peace in Indochina. A
spokesman for the Nationalist China Foreign Ministry on 28 January
took note of the United States' urgent desire to achieve peace in
Indochina, but he stressed that "one must not overlook the basic
objective of the communists and the unscrupulous means they use
to employ to achieve their goal." Two Taipei radio news. analyses
on 26 and 28 January belittled the U.S. attempts at negotiation,
alleging that past negotiations with the communists have proven the
futility of this approach and arguing that negotiation cannot be a
substitute for confrontation.
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Reaction from Malaysia was highlighted by a statement by Prime
Minister Tun Abdul Rezak carried over Kuala Lumpur radio on
27 January. He said the peace plan could form a basis for
- negotiations to resolve the Vietnam problem, and he explained
that the proposals are "in line with Malaysia's proposal for the
neutralization of Southeast Asia." The STRAITS TIMES, in a
27 January editorial, supported the new plan and predicted that
it will strengthen the President's stand both at home and with
the Chinese. The editorial stressed: "These are honorable terms
for both sides, and they are not the last word; they are terms for
negotiation."
Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik termed the new proposal "Very
heartening" and expressed the belief that "the efforts will bear
fruit in the nearjuture.". He said it represents America's
sincere desire to end the war and hopes it will he given
consideration by the parties concerned, and he concluded: "When
the proposal becomes a reality, Indonesia is willing to contribute
to the attainment of peace in Vietnam." On 8 January the
Djakarta radio carried a lengthy commentary stressing that the
proposal is aimed at changing the attitude of the opposition in
America, since Hanoi has already rejected it long ago. In a
similar vein, an editorial in the English-language Djakarta
TIMES on 28 January foresaw little chance that President Nixon's
initiative would end the war. Nonetheless, the paper said, the
President's move "is commendable"; he has done all he could,
and "if he fails to achieve the goal, it is only because of the
attitude of his enemy, who wants him to accept humiliating peace
terms--a price he is certainly not expected to pay."
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MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
FBIS REACTION REPORT
1 FEBRUARY 1972
..ARAB COUNTRIES Arab reaction has been scanty, with radio comment
only from Cairo and Baghdad and no news items even
on the transmissions of the Arab news agencies. The coincidence of
Egyptian President as-Sadat's major foreign policy speech on the
25th and the Moslem Id al-Adha holiday on 26-29 January contributed
to the minimal reaction.
A Cairo radio commentary on the 27th said the President's new plan
came as no surprise to those aware of the Nixon Administration's
method of adopting "measures which incite the U.S. and world public,"
then adopting other measures to diminish public interest.
Comparing the South Vietnamese and Middle East situations, Cairo
asserted that just as Secretary Rogers presented plans on the
Middle East issue "devoid of any practical content," so the President
presented a similar eight-point plan on Vietnam. In a commentary on
the 30th, Cairo radio compared the President's most recent Vietnam
initiative to Israel's attitude toward its Arab neighbors--neither
will agree to withdraw until the other side signs an agreement
"covering all the points and issues disputed." Commenting on the
"peculiar" U.S. offer of economic assistance to Indochina after the
war, the Cairo broadcast Speculated that the eight-point proposal
and then the offer to rebuild, coming "at a time when the aggressive
war . . . is continuing with no evidence of nearing an end, means
that the U.S. Government is scheming at something." The commentator
concluded that Washington's purpose is to "mask further aggression."
Only "imperialist and American logic," the radio contended, "could
be so contradictory as to propose to rebuild" what it is trying to .
destroy "by all weapons of total destruction and massacre."
On the 27th, Baghdad radio criticized the "new U.S. trick" as an
attempt to deceive world opinion "by making America appear to be
working for peace." The commentator declared that the only thing .
that "will put America in its proper place" is "the alliance of the
popular forces engaged in the war against the United States in
Vietnam and Indochina."
Cairo radio also broadcast a number of news items on the U.S.
proposals, mostly citing unfavorable foreign reaction and
emphasizing the reaction from Hanoi and Peking. Monitored Damascus
radio coverage was limited to two news reports on Hanoi's reaction.
Baghdad radio broadcast news reports and gave them more prominence
in its newcasts than other Arab radios did, the reports have been .
uniformly critical, usually 'citing.DRV or PRG sources. Amman and
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Beirut radios, while carrying reports on the proposals and foreign
reaction far down in their newscasts, have presented more balanced
.'news coverage, including details of the proposals as well as Hanoi
and Peking criticism of them.
ISRAEL The Israeli radio has broadcast extensive and balanced
news reports, prominently featured. It has made no
comment except for a press review reference which quotes the
Jerusalem POST asking "why Hanoi should make Nixon's election
campaign easier by accepting his plan."
GREECE, TURKEY, The Athens radio carried only minimal news
IRAN coverage of the proposals and of Hanoi's
and Peking's reactions. The Greek press
provided more coverage, although virtually all of it was confined
to factual reporting. The 27 January NEA POLITIA, in the only
available comment from a Greek source, said the proposal "is
noteworthy not only because it contains so many constructive
elements , . . but also because it proves the U.S. President's
devotion to the idea of peace and the relaxation of world
tensions."
Ankara radio devoted fairly extensive news coverage to the
proposals and to reactions from both communist and noncommunist
capitals, but it furnished no comment of its own. The Turkish
press through the 27th followed suit, with the Istanbul
CUIIHURIYET the only paper to report the plan fully to the
extent of including all eight points.
In Cyprus, the Nicosia radio and press also carried factual reports
on the plan and its provisions, but otherwise concentrated chiefly
on the negative reactions from Hanoi, the Vietnamese communist'
delegates in Paris, and Peking.
The Teheran radio, after lengthy initial reviews of world reaction
to the proposals, carried only brief and infrequent followup
reports on rejection of the plan from Hanoi, Peking, the Pathet
Lao, and the DRV delegate in Paris.
NORTH AFRICA The President's peace plan encountered a mixed
response, generally along the lines of standard
country attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. Thus Algeria reacted
negatively, Tunisia positively, and Morocco noncommittally. The
official Algerian press service and Algiers newspapers have
characterized the plan as one devoid of new initiatives and
publicized it as a propaganda exercise for internal consumption.
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41'-
FBIS REACTION: REPORT
1 FEBRUARY 1972
While Algiers radio initially noted that "all observers see it as a
bold plan," some 12 hours later it reported the communist side's
"categorical no" and from then on highlighted such negative
communist reaction, citing also "certain observers" who noted the
timing of the announcement a few weeks before the President's
departure for Peking. On its own, the official Algerian Press
Service dismissed the plan as failing to meet "the Vietnamese
people's" two basic demands: a precise date for unconditional
withdrawal and the setting up .of a coalition government.
The Tunisian radio has carried balanced reports of the plan, .
noting "some embarrassment" among antiwar critics in the United
States; it also cited diverse opinions expressed by members of
Congress and reported Radio Hanoi's "total rejection" of the
proposals. The government party daily L'ACTION commented that
the plan shows a "patent desire for peace." L'ACTION said
Secretary Rogers' assurances that the United States is prepared to
accept a government in Saigon chosen by the South Vietnamese people
"confirm the impression that Washington is seriously determined" to
speed the process of achieving an honorable peace. The Tunis
news agency TAP, observing that the communist side seems to take
the plan seriouslY, counseled "honorable concessions" and the
avoidance of "unconditionalise by both sides in the war.
The Moroccan radio has carried limited, factual reportage on the
President's peace plan. The relatively new Moroccan daily LE
MATIN on 27 and 28 January publicized negative reactions from
Hanoi, the PRG, and the NFLSV.
AFRICA Reportage on the President's peace plan has been
monitored from Ghana, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and
Senegal, with comment only from Nigerian media. The Lagos radio
on the 31st reviewed a comment in that day's Lagos POST
manifesting impatience with both sides in the Vietnam conflict.
The POST reportedly complained that "whatever plan the Americans
and the North Vietnamese may have, the world is getting fed up
with gun sounds in Southeast Asia." The paper called on "the
superpowers" to make "honest" proposals for peace and to heed
such suggestions as "neutralization of the area."
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LATIN AMERICA
.President Nixon's proposals, along with the reaction of Hanoi and
other world capitals, have been fairly extensively reported by the
Latin American radio and press. Comment available so far is very
sparse, however.
A Panama City Radio Union commentator saw peace in Vietnam as
feasible, "but it should be'Vietnam's peace, not Nixon's peace or
a U.S.-style peace." The commentator said that unifying Vietnam
is the only means of assuring peace. The Panama City paper
�LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA of 28 January observed in an editorial
that neither Peking nor Moscow would be happy to have the other .
control Vietnam. The editorialist predicted that President Nixon
will discuss this situation in his coming meetings with the major
communist leaders in Peking and Moscow.
The San Jose Radio Reloj reported that a Costa Rican deputy
denounced President Nixon's proposals as a "political maneuver."
The President knows that the DRV will not accept them because it
is fighting to set up a socialist republic, not a democratic
regime, the deputy said. The same station quoted Costa Rican
President Figueres as remarking that he is more amazed each day
by President Nixon's skill in conducting his policy and taking
the United States out of the war. "Each day I am more convinced
of Nixon's desire to take the United States out of a war which
is disadvantageous and totally unpopular in his country,"
Figueres declared,
The Caracas paper EL MUNDO on 26 January published a Madrid EFE
dispatch quoting Washington observers as commenting that President
Nixon, by revealing the secret peace negotiations, has closed the
door to a negotiated peace in Vietnam but assured his reelection.
The same newspaper carried a cartoon portraying the President as
a dove on the wing bearing an olive branch.
Chile's Communist Party paper EL SIGLO in its 28 January editorial
describes President Nixon's plan as a "demagogic and electoral
expedient intended solely to serve his propaganda purposes in the
coming U.S. presidential elections." The paper said "there can be
no conciliation in matters regarding the independence and liberty
of Vietnam."
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