SOUTH AFRICAN TIES TO RENAMO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06828286
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-01308
• Publication Date: May 16, 1988

_ Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 May 1988
South African Ties to RENAMO
Summary
South Africa is providing limited, but important support to
insurgents of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). A lack
of detailed and reliable reporting makes the scope and volume of
this aid difficult to assess, but we believe it consists primarily
of communication, intelligence, and modest materiel and logistic
support. Although RENAMO has become increasingly independent
since South Africa reduced its support following the signing of a
nonaggression pact with Mozambique in 1984, Pretoria appears to
(b)(3)
This typescript was prepared by Africa Division, Office (b)(3)
of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and aueries are welcome 71 (b)(61
may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, (b)(3)
ALA M 88-20037C
SC-02399/88
Copy 1) of
-7012�rarteRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
retain considerable influence with the insurgents. While South
African support has boosted RENAMO's military capabilities, we
believe the insurgents have become largely self-sustaining and
would continue to operate effectively--though at reduced levels--
were Pretoria to terminate all assistance.
Origins and Evolution
Sponsorship of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) passed from
Rhodesia--which formed the group in 1976 as a counterbalance to Mozambican-
based Zimbabwean insurgents--to South Africa prior to Zimbabwean independence
in 1980.1 Pretoria saw the group as leverage against the Marxist-Leninist
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government in Maputo that was
supporting anti-South African activities of the African National Congress
(ANC). Pretoria transferred RENAMO rear bases from Rhodesia to South Africa's
northern Transvaal Province, assumed responsibility for training and equipping
the insurgents, and helped them infiltrate in and out of Mozambique. Under
South African tutelage, RENAMO became a well organized and effective military
force that grew rapidly and gradually expanded its area of operations. By
1. RENAMO initially was formed from diverse elements united
largely by their opposition to the ruling FRELIMO government.
The grouping included small political parties that refused to
join FRELIMO, various tribal leaders in central Mozambique who
had grievances against the southern-led FRELIMO government, and
Portuguese citizens whose properties were nationalized at
independence. For additional details on RENAMO'S origin and
current military and political organization see DI Research
Paper, ALA 87-10051 October 1987, Mozambique:
A Close Look at RENAMO.
SC-02309/88
2
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Expansion of RENAMO Operations, January 1981-September 19874
ke
Be.thtldge
Inhambane
mSvaal�- % Gaza \
PhaIaborwa
Inhamba
frioine
acala
Mocambique
elimane
Angoche
RENAMO Activities
'I September 1987
April 1983
na:::} March 1982
no January 1981
Data remain current as of September 1887.
4 Major Mozambican
airbase
Beira transportation
corridor foam oil pipeline,
railroad, end road)
Province boundary
150 Kilornezro
1-1
iho mile�
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
1983, RENAMO had grown to at least 10,000 men, largely because of mounting
opposition to government policies in the rural areas, and was operating in
nine of the country's ten provinces.
Maputo's inability to contain the insurgency was a key factor in the
late President Machel's decision to conclude the Nkomati accord with South
Africa in March 1984. The pact called for South Africa to end its materiel,
logistic, and training support for RENAMO, while Maputo promised to terminate
military assistance to the ANC. Despite Machel's hopes that the pact would
cause RENAMO to wither away, by 1987 the insurgency had grown to some 20,000
men, was operating in all ten provinces, and had become the predominant force
in some rural areas in central Mozambique. Although RENAMO benefited from a
large transfer of weapons and equipment from South Africa shortly before
concluding the Nkomati agreement, the insurgents have become largely self-
sufficient in arms and ammunition as a result of successful attacks on
vulnerable Mozambican military targets.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
South Africa has continued to maintain ties to RENAMO.
RENAMO operations have been run out of a
special forces base near Phalaborwa in the eastern Transvaal
SC-02309/88
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
3
117P�SteRErS
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Current Level of South African Assistance
South Africa is currently providing communications, intelligence,
logistic, materiel, and possibly training assistance to RENAMO, according to
sources of varying reliability. We judge that the scope and volume of this
aid is limited, however, and much reduced from pre-Nkomati levels.
Communication and Intelligence Support
Pretoria supplies vital communication equipment to RENAMO,
SC-02309/88
4
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
In our judgment, the combination of South African communications and
intelligence support is very valuable to RENAMO.
(
(
b)(1)
b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
SC-02309/88
44,12_46c4456T7L
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Materiel and Logistics Assistance
Although it is difficult to confirm, South Africa probably provides
RENAMO with limited materiel support, including light weapons.
South Africa appears to deliver most supplies by air.
2. Zimbabwean officials claim that they have traced Soviet
serial numbers on some captured RENAMO AK-47s--probably with
Soviet or Angolan assistance--to arms seized from the Angolan
government by South African-backed UNITA insurgents. Reporting
weapons captured by UNITA in Angola to RENAMO.
support the view that Preto7ia has tranferred 7
SC-02309/88
6
TOP SECRET-
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
South Africa may use land and
sea routes to deliver supplies to RENAMO.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
3. According to the US defense attache in Malawi, there is
no firm evidence to support this claim, but the South African
defense attache is the liaison between ARMSCOR--the South African
Arms Company--and the Malawi Government which would nrovide
excellent cover for such an operation.
(b)(3)
SC-02309/88
-717P-5�49111 (b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Pretoria also appears to facilitate the movement of insurgents and their
supporters between Mozambique and South Africa.
On balance, we believe the evidence suggests that the scope and volume
of South African materiel and logistic support to RENAMO is fairly limited.
4. In one incident, a group of insurgents entering
Mozambique from South Africa in late 1987 ran into a minefield.
Pretoria claimed the Mozambican who hit the minefield were
returning refugees, but refused to allow Mozambican authorities
to intervi7w the woun�d who were taken to South African
hospitals.
SC-02309/88
8
-117P�STCRET
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
(b
(b
Advisory Support and Possible Training
The South Africans also appear to advise RENAMO on military strategy,
5. We have no reporting concerning Pretoria's attitude
towards crowing RENAMO abuses against civilians in Mozambique.
SC-02309/88
(b
(b
(b)(3)
.pror_stre:�4."
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
,
SC-02309/88
10
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Extent of South African Influence
While South Africa appears to maintain considerable influence with
RENAMO, the insurgents have become increasingly independent of Pretoria since
the signing of the Nkomati accord, in our judgment.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Nevertheless, we believe South Africa's continued position as RENAMO's
primary external backer assures Pretoria important influence with the
insurgents. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
SC-02309/88
11
-Tep�ss�GP.gw
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
We believe South Africa also tries to influence RENAMO's external
political wing. Evo Fernandes--former RENAMO Secretary General who was
murdered in Lisbon last month
--was the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
primary conduit for South African influence
b)(1)
b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
SC-02309/88
12 )
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
__Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
RENAMO's Role in South African Policy
RENAMO is a key element in a broader South African policy toward
Mozambique that combines military pressure and economic inducements to force
Maputo to acquiesce in South Africa's security concerns. Although this policy
has been highly successful, a variety of sources report that since the signing
SC-02309/88
(b
(b
(1)
(3)
13
-111eP-S�ECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
�-..Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
of the Nkomati accord, differences have surfaced between the SADF and the
Department of Foreign Affairs over the right mix of coercion and cooperation
to apply toward Mozambique. In addition, recent insurgent attacks on economic
targets in Mozambique, which are partially financed by Pretoria, have brought
into sharper focus the potential conflict between military pressure and
economic inducements.
The Stick...
South African security officials view RENAMO as a low-cost vehicle to
ensure that Mozambique and its Frontline States allies, particularly Zimbabwe,
restrict ANC activity and remain weak. They also see the insurgents as an
obstacle to the Frontline States' efforts to use transportation routes through
Mozambique to reduce South Africa's regional economic leverage.7 Although a
variety of sources report that South African security officials believe that
Maputo has made some effort to control the ANC, they distrust Chissano and
believe constant pressure is needed to make sure he continues to restrict ANC
(b)(3)
activity in
clamp down on
two attacks
Mozambique. The
the ANC, and it
in Maputo over the
South African military frequently warns Maputo to
occasionally intervenes directly, such as the
past year against presumed ANC personnel and
residences.
(b)(3)
�
7. For additional
details on southern
rican pconomic ties
see DI Intelligence Assessment,
ALA 88-1002
(b)(3)
May 1988 Southern Africa:
Wrestling with South Atrican Economic
Ties.
(b)(3)
SC-02309/88
14
0-
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
_ __Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
In our judgment, most South African military officials do not see RENAMO
as an alternative to the current FRELIMO regime, and they are unwilling to
provide the substantial resources needed for a RENAMO military victory.
Moreover, the SADF may also be concerned that a more serious RENAMO threat to
the Maputo regime would lead to increased Communist influence in Mozambique,
possibly including the deployment of Cuban troops. Finally, a variety of
reporting indicates that senior South African military officials view the
insurgent's political organization as feckless, and they probably reason that
the insurgents could not govern effectively in any case.
...and the Carrot
In contrast to the military approach, the South African Foreign Ministry
is encouraging Maputo's security cooperation by promoting modest economic
assistance programs that reinforce South African leverage. Pretoria is giving
Maputo a $3 million low-interest loan and technical assistance to improve the
port at Maputo--the closest harbor to South Africa's industrial heartland. It
also is providing food aid and negotiating a new work permit system for more
than 70,000 documented Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa who pump
critical foreign exchange into Mozambique's economy. Finally, Pretoria has
cooperated with Lisbon and Maputo in trying to reopen the Cahora Bassa
hydroelectric complex in northern Mozambique. Last month Pretoria agreed to
SC-02309/88
(b)(3)
15
�TeP�SrsCRET
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
- for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
equip 1,500 Mozambican troops to guard the transmission lines from attacks by
RENAMO insurgents.8
South African foreign affairs officials have been pleasantly surprised
(b)(3)
by Chissano's pragmatic policies, and
they believe that Pretoria can work with
him to improve bilateral relations.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Foreign Minister Pik Botha is encouraging
increased economic ties to
Mozambique,
while also pushing to limit South African ties to RENAMO. South
African foreign affairs officials are advocating improved economic ties to
Mozambique, partly in an effort to resurrect
their influence in a policymaking
process dominated by security officials
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(0)(3)
RENAMO attacks on economic targets in Mozambique, however, appear to be
complicating Pretoria's dual-track approach. Over the past year South African
repair crews have repeatedly rebuilt track and bridges destroyed by RENAMO
that had delayed export of thousands of tons of South African goods through
the port of Maputo. RENAMO attacks also are a major stumbling block to
reopening the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric complex--a key issue in South
African-Mozambican relations whose successful outcome is viewed by Maputo as
an important sign of good faith by Pretoria.
8. The Cahora Besse hydroelectric complex was built in the
late 1970s with Portuguese financing and was intended to supply
about 10 percent of South Africa's electrical needs. RENAMO
attacks in the early 1980s destroyed a large portion of the
transmission lines to South Africa, _preventing Pretoria's use of
the electricity from the complex.
SC-02309/88
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
__,.. __Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
Outlook
In our judgment, limited South African support to RENAMO is likely to
continue to be part of Pretoria's two-track policy toward Mozambique. Debate
probably will intensify, however, between South African military and foreign
affairs officials over which track should be emphasized. Chissano's apparent
willingness to cooperate may give added leverage to South African officials
who favor playing down aid to RENAMO, but Pretoria's policy will depend
primarily on Maputo's ability to cooperate on South Africa's terms. The
successful reopening of the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Complex, in our
judgment, would be a key indicator that Pretoria is moving toward emphasizing
cooperation over coercion in its Mozambican policy. South Africa almost
certainly would not publicly oppose negotiations between RENAMO and Maputo,
and it may be willing to facilitate talks. Nevertheless, Pretoria probably
believe that successful negotiations are currently unlikely given RENAMO's
lack of political leadership and FRELIMO's unwillingness to share power.
Although less likely, a change in South African policy that increased
aid to RENAMO is also possible. In our judgment, antagonistic actions by
Maputo--such as allowing increased ANC activities in Mozambique or renouncing
the Nkomati accord--probably would spur Pretoria to increase support to
RENAMO. New South African assistance probably would include increased
training, arms, and ammunition. Pretoria may also provide heavier weapons to
improve the insurgents' capability to attack Larger towns and garrisons and to
hold and defend territory.
SC-02309/88
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
17
TOP ShLKEI
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
--........Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)
Alternatively, Pretoria may decide that Chissano's willingness to
acquiesce to its security concerns and cooperate on key economic projects
argue for an end to aid to RENAMO. Although such action would lead to an
erosion in RENAMO's military capabilities, the insurgents almost certainly
would continue to be a major destabilizing factor in Mozambique.
SC-02309/88
(b)(3)
TOP�Steg114
Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06828286
(b)(3)