ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: DIFFERENT NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, DIFFERENT PROBLEMS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06820819
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-01987
• Publication Date: March 23, 1978

Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820819
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Weekly Review
23 March 1978
RP LAWR 78-012
23 March 1978
Copy
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LATIN AMERICA AMERICA WEEKLY REVIEW
23 March 1978
CONTENTS
Argentina and Brazil: Different Nuclear
Programs, Different Problems
7
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Latin America Divisi9n, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occa-
sional contributions fromother offices within the National Foreign Assessment
Center and from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and
queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual
articles.
btOct
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Argentina and and Brazil: Different Nuclear Programs,
Different Problems
Brazilians are steeled for further disagrement on
nuclear matters during President Carter's trip next week.
President Geisel's resistance to US advice on nuclear
affairs has stood as a symbol of Brazil's independence.
Deep grievance and skepticism toward Washington on the
nuclear issue probably preclude a shift away from an
adversary relationship, at least under the Geisel admin-
istration. The government may use as �new evidence of US
unreliability the recent bad publicity over conditions
at a US-contracted nuclear plant in Brazil.
Except for agreement on the need for international
controls, the Brazilian and US views of the global
nuclear situation have almost no overlap. As a deter-
minedly upward mobile nation, Brazil rejects privileged
positions for a closed club of first-class powers.
Brasilia refuses as far as possible to be burdened by
obligations not accepted by the United States and others
for their nuclear programs. Brazil's own nuclear program
is under the stringent safeguards of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, and its leaders resent the distrust
implied by efforts to have Brazil give further assurances
that its nuclear intentions are honorable. During his
visit to Mexico last month, Geisel explicitly addressed
concern about weapons spread and committed Brazil to all
controls necessary to assure against diversion of nuclear
fuels.
Geisel's sense of invulnerability-to US pressure on
nuclear matters is fortified by repeated statements from
Bonn that nothing will irfLerfere with the Brazil - West
German accord. Brazil's
interest in US pLypubaib on ullUi1UM Lesedlen, but Geisel
indicates no willingness to cede any part of the uranium
cycle in exchange. Probably to emphasize that Brazilian
need does not motivate its interest in US technology,
Geisel returned from his recent visit to Bonn with an
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-Starr
agreement to cooperate in the field of thorium-fueled
high temperature rea-tors.
The new US legislation on nonproliferation seems
sure to harden Brasilia's distrust of the United States
as a possible partner in nuclear affairs./ Brazil has
already been affected by Washington's tightened control
on nuclear material. Brazil's license application for
low enriched uranium for a US-built pov,er reactor was
under executive review for over a year; then the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission took another five months before
issuing the authorization this month. Beyond the prac-
tical import of US policy, Brazil will probably regard
the new US law as an unacceptable unilateral effort to
establish a discriminatory international code.
While the Geisel aaministration feels safe from out-
side direction on its nuclear policy, it nevertheless
finds implementation difficult at home. The nuclear pro-
gram does not enjoy the full support of the Brazilian
scientific community; the official nuclear bureaucracy
suffers significant internal discord; and the program
is behind schedule and escalating in cost.
Some scaling down of
tne original projections seems inevitable. The govern-
ment evidently hopes that closer cooperation with the
industrial sector will deepen the support of the business
community. It also hopes that the addition of research
in the thorium technology will draw in the scientific
community, which prefers a program less dependent on ex-
ternally supplied fuel. Brazil has ample thorium re-
serves.
Another impediment to the program may come from a
small but growing environmentalist movement. This cause
has been helped by leaked classified Brazilian documents
used as the basis for a muckraking series in Brazil's
most prestigious newspaper. The stories reveal gross
security and safety hazards at ..he construction site of
the US-contracted nuclear plant, bureaucratic infighting
in the official nuclear community, and an official at-
tempt to force project engineers to cover up the prob-
lems.
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-frEC-444� .
The Geisel administration, which has permitted un-
usually free political commentary over the past year or
so, has been ostensibly gratified by this journalistic
focus on a problem needing attention. Geisel could have
censored this series for seurity reasons, however, and
his restraint probably is due to something more than
tolerance for an open press. Possibly he finds it a
good backdrop for a coming shakeup in the rival-ridden
nuclear agencies. Another possibility is that Geisel
wants to contrast Brazil's experiences with US and German
contractors.
Argentina
Although Argentina's nuclear program is considerably
more advanced than that of Brazil, Buenos Aires finds
itself much more vulnerable than Brasilia to changing
international rules for nuclear control. Brazilian 1�,ad-
ers, under criticism for making Brazil dependent on West
German technology, can find solace in the dilemma Argen-
tina faces. Argentina, after carefully crafting a nu-
clear power program that would give their country nuclear
self-sufficiency, finds itself stymied by new restrictive
conditions for technology transfer. Exporters are begin-
ning to insist that recipients of sensitive material and
technology put under internhtional safeguards all their
nuclear facilities, even thOse indigenously designed and
built. This is forcing Argentina to review its nuclear
policy, weighing its commitment to an independent pro-
gram against its continuing technology gap.
Argentine officials in recent weeks have given mixed,
ambiguous signals abou their intentions, including some
suggestions that Buenos Aires is moving toward acceptance
of full scope safeguards or ratification of Tlatelolco,
the treaty declaring Latin America a nuclear-weapons-free
zone. At the same time, they are making implied threats
to Canada, their most important supplier, that Argentina
can tough it out by reorienting the nuclear program to-
ward a less rigid supplier such as West Germany. The
head of Argentina's nuclear agency has stated that policy
is under review and that important decisions must be made
in the next several months, probably by June.
Faced with unhappy choices for their nuclear pro-
gram, Argentine officials would probably be able to bend
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tEel2E-T�
their principles for the sake of practicality, if they
could see clearly where practicality truly lies. If they
could be confident that accepting broader safeguards
would yield a sure payoff, the debate between hardline
defenders of sovereignty and the more practical-minded
could be readily evaluated by the ultimate arbiters, the
ruling junta. The advocates of accepting further nuclear
accountability, however, are undercut by deep distrust
toward the nuclear exporters, who have changed policy
before and might do the same again.
While the issue is under study, Argentina seems to
be doing its best to influence the attitudes of potential
suppliers. Buenos Aires is suggesting to Canada that it
will lose the Argentine market and to West Germany that
it can gain a market. For US consumption, officials
have suggested that ratification of Tlatelolco may take
place soon. Along with each sign of Argentine flexibil-
ity, however, comes a reminder that Argentina--or at
least some bloc in official circles--will not give in
to pressure but will aive only in fair pxrhanap for a
tangible gain.
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