OS - REQUEST FOR A REPORT WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06619069
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2020
• Case Number: F-2013-01784
• Publication Date: January 22, 1990

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEE.
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Raymond M. Reardon
Chief, Counterintelligence Center,
Security Group
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
Request for a Report within the
Intelligence Community
EXTENSION NO
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
rort4s-kcl, cs-r
DATE
22 January 1990
(b)(3)
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw o line across column after each comment.)
girector of Security
.W96
2.
DD/PS
3.
C/SAJ)
a
5.
: 7.
9.
10.
12.
13.
FYI, Dr. Lynch has told Mr.Reardon
he does not intend to provide:,
input re SEQ.as he. suggestO,
the attached memorandum .5-}17
CA-.2
-7,j4d:VA0i1PAIC&Al
1989-235-688/0003
E1
n ,
''71-4115"-4th
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(.3)
(3)
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22 January 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Raymond M. Reardon
Chief, Counterintelligence Center,
Security Group
Request for a Report within the Intelligence
Community
I,receiv a copy of the attached memoranda from the SSCI on
22 January 1990. The Counterintelligence Center (CIC) has been
asked to put together an overall response. CIC/INV will be
working directly with the Special Activities Division, Office of
Security, in providing input to paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 6. In view
of some of the other issues raised, such as SEO, I thought you
might like the opportunity to provide input to the overall
response.
Attachment:
As stated above
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
Raymond(0--F_Ordon
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
Da
X
2
DDCI
X
3
D/ICS
X
4
DDA
5
DDI
6
DDO
X
7
DDP&C
8
DDS&T
91G,
10
COMPT
11
D/OCA
X
12
'GC
13
ChsaLNIC
14
D/PAO
15
COUNSEL/DCI
ici
17
DO
TVSFS)
X
18
19
20
� -
21
22
SUSPENSE
ASAP
Date
Remarks D/OCA will coordinate with C/CI
and prepare response for DCI signature.
Execut
3637 004"
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Date (b)(3)
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CLAIMIORNIE PELL. RHODE ISLAND. CHAIRMAN
,irdSEPMB ,..rDEN J. OELAWARE
5 S�ROANES, ...A.vLANO
ALAN CRANSTON CALIEORNI�
CHRISTOPHER .1 DODO. CONNECTICUT
JOHN E KERRY MASSACHUSETTS
P�uL SIMON ILLINOIS
TERRY S�NEORD. NORTH CAROLINA
DANIEL P MOTN,HAN NEW YORE
CHARLES 5 Rose. VIRGINIA
GERTLD 13. CHRISTIANSON. STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES P LUCIER. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
JESSE HELMS NORTH CARD
RIZH�RD G LUGAR NO Approved for Release: 2020/01/03 C06619069
NANCY I.4ASSE8AUM AS
�11..:OT KOSCHWiTZ MINI.,JTA
LARRY PRESSLER SOUTH DAKOTA
;RAN. H MUAKOWSKI ALASKA
MITCH MCCONNELL. KENTUCKY
GORDON .1. HUMPNREY. NEW NAMPS,RE
CONNIE MACK. FLORIDA
SSCI #89-3939
United cStats ErlatE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225
October 18, 1989
Senator David Boren
Chairman
Senator William Cohen
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
Dear Senators:
As you know, competitive analysis has been demonstrated by the 1975--
1976 A Team-B Team exercise to be beneficial to better intelligence
support to protecting our national security. It turns out that the
Central Intelligence Agency's benign view of the Soviet military
threat in the .mid-1970s was far too complacent, but we would never
have had available the more accurate warning of the growth of Soviet
strategic superiority provided by the B Team had it not been for the
exercise of competitive analysis. Contending points of view and
varying schools of analysis and interpretation are inevitable in tr..-
art of intelligence, and experience has shown that we should
encourage competitive analysis.
On September 24, 1986, the Senate unanimously agreed to my
amendment to S. 2477, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1987, directing the CIA to conduct competitive analysis on 32
important intelligence issues. One of these issues, numbered 24, was
"The possibility that the CIA and the State Department have been
penetrated by the KGB at various levels." The CIA's classified
report to the Senate on this topic was received in 1987. It was,
however, only a short and cursory paragraph, and it was not the
result of competitive analysis.
Since then there have been five probable espionage cases reportesa'
in the media which suggest that the CIA and the State Department
should have treated my amendment more seriously.
First, the senior forei;n service officer Mr. Felix Bloch has be-7
placed on administrative leave by the State Department beca�Ise he
detected engaging in unreported contacts with Soviet Inte1li3ence
is suspected of espionage. These contacts reportedly even
the passing of a briefcase from Mr. Bloch to a known Soviet
Intelligence Officer.
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Page 2 Letter to Senators Boren and Cohen, October 18, 1989
Second, there are recent media reports that the late CIA senior
analyst Mr. John Paisley may have been a long-term Soviet mole at the
CIA. A.r'ecent book has described the details surrounding Mr.
Paisley's suspicious death in September, 1978, and the evidence that
he might have been recruited during his World War Two Merchant Marine
voyages to the Soviet Union to be a long-term Soviet Intelligence
mole inside the CIA. Mr. Paisley apparently lied about his wartime
visits to the Soviet Union when he entered CIA.
Third, this book also reports that the senior CIA officer Mr. Jarn9s
Speyer Kronthal was a Soviet Intelligence mole inside CIA.' Mr.
Kronthal apparently committed suicide in 1953, when his treachery was
discovered.
Fourth, this book and another recent book have reported the details
of the damage caused by the convicted spy Mr. Karl Koecher, a CIA.
contract employee who was a mole inside the CIA for Soviet/Czech
Intelligence.
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Because the CIA and the State Department did not take my original
amendment seriously, and because of the subsequent evidence
suggesting serious Soviet Intelligence penetrations of the CIA and
the State Department, it is clear that counter-intelligence at CIA
and the State Department must be strengthened. In accordance with
the 1986 Helms amendment, I therefore request that the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence require the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, -
and the Secretary of .State to submit reports, utilizing the method
competitive analysis, on the following:
1. The reason why the 1987 CIA report on this topic was only
cursory and failed to fulfill the original 1986 Senate directive f-7-
a competitiveHanaysis of whether the CIA and the State Department
were penetrated by Soviet-bioc intelligence services.
2. The evidence which wuuld determine whether the senior fore: :-
service officer Felix Bloch, the late CIA senior analyst John
Paisley, the former CIA contract employee Karl Koecher, the lat
senior CIA officer James Kronthal (b)(1)
were spies for Soviet-bloc(b)(3)
intelligence s=rvices, including any evidence indicating when
may have first begun spy',.hg for :iet-ticc intelligence services.
3; The circumstances of the detection of Mr. Bloch's, Mr.
Paisley's, Mr. Koecher's, Mr. Kronthal's,
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Page 3 Letter to Senators Boren and Cohen, October 18, 1989
reported dealing: with Soviet-bloc int-,1"--nce
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services.
4. The reasons why it took the United States Government an
inordinate length of time toauSDeCt Mr. Mr.
Koecher's, Mr. Kronthal's, (W(1)
probable espionage dealings with Soviet-bloc (b)(3)
intelligence services.
5. The liklihood that there could be similar, though as yet
undetected, cases in the State Department and the CIA suggesting the
probability of espionage, including a list of all former and current
State Department and CIA employees who have had unreported contacts
with Soviet-bloc intelligence services, or were involved in false
flag entrapments, or were possibly compromised by Soviet-bloc
intelligence services.
6. An
Paisley,
assessment of the possible damage that Mr. Bloch, Mr.
Mr. Koecher, Mr. Kronthal, (W(1)
may have done to United States foreign policy, (b)(3)
intelligence, and national security interests by their actions,
including an analysis of the damage that they may have done as Soviet-
bloc intelligence agents of influence over United States policy.
7. An assessment of whether the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Secretary of State, and t'ne Director of Central
Intelligence, should establish a joint Security Evaluation Office.
The joint Security Evaluation Office would set personnel and physical
security standards for all U.S. embassies abroad. These security
standards would apply to all personnel of the State Department and
all its agencies, and also to all U.S. Government personnel belongin7
to all U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. These security standards
would also apply to all facilities and buildings of all U.S.
diplomatic missions. The joint Security Evaluation Office would a1s.:1,
monitor the compliance of the State Department and all U.S. mission -
personnel and facilities with these security standards.
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9. An assessment of whether each annual security report on each
U.S. mission should be forwarded to the State Department Regional
Security Officer, to the FBI r.3presentative in each mission (wher,.?
api:licable), and to the v-int Security Evaluation Office. The joi.r.
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Page 4 Letter to Senators Boren and Cohen, October 18, 1989
Security Evaluation Office would analyze these reports, make
enforcement recommendations, and consolidate the reports and
enforcement recommendations for submission to the Chief of Diplomatic
Security-at the State Depaitment. The Chief of Diplomatic Security
would submit the consolidated annual mission security report and
enforcement recommendations to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security and to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of
State would use his existing statutory authority to administer and
enforce the joint Security Evaluation Office security standards.
10. An assessment of whether the Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security should submit the consolidated annual mission
security report and enforcement recommendations to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, together with a summary of all enforcement, corrective
and disciplinary actions taken.
11. An assessment of whether upon being transferred back to the
United States or being posted to any other permanent change of
station, all U.S. diplomatic mission country team members at all U.S.
embassies should be interviewed on all security issues, including
lifestyle, foreign contact reporting, and non-fraternization policy,
by State Department diplomatic security officers, and if there is
sufficient reason, by the FBI.
I hope that by posing these questions and asking for these
competitive analyses and assessments, progress will be made in
improving our counter-intelligence. I appreciate the efforts alr(ia..!:
being made in this area by the SSCI, and I look forward to working
with you further toward achieving additional improvements.
Sincerely,
JESSE HELMS
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