SOUTH AFRICA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION <SANITIZED>

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06381536
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-00226
• Publication Date: March 15, 1990

TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
15 March 1990
TO:
� DI Registry
ROOM NO.
7E47
BUILDING
OHB
REMARKS:
FROM: Office of African and Latin
American Analysis
ROOM NO.
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BUILDING
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EXTENSION
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Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
15 March 1990
NOTE FOR: Associate Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Attached is a fresh version of the
Nuclear Proliferation memo. After our
discussion this morning I met with several
of our South Africans and we went step-
by-step through the analytical line. I
think you will find this version clarifies
fhP 2mhi gni ties
Deputy Director
African and Latin American Analysis
Attachment
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15 March 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM:
Acting Director of African and Latin
American Analysis, DI
SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation
1. South Africa appears close to a decision to accede to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after years of
negotiation and threatened expulsion from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Most observers now expect Pretoria
to sign the treaty later this year or in 1991.
2. Two key factors appear to be pushing South Africa
toward NPT accession. President de Klerk is trying to fight
South Africa's international isolation and roll back financial
and economic sanctions. The issue of nonadherence to the NPT
is a source of international condemnation, and each year,
South Africa faces potential expulsion from the IAEA. We believe
de Klerk wants to remove this source of international criticism.
3. We believe de Klerk will face significant domestic
criticism if he fails to win international concessions for
signing the NPT, since the weapons program is a source of pride
and security for many whites. De Klerk will certainly want to
gain assurances from Western governments that South Africa will
have access to nuclear technology and commerce if he accedes to
the treaty. In addition, he may push for other countries in
southern Africa to sign the treaty as a condition of South
African accession.
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SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation
4. South African accession to the NPT would mark the first
time a country with a covert weapons proaram has sianed the
treaty
we
would have three possible options:
-- Terminating its nuclear weapons program.
require that South Africa
place highly-enriched uranium inventories
under IAEA safeguards.
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believe it
This would
-- Declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. Under this
scenario, Pretoria would maintain nuclear weapons
stockpiles while subjecting nuclear materials not used
for weapons purposes to safeguards. This would require
revision of the NPT, which currently identifies only the
US, USSR, UK, France, and China as nuclear weapons
states.
Maintaining a covert nuclear weapons program. Pretoria
would have to secret away its nuclear weapons and deny
having a weapons program. It is not clear how the IAEA
would respond to such a denial.
5. De Klerk's move toward NPT accession coincides with a
period of virtually unprecedented regional and domestic change.
De Klerk has reversed the relative emphasis former President
Botha placed on military and political means to address
South Africa's problems at home and in the region, deemphasizing
military operations and security measures in favor of diplomatic,
economic, and political solutions.
6. Under de Klerk, South Africa has significantly enhanced
its regional standing, improving ties with neighboring states,
negotiating the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola,
and agreeing to Namibian independence. As a result of South
Africa's improving security position, de Klerk has cut some 14
percent from South Africa's defense budget and significantly
trimmed research and development or7grams affecting a number of
weapons systems.
7. At the same time, de Klerk has taken dramatic steps at
home--ordering the release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning the
African National Congress--to end the political stalemate that
has gripped the country in recent years. We believe de Klerk is
committed to negotiating a new constitution with credible black
leaders that will be acceptable to the majority of all South
Africans and international observers, while protecting white
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SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation
interests.
most
observers believe this process could ebb and flow tor several
years.
8. Predictions about the likely outcome of constitutional
negotiations at this stage--with both the government and the
opposition keeping silent on key questions--remain highly
speculative. Any predictions about the position of any future
South African crovernment on nuclear issues would be at best
speculative.
it is conceivable that de Klerk is inclined to sign
the treaty before taking South Africa into uncharted waters. In
any event, we would expect de Klerk to try to resolve the nuclear
question before implementation of a new constitution that
substantially affects white control. over the security forces.
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