KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD: PREEMINENT SOURCE ON AL-QA'IDA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05428488
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Case Number: F-2009-01030
• Publication Date: July 15, 2004

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Key Findings (U)
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent
Source On Al-Qatidar315,44.
Since his March 2003 capture, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the
driving force behind the 11 September attacks as well as several
subsequent plots against US and Western targets worldwide, has
become a premier sort l-Qa`ida. As a detainee, he has provided
information leading to reports that have shed light on al-Qa`ida's
strategic doctrine, plots and probable targets, key operatives, and the likely
methods for attacks in the US homeland, leading to the disruption of
several plots against the United States.
� Information from KSM has not only dramatically expanded our universe
of knowledge on al-Qa`ida's plots but has provided leads that assisted
directly in the capture of other terrorists, including Jemaah Islamiya
leader Hambali and the "other" shoe bomber, Sajid Badat..
KSM steadfastly maintains that his overriding priority was to strike
the United States but says that immediately after 11 September he
realized that a follow-on attack in the United States would be difficult
because of new security measures. As a result, KSM's plots against the
US homeland from late 2001 were opportunistic and limited, including a
plot to fly a hijacked plane into the tallest building on the US West Coast
and a plan to send al-Qa`ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off
bombs in high-rise apartment buildings in a US city.
� While KSM has recanted little of the information he has provided
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� CIA assesses that KSM has revealed at least the broad outlines of the
set of terrorist attacks upon which he and his lieutenants focused
from about 1999 until his detention four years later. We judge that
KSM has been generally accurate because his information tends to
be consistent, and much of it has been corroborated by detainees,
and other reporting.
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we assess that KSM still is withholding
significant information
the inside the
on plots around world�including
United StatesH
� KSM continues
to provide fresh information; in recent debriefings,
including analysis on how al-Qa`ida might conduct attacks in the US
homeland.
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Contents
page
Key Findings
What KSM Has Told Us
KSM's Rolodex A Boon For Operations
KSM's Information Seems Credible.
. . But Probably Still Retains Important Information
Appendix
Biography of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
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Khalid Shaykh Muhammad:
Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida
"trS71
What KSM Has Told Us-TS-7,4E4.a
Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad (KSM), the
driving force behind the
11 September attacks as
well as several
subsequent plots against
US and Western targets
worldwide, has become,
since his capture in
March 2003, a key
intelligence source on
al-QMida's plots and
personalities.
Debriefings since his detention have yielded
reports that have shed light on the plots, capabilities,
the identity and location of al-Qa`ida operatives, and
affiliated terrorist organizations and networks. He
has provided information on al-Qa`ida's strategic
doctrine, probable targets, the impact of striking each
target set, and likely methods of attacks inside the
United States.
� KSM has also provided in considerable detail the
traits and profiles that al-Qa`ida sought in Western
operatives after the 11 September attacks, including
individuals holding US status, possessing authentic
Western travel documents, and being familiar with
the West.
� In addition, KSM has given us insight into how
al-Qa`ida might conduct surveillance of potential
targets in the United States, how it might select
targets, and the method of communication used
between operatives and planners.
sts.
It will take years to determine definitively all the
plots in which KSM was involved and of which he
was aware, but our extensive debriefings of various
KSM lieutenants since early 2003 suggest that he has
divulged at least the broad outlines of his network's
most significant plots against the United States and
elsewhere in his role as al-Qa`ida's chief of
operations outside Afghanistan:
� Striking the United States. Despite KSM's
assertion that a post-11 September attack in the
United States would be difficult because of more
stringent security measures, he has admitted to
hatching a plot in late 2001 to use Jemaah Islamiya
(JI) operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the
tallest building on the US West Coast. From late
2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several
low-level plots, including an early 2002 plan to
send al-Qa`ida operative and US citizen Jose
Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise apartment
buildings in an unspecified major US city and an
early 2003 plot to employ a network of
Pakistanis�including Iyman Faris and Majid
Khan�to target gas stations, railroad tracks, and
the Brooklyn Bridge in New York. KSM has also
spoken at length about operative Ja'far al-Tayyar,
admitting that al-Qa`ida had tasked al-Tayyar to
case specific targets in New York City in 2001.
� Attacks in Asia, Europe, the Middle East. During
2000-2001, KSM plotted attacks against US and
other targets in Southeast Asia using al-Qa`ida and
JI operatives, but after the 11 September attacks he
claims that he largely regarded JI operatives as a
resource for his plots against targets in Europe and
This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis.
Comments and Queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief
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Using Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad To Implicate
Sufaat in CBRN Plotting
Reporting from Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad (KSM) has greatly
advanced our understanding of
al-Qa`ida's anthrax program.
KSM revealed he had met three individuals
involved in al-Qa`ida's program to produce
anthrax. He appears to have calculated,
incorrectly, that we had this information already,
given that one of the three�Yazid Suffiat had
been in foreign custody for several months
before KSM's arrest for unrelated terrorist
activity.
When confronted with the information provided
by KSM, Yazid, who had access to press
reports and therefore knew of KSM's capture,
expressed anger because he figured it was KSM
who betrayed him. Eventually, Yazid admitted
his principal role in the anthrax program and
provided some fragmentary information on his,
at the time, still at-large assistants. But it was
ultimately the information provided by KSM
that led to the capture of Yazid's two principal
assistants in the anthrax program.
KSM's fragmentary reporting on al-Qa`ida's
WMD program, coupled with reporting from
detainees captured as a result of his reporting,
opened important new leads to al-Qa`ida's
strategic biological weapons program.
the United States. KSM took a robust role in
directing and assisting operations during 2002 and
early 2003, including overseeing the Heathrow Plot,
providing money to Hambali for terrorist plots in
East Asia, and encouraging attacks against US
targets in Saudi Arabia.' He has also revealed
details of the al-Qa`ida bombing of the Djerba
synagogue in Tunisia in April 2002 and his role in
this attack.
� CBRN Attacks. Reporting from several sources,
including from KSM himself, indicates that from
2001, he was involved with al-Qa`ida's efforts to
produce anthrax and typhoid. He claimed that
fellow mujahidin sought his help in acquiring
chemical and/or biological agents for use in attacks
but that such materials were not available to him.
Other reporting suggests, moreover, that none of
KSM's operatives�including Jose Padilla, the so-
called "dirty bomber"�had succeeded in producing
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons as of
March 2003.
�
Historical Plots. KSM has been one of the primary
sources on understanding how the 11 September
attacks were conceived, planned, and executed.
While KSM was the manager of the 11 September
plot, he claims to lack knowledge of many aspects
of the attack's planning and execution because Bin
Ladin and his deceased deputy Muhammad `Atif
played a key role in the selection of operatives, and
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, not KSM, was in direct contact
with the 11 September hijackers once they were in
the United States. KSM also has provided a fair
amount of detail on the 1994-95 "Bojinka"
plot�formulated along with his nephew Ramzi
Yousef�in which they conspired to explode in
midair a dc 'en I JS-fla ged airliners over the Pacific
Ocean. ts4.
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KSM has not admitted to a role in the bombing by J1
operatives of nightclubs in Bali in October 2002;
Hambali claims that he financed these bombings from
funding provided by KSM for attacks in general in
Southeast Asia.
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KSM's Rolodex A Boon For Operationa
KSM's decade-long career as a terrorist, during
which he met with a broad range of Islamic
extremists from around the world, has made him a
key source of information on numerous al-Qa-ida
operatives and other mujahidin. He has provided
intelligence that has led directly to the capture of
operatives or fleshed out our understanding of the
activities of important detainees, which in turn
assisted in the debriefings of these individuals.
� Next, KSM when explicitly queried on the
issue�identified Hambali's brother, `Abd al-Hadi,
a prospective successor to Hambali. KSM's
identification of Abd al-Hadi's status prioritized
and expedited his capture. Information from
multiple detainees, including KSM, narrowed down
`Abd al-Hadi's location, and he was captured in
Karachi in September 2003.
Similarly, information that KSM
provided on Majid Khan in the
spring of 2003 was the crucial first
link in the chain that led to the
capture of prominent JI leader
and al-QMida associate Hambali
in August 2003 and more than a
dozen Southeast Asian operatives
slated for attacks against the US
homeland. KSM divulged Khan's role in delivering
$50,000 in December 2002 to operatives associated
with Hambali.
� In an example of how information from one
detainee can be used with another detainee in a
"building-block" process, Khan�who had been
detained in Pakistan in early 2003�was confronted
with KSM's information about the money and
acknowledged that he delivered the money to an
operative named "Zubair." Khan also provided
Zubair's physical description and contact number.
Based on that information, Zubair was captured in
June 2003.
� Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Hambali
and provided fragmentary information
� Bringing the story full circle, `Abd al-Hadi
identified a cell of JI operatives�some of them
pilots�whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for
possible al-Qa`ida operations. When confronted
with his brother's revelations, Hambali admitted
that he was grooming members of the cell for US
operations�at the behest of KSM�probably as
part of KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the
tallest hiiildint on the US West Coast.
Leads KSM provided in November 2003 led directly
to the an-est of Sajid Badat in the United Kingdom;
KSM had volunteered the existence of Badat�whom
he knew as "Issa al-Pakistani"�as the operative who
was slated to launch a simultaneous shoe-bomb attack
with Richard Reid in December 2001.
� Using the intelligence from KSM on Badat, Ammar
al-Baluchi was then asked about Badat, who
provided new information about the UK operative.
he Information Zubair provided led to
the arrest of Hambali.
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KSM's Information Seems Credible.
KSM has recanted little of the information he has
provided, and the bulk of his reporting�such as on
the Heathrow plot and operatives targeted for
missions against the United States after
11 September�has been consistent with or
corroborated by renortinn from other detainees
� Shortly after his capture, KSM probably was
willing to divulge limited information on the
Heathrow plot because key Heathrow plotter Ramzi
Bin al-Shibh had been detained about six months
earlier. Nevertheless, KSM withheld details about
the evolution of the operation until confronted with
reporting from two other operatives knowledgeable
concerning the plot�Khallad Bin `Attash and
KSM's nephew Ammar al-Baluchi--who were
caught two months after KSM.
� KSM also provided much more specific information
on al-Qa`ida's operational activities with JI and the
identities of JI operatives only after he was
confronted by details derived from the debriefings
of JI leader and al-Qa`ida associate Hambali, who
was detained in August 2003.
How Khalid Shaykh Muhammad Compares With
Other High-Value Detainees ismwo.....
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) and senior
detainee Zayn al-`Abidin Abu Zubaydah are the
brightest "stars" among the high-value detainees
HVDs), surpassing by far the other high-value
detainees in terms of quantity and quality of
intelligence information. Together their information
accounts for over half of the HVDs reporting output,
as of June
2004. In addition to the volume of their reporting,
KSM and Abu Zubaydah have been pivotal sources
� A second tier of al-Qa`ida HVDs, such as Hassan
Ghul, KSM's nephew Ammar, USS Cole plotter
Khallad Bin `Attash, and JI leader Hambali, have
also been very useful as sources, but none of them
have the breadth and depth of information of KSM
and Abu Zubaydah
... But Probably Still Retains Important
Information 75,5'Pirt,1�
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KSM still is
as:
we assess that
thholding significant information, such
� US-Based Plots. KSM alleges that al-Qa`ida has
neither active operatives or sleeper cells in the
United States, claiming ignorance of such items as
the US zip codes in his notebook, and denying the
existence of "Haji Adam," who Abu Zubaydah
insists served as a deep-cover operative for KSM
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� since the early 1990s. He also says that he was
never in direct contact with individuals in the
United States, and he has provided only minimal
information about his Muslim contacts in the
United States while a student here. We continue to
explore with KSM and other detainees the
possibility that the 11 September hijackers were in
contact with Islamic extremists in the United States.
� Plots in the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia.
KSM has stated that he lacked detailed knowledge
of plotting in Saudi Arabia because he delegated
decisionmaking authority to cell leaders there, but
not long after his capture, he was able to provide a
detailed list of the leaders and members of four
cells in the Kingdom. Likewise, despite living in
Pakistan from late 2001 until his capture, KSM has
provided only limited information on Pakistani
militants who, since 11 September, have
increasingly switched from promoting local causes
to focusing on hitting US and other Western targets
in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf.
� Plots in East Africa. KSM has expressed general
knowledge of planning by al-Qa`ida operative Fazul
Muhammad (a.k.a. Harun) to stage attacks against
US or Israeli targets in either Kenya or Tanzania.
His statements about working before his detention
to ship explosives to Harun suggests, however, that
he very likely knows more about Harun's plotting
than he is letting on. In one case, KSM provided
new information on operational discussions he had
with Harun only after being presented with a
captured operational proposal written by Harun.
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Appendix: Biography of Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (U)
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was born on
24 April 1965; his father, a cleric who died in
1969, moved to Kuwait along with other Baluchi
relatives from Iran in the 1950s and early 1960s,
when large numbers of migrants traveled to the
Gulf region from across the Muslim World to take
advantage of the oil boom. In a lengthy
autobiographical statement made after his capture,
KSM noted that he had a rebellious streak from
childhood; he claimed that in grade school, he and
his nephew, World Trade Center bomber Ramzi
Yousef, tore down the Kuwaiti flag from their
school. He also stated that he joined the Muslim
Brotherhood as a teenager as an expression of his
defiance against the secular world he saw around
him.
� In addition to Ramzi Yousef, another five
relatives of KSM are terrorists, the most notable
of whom are nephew 'Ali 'Abd al-Aziz 'Ali
(a.k.a. 'Ammar), a key facilitator for the
11 September attacks
KSM's limited and negative experiences in the
United States�which included a brief jail stay
because of unpaid bills�almost certainly helped
propel him on his path to become a terrorist. KSM
stated in his jailhouse autobiography that, while
attending North Carolina A&T State University, he
focused on his studies and associated primarily
with fellow Islamist students from the Middle East.
----StentritIOAQUOL�
Photo of KSM from the circa
1988 wedding to his cousin.
"PISE.L.
He stated that his contacts with Americans, while
minimal, confirmed his view that the United States
was a debauched and racist country.
� After graduating from A&T in 1986 with a
degree in mechanical engineering, KSM said
that he traveled to Afghanistan to participate in
the fighting against the Soviet Army there. He
stated that most of his time in Afghanistan
during this period was directed to support work
for other mujahidin. INi
KSM also has identified the terrorist activities of
his nephew Ramzi Yousef, along with his anger at
the US Government's support of Israel, as playing
a pivotal role in his decision to engage in terrorism
against the United States. In 1992, KSM says he
provided about $1,000 to help fund Yousef's
bombing of the World Trade Center, adding that
he was impressed by the ease with which his
nephew was able to operate in the United States.
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He then joined Yousef in the Philippines in 1994
to plan the "Bojinka" plot�the simultaneous
bombings of a dozen US-flagged commercial
airliners over the Pacific.
� After the Bojinka plot was disrupted and Yousef
was caught in early 1995, KSM escaped but was
subsequently indicted in the United States for his
role in the plot and went into hiding.
� Years later, a detained associate reported that
KSM showed him a photograph of Yousef in
handcuffs, and said, "This is the man I am
fighting and dying for." The associate further
noted that KSM pledged to find a way to free his
nephew from US custody.s'S
While preparing the Bojinka plot, Yousef and
KSM also discussed the idea of using planes as
missiles to strike targets in the United States,
including the White House and the Central
Intelligence Agency. KSM says that, in 1996, he
expanded the idea of using planes as missiles by
conceiving of a plot of hijacking ten airliners to
strike simultaneously targets on both coasts of the
United States.
KSM traveled to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s to
gain the support of Usama Bin Ladin and thereby
hopefully obtain the resources necessary to realize
the operation. The al-Qa`ida leader at first
demurred but changed his mind in late 1999 and
provided KSM operatives and funding for a
scaled-down version of his hijacking operation.
This planning culminated in the 11 September
attacks.
� Before September 2001, KSM was neither a
formal member of al-Qa`ida nor a member of its
leadership council, but in addition to managing
the 11 September operation, he headed
Photo of KSM from 2002,
probably intended for a false
passport.-73,04SL
�SECRPT/OttEWORN---
al-Qa`ida's Media Committee and oversaw
efforts during 2000-2001 to work with East
Asian Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives to launch
terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia against US and
Israeli targets.
� KSM has stated that he intentionally did not
swear bay'ah (a pledge of loyalty) to Bin Ladin
until after September 2001 so that he could have
ignored a decision by the al-Qa`ida leadership to
cancel the 11 September attacks.
After late 2001, the collapse of the Taliban regime,
the dispersal of al-Qa`ida's leadership, and the
prestige associated with engineering the
11 September attacks combined to propel KSM
into the role of operations chief for al-Qa`ida
around the world.
� KSM stated that he had planned a second wave
of hijacking attacks even before September 2001
but shifted his aim from the United States to the
United Kingdom because of the United States'
post-11 September security posture and the
British Government's strong support for
Washington's global war on terror.
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� In addition to attempting to prepare this so-called
"Heathrow Plot"�in which he planned to have
multiple aircraft attack Heathrow Airport and
other targets in the United Kingdom�KSM also
launched a number of plots against the United
States.
� Although he was responsible for operational
plotting, KSM stated that during most of 2002,
he spent considerable time managing the
movement and housing of operatives and their
families from Afghanistan to Pakistan and then
onwards to the Middle EastS
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