SOUTH AFRICA: READY TO ACCEDE TO THE NPT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06813283
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-00226
• Publication Date: February 8, 1990

Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06813283
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Director of Central Intelligence
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
DAILY
Thursday, 8 February 1990
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CPAS AID 90-032.1X
TC.S' 2732/90
8 February I990
Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06813283
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Contents
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Special Analyses
South Africa: Ready To Accede to the NPT
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8 February 1990
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA: Ready To Accede to the NPT
After delaying some 20 years, South Africa appears ready to accede
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), possibly as early as this spring.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will face the unique
problem of developing procedures to safeguard nuclear material in an
ostensibly non-nuclear-weapons country that probably has nuclear
weapons and a large inventory of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
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Pretoria developed the capability
to produce nuclear-weapons-grade uranium and the technology to
produce nuclear weapons in the I 970s and probabl now has at least
the carmbilitv to auicklv assemble nuclear weapons
Safeguards, HEU, and Nuclear Weapons
South Africa has two uranium enrichment plants, a pilot plant
and a so-called semicommercial one. both using an aerodynamic
enrichment process. Pretoria's inventory of HEU was produced in
the pilot plant, which was to shut down as of 1 February
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Existing international safeguards arc intended to verify that
enrichment plants do not produce highly enriched uranium, and
the IAEA has inspection procedures only for enrichment by the
centrifuge process. The IAEA currently has no procedures for
inspecting enrichment plants of the aerodynamic type operating in
South .Africa nor for plants that have produced HEU nor for HEU
inventories. Before IAEA safeguards can be applied in South Africa,
such inspection procedures would have to be developed and agreed
to by the IAEA and Pretoria
The perception that South
Africa joined the N PT while maintaining a nuclear weapons
capability could significantly damage the treaty's credibility.
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Pretoria's Agenda
South Africa expects that the international community will
enthusiastically welcome its accession to the NPT. Such a move may
prompt other African NPT holdouts to join and would rid the IAEA
of the contentious political issue of South African nonadherence,
which has led to the perennial calls for expelling Pretoria from the
IAEA. South African NPT membership would also give advocates
of the treaty a sense of momentur for the fourth NPT review
conference, set for later this year.
Pretoria's key motivations probably are to get access to nuclear
technology and to reduce its international isolation. South Africa
does not yet have the infrastructure for a self-sufficient nuclear power
industry and apparently believes it will gain access to foreign nuclear
suppliers�in spite of antiapartheid sanctions�if it acceded to the
NPT.
if South Africa does accede, Foreign
Minister 1 ik Botha expects to participate in the NPT review
conference with full rights and privileges. Pretoria is particular13(b)(1)
interested in discussing Article IV of the treaty, which states tha(b)(3)
parties have a right to the "fullest possible exchange of equipme,/�
materials, and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy." South
Africa has had technical problems with its nuclear dower plants in
Koeberg and its enrichment facilities at Valindaba. Pretoria may lu)l I )
view accession as a means of getting help with these problems. (b)(3)
Accession might also help President de Klerk's attempts to reduce
South Africa's international diplomatic and nolitical isolation and
enhance its security in the region.
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TCS 2732/90
8 February 1990
Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06813283