THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM (NIE 11-2-61)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06851104
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2020
• Case Number: F-2020-00991
• Publication Date: October 5, 1961

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NIE 11-2-61
5 October 1961
TS 117700
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER fl-2--61
11-2-61
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The
Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 5 October 1961. Concurring were the Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Director, De-
fense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission
Representative to the USIB; and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his
jurisdiction.
CONTAINS
DEFINED BY THE ATOMIC E
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
NIE 11-2-61
5 October 1961
This estimate supersedes NIE 11-2-60, 21 June 1960 and Annex E
to NIE 11-5-61, 25 April 1961.
This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, which is composed of representatives of
the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy
Commission, The Joint Staff, the National Security Agency, the Assist-
ant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. See appropriate footnotes, however, for the dis-
senting views of the Navy and Air Force. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pan
THE PROBLEM 1.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 5
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PRO-
GRAM
5
II. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
Research Reactors
7
Power Reactors
7
Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems
7
Nuclear Propulsion Systems for Aircraft, Missiles, and Space
Vehicles
13
Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Systems for Space Applications.
14
Nuclear Auxiliary (Non-Propulsion) Power Supplies . . . �
14
III. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION PRO-
GRAM
14
Soviet Uranium Ore Procurement
14
Uranium Metal
15
U-235 Production
16
Plutonium-Equivalent Production
18
Other Nuclear Materials
22
IV. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM. . . .
22
Nuclear Weapon Research and Development Installations.
22
Weapon Development Program
24
Fabrication and Stockpiling
36
Control of Nuclear Weapons
38
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
V. POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF FISSIONABLE MA-
TERIALS TO WEAPON STOCKPILES
39
The Soviet Test Program
39/
Availability of Fissionable Materials
40
Soviet Military Doctrine and Policy
40 -
Long Range Striking Forces
40
Air Defense
42
Support of Ground Operations
42
Naval Operations
43
Summary
43
ANNEX A RESEARCH LABORATORIES SUPPORTING THE SO-
WET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
45
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LIST OF TABLES
Page/
Table 1 USSR Research Reactors and Reactor Experiments 8
Table 2 Soviet Nuclear Power Stations and Expertmental
Centers 11
Table 3 Estimated Soviet Bloc Recoverable Equivalent Ura-
nium Metal Production Through 1966 16
Table 4 Estimated Soviet Fissionable Materials Production 21
Table 5 Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests (1949-1958) . 25
Table 5A Preliminary Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests in
1961 31
Table 6 Soviet Thermonuclear Weapons 32
Table 7 Soviet Fission Weapons 33
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LIST OF FIGURES
Follows page
"H" Class Submarine 6
Map�Nuclear-Electric Power Sites
6
ix
(b)(1)
Figure 4
Map�Nuclear Materials Production Sites .
16
Figure 5
Verkh-Neyvinsk Gaseous Diffusion Plant .
18
Figure 6
Tomsk Gaseous Diffusion Plant
18
Figure 7
Tomsk Reactor Area
18
Figure 8
Map�Nuclear Weapon Research and Test Areas
24
Figure 8A
Map�Nuclear Weapon Storage Sites
24
Figure 9
Sarova Nuclear Research and Development In-
stallation
24
Figure 10
Probable Test Area at Kasli
24
Figure 11
Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapon Proving Ground
(Photograph)
24
Figure 11A
Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapon Proving Ground
(Line Drawing)
24
Figure 12
New Research Facility at Semipalatinsk (Photo-
graph)
24
Figure 13
New Research Facility at Semipalatinsk (Line
Drawing)
24
Figure 14
Grid Sites at Semipalatinsk
24
Figure 15
Apparent Ground Zero at Semipalatinsk (Photo-
graph)
24
Figure 16
Apparent Ground Zero at Semipalatinsk (Line
Drawing)
24
Figure 17
Nizhnyaya Tura Nuclear Energy Complex.
36
Figure 18
Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Site at Nizhnyaya Tura
36
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Annex A
Figure 1
Kharkov Linear Accelerator
�
46
Annex A
Figure 2
Map�Major Nuclear Research Centers
46
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SECRET 1
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current status and probable future course of the Soviet atomic
energy program to mid-1966.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY
1. Weapon Capability. We believe that
nuclear weapons are available for delivery
systems which we know to be in the So-
viet arsenal or which we estimate to be
under development. However, many of
these weapons probably are not of opti-
mum design, and serious gaps in the So-
viet knowledge of weapons effects for cer-
tain military applications may exist.
Based on an analysis of available data
from tests conducted prior to 1 September
1961, we estimate that these weapons
ranwe frnm ffssinn warhead deviepq yield-
ing
to thermonuclear warheads yield-
ing
We have reliable reports
of short range army support weapons of
low yield, some of which may well have
been tested. We must consider also the
Possibility that there are larger yield
bombs in stockpile although such devices
have not been tested, and ttherefore, the
Soviets would have reduced confidence
in the yield.
It is estimated that
by a series of tests and weapons develop-
ment efforts probably requiring one year
or more, the Soviets could complete the
design and be prepared to fabricate
a es � an
an. -arcis.
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
2. Uranium Ore. Available evidence con-
tinues to indicate that the Soviets are
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expanding both their domestic and satel-
lite procurement of uranium ore. We
estimate that by the end of 1960 the So-
viet Union had procured a cumulative
total of about 130,000 metric tons of re-
coverable uranium. As in previous years
these amounts are considerably in excess
of the recoverable equivalent uranium
metal required to support our current
estimate of fissionable materials produc-
tion. (Table 3, and Paras. 50 to 55)
3. Uranium-235. Two gaseous diffusion
uranium isotope separation plants have
been identified in the USSR, one at Verkh-
Neyvinsk and the other at Tomsk. A
probable third plant is located near
Angarsk in the Lake Baykal region.
However, we have been unable to confirm
U-235 production in this area. We be-
lieve that no other large gaseous diffu-
sion uranium-235 plant is currently in op-
eration� in the Soviet Union. (Para. 57)
4. We estimate that the Soviets produced
the equivalent of 76,000 kg of weapon-
grade U-235 by mid-1961 and that the
cumulative total will have increased to
about 285,000 kg by mid-1966.2 (Table
4, page 21.)
A fairly good confi-
dence level can be assigned to 50% er-
ror range- for the estimated mid-1963
value.
(Para.
58-63)
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'See page 18 for the view of the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations (Intelligence) , Department of the
Navy.
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5. Plutonium Equivalent.' Two major
plutonium-equivalent production sites
have been identified in the USSR. The
earliest 4.nd largest is located near
Kyshtyrn in the Urals and the second is �
north of Tomsk in Central Siberia. The 1
atomic energy site near Krasnoyarsk, and
possibly the site at Angarsk, could also
include some plutonium-equivalent pro-
duction facilities, but available evidence
does not confirm the existence of such
facilities at these sites. (Paras. 64-67)
6. The available evidence leads to differ-
ent values of Soviet plutonium-equivalent
production.
(b)(1)
the total re-
actor-products production is expressed in terms of
equivalent amounts of plutonium and is termed
plutonium equivalent. For planning purposes 10
grams of tritium is considered equal tO one kilogram
of plutonium.
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See page 21 for the view of the AssiStant Chief
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the Navy.
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3
POSSIBLE ALLOCATIONS OF FISSION-
ABLE MATERIALS TO WEAPON STOCK-
PILES
10. We believe that the long-range strik-
ing forces have been given the largest
allocation of fissionable mat�rials, and
that at present the Soviet weapons stock-
pile can support massive nuclear attacks
against targets in Eurasia and North
America. In view of the large allocation
estimated for the long range attack
forces, and the size and nature of the
overall materials stockpile, limitations
are imposed on thefl numbers of weap-
ons available for other air, ground,
and naval operations. These limitations
necessarily affect military planning.
However, we consider it unlikely that the
availability of fissionable materials for
nuclear weapons is a factor which in it-
self significantly limits Soviet policy.
We have estimated a considerable growth
in the Soviet fissionable materials stock-
pile which should keep pace with the esti-
mated growth in Soviet missile capabili-
ties for long-range attack, and also ease
the limitations noted above. (Paras.
138-161)
NUCLEAR WEAPON RESEARCH, DEVEL-
OPMENT, FABRICATION AND STOCK-
PILING
11. Research and Development. The So-
viet nuclear weapon research and devel-
opment effort has remained active since
1958, as evidenced by 1960 photography
of the weapon research complex at
Sarova and the Semipalatinsk proving
grounds, and. the resumption of an ex-
tensive test program in September 1961.
Recent analysis of 1959 photography in-
dicates that Kasli is another important
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and active Soviet nuclear weapon re-
search and development site. Other
sites at which some research and develop-
ment is being conducted include Nizh-
naya Tura and probably Krasnoyarsk.'
(Paras. 88-98)
12. Fabrication and Stockpiling. We
have identified nuclear weapon fabrica-
tion and national stockpile sites in the
Urals at Nizhnaya Tura and Yuryuzan.
Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia is prob-
ably engaged in fabrication operations
and may also be a stockpile site. At least
three, and probably five, national as-
sembly and stockpile sites,F7storage
sites for the Long Range Aviation (LRA)
at arctic staging bases, and more than a
dozen airfield storage sites have been
identified. While we have no firm evi-
dence of operational nuclear weapon
storage facilities except at LRA and a few
naval airfields, we continue to estimate
that such facilities are available to the
Soviet tactical and naval aviation, to the
naval surface forces, and to the ground
forces. (Paras. 119-135)
NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
13. Power Reactors. The Soviets have
fallen far short of their nuclear power ob-
jectives announced in 1956 and included
in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Soviet offi-
cials have stated that they have reduced
the nuclear power program since their
reactors were not competitive with con-
ventional power sources. We estimate
that he Soviets will have about 1000
megawatts of nuclear generating capac-
5For the likelihood that the Soviets have con-
ducted tests during the moratorium period, see
SNIE 11-9-61. -1-grellia:Q1
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ity installed by mid-1966. (Paras. 32
and 33)
14. Marinp Nuclear Propulsion Systems.
Soviet redctor technology indicates that
late 1957 was the earliest date that a nu-
clear propulsion reactor for a submarine
could have been available for installation.
Pressurized-water reactors are probably
being installed in all nuclear submarines
currently under construction and we be-
lieve that the Soviets will continue to use
this type of system for the next five years.
(Paras. 34-36)
15. We believe that the first Soviet nu-
clear'submarine was completed at the
Severodvinsk shipyard in mid-1958 and
probably went into service with the
Northern Fleet in 1959. The Kom-
somol'sk shipyard in the Far East is esti-
mated to have completed its first nuclear
submarine in 1960. (Paras. 37-39)
16. Recent information on the new class
of Northern Fleet submarines (H-class)
indicates that some form of unconven-
tional propulsion, probably nuclear, is
employed. The size and operating
characteristics of these submarines seem
to be more� limited than those of US nu-
clear submarines. (Para. 37)
17. Based on all available evidence, it is
estimated that the Soviets had seven H-
class submarines, probably nuclear pow-
ered, in service in the Northern Fleet as
of mid-July 1961, and that a few addi-
tional such submarines may be under-
going trials and training. Current nu-
clear submarine production is estimated
to be at a rate of about six submarines
per year. (Para. 39)
18. Reactor Systems for Aircraft. If the
Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP)
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program was initiated in 1956, was sup-
ported continuously at a high level, and
progressed with no major setbacks, the
Soviets could produce an aircraft nuclear
power plant as early as 1963-1964. Such
a program might permit a first militarily
useful nuclear powered aircraft to be-
come available in 1966. However, the
lack of evidence of the program, the de-
creasing frequency of Soviet statements
on progress, and the apparent general
level of their reactor technology indicate
that the effort may have encountered
serious obstacles. Therefore, we believe
it unlikely that the Soviets will obtain a
militarily useful nuclear powered aircraft
during the period of this estimate. How-
ever, at any time during the period of
this estimate the Soviets, for propaganda
purposes, might fly an aircraft obtaining
part of its thrust from nuclear heat.
(Paras. 40-42)
19. Reactor Systems for Rockets and
Ramjets. We estimate that the Soviet
Union is working to develop a nuclear
rocket engine and will have the capability
to conduct a nuclear rocket static test
firing by 1965. To date there is no spe-
cific evidence to indicate that tile Soviets
have a nuclear ramjet under development,
and we estimate that it is unlikely that
the Soviets will be able to flight-test a
nuclear ramjet engine before 1966.
(Paras. 43-44)
20. Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Sys-
tems for Space Applications. The major
Soviet effort in this field appears to be
directed toward an ion propulsion system.
We estimate that the Soviets could flight
test a prototype system operating at a
power of about 75 kilowatts possibly 17
1964, if no major difficulties are en-
countered in developing the nuclear
power source for the engine. (Paras.
45-48)
DISCUSSION
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC
ENERGY PROGRAM
21. The Soviet atomic energy program is di-
rected primarily by two organizations. The
Ministry of Medium Machine Building
(MSM) , headed by E. P. Sla,vskiy, is re-
sponsible for most of the atomic energy pro-
gram in the USSR, including exploration and
exploitation of ore, production of fissionable
material, and, with the Ministry of Defense,
development and stockpiling of nuclear weap-
ons. The State Committee of the USSR
Council of Ministers for the Utilization of
Atomic Energy (ATOMKO1VIITET) is re-
sponsible for the application of non-military
uses of atomic energy within the USSR as well
as the cooperation of the USSR with countries
other than European satellites in these mat-
ters. The Academy of Sciences, USSR, (AN) ,
is apparently used to advise and conduct sup-
porting research for both the Ministry and the
State Committee. Some of the institutes
playing a more prominent role in the Soviet
nuclear research effort are described in
Annex A.
22. Identification of the organizational rela-
tionships affecting the research, uranium
mining, feed materials production, and fis-
sionable materials production aspects of the
Soviet atomic energy program has been based
on relatively firm evidence. New informa-
tion has improved our understanding of the
organizational relationships affecting the nu-
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clear weapon design, development, testing,
and storage aspects of the program.
23. The nuclear weapon proving ground at
Semipalatinsk and installations supporting
the test area on Novaya Zemlya are probably
under the operational control of the military.
Test activity itself is probably a joint effort
by both the military and the scientific labora-
tories involved, with the Ministry of Medium
Machine Building exercising technical di-
rection.
24. We believe that the Ministry of Medium
Machine Building is responsible for the opera-
tion of national assembly and stockpile sites
and that the weapons immediately required to
implement military missions are controlled by
the Ministry of Defense, probably by a special-
ized central element of that Ministry. (See
Paras. 136 and 137)
25. A reorganization within the area of
"peaceful uses" of atomic energy occurred in
the Soviet Union on 18 May 1960, when the
former Chief Directorate for the Utilization of
Atomic Energy (GLAVATOM) attached to the
Council of Ministers was reorganized and ele-
vated to the ministerial level as the State
Committee for the USSR Council of Ministers
for the Utilization of Atomic Energy
(NromKomrrET) with V. S. Yem.el'yanov as
its chairman. This State Committee has
probably acquired more authority and a
higher priority in carrying out its "peaceful
uses" efforts. According to one source, the
new organization has planned a considerable
increase in the use of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear energy and is expected to expand the
whole field of nuclear research and tech-
nology. This increased emphasis on the
practical application of nuclear technology
by the atomic energy State Committee
parallels the effort by the newly-organized
State Committee of the USSR Council of Min-
isters for the Coordination of Scientific Re-
search, headed by Konstantin Rudnev, which
was establi4hed to introduce the newest
scientific arid technical discoveries into the
economy: To date, we have seen no evidence
that Rudnev's State Committee is connected
with the Soviet atomic energy program.
26. Since July 1960, cooperation among the
European satellites in the field of peaceful
uses of atomic energy has been the responsi-
bility of a Standing Committee for the Peace-
ful Uses of Atehnic Energy created by the
Council for Mulual Economic Aid (CEMA).
The long range plan of the CEMA atomic
energy committee will divide the various tasks
among the member nations and will result hi
a single integrated Satellite atomic energy
program. This type of inter-country collabo-
ration will probably delay, if not prevent, the
development of an independent nuclear
capability by any of the participating coun-
tries.
II. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
Introduction
27. The USSR has continued to conduct a
diversified and comprehensive reactor pro-
gram, but the nuclear power program was
further reduced during the past year. The
USSR has done excellent work in the impor-
tant fields of heat transfer, the superheating
of steam directly in reactors, and the develop-
ment of fast reactors.
28. The present Soviet reactor capacity is de-
voted almost exclusively to plutonium pro-
duction. There is reason to believe that So-
viet production reactor technology has been
conventional and has shown no outstanding
advances. Both graphite-moderated and
heavy-water moderated types are in use. In
addition, at least two dual-purpoSe reactors,
apparently optimized for plutonium produc-
tion are in operation at Tomsk.
29. While the Soviets are constructing some
large-scale power reactors of different types,
they have indicated that they are not com-
mitted to a specific power reactor type but in-
stead are exploring the advantages of various
types in prototype reactors and reactor ex-
periments in an effort to obtain competitive
nuclear power.
30. In the USSR, the greatest advances in
power reactor technology appear to have been
made in pressurized-water systems. All large
power reactors which the Soviets plan to build
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In Operation (date of full power)
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Indefinitely Postponed
4
80
120 160 180
Ulan-Ude
8 ULAN 13P:1�1'
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recognized by the U.S. Government
100
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NUCLEAR- ELECTRIC POWER
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in the USSR in the near future employ normal
water as the coolant in either the pressure-
vessel or pressure-tube configuration. The
Soviets are definitely interested in the bulk
type boiling-water reactor, but they appear
to be awaiting further development of the
technology of the pressurized-water reactor
(PWR)6 and the pressure-tube boiling water
reactor with nuclear superheat before extend-
ing the development of a bulk boiling-water
reactor. Soviet work on organic moderation
has been limited to the operation of critical
assemblies. The Soviets have done little work
on liquid-metal fueled reactors. Their re-
quirements for reactor safety have not been
stringent by Western standards; however,
there is evidence of growing Soviet concern
with reactor safety and control.
Research Reactors
31. There are presently at least 15 research
reactors available to the USSR. (Table 1.)
This number and variety of reactors give the
Soviets an excellent capability to study and
develop materials for more advanced reactors.
A particularly important new reactor is the
impulse fast reactor, IBR (also called the
"merry-go-round" reactor) which began to
operate late in 1960 at the Joint Institute of
Nuclear Research in Dubna. A neutron
spectrometer with a flight path of 1 kilometer
to be used with this reactor is now under con-
struction and should be completed in 1962.
This research facility will permit the Soviets
to advance 'their understanding of neutron
physics over wide energy spectrum and
could be valuable in the study of some effects
of nuclear weapons on various components
and systems.
Power Reactors
32. The USSR has fallen far short of the nu-
clear power objectives announced in 1956 and
included in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. This
Plan called for the installation of 2000-2500
electrical megawatts (MWe) of nuclear gen-
erating capacity by the end of 1960. The pro-
'Pressure vessel type reactor with non-boiling
water as a coolant.
7
gram has continued to slip since 1958, and
Soviet officials have stated that they have
reduced the nuclear power_ program for eco-
nomic reasons since their nuclear reactors are
not yet competitive with conventional power
sources.
33. Two large reactor stations are being con-
structed: a pressurized-water reactor (210
MWe) at Novo-Voronezh, and a pressure-tube,
graphite-moderated reactor with nuclear
superheat at Beloyarsk (100 MWe). Both
are expected to be completed in 1962. The
experimental boiling-water, and possibly the
fast reactors at Ul'yanovsk might add another
100 electrical megawatts. We estimate,
therefore, that including the dual-purpose re-
actors at Tomsk, the USSR will have about
1000 megawatts of nuclear generating capac-
ity installed by mid-1966. (See Table 2 and
Figure 2)
Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems
34. The nuclear powered icebreaker, LENIN,
completed its first operational season in the
Northern Sea Route in the fall of 1960. Her
propulsion system has since had a major
overhaul and numerous reports indicate that
problems were encountered with leakage of
water from the primary loop and with shield-
ing. The Soviets may be encountering many
of these problems in their nuclear submarine
propulsion system.
35. Soviet reactor technology indicates that
late 1957 was the earliest date that a nuclear
propulsion reactor for a SUbnlarrp havP
been available for installation.
36. Soviet preference for PWR's in marine
propulsion systems can be inferred from their
use on the LENIN and from statements by
Soviet atomic energy and shipbuilding
authorities. Pressurized-water reactors are
probably being installed in all nuclear sub-
marines currently under construction and we
believe that the Soviets will continue to use
this type of system for the next five years.
ICTED DATA TS 117700
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Table 1
USSR RESEARCH REACTORS AND REACTOR EXPERIMENTS
Operating Research Reactors
Max. Thermal
Power Neutron Flux
Reactor Thermal (neutrons/ Date
Designation Location (KW) cm/sec) Fuel Moderator Coolant Critical Heavy Remarks
1. TR (rebuilt) Moscow, Inst. of 2,500 2.5 x 101$ 270 kg of en- Heavy June 1957 Originally a 500 kw prototype
Theoretical & riched U Water Water for Soviet heavy-water pro-
Experimental 4.5 tons duction reactors. Critical
Physics
in Apr. 1949. Rebuilt ver-
sion has 9 vertical and 52
horizontal experimental
channels.
2. RPT (rebuilt) Moscow, Inst. of 20,000 1.8 x 1014 6.1 kg of 90% Graphite Water 1957 Original version at full power
C/1 AE enriched U and
in Dec. 1952. Five inpile
Water loops, 3 water-cooled, 1
gas-cooled, 1 liquid-metal
cooled. 4 vertical channels.
0 Reconstruction accom-
plished during normal shut-
downs. Now 11 inpile loops,
15 vertical channels.
3. VVR-2 (re- Moscow, Inst. of 3,000 4 x 10" 45 kg of 10% en- Water Water 1955 Original version critical in
built) AE riched U 1952. Tank-type reactor de-
signed for testing of shield-
ing materials and configura-
tion. Now has 5 horizontal
channels with choppers, 3
vertical channels, and a
"neutron multiplier" (spent
fuel elements in a tank
adjacent to reactor).
4. VVR�S Moscow, Moscow 2,000 2.5 x 101$ 60 kg of 10% en- Water Water 1955 Tank-type; 10 vertical chan-
State Univ.
riched U nels, 9 horizontal channels.
Supplied to Rumania, Hun-
gary, Czechoslovakia, E.
Germany, Poland and
Egypt.
w 5. VVR�S Tashkent, Inst. of 2,000 2.5 x 101$ 60 kg of 10% en- Water
Nuclear Physics riched U Water Late 1959 Tank-type; 10 vertical chan-
nels, 9 horizontal channels.
tzi
Table 1 (Continued)
oo
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Table 1 (Continued)
Reactor
Designation
6. IRT
7. IRT
8. VVR�M
9. VVR�M
10. Intermediate
Flux Trap
11. IBR (Merry-
go-round
12. Isotope Re-
actor (IR)
Location
Moscow, Inst. of
AE
Tbilisi
Power
Thermal
(KW)
2,000
Max. Thermal
Neutron Flux
(neutrons/
cm2/sec)
3.2 x 1013
Fuel
Date
Moderator Coolant Critical
40 kg of 10% en- Water
riched U
2,000 3.2 x 1015 40 kg of 10% en- Water
riched U
Leningrad Physical- 10,000 1 x 10"
Technical Insti-
tute
Kiev Physical 10,000 1 x 1014
Technical Insti-
tute
Maldek, Ulya-
novsk, Oblast
Dubna Joint Inst.
of Nuclear Re-
search
Unknown � possibly
Kyshtym
20 kg of 20% en- Water
riched U
� 20 kg of 20% en- Water
riched U
50,000 2.2 x 1015 11.7 kg of 90% Water
enriched U
1 Ave. 10" during Graphite impreg- Graphite
100,000 burst nated with
Max. UO2
50,000 3-4.5 x 10" 3 tons of 2% en- Graphite
riched U metal
Remarks
Water Nov. 1957 Swimming-pool type for use in
universities and institutes.
An additional reactor at
Riga will probably become
critical in late 1961. A
1000-Kw version, IRT-1000,
will be built at Minsk
(probably critical in 1961),
Tomsk and Sverdlovsk.
Water Nov. 1959 Swimming-pool type for use in
universities and institutes.
An additional reactor at
Riga will probably become
critical in late 1961. A
1000-Kw version, IRT-1000,
will be built at Minsk
(probably critical in 1961),
Tomsk and Sverdlovsk.
Water Dec. 1959 Beryllium reflected, used for
isotope production, prod. of
trans-U elements also neu-
tron diffraction studies,
probably in connection with
solid-state work in Lenin-
grad.
Water Feb. 1960 Beryllium reflected, used for
isotope production, prod. of
trans-U elements also neu-
tron diffraction studies,
probably in connection with
solid-state work in Lenin-
grad.
Water Probably Be or Be0 reflected, central
1960 water cavity where max.
thermal neutron flux is ob-
� tained.
None Summer To be used with a 1 km time-
1960 of-flight neutron spectrom-
eter in 1962.
Water 1952 Experimental facility for pro-
duction of isotopes.
Table 1 (Continued)
1-3
0
1. Fursov Pile
Reactor
Designation
Max. Thermal
Power Neutron Flux
Thermal (neutrons/
Location (KW) cm2/sec)
5,000 10" (fast) 50 kg Pu Oxide
13. BR-5 Fast Obninsk
Reactor
14. VVR-Ts
1. Beryllium
Physical Re-
actor (BFR)
2. BR-4 Fast Re-
actor.
2. BR-1 Fast Re-
actor
3. BR-2 Fast Re-
actor
4. BR-3 Com-
bined Fast
Thermal Re-
actor
5. UF'6 Gas-Fueled Moscow Inst. of AE
Reactor
Fuel
Unknown 10,000 1 x 1014
Obninsk 0.05
Obninsk Low
Moscow, Inst. of 10
AE (Max.)
Obninsk 0.05
Date
Moderator Coolant Critical
None
25 kg of 20% en- Water
riched U
Low Power Reactor Experiments
Now in Operation
U3 08 with 20% Beryllium
Obninsk 100 1044 (fast)
Obninsk 0.05
1.5 2.7 x 1010
enriched U met- metal
al
Pu None
Remarks
Sodium June 1958 Uranium and nickel reflector.
(Full
power�
July 1959)
Water Unknown Specialized radio-chemical re-
search reactor.
None August Zero-power critical assembly,
1954 bare and reflected.
None
No Longer in Operation
45 tons of Nat- Graphite Air
ural U
Pu
Pu-U
Pu
None
None
None
Fall BR-3 with modified reflector
1959 of UO2.
1947 Possibly now dismantled. Sim-
ilar to US CP-1, served as
prototype for 1st Soviet pro-
duction reactor.
None Early Uranium and copper reflectors.
1955 Used to make BR-3.
Mercury Early Uranium reflector. (Disman-
1956 tied to make BR-5).
None Mid- Uranium and water reflector.
1957 (BR-1 w/modif. refl.). Used
to make BR-4: -
T.7F6 with 90% Beryllium None August Probably dismantled.
enriched U metal
1957
P
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Table 2
SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS
Station No. of Reactors and
Location Type
Tomsk ''' 6 Dual-purpose
(planned).
Beloyarsk
Novo-
Voronezh
1 Gyaphite-Moder-
died, Water-cool/ed,
Pressure Tube Con-
figuration.
1 Water-Moderated,
Water-Cooled Pres-
sure Vessel Configu-
ration
Elec. Thermal
Power Power
Per Per Fuel Loading
Reactor Reactor Per
(MW) (MW) Reactor
100 500 200 metric
(claimed) tons of
1200 Natural
(esti- U metal.
mated)
(peak
power)
100 286 90 metric
tons of
1.3% U
metal
210 760 23 metric
tons of
1.5% UO2
and 17
metric
tons of
natural
UO2 (820
kg U-235
metal
equiva-
lent)
0.65 at be- 74 66 2 yrs.
ginning of
cycle, 0.55
at end.
108 117 1.5 yrs.
Conversion
Ratio
Annual
Con-
sump-
tion Annual
ETP Produc-
U-235 tion Pu Estimated
Per Per date of
Reactor Reactor Fuel Full Power
(KG) (KG) Lifetime Operation Remarks
0.7 . 300 Sept 1958 Plant factor of 0.75.
1st Re- The second reactor
actor believed to be opera-
tional in 1960. Spe-
cific dates for the re-
maining reactors are
unknown; estimate
all in by end of 1966.
1962 Employs nuclear super-
heat. Est. schedule:
1st reactor, 1962. 4
originally planned.
1962 Zr-Nb alloy clad fuel
elements. 2 origi-
nally planned.
Station
Location
No. of Reactors and
Type
Elec.
Power
Per
Reactor
(MW)
Thermal
Power
Per
Reactor
(MW)
Leningrad
Same as Novo-Voronezh
Obninsk
1 Graphite-Moderated,
Water-Cooled, Pres-
sure Tube Configu-
ration
5
30
1-3
Obninsk
1 Package Power
2
10
Water-Moderated,
Water-Cooled, Pres-
sure Vessel.
Lxi
Uryanovsk
1 Boiling Water Re-
actor.
50
240
Ur yanovsk
1 Fast Plutonium
50
200
Lxi
Breeder (BN-50)
Uryanovsk
1 Fast Plutonium
250
1,000
Breeder (BN-50)
Uryanovsk
1 Graphite-Moder-
ated, Sodium Cooled
50
180
Ul'yanovsk
Homogeneous Tho-
rium Breeder
35
Probably 1 Graphite-Moder-
Uryanovsk ated, CO2-cooled
Table 2 (Continued)
Fuel Loading
Per
Reactor
Conversion
Ratio
Indefinitely Postponed
550 kg of 0.3
5%U
metal
....
Pu02 or
Pu-U-Mo
alloy
.
.
35-50 170 ....
(as- (assumed)
sumed)
1.6-1.8
breeding
ratio
claimed
1.8-2.0
breeding
ratio
claimed
0.8
�
Annual
Con-
sump-
tion Annual
ETP Produc-
U-235 tion Pu
Per Per
Reactor Reactor Fuel
(KG) (KG) Lifetime
3 100 days
36 ..
720-
800
50 � ..
r m
(11
Estimated
date of
Full Power
Operation
Remarks
1954 First Soviet nuclear
power station. Pro-
totype of Beloyarsk
reactors. Used ex-
tensively for experi-
ment as well as power
production.
1960 Assembled for testing
at Obninsk and prob-
ably moved to an-
other location after
testing.
1962 Same Type fuel element
as large PWR's.
1965 Designation BN-50,
(may have sodium-cooled with
been post- intermediate NaK
poned in- loop; may use neutral
definitely) diluents, in fuel ele-
ment.
After 1965 Now in early planning
stage. May never
be built.
Indefinitely Intermediate NaK
postponed Loop.
After 1966 Suspension or solution
of U in heavy water,
boiling. Believed to
have been cancelled.
Unknown Gas cooled.
!�-t C, r 11) cn T4 r tn cn cn
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0
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i.ur JUt,ET
37. We believe that the first Soviet nuclear
submarine was completed at the Severodvinsk
shipyard in mid-1958 and probably went into
service with the Northern Fleet in 1959. Re-
cent information on the new class of Northern
Fleet submarines (H-class) indicates that
some form of unconventional propulsion, prob-
ably nuclear, is employed. The observed
operating characteristics of these submarines
seem to be more limited than those of US
nuclear submarines.
38. In the Far East the Komsomorsk shipyard
is estimated to have completed its first nuclear
submarine in 1960. This submarine is prob-
ably being outfitted and undergoing trials at
Vladivostok. It is estimated that the Kom-
somol'sk yard can produce 2-3 nuclear sub-
marines per year.
39, Based on all available evidence, it is esti-
mated that the Soviets had seven H-class
submarines, probably nuclear powered, in
service in the Northern Fleet as of mid-July
1961, and that a few additional such sub-
marines may be undergoing trials and train-
ing. Current nuclear Submarine production
is estimated to be at a rate of about six sub-
marines per year.
Nuclear Propulsion Systems for Aircraft,
Missiles, and Space Vehicles
40, Aircraft. It is estimated that a Soviet air-
craft nuclear propulsion (ANP) effort may
have begun as early as 1956 and that as of
1959 the Soviets were engaged in an effort to
develop some. type of ANP system. However,
no evidence has been received which permits
determination of the exact type of system
under development or the status of the effort.
Furthermore, since January 1959, the Soviets
have given no optimistic expressions concern-
ing the progress of their program.
41. The Soviet scientific literature reflects an
extensive, but basic, research effort to de-
velop materials suitable for high temperature
reactors, including fuels, cladding, and cool-
ants. Other Soviet work applicable to ANP
developments has been noted on a more
limited scale in the fields of heat transfer,
TS 117700
13
shielding, instrumentation, and reactor con-
trol. The development of fissionable fuels
suitable for use at high temperatures is ap-
parently progressing at a faster rate than
cladding and reactor structural materials.
There is no specific evidence that Soviet efforts
to produce high temperature n.clear mate-
xials have progressed from the laboratory
stage to the industrial capacity for produc-
ing mill forms in quantities required for an
ANP program.
42. If the Soviet ANP program was initiated
in 1956, was supported continuously at a high
level, and progressed with no major setbacks,
the Soviets could produce an aircraft nuclear
power plant as early as 1963-64. This might
permit a first militarily useful nuclear
powered aircraft to become available in 1966.
However, the lack of evidence of the program,
the decreasing frequency of Soviet statements
on progress, and the apparent general level
of their reactor technology, indicate that the
effort may have encountered serious obstacles.
Therefore, we believe, it unlikely that the So-
viets will obtain a militarily useful nuclear
powered aircraft during the period of this
estimate. However, at any time during the
period of this estimate the Soviets, for propa-
ganda purposes, might fly an. aircraft obtain-
ing part of its thrust from nuclear heat.
43. Ramjets. To date there is no specific evi-
dence to indicate that the Soviets have a nu-
clear ramjet missile under development.
Analysis of the Soviet literature indicates an
excellent conventional ramjet research pro-
gram, but references to nuclear ramjets can
be attributed to feasibility studies. Based on
this lack of evidence, and the technical com-
plexity of such a missile, we estimate that it
is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to
flight-test a nuclear ramjet engine before
1966.
44. Rockets. Based on Soviet statements and
their published research in the field, we esti-
mate that the Soviet Union is at this time
working to develop a nuclear rocket engine.
Their research in high-temperature refractory
compounds, high-pressure containment yes-
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sels for reactor cores and their success in de-
veloping a uranium-graphite fuel element for
the "merry-go-round" pulsed reactor add to
their development capability in this field. In
view of the above, and of the availability of
unclassified Western technical information,
we believe that the USSR will have the capa-
bility to conduct a nuclear rocket static test
firing by 1965.
Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Systems for
Space Applications
45. Electric propulsion using nuclear energy
sources offers the possibility for producing a
low-thrust, high specific impulse system suit-
able for outer space and inter-orbital applica-
tions; such systems would be useless for take-
off.
46. Although the Soviets have shown interest
in all forms of electric propulsion,7 their ma-
jor effort appears to be directed toward an
ion propulsion system. Soviet fast reactor
scientists at Obninsk were conducting cesium-
ion thrust-chamber experiments as early as
1958. Such experiments have application to
ion-propulsion systems.
47. It has been reported that Soviet scientists
at the State University imeni Shevchenko in
Kiev are developing in-flight instrumentation
for an ion propulsion system to operate in
a power range of 75-500 kw, and that this
instrumentation contract ends in early 1962.
This may indicate that an ion engine with its
associated power source is expected to be
available by that time.
48. It is estimated that the Soviets could
flight test a prototype ion-propulsion system
operating at a power of about 75 kilowatts,
possibly by 1964, if no major difficulties are
encountered in developing the nuclear power
source for the engine. A system operating at
this power level could change the original
orbital inclination and spiral a satellite out
to an ort)it such that the satellite would re-
main fixed in position over a given location
on the earth's surface.
This includes, ionic, plasma, arc-jet and mag-
neto-hydrodynamic propulsion systems.
TS 117700
Nuclear Auxiliary (non-propulsion) Power
Supplies
49. We have no evidence that the Soviets have
utilized nuclev heat sources for auxiliary
power supplies in their space program, al-
though their outstanding work in the devel-
opment of thermoelectric materials has been
well substantiated. Based on their capabili-
ties in reactor technology, the utilization of
radio-isotopes, and thermoelectric materials
development, we estimate that the Soviets can
develop nuclear heat sources producing in the
order of several 100's of watts and suitable for
use as auxiliary power supplies in missiles
and space vehicles as early as 1962.
III. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRO-
DUCTION PROGRAM
Soviet Uranium Ore Procurement
50. We estimate that by the end of 1960 the
Soviet Union had procured a cumulative
total of about 130,000 metric tons of recover-
able uranium (Table 3, page 16). As in pre-
vious years, these amounts are considerably
in excess of the recoverable equivalent ura-
nium metal required to support our current
estimate of fissionable materials production.
Nevertheless, the available evidence continues
to indicate that the Soviets are expanding
both their domestic and satellite procurement
of uranium ore.
51. The most significant trend in the satel-
lites is the continuing shift in East German
mining operations from the largely depleted
vein-type Saxony ores to the sedimentary-
type Thuringia ores. A new concentration
plant is being built at Seelingstadt which will
use modern ion-exchange recovery methods
to process up to 12,000 tons of ore daily. East
German uranium production is therefore ex-
pected to increase gradually in the next five
years. Reports that a new concentration
plant being built near Porubka in eastern
Czechoslovakia indicate an increase in Czecho-
slovakian uranium production is planned.
While Poland discontinued shipment of ore
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to
an
thi
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an
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52
Cl
UI
li
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pproved for Release: 2020/07/29 C06851104
to the USSR after 1958, Bulgaria, Hungary
and Rumania are estimated to have supplied
the USSR with several thousand tons of re-
coverable equivalent uranium metal in 1960
and are expected to continue to do so at a
slightly expanding rate during the next five
years.
52. An increasing amount of evidence on the
Chinese Peoples Republic uranium procure-
ment program suggests that a fair-sized
uranium raw materials base has been estab-
lished. However, we believe that uranium
mined in China is meant to supply the
Chinese nuclear energy program and will not
be shipped to the USSR.8
53. In the USSR, the Krivoy Rag district in
the Ukraine is estimated to be the leading
uranium producer. The Fergana Valley in
Central Asia is believed to be the second
largest producing area followed by the Frunze-
Lake Issyk-Kul' district and the Pyatigorsk
district in the northern Caucasus. The 1959
visit to the Krivoy Rog area by the McCone
party
have supplied in-
rormation maicating mat yearly uranium pro-
duction is on the order of 3,000 metric tons
of equivalent uranium metal. Excellent 1956
and 1958 ground photography and 1957 aerial
photography of the Pyatigorsk .plant in the
northern Caucasus leads to a fairly firm esti-
mate of production from this area. (Figure
3.) Information received on other uranium
mining sites has been more limited, but it
demonstrates that the Soviets have been able
to extract uranium from a variety of deposits
including veins, sandstones, oil-shales, lime-
stones and sub-bituminous coals. The last
type of deposit contributes a significant per-
centage of uranium to their program (15 to
20 percent), and its use demonstrates an
ability to develop a type of deposit largely
ignored in the western world., The Soviets
have matched many mining anti ore concen-
�See NIE 13-2-60, The Chinese Communist Atomic
Energy Program, 13 Dec. 1960.
15
tration methods used in the US; and their
recovery of uranium from coals, as well as
from Krivoy Rog iron ore slags, indicates
native developments requiring considerable
engineering capability.
54. The Soviet Bloc is estimated 136 have re-
serves of at least 300,000 tons of recoverable
equivalent uranium metal present in deposits
similar in nature to those now mined. Of
the known deposits being worked only the
Thuringia deposits in East Germany and the
Krivoy Rog deposits have apparent large re-
serves matching many uranium mining dis-
tricts of the western world. Nevertheless,
Soviet exploitation of numerous small-reserve
deposits has supplied, and can continue to
supply sufficient uranium to meet all of the
requirements of the Soviet nuclear energy pro-
gram. Present mining and ore concentration
costs are high, but this situation can be al:
tered quickly by. the discovery of one or more
large-reserve deposits similar to the Ambrosia
Lake deposit in New Mexico or the Blind River
deposit in Canada�deposits in which the So-
viets have recently expressed considerable in-
terest. There is a strong likelihood of such
a development in view of the geological diver-
sity of the USSR.
55. We estimate that uranium production in
the Soviet Bloc will expand at the rate of 400
metric tons of recoverable equivalent uranium
metal a year. At this rate, approximately
250,000 metric tons of equivalent uranium
metal will have been available to the USSR
through 1966. (Table 3.) This figure is sub-
ject to large margins of error, however, since
actual production will depend upon Soviet
policies and plans.
Uranium Metal
56. 'Uranium metal and other feed materials
are produced on a large scale at three known
locations in the Soviet Union: Elektrostal,
near. Moscow; Glazov, just west of the Urals;
and Novosibirsk in central Siberia. Produc-
tiOn at Elektrostal reportedly increased from
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16 -117-P
Table 3
ESTIMATED SOVIET BLOC RECOVERABLE EQUIVALENT URANIUM METAL PRODUCTION
THROUGH 1966
(Metric Tons, Rounded)
End of Year
Pre 1946 Stocks
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
E. Bul- Ru- Total
USSR Germ. Czech. garia Poland mania Hungary China Annual
Total
Cumu-
lative
20 200 70 Nominal 300 300
130 60 30 Nondmd 200 500
200 300 50 20 Nominal 600 1,100
630 500 150 30 20 1,300 2,400
1,100 1,000 250 60 40 2,400 4,800
1,300 1,300 400 100 40 .. 3,200 8,000
2,500 1,700 500 150 40 Nominal 4,900 13,000
2,700 2,400 600 200 40 50 *(40) 6,000 19,000
4,300 3,300 800 300 40 150 (40) 8,900 28,000
4,600 3,800 1,000 400 40 300 (60) 10,000 38,000
5,600 4,300 1,200 600 40 500 .. (60) 12,000 50,000
6,300 4,600 1,400 800 40 600 Nominal (80) 14,000 64,000
7,100 5,000 1,600 900 40 700 100 (100) 15,000 79,000
7,700 5,000 1,600 1,000 40 700 200 (200) 16,000 95,000.
7,800 5,000 1,700 1,000 *(40) 800 300 (400) 17,000 110,000
8,100 5,000 1,700 1,000 (40) 800 400 (500) 17,000 130,000
8,500 5,200 1,800 1,200 (40) 800 500 (700) 18,000 150,000
8,900 5,400 1,800 1,200 (40) 1,000 600 (1,000) 19,000 170,000
9,300 5,600 2,000 1,200 (40) 1,000 700 (1,200) 20,000 190,000
9,700 5,800 2,000 1,400 (40) 1,200 800 (1,200) 21,000 210,000
10,000 6,000 2,000 1,400 (40) 1,200 900 (1,200) 22,000 230,000
11,000 6,200 2,000 1,400 (40) 1,200 1,000 (1,200) 22,000 250,000
Not included in total annual or total cumulative production since China and Poland (after 1958) have retained
their domestic production.
360 tons per year as uranium metal slugs in
late 1949 to about 1500 tons per year as metal
or slugs and 1500 tons per year as uranium
tetrafluoride in late 1957. Production values
for Glazov are unknown after late 1949 when
a rate of 240 tons per year (as slugs) had been
attained. Ground and aerial photography
shows that the Novosibirsk plant is physically
a little larger than the Fernald plant in the
US. The estimated Novosibirsk production
rates of 9-10,000 tons of slugs per year after
1952 have been derived from Elektrostal site
and process data, making a reasonable allow-
ance for tlr economy of space resulting from
the use of larger buildings and equipment.
Thus there appears to be sufficient feed mate-
rial plant capacity in the USSR to process all
the uranium ore concentrate indicated by the
uranium ore estimate. (See Figure 4.)
TS 117700
U-235 Production
57. Two gaseous diffusion uranium isotope
separation plants have definitely been identi-
fied in the USSR. Photographs of the plant
at Verkh-Neyvinsk in the Urals, and of the
one located north of Tomsk in central Siberia,
were obtained in 1959 and 1957 respectively.
A probable third gaseous diffusion plant is
located near Angarsk in the Lake Baykal re-
gion (See Figure 4).
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Figure 4
.11oundories are not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
USSR
NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION SITES
35328 8-61
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1.01" bhUkCE-r
Significant
cumulative soviet 1.1--Z6 proauction by ultra-
centrifuge or other methods is unlikely.
58. The photography of Verkh-Neyvinsk in
June 1959 and Tomsk in August 1957 (See
Figures 5 and 6) has added much to our
knowledge of Soviet U-235 production.
Construction activity observed in
the photography has furnished a good basis
for estimating future additions to the produc-
tion capacity of the U-235 plants for periods
up to about three years after the dates of
photography. -A-An active expansion program
was underway at Tomsk in.1957, with two new
cascade buildings and about 500 megawatts
of new electric power capacity under construe-
o new buildings were under construe-
tidn at Verkh-Neyvinsk in 1959, but a con-
siderable power augmentation was underway
and the oldest plant was apparently being
overhauled. It is likely that the power in-
crease is associated with the installation of
a new and more efficient type of gaseous diffu-
sion barrier in the Verkh-Neyvinsk buildings. I/
(b)(1)
17
60. During the past year a considerable
amount of information about the probable
Angarsk gaseous diffusion plant has become
available. . buildings
there similar to those at Verkh-Neyvinsk and
one of the buildin s was in o -
eration in the summer of 1958.
is power p an as .een exp
ing at very rapid rate and will probably
reach a capacity of 1,000 megawatts by the
end of this year. Expansion of the gaseous
diffusion plant at Angarsk will probably con-
tinue after 1961 using power supplied by the
huge Bratsk hydroelectric statiiI This sta-
tion, constructed with help frorrrt e Ministry
of Medium Machine Building, is now being
connected to the Angarsk site by a 500 kilo-
volt transmission line. The 500 Kv line and
the first Bratsk generators are scheduled to
go into service in late 1961 or early 1962.
61. Our estimate of Soviet 11-235 production
is presented in Table 4, in terms of cumulative
production of uranium enriched to 93% 11-235
T P�...E.G-R-E-r
''' __
-
RCTED DATA TS 117700
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(b)(1)
(b)(1)
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18 717F�S"-E-elt-E-T
content.9 It includes the 93% equivalent of
materials produced at lesser enrichments.
Future U-235 Production
Margins of Error
� The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-
gence), Department of the Navy, does not concur
in the U-235 production estimate. He considers it
to be based upon assumptions which are not sup-
ported by the available evidence.
An analysis of the basic technology known to have
been used by the Soviets and supported by evidence
as late as 1959 shows that the correct values should
�be materially below those given by the minimum
estimate. The technology he� believes to be em-
ployed is in precise aareement with the available
information
The completed cost re-
quirements are in good accord with statements in
the Soviet Encyclopedia of Atomic Energy, with
statements by Aleksandrov on the cost of fuel ele-
ments for power reactors and with the sale price
asked by Soviets for reactors. The calculations also
account f9r the very limited use of 1J-235 before
late 1955./ .
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-
gence) , Department of the Navy, can find insuffi-
cient information to justify the existence of a
gaseous diffusion plant near Angarsk. He does be-
lieve that heavy water is being concentrated in
this area.
TS 117700
(b)(1)
Si
Plutonium-Equivalent Production'
64. Two major plutonium-equivalent produc-
tion sites have been identified in the� USSR.
The earliest and largest is located near
Kyshtyrn in the Urals and the second is Co.
located with the I1-235 production complex at
the atomic energy site north of Tomsk in
central Siberia. The large atomic energy
site near Krasnoyarsk, �and perhaps that at
Angarsk, could also include some plutonium-
equivalent production facilities, but available
evidence does not confirm the existence of
such facilities at these sites. It is believed un-
likely that other known atomic energy sites
include large plutonium production facilities,
and it is very unlikely that any sites large
enough to have significant plutonium pro-
duction capacity would have remained wholly
unassociated by intelligence with the Soviet
atomic energy program. (See Figure 4.)
65. Aerial photography of Tomsk plutonium
production facilities was obtained in August
1957. (See Figure 7.) A large production-
reactor building has been operating there
since 1955, and two dual-purpose reactor
buildings and a very large chemical separa-
tion plant were under construction in 1957.
All three Tomsk reactor buildings are believed
to be in operation by this time and others may
be under construction there. The first of the
dual-purpose reactor buildings is the "Si-
berian Nuclear Power Station" reactor an-
nounced by the Soviets at the 1958 Geneva
the
total reactor-products production is expressed hi
terms of equivalent amounts of plutonium and is
termed plutonium equivalent. For planning pur-
poses 10 grams of tritium is considered equal to one
kilogram of plutonium.
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VERKH-NEYVINSK GASEOUS DIFFUSION PUNT, SECTIONS A-D
VERKH-NEYVINSK GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT SECTION E
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Figure is not oriented north to south as other figures because of the obliquity of the PhotograqhY.
SiC-eittor
Figure 5
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Figure 7
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Tor OECRET 19
Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy. At this time they also announced
plans to build six such dual-purpose reactors
at this station.
66. Less is known about the earlier plutonium
production site near Kyshtym. Construction
started at that site shortly after World War II,
and a small production reactor went into
operation in 1948. Others have been added
since, but f1iir nirmhpr 1-Nrnp anti qi7PC n re
not known.
The Kyshtym site
may also include one or more dual-purpose
reactors in addition to those built only for
plutonium-equivalent production.
67. The large atomic energy site near
Krasnoyarsk is especially secret and secure
and much of the early construction there was
underground. While the complex functions
(b)(1) of the site remain largely unidentified, we be-
lieve that weapon development and fabrica-
tion is a major purpose of the enterprise.
Available
evidence is insufficient to identify the existence
of plutonium-equivalent production at the
Krasnoyarsk site.
68. Soviet plutonium-equivalent production
can be estimated on the basis of Tomsk and
Ryshtym information, assuming that these
sites include all Soviet production capacity.
(b)(1) Because of uncertainties in these data, par-
ticularly at Kyshtym, site-based estimates are
subject to wide margins of errofs.
T 0 P
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1: 0.1-' 1.; E
72. The USSR normally maintains large state
reserves of a wide variety of strategic mate-
rials. Such reserves are considered a high-
priority necessity in the Communist phi-
losophy. A large warehouse area noted in the
1957 photography of the Novosibirsk uranium
metal plant and another reportedly adjacent
to the Glazov uranium metal plant suggest
that these reserves include uranium. How-
ever, we lack specific information indicating
the magnitude of uranium reserves, if any,
or of the magnitude of reserves of comparable
strategic materials.
73. A very large reserve and pipeline would
be required to account for the discrepancy be-
tween our estimates of uranium procurement
and use. Even if early uneconomical produc-
tion practices had been continued, about 1/3
of the total estimated uranium procured
would be needed to produce the amounts of
U-235 we esti-
mate, and the present delay between uranium
procurement and use would amount to more
than four years. There is evidence that more
economical production practices; i.e., feeding
reactor tails and utilization of higher
MWD/T, were at least partially employed in
the 1957 and 1958 periods. These practices,
if generally adopted, would indicate a still
larger discrepancy between our estimates of
uranium procurement and use.
74. The maintenance of a large uranium re-
serve must be assumed for any estimate of
cumulative Soviet plutonium equivalent to
date whicli lies within the limits imposed by
site inforthation even assuming that some
production capacity has remained undetected.
TS 117700
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ICTED DATA
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3.
7e
3,
es
el
rs.
-es
or
3o-
of
itY
Mid Year
U-235
(93%) b 11
Total
/
Available for
Weapon Use
1950
1951
25
160
..
1952
600
500
1953
1,550
1,400
1954
3,350
3,000
1955
6,300
6,000
1956
10,500
10,000,
1957
16,500
16,000
1958
24,000
23,500
1959
34,500
34,000
1960
51,000
50,000
1961
76,000
74,000
1962
110,000
105,000
1963
145;000
140,000
1964
190,000.
180,000
1965
235,000
225,000
1966
285,000
275,000
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21
Table 4
ESTIMATED SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
PRODUCTIONS
(Cumulative Production in Kilograms, Rounded)
Plutonium
Equiva-
lent e 12
90
300
-..550
1,000--:-.--
1,500
2,000
2,700
3,400
4,200 -
5,600
8,000
11,000
15,000:
20,000.
25,000
31,000
38,000
. See paragraphs 63 and 82 for the uncertainties and
ranges of error in these estimates.
le Production of less highly enriched uranium is in-
cluded as equivalent quantities of 93% material.
. Non-weapon uses of plutonium are expected to be
negligible during the period of this estimate.
11 See page 18 for the view of the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of
the Navy.
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Margins of Error
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82. It is very improbable that actual mid-
1961 Soviet cumulative plutonium-equivalent
production is more than 35% below the esti-
mated krypton-based value. On the other
hand, information on known plutonium pro-
duction sites as well as on possible additional
unidentified facilities makes it very improb-
able that actual production is more than twice
the estimated value. No meaningful margin
of error can be assigned to post-1961 esti-
mates. Actual future production will depend
on Soviet plans and policies, particularly those
regarding the stockpiling of small-yield tacti-
cal and air defense weapons.
Other Nuclear Materials
83. Lithium.
84. It is probable that the USSR has been pro-
ducing enriched lithium isotopes in quantity
since at least 1954, although locations and
capacities of Soviet lithium isotope separation
plants apre unconfirmed: Substantial in-
creases in the production of lithium com-
pounds within the USSR have occurred in re-
cent years and we estimate that sufficient
amounts of both natural and enriched lithium
have been available to the USSR since 1953
TS 117700
to meet the requirements of the Soviet nuclear
weapon program.
85. Heavy Water. We estimate that the
heavy water 'production of the nine known
Soviet heavy water plants is about 100 metric
tons per year. (See Figure 4 for plant loca-
tion.) This amount is believed to be ample
for the needs of the Soviet nuclear program
86. U-233. The Soviets showed moderate in-
terest in the procurement of thorium-bearing
minerals between 1946 and_1952
87. Tritium.
production of
tritium up to 1961 is probably not more than
20% of the total cumulative plutonium equiv-
alent. It is probable that in the period from
1957 on something less than 20% of plu-
tonium-equivalent production capacity would
be required to create the amount of tritium
needed for the more recent weapons. Thus
a small amount of U-235 will probably be di-
verted from weapon uses to support a tritium
production program. However, it is unlikely
that the diverted U-235 will exceed 2% to 5%
of estimated annual U-235 production in any
one year.
IV. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON PRO-
GRAM
Nuclear Weapon Research and Development
Installations
88. The Soviet nuclear weapon program has
undoubtedly been supported by research con-
ducted at a number of institutes and labora-
tories in the USSR, probably including the
Institute of Atomic Energy of the Academy
of Sciences (formerly Laboratory II) , Moscow;
the fast reactor installation at Obninsk; and
the Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow.
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Of these, the last probably has the most im-
portant role of the three in Soviet nuclear
weapon development. (See Figure 8 for lo-
cations.)
89. Sarova. The principal Soviet center spe-
cifically concerned with nuclear weapon re-
search, design and development is located at
Sarova (5457N, 4325E) , about 250 miles east
of Moscow. Good quality photography (Fig-
ure 9) of this site obtained in February 1960
revealed a large and elaborate nuclear weapon
research and development complex compar-
able in size to the combined facilities of the
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and the
Sandia Corporation at Albuquerque. The
photography revealed signs of current and
continuin� activit at the corn sie
Some expansion of both opera-
tional and support facilities was also under
way at the time of photography.
90. Kasli. Recent analysis of July 1959 pho-
tography (Figure 10) of an installation near
Kasli (5612N, 6038E) indicates that it is
probably concerned with nuclear weapon re-
search and development. Certain areas in the
complex under construction in the summer of
1959 resemble areas at Sarova and at the
Nizhnyaya Tura nuclear weapons fabrication
site. We estimate that the Kasli installation
became operational during the latter half of
1959 and that it represents a major addition
to the Soviet nuclear weapon development po-
tential.
91. Kerch/Bagerovo. July 1956 photography
of an airfield near Kerch/Bagerovo (4521N,
3629E) , although of poor quality, suggests
that the airfield and its associated facilities
are a research and development establishment
or a test installation, rather than an opera-
tional base. Recent reports of the function
Of the base indicate that it is a research in-
stallation concerned with nucledr weapon sys-
tems development, particularly those involv-
ing aircraft. This airfield probably provided
23
the aircraft and crews for the weapon tests
at Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya.
92. Semipalatinsk. The Semipalatinsk prov-
ing ground, located in northeastern Kazakh-
stan about 100 miles west of Semipalatinsk,
has remained active since the nucleiar tests de-
tected there in 1958.
93. Comparison of two sets of photography
obtained in August 1957 and April 1960 clearly
shows this activity, and a review of all the
available evidence suggests that the Soviets
have kept a technical staff and appropriate
support personnel in place at the proving
ground. Maintenance of such an in-place
staff would also provide the Soviets with a
capability to perform research and develop-
ment work related to military nuclear pro-
grams not involving testing, or to other sensi-
tive research and development activities.
94. Three facilities were constructed outside
the fenced shot area since 1957. They con-
sist of a new research facility located north-
west of the main shot test area, a rectangular
grid pattern about 3 miles by 5 miles in size
west of the shot area, and an apparent ground
zero located north-northwest of the shot area,
consisting of an excavation surrounded by
concentric rings of structures. (Figures 11
and 11A (April 1960 photography) .)
95. The new research facility (See Figures 12
and 13 (April 1960 photography) ) most
probably is concerned with laboratory experi-
ments relating to nuclear weapon develop-
ment, although other functions, such as
nuclear propulsion development or controlled
thermonuclear research, cannot be excluded.
96. Several explanations, such as agent dis-
persal studies, have been "advanced for the
function of the large rectangular grid See
Fi ure 14
Older grid structures north of the shot
area are believed to have been used for studies
in decontamination methodology, probably
utilizing the fallout from weapon tests.
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97. The apparent ground zero which was be-
ing constructed north of the enclosed shot
area in April 1960 consists of numerous heavy
concrete structures, revetments, bunkers,
buried buildings, and above-surface structures
arranged in a semicircular pattern (See Fig-
ures 15 and 16 (April 1960 photography) ).
The structures in the inner ring (300-500 foot
radius) are heavily constructed and will prob-
ably be earth covered when completed. The
larger rings (1000-foot and 1500-foot radii)
contain revetments and lighter structures.
The area appears to be intended for use with
a venting explosion, either HE or nuclear.
Capabilities Prior to Resumption of Testing
100. We believe that nuclear weapons are/
aVailable for all delivery systems which We
know to be in the Soviet arsenal or which We
estimate to be ',under development. However,
many of these weapons probably are not of
optimum design, and serious gaps in the So-
viet knowledge on weapons effects for certain
military applications may exist.
101. We estimate that at present the Soviets
have the capability to produce thermonuclear
(TN) weapons in the following yield and
weight classes (See Table 6) :
Weapon Development Program
99. Soviet Nuclear Test Program, 1949-1958.
The Soviets conducted nuclear tests at four
separate locations in the USSR during the
1949-1958 period.
103. We believe that the Soviets also have
the capability to produce fission weapons in a
variety of types and yields (See Table 7).
We esti-
mate that at present the Soviets have the
ja The following estimates of present Soviet capa-
bilities for weapon development do not take into
consideration the 1961 test series. Only preliminary
data on these tests are now available. (See Table 5A
on page 31)
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Table 5
EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS (1949-1958)
Dimensions 4 Approximate Total Materials 5
Burst Yield Est Wt Est Dia
No. Date Location 1, 2 Height (ft)2 (KT) 3 (ibs) (in)
1
29 Aug 49
Semi
Surface
2
24 Sep 51
Semi
Surface
3
18 Oct 51
Semi
Air
4
12 Aug 53
Semi
Surface
5
23 �Aug 53
Semi
Air
6
3 Sep 53
Semi
Air
0
P1:1
7
10 Sep 53
Semi
Air
8
14 Sep 54
Totskoye
1,000
53.1N, 51.9E
1,500
9
3 Oct 54
Semi
Air
10
5 Oct 54
Semi
Air
11
8 Oct 54
Semi
7 < few 1,000
12
23 Oct 54
Semi
Air
13
26 Oct 54
Semi
Air
14
30 Oct 54
Semi
Air
15
29 Jul 55
Semi
Surface
16
2 Aug 55
Semi
Air
17
21 Sep 55
NZ
Underwater
70.6N, 54.2E
18
6 Nov 55
Semi
3,500
19
22 Nov 55
Semi
4,500
See footnotes at end of Table 5A.
Remarks
C.71
001,241 t SI
1-3
0
tzi
29
19 Jan 57
Kapustin Yar
49.5N, 48.0E
30
8 Mar 57
Semi
31
3 Apr 57
Semi
Table 5 (Continued)
Dimensions' Approximate Total Materials 5
JOE Burst Yield Est Wt Est Dia
No. Date,.... Lotation 1, 2 Height (ft) 3 (KT) 3 (lbs) (in)
Remarks
20 2 Feb 56 Caspian Sea Air
21 16 Mar 56 Semi Surface
22 25 Mar 56 Semi Surface
23 24 Aug 56 Semi Tower
24 30 Aug 56 Semi 3,300
25 2 Sep 56 Semi >1,500
26 10 Sep 56 Semi 1,500
3,000
27 17 Nov 56 Semi 7,800
28 14 Dec 56 Semi Air
Air
Air
Air
See footnotes at end of table 5A.
ts3
Table 5 (Continued)
Dimensions 4 Approximate Total Materials 5
V0[1.99900 6Z/LO/OZOZ :aseaia JOI penaidd\of
JOE Burst Yield Est Wt Est Dia
No. Date Location Height (ft) 3 (KT) (lbs) (in)
32 6 Apr 57 Semi Air
33 10 Apr 57 Semi 6,800
34 12 Apr 57 Semi Air
35 16 Apr 57 Semi 5,000
7,000
36 22 Aug 57 Semi >2,000
37 7 Sep 57 NZ Surface
7036N, 5412E
38 13 Sep 57 Semi Unknown
39 24 Sep 57 NZ 7,000
7348N, 5524E 10,000
40 26 Sep 57 Semi Air
41 6 Oct 57 NZ 7,000
7348N, 5500E
42 10 Oct 57 NZ Underwater
7036N, 5412E
43 28 Dec 57 Semi Air
44 4 Jan 58 Semi Unknown
Unknown
45
17 Jan 58
Semi
46
23 Feb 58
NZ
7418N, 5348E
47
27 Feb 58
NZ.
OOLLIT S,L
7418N, 5400E
Unknown
10,500
10,300
See footnotes at end of table 5A.
Remarks
OOLLIT SI
JOE
No.
Date
Location 1,2
48
27 Feb 58
NZ
7424N, 6336E
49
13 Mar 58
Semi
50
14 Mar 58
NZ
7415N, 5420E
51
14 Mar 58
Semi
1-3
C
52
15 Mar 58
Semi
53
20 Mar 58
Semi
54
21 Mar 58
NZ
7400N, 6000E
55
22 Mar 58
Semi .
56
30 Sep 58
NZ
7345N, 5445E
57
30 Sep 58
NZ
1324N, 5500E
58
2 Oct 58 NZ
7345N, 5430E
59
2 Oct 58
NZ
7338N, 5730E
Table 5 (Continued)
Dimensions 4 Approximate Total Materials 5
Burst Yield Est Wt Est Dia
Height (ft) 8 (KT) 3 (lbs) (in)
Remarks
See footnotes at end of Table 5A.
10,800
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
>7,500
Unknown
6,800
8,500
Air
Air
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OOLLIT SI
Table 5 (Continued)
Dimensions 4 Approximate Total Materials 5
JOE Burst Yield Est Wt Est Dia
No. Date Location 1, 2 Height (ft) 3 (KT) (lbs) (in)
60
4 Oct 58
NZ
7037N, 5445E
Air
61
5 Oct 58
NZ
Air
7037N, 5445E
62
6 Oct 58
NZ
Air
7042N, 5455E
�
63
10 Oct 58
NZ
Air
7338N, 5415E
1-3
64
12 Oct 58
NZ
4,500
7330N, 5500E
65
15 Oct 58
NZ
7,600
7400N, 5500E
66
18 Oct 58
NAZ
6,500
7342N, 5454E
67
19 Oct 58
NZ
Air
7350N, 5735E
68
20 Oct 58
NZ
Air
7335N, 5418E
� 69
21 Oct 58
NZ
Air (?)
7038N, 5445E
70
22 Oct 58
NZ
7,000
7348N, 5506E
See footnotes at end of table 5A.
Remarks
1-3
Cn
cr)
JOE
No.
Date'�-�
Location 1, 2
Burst
Height (ft)
71
24 Oct 58
NZ
7400N, 5800E
7,600
72
25 Oct 58
NZ
7400N, 5500E
Air
73
1 Nov 58
Kapustin Yar
4930N, 4800E
Air (?)
74
3 Nov 58
Kapustin Yar
Air (?)
4930N, 4800E
See footnotes at end of table 5A.
Table 5 (Continued)
Dimensions 4 Approximate Total Materials 5
Yield Est Wt Est Dia
(KT) 3 (lbs) (in)
Remarks
Table 5A
V0[1.99900 6Z/LO/OZOZ :aseaia JOI penaidd\of
V0[1.99900 6Z/LO/OZOZ :aseaia JOI penaidd\of
OOLLII SI
No.
Date
Location 1,
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS IN 1961*
Yield
2 Burst Height (ft)3 (KT) Remarks
75
1 Sept 61
Semi
Below tropopause
76
4 Sept 61
Semi
Below tropopause
77
5 Sept 61
Semi
Below tropopause
78
6 Sept 61
Semi
Air -
79
6 Sept 61
Kapustin Yar
Air
80
10 Sept 61
NZ
7,000
81
10 Sept 61
NZ
Below tropopause
82
12 Sept 61
NZ
4,000
83
13 Sept 61
Semi
Below tropopause
84
13 Sept 61
NZ
Below tropopause
85
14 aept 61
NZ
5,500
86
16 Sept 61
NZ
3,000
87
17 Sept 61
Semi
Below tropopause
88
18 Sept 61
NZ
5,000
89
19 Sept 61
Semi
Below Tropopause
90
20 Sept 61
NZ
4,500
91
21 Sept 61
Semi
Air
92
22 Sept 61
NZ
4,000
93
2 Oct 61
NZ
Air
94
4 Oct 61
Semi
Below Tropopause
95
4 Oct 61
NZ
7,000
96
6 Oct 61
NZ
8,000
97
6 Oct 61
Kapustin Yar
Air
98
8 Oct 61
NZ
Air
99
11 Oct 61
Semi
Sub-surface
100
12 Oct 61
Semi
Air
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capability to produce fission weapons in the
following yield and weight classes (See Table
7) .
104. The USSR has demonstrated at least orie
preinitiation-proof, boosted weapon of hi�
rperformance (b)(1)
and whim we estimate the most likely
candidate', for some Soviet thermonuclear
primaries.
105. Gun-Asserablu Weapons.
it is
considered that, because of the simplicity of
design, weapons of this type are probably
available in stockpile. These weapons would,
however, require large amounts of fissionable
materials. Therefore, we estimate the Soviets
would stockpile only small quantities of .these
weapons. Versions could be available for their
310 mm gun and 420 mm mortar.
Table 6
SOVIET THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
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107. No direct information is available on the
specific nuclear weapon types in the USSR
stockpile.
(b)(1)
Table 7
SOVIET FISSION WEAPONS
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Development Capabilities Prior to Resumption
(b)(1) of Testing 14
Such changes would require at least a
mock-up test.
111. The Soviet capability to improve their
present weapons designs is probably more lim-
ited than that of the US because their pri-
mary reliance on air drops and airborne
diagnostic instrumentation would necessarily
result in less detailed diagnostic data on
weapon performance. While it is conceivable
that the Soviets could stockpile weapons\
without benefit of tests,
we believe this unlikely in view of the ample
multi-megaton capability they already possess
and which they can readily accommodate in
existing ICBMs. Moreover, the additional
few megatons would be obtained at a cost of
100 kilograms of U-235 per megaton. The
Soviets would be hard pressed to improve in
the light-weight TN class without tests be-
cause of their limited experience in this area.
" This section does not consider improvements re-
sulting from tests beginning in September 1961.
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113. We believe that there could be only
limited improvement in fission weapons to be
stockpiled without further nuclear testing.
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improvements with Unrestricted Testing
115. With continued unrestricted testing, the
Soviets could approach the theoretical limits
(b)(1) performance in all yield-to-weight classes.
116. Fission Weapons/Primaries. We esti-
mate that the Soviets could develop light-
weight, low-yield fission devices eaualling our
own capability.
weight primaries would be a necessary part
of an effort to develop light-weight thermo-
nuclear weapons in the few hundred pound
category. In addition, if they have not
already done so, they could develop tactical
weapons of reduced fission yield and frac-
tional-kiloton weapons where, at least con-
ceptually, it appears possible to detonate sub-
kilogram quantities of plutonium. The So-
viets may also attempt to develop tactical war-
heads with particularly enhanced radiation
yields. (b)(1)
117. Thermonuclear.
35
118. The Soviets have recently stated that
they "have worked out designs for creating a
series of super-powerful nuclear bombs of 20,
30, 50, and 100 million tons of TNT." The
statements further assert a capability to de-
liver such warheads to any point in the world
with rockets similar to existing snace boosters
0 P
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Fabrication and Stockpiling (See Figure 8A)
119. For some years, there had been indica-
tions that a large industrial installation at
Nizhnyaya Tura (5845N, 5955E) in the north
central Urals was involved in some way in
the Soviet atomic energy program. Analy-
sis of photography of this installation ob-
tained in July 1959 confirmed that a major
nuclear weapon complex involving facilities
for the fabrication, assembly, and stockpiling
of nuclear weapons existed at this location
(See Figure 17). , Other significant facilities
within the complex include a high-explosive
(b)(1) test area and a possible lithium-isotope sep-
aration plant.
is clearly a nuclear
weapon stockpile site and is probably the first
Soviet national stockpile. (See Figure 18.)
We believe that the earliest series-produced
weapons in the Soviet program were fabri-
cated and stored at the Nizhnyaya Tura com-
plex in 1951.
120. A second Soviet nuclear weapon fabrica-
tion, assembly, and stockpile complex is lo-
cated/about 240 n.m. south of Nizhnyaya Tura
in the vicinity of Yuryuzan. Unfortunately,
the quality of the photography (obtained at
the same time as the Nizhnyaya Tura cover-
age) is poor. From what can be discerned,
however, the installation at Yuryuzan appears
(b)(1)
generally to duplicate parts of the Nizhnvau.
Tura complex.
We are uncertain
as to the date of initial operation of this com-
plex, but we believe it was constructed at a
substantially later date than the Nizhnyaya
Tura installation.
121. Another atomic energy site, part of which
may be associated with the nuclear weapon
program, is located north of Krasnoyarsk in
central Siberia. This large, early site is char-
acterized by extensive tunnelling and many of
its facilities are probably underground. The
probable weapons functions of this site include
research and development,, fabrication, and
possibly stockpiling. The extensive security
and underground nature of the site is diffi-
cult to explain, but indicates an unusual So-
viet sensitivity about this site.
National Assembly and Stockpile Sites
122. In addition to the national stockpile sites
at Nizhnyaya Tura and Yuryuzan, national
assembly lad stneknile sites have been nhn-
togranhed. (1)( 1 )
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Storage Sites at Arctic Staging Bases
125. nuclear weapon storage fa-
cilities are believed to be located in the vi-
cinity of probable major Long Rang Aviation
staging airfields in the Arctic.
, Soviet Airfield Storage Sites
128. We have photographic evidence that op-
erational storage sites for nuclear weapons are
associated with certain airfields in the, Soviet
Union.
(b)(1)
37
130. All of the above airfield sites are home
bases for Soviet Long Range Aviation units
except two which appear to serve Naval Avia-
tion. There are indications that similar stor-
age sites exist at other Soviet airfields and we
estimate that all primary LRA bases have a
nuclear weapon storage capability.
Other Operational Storage Facilities
131. We have no firm evidence of the existence
of operational storage facilities specifically
designed for nuclear weapons other than those
at LRA and naval airfield sites. However, the
Soviets may well have a nuclear storage capa-
bility at a number of tactical and naval air-
fields. Soviet tactical doctrine and training,
and nuclear testing specifically oriented to
ground and naval requirements, indicate that
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nuclear weapon storage sites are probably also
available to units of the Soviet ground forces
and to certain naval surface and submarine
forces.
132. The Soviet guided missile program has
clear requirements for nuclear warheads, par-
ticularly in strategic attack and certain air
defense applications. Although there is to
date no confirming evidence, we would expect
to find special security arrangements and pro-
visions for check-out and storage of nuclear
warheads for all deployed surface-to-surface
and air-to-surface missile units having mis-
siles of 100 n.m. range or greater. Although
we estimate that the Soviets have tested at
least three nuclear warheads in surface-to-air
missiles, available photography on surface-to-
air missile sites has not as yet revealed any
characteristics associated with nuclear weap-
on handling and storage at operational sites.
133. While there is no direct evidence to indi-
cate that the Soviets have selected nuclear
warheads for their Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) system, photography of the Sary Sha-
gan ABM research and development site re-
veals a "high-hat" shaped building
A nuclear warhead
would be particularly attractive to the Soviets�
for use in an ABM system because it would
providt large lethal radii against light-weight
re-entry vehicles, particularly at high alti-
tudes.
134. The Soviet nuclear weapon logistics sys-
tem, although it reveals effective planning for
and implementation of the dispersal concept,
does not appear to have a capability for rapid
movement or preparation of weapons for op-
erational use in a compressed time period.
The natibnal sites do not have easy access to
an airfield. In order to move weapons from
the natioyial sites to the operational storage
sites, it is necessary to carry them 15-20 miles
by truck from the site over good, all-weather
roads, to the railroad, by rail to the airfield
and then again by truck to the airfield storage
site.
TS 117700
135. At the operational sites, at least until
1958, the requirement for assembly operatinnQ
to prepare weapons for strike
(b)(1)
brie cipparent, reuctnee on pit-loading of the
aircraft confirm our general impression that
the Soviet system was a slow, cumbersome and
inefficient one by US standard& We believe
that the Soviets had not yet generally adopted
the practice of storing their weapons in an
operational configuration, although there is
some indication that they are concerned with
this problem and are taking corrective action.
Control of Nuclear Weapons
136. There are two distinct categories of nu-
clear weapon storage in the USSR, each sep-
arately administered and controlled. The
first consists of national storage facilities at
the national assembly and stockpile site. We
believe that these sites are operated by the
Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The
second class of storage houses those weapons
immediately required to implement military
missions. These weapons are stored at mili-
tary bases in sites corresponding approxi-
mately to Service Storage Facilities in the US
program and include the arctic storage bases
and the Types I and II airfield sites. We be-
lieve these weapons are controlled by the Min-
istry of Defense, probably by a specialized cen-
tral element of that Ministry.
137. The authority to decide whether or not to
employ nuclear weapons in a given situation is
probably vested specifically in the Military
High Command, which in peacetime com-
prises the Minister of Defense and his imme-
diate subordinates. Major operational com-
mands in the field are believed to have a spec-
ified number of nuclear weapons, and the
field commanders probably have some discre-
tion in determining how the weapons are to
be employed. From the standpoint of rapid
and effective response to various military con-
tingencies, it is quite logical for the Ministry
of Defense to provide the command mecha-
nism for controlling the release of weapons
in operational storage as well as for deciding
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whether or not employment of nuclear weap-
ons might be militarily desirable in given sit-
uations. It is virtually certain, however, that
any decision made within the Ministry of De-
fense to employ nuclear weapons would re-
quire ratification by the top political leader-
ship, and that the ultimate decision on
whether or not to initiate a nuclear attack
would be made by the Presidium of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party.
V. POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS TO WEAPON
STOCKPILES
138. Sufficient information is available to es-
timate the major characteristics, i.e., weights,
yields and materials composition, of nuclear
weapons available to the Soviet arsenal. In
addition, broad judgments can be made as to
Soviet plans for the employment of nuclear
weapons, the relative emphasis on types of
weapons for various missions, and general
Soviet nuclear capabilities. These judgments
are derived from a number of considerations:
the Soviet nuclear test program through 1958;
estimated availability of fissionable materials;
evidence on stockpiling practices; Soviet doc-
trine on the use of nuclear weapons; Soviet
strategy and military policy; and estimated
Soviet development and deployment of weap-
ons systems. Our information is sufficient to
delineate, within broad limits the general size
and composition of the Soviet nuclear stock-
pile, but it is not of wfficient quality to per-
mit detailed allocations.
139. Future projections of the Soviet nuclear
weapon stockpile are highly tentative. Our
estimates of the present materials stockpile
are subject to margins of error which become
greater over the next few years (See para-
graphs 63 and 82). No meaningful margin of
error can be stated after 1961 for the estimate
of plutonium equivalent, or after 1963 for the
estimate of cumulative U-235 production.
Therefore, this section is addressed priimarily
to a consideration of the Soviet nuclear weap-
on stockpile in the current period.
39
The Soviet Test Program
140. We estimate that the present Soviet
stockpile consists primarily of weapons devel-
oped from nuclear tests conducted prior to
November 1958. New weapon designs being
tested in the current series which began on 1
September 1961 probably would not enter the
stockpile for about one to two years. How-
ever, the current tests may also have the ob-
jective of proving some previously untested
weapons from the present stockpile. If the
Soviets engaged in clandestine testing, some
of the current tests would be designed to ex-
ploit the results achieved. Further analysis
will be required to determine the design of
recently tested devices and to establish the
objectives of the current test series.
141. The Soviet test program over the years
has reflected the development of nuclear
weapons to meet a wide variety of military
requirements. The 74 Soviet tests detected
through 1958 were almost evenly divided
among the low-yield, medium-yield and high-
yield tests." Some of the low- and medium-
yield tests probably related to the develop-
ment of thermonuclear weapons. Likewise,
some of the high-yield shots may have con-
tributed to the improvement of the lower yield
weapons. However, beginning in November
1955, when the Soviets tested their first
two-stage thermonuclear weapon, greater em-
phasis was placed on the high-yield category.
Of the 31 tests detected during 1958, about
one-half were high-yield shots, and 10 of these
were in the megaton range.
142. Tables 6 and 7 present weapon designs
which we estimate to be available to the pres-
ent stockpile. These designs are based on spe-
cific Soviet tests detected through 1958 and
represent a selection of the best of the weap-
ons tested in various weight classes. The list-
ing in these tables, however, is probably not
complete.
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In addi-
tion, the listing does not contain any untested
weapons, developed or extrapolated from
tested devices, which the USSR may have
stockpiled.
Even with these omissions, however, it is evi-
dent that a wide spectrum of fission and ther-
monuclear weapon designs is now available
to the Soviets.
Availability of Fissionable Materials
143. We estimate that the total amount of
fissionable materials available for fabrication
into weapons increased considerably during
the past year. We estimate that production
in this period has increased total Soviet stocks
of U-235 by about 45 percent, and 7f nintn-
nium-equivalent by about 30 percent.
Soviet Military Doctrine and Policy
144. Although the Soviets cannot be certain
as to the nature and duration of a general
war, they appear to assume that it would
commence with massive nuclear attacks upon
the homelands of the opponents. Nuclear
weapons would also be employed in the sub-
sequent struggle which would be character-
ized by a total commitment of remaining
forces and weapons. In any future conflict
short of general war we have estimated that
the Soviets probably would seek to exclude
the use of nuclear weapons because of their
superiority in conventional forces. At the out-
set of such a conflict they would probably
make a considerable effort to avoid being the
first /to use nuclear weapons, but would un-
doubtedly respond, in kind, to Western use of
"For the view of the Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
see pages 18 and 21.
TS 117700
nuclear weapons, if they considered it mili-
tarily necessary.22
145. We believe that the Soviets will continue
to maintain substantial forces in being and
that, insofar as is appropriate to their mis-
sions, these forces will be dual purpose, ca-
pable of employing nuclear or nonnuclear
weapons. If as we estimate, the Soviets have
not yet achieved a state of "nuclear plenty,"
the various missions necessarily have to com-
pete for allocations of fissionable material.
Considering our estimates of Soviet strategy,
we believe that the USSR has given the largest
allocation of fissionable material to its long-
range attack forces. Using as a basis the esti-
mated characteristics and numbers of avail-
able delivery vehicles, we believe it possible
to make a rough judgment concerning the
amount of material involved in this allocation.
There are so many possible combinations of
requirements and allocations for Soviet air
defense forces, theater field forces, and naval
forces that we have not attempted to assess
the amount of material allotted to each of
these forces.
Long Range Striking Forces
Long Range Aviation
146. There is ample evidence that the Soviets,
early in their nuclear weapons program, de-
cided upon the extensive deployment of nu-
clear weapons to Long Range Aviation. The
Soviets probably began construction of the
nuclear storage sites which have been identi-
fied at numerous Long Range Aviation bases
in 1952, and we estimate that all primary LRA
bases have nuclear weapon storage. In their
test programs, the Soviets clearly stressed the
rapid development of thermonuclear weapons
suitable for delivery as bombs and selected
weapons for air-to-surface missiles. We be-
lieve that the Soviets have provided nuclear
weapons for the bombers of Long Range Avia-
tion intended for weapons delivery in the
event of general war. They may have pro-
'For a full discussion of this subject, see NIE
11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and
Policies," Paras. 91-94, T.S., dated 1 December 1960.
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41
A. it mili-
1 continue
being and
their mis,
rpose, ca-
onnuclear
viets have
,r plenty,"
Te to corn-
material,
; strategy,
,he largest
) its long-
is the esti-
; of avail-
.t possible
ming the
allocation.
lations of
Soviet air
and naval
to assess
o each of
(b)(1)
ie Soviets,
gram, de-
nt of nu-
;ion. The
)n of the
en identi-
tion bases
nary LRA
In their
ressed the
r weapons
I selected
� We be-
d nuclear
Lnge Avia-
ry in the
have pro-
see NIE
Mites and
.ukber 1060.
vided a certain number of weapons for mul-
tiple bomb loads and for restrikes by surviving
aircraft. Virtually all of these weapons would
probably be high-yield types, and many would
probably be in the megaton range.
147. The numbers of weapons allocated to
Long Range Aviation could vary widely de-
pending upon operational planning, the size
of weapons employed and other factors.
Long Range Aviation could now have on the
order of 1,000 nuclear weapons. This number
of weapons might require about 40 percent of
the estimated U-235 stockpile and about 35
percent of the estimated stocks of plutonium
equivalent. In view of the growing demands
of Soviet missile forces and our estimate that
the long range bomber force will decrease
somewhat, we do not foresee any increase in
the number of nuclear weapons allocated to
Long Range Aviation.23
Missiles
148. Included in the long range attack forces
are ICBMs, medium range (700n.m. and 1,100
n.m.), and submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles. Missiles employed in an initial attack
on land-based retaliatory targets and on ur-
ban-industrial centers would probably be
equipped with thermonuclear warhea rig at. nr
near the maximum yields available.
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-
gence) , Department of the Navy, does not concur in
these impiied allocations because he believes the
availability of Soviet fissionable material to be ma-
terially below that given in the majority estimate,
as pointed pit in the footnotes on pages 18 and 21.
In addition, he feels that the insufficiency of evi-
dence on actual Soviet weapon apportionment and
the wide margins of error inherent in fissionable
material estimates are such that these estimated
allocations are only possibilities.
149. We estimate that the Soyiet long range
attack forces now have some 10-25 ICBM's
and 250-300 medium range missiles available
for launching in an initial salvo.24 The 28
Soviet missile submarines estimated to be in
service probably carry a total of about 80
short-range (150 or 350 n.m.) ballistic mis-
siles. Assuming a present ICBM inventory of
about two missiles per launcher and an
MRBM inventory of about three missiles per
launcher, the Soviets would have an opera-
tional inventory of 800 to 1,000 missiles in all
these categories. We believe �that nuclear
warheads would be provided for all these
missiles.
150. We estimate that maximum yield war-
heads would be used in ICB'M's, submarine-
launched missiles, and MRBM's for an intial
salvo, and that the remaining MRBM's would
be equipped with nuclear warheads of varying
yields. Such an allocation would consume
between 30 and 40 percent of the estimated
stock of plutonium equivalent, and 25 to 35
percent of the U-235 stockpile. Thus, consid-
ering also the possible allocations to Long
Range Aviation, Soviet long-range attack
forces may consume about 65-75 percent of
the plutonium equivalent stockpile and about
65-75 percent of the U-235 stockpile.25
151. Soviet missile strength will continue to
grow over the next few years. We have esti-
mated that in mid-1963 the Soviets will have
some 75-125 ICBM's and about 350-450
MRBMs/IRBMs on launcher.26 In the same
period, we have estimated only a modest in-
The representative of Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, USAF believes that Soviet long range
attack forces now have about 60 ICBM's on launcher.
(See the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
footnote to NIE 11-8/1-61: "Strength of Soviet Long
Range Missile Forces" for his views on this subject.)
See footnote 23 for the view of the Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) .
28 The representative of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that in mid-1963
the Soviets will have about 250 ICBM's on launchers.
(See the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
footnote to NIE 11-8/1-61: "Strength of Soviet Long
Range Missile Forces" for his views on this subject.)
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42 TOP SECRET
crease in the number of missile submarines
and a gradual decline in Long Range Aviation
strength. Thus we believe that the future
nuclear material requirements of Soviet long-
range attack forces will be largely a function
of the Soviet ballistic missile buildup.
Air Defense
152. A few Soviet nuclear tests appear to have
been related to the development of nuclear
warheads for employment in air defense.
This evidence does not indicate that the So-
viets have developed a nuclear warhead suit-
able for use in an air-to-air missile. However,
the possibility that the Soviets have developed
such warheads cannot be excluded. We con-
tinue to estimate that the Soviets have avail-
able nuclear warheads suitable for use in sur-
face-to-air missiles, although there is no evi-
dence of their deployment to SAM sites.
153. The rapid and extensive deployment of
surface-to-air missile sites in the USSR is in-
dicative of the high priority accorded the air
defense mission. Of the three SAM systems
now believed to be operational, deployment of
the SA-2 is by far the most widespread. We
estimate that 350-400 SA-2 sites are now op-
erational at about 70 urban-industrial areas
in the USSR, others have been deployed for de-
fense of military installations and field forces.
We believe that within the next few years the
Soviets will have deployed roughly 500 SA-2
sites at some 100 urban-industrial areas, pos-
sibly 80-120 SA-2 units for defense of field
forces, and an unknown additional number
for defense of such military installations as
ballistic missiles sites.
154. Although Soviet SAM systems are de-
signed to be effective with HE warheads
against aerodynamic targets, nuclear war-
heads would be 'required to give a significant
probability for destruction of the nuclear
weapons themselves. Such warheads would
also increase the kill probability for the de-
struction of the delivery vehicles. We believe
these considerations would impel the Soviets
to provide some portion of their surface-to-air
missiles with nuclear warheads.
TS 117700
(b)(1)
we doubt that the Soviets have equipped
a large percentage of their surface-to-air mis-
sile force with nuclear warheads. However,
some nuclear warheads have probably been
provided for the defense of Moscow and per-
haps for other major urban-industrial cen-
ters. Allocation of nuclear warheads for sur-
face-to-air missiles will probably increase over
the next few years, but we consider it unlikely
that the Soviets will seek to provide such war-
heads for all missile units or sites.
155. We have estimated that the Soviets will
probably begin at least limited deployment of
an antimissile system in the period 1963-1966.
Several of the thermonuclear devices tested in
1958 might lend themselves to such applica-
tion. We believe that the Soviets have not
conducted nuclear tests in space or above
about 30,000 feet and that they probably lack
basic effects data on high altitude and space
detonations. The lack of such data probably
would hinder, but not prevent, Soviet develop-
ment of a suitable nuclear warhead. There is
some evidence that the Soviets intend to use
nuclear warheads within the atmosphere and
fragmentation warheads outside of the at-
mosnhere
(b)(1)
156. We have no estimate as to the magnitude
of a projected Soviet antimissile deployment
program. However, if such a system were to
be widely deployed, it might place new and
heavy demands upon Soviet stocks of fission-
able materials which would be felt even before
actual deployment.
Support of Ground Operations
157. There is ample evidence in current So-
viet military doctrine and training that the
Soviets contemplate the use of nuclear weap-
ons on the battlefield in support of ground
operations. This doctrine envisions delivery
of nuclear weapons by a variety of methods
including rifled artillery. free rockets, guided
missiles, and aircraft.
TOPS
CTED DATA
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(b)(1)
The larger medium- and high-
yield weapons could be delivered by aircraft or
by the types of surface-to-surface missiles now
believed available for ground support. We
have estimated that the Soviets could now
have large numbers of short range missiles
(up to 350 n.m.) but we believe that only a
small portion of the total inventory would
now be equipped with nuclear warheads.
However, substantial numbers of the 150 n.m.
and 350 n.m. missiles actually deployed prob-
ably have nuclear warheads available. Vir-
tually all medium-range missiles (700 and
1,100 n.m.) available for support of field forces
would be equipped with nuclear warheads of
varying yields.
158. We believe that the present Soviet mate-
rials stockpile does not permit the allocation
of very large numbers of low-yield nuclear
weapons for tactical uses. Within the next
few years, the limitations imposed by the
availability of fissionable materials will have
eased considerably, and Soviet nuclear ground
support capabilities will be greatly improved.
Naval Operations
159. There is firm evidence supporting the
development of nuclear weapons for naval
missions. Of the weapons tested by the USSR,
a number of medium- and low-yield weapon
types would be suitable for use against naval
targets. There have been nuclear tests in the
Novaya Zemlya area which almost certainly
relate to haval effects or to the development
of naval weapons. We have evidence of nu-
clear weapon storage facilities at naval air-
fields and believe that nuclear weapon storage
sites are probably also available to certain na-
val, surface, and submarine-launched missiles.
43
160. The allocation to Soviet naval forces al-
most certainly is being increased with the
growth in the numbers of guided missiles
available to naval units. We have estimated
that all submarine-launched ballistic missiles
probably will be equipped with thermonuclear
warheads. Nuclear warheads probably liave
also been provided for some portion of� the
air-to-surface missiles employed by Naval Avi-
ation, and for some of the cruise-type missiles
now employed by a few surface vessels. Lim-
ited numbers of nuclear bombs, depth charges,
torpedoes, and mines are probably available
for direct support of naval operations. The
growing requirement for more effective anti-
submarine weapons to meet the threat posed
by US missile submarines probably will result
in increased allocations to naval forces.
Summary
161. We believe that the long-range striking
forces have been given the largest allocation
of fissionable materials, and that at present
the Soviet weapons stockpile can support mas-
sive nuclear attacks against targets in Eurasia
and North America. In view of the large al-
location estimated for the long range attack
forces, and the size and nature of the overall
materials stockpile, limitations are imposed
on the numbers of weapons available for other
air, ground, and naval operations. These lim-
itations necessarily affect military planning.
However, we consider it unlikely that the
availability of fissionable materials for nu-
clear weapons is a factor which in itself sig-
nificantly limits Soviet policy. We have esti-
mated a considerable growth in the Soviet fis-
sionable materials stockpile which should
keep pace with the estimated growth in Soviet
missile capabilities for long-range attack, and
also ease the limitations noted above.
ICTED DATA
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ANNEX A
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45
ANNEX A
RESEARCH LABORATORIES SUPPORTING THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
1
1. Although many laboratories throughout
the Soviet Union are engaged in the develop-
ment of various aspects of the atomic energy
program, only a few, aside from those directly
under the Ministry of Medium Machine Build-
ing (MSM), have borne the main weight of
the basic nuclear research effort. The Insti-
tute of Atomic Energy of the Academy of Sci-
ences in Moscow (formerly Laboratory II) is
undoubtedly the leading institute in this field,
and is presently a center for heavy-isotope sep-
aration, reactor development, and controlled
thermonuclear research. (See Annex A, Fig-
ure 2.)
2. The Institute of Chemical Physics (ICP)
in Moscow was, and probably still is, closely
associated with the development of nuclear
weapons. This association is not unexpected
in view of this institute's long history of in-
vestigations in the various phases of chemical
explosives and chemical chain reactions. Sev-
eral of its scientists have been directly con-
nected with nuclear weapon developments.
Moreover, according to repatriated German
scientists, the responsibility for implosion sys-
tems of nuclear weapons during the mid-
1940's was assigned to a committee made up
of ICP personnel and headed by N. N. Seme-
nov, the director of ICP.
3. The Physics Institute located in Obninsk,
which is believed to be under the administra-
tion of the State Committee of the USSR
Council Of Ministers for the Utilization of
Atomic Energy (ATOMKOMITET), is respon-
sible for the development of fast breeder re-
actors and a power reactor employing nuclear
superheat. The institute has recently under-
taken research which could lead to the devel-
opment of an ion propulsion engine and pos-
sibly a nuclear power source for space appli-
cations.
4. The Leningrad Radium Institute of the
Academy of Sciences is a leading institute for
basic research pertaining to reactor fuel proc-
essing and has contributed to,other important
phases of the program, such as the measure-
ment of neutron cross sections.
5. The Moscow Institute of Theoretical and
Experimental Physics of the Academy of Sci-
ences (previously called Laboratory III and
the Thermotechnical Laboratory) has pio-
neered the development of heavy water re-
actors in the USSR and has obtained much of
the fundamental nuclear physics data re-
quired by the Soviet atomic energy program.
B. The Moscow Metallurgical Institute imeni
Baykov appears to be the center for the de-
velopment of metals resistant to high tem-
perature, while the development of ceramics
and cermets for high temperature reactors is
being conducted in Kiev at the Institute of
Metallic Ceramics and Special Alloys of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
7. The State Institute of Rare Metals
(GIREDMET) in Moscow and the Moscow In-
stitute of Non-ferrous Metals and Gold imeni
Kalinin are active in the study of the metal-
lurgy of thorium, beryllium, zirconium, nio-
bium, molybdenum and other non-ferrous
metals necessary to the atomic energy pro-
gram. Recently an affiliate of the latter in-
stitute has been established at Krasnoyarsk
where it appears to be conducting the same
type of research, but probably with more em-
phasis on the classified aspects of the Soviet
atomic energy effort.
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46 "ITTP�S-Lf-e-R-E-12-
8. The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at
Dubna is partially manned and financed by
Satellite countries and Communist China.
Though it is concerned primarily with basic
research in high-energy nuclear physics, a
fast pulsed reactor ("Merry-go-round") ,
which could be important to future atomic
energy programs, was put into operation in its
Laboratory of Neutron Physics in June 1960.
9. Besides these institutes, the USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences and its affiliates operate a
vast network of research institutes and labora-
tories which are engaged in the broad field of
science and technology. At these institutes,
such as the Tomsk Polytechnical Institute
TS 117700
and Kharkov ,Physico-Technical (see annex
A Figure 1) , some basic research pertain-
ing to nuclear energy is conducted, generally
in a specialized field.
10. The leading educational institutes under
the Ministry of Education perform contract
research for ATOMKOMITET and the MSM
and are used to train the technicians for the
operation of such installations as atomic pow-
er stations. The development of these large
research and training centers are now be-
ginning to strengthen the Soviet capability in
the field of atomic energy. (See Annex A Fig-
ure 2.)
TOP
RICTED DATA
35331.20
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Approved for Release: 2020/07/29 C06851104
(see annex
pertain-
1, generally
utes under
rn contract
1 the MS1VI
ans for the
tomic pow-
these large
.e now be-
tpability in
inex A Fig-
35331.20
KHARKOV LINEAR ACCELERATOR
ACCELERATOR BUILDING U/C � \
ANNEX A Figure 1
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