MANAGING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE BRAZILIAN CASE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06827292
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-01987
• Publication Date: February 16, 1977

Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06827292
Secret
International Issues
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ANALYSIS
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RP AII 77-002
16 February 1977
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
16 February 1977
CONTENTS
International Issues Division:
Statement of Mission 1
LDC Demands at the IAEA . � 2
Human Rights Implications of
India's Population Policy 5
8
Managing Nuclear Proliferation:
The Brazilian Case 13
International Terrorism in 1976
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES is published and distributed
the third week of each month.
17
This publication is prepared by the International Issues Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. The views presented are the best judgments of individual
analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to alternative
interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the
authors of the individual articles.
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NOTE; Page Page 13 of International Issues, Regional and
TiTitical Analysis, 16 February 1977 was garbled. Please
replace it with this corrected page.
Managing Nuclear Proliferation: The Brazilian Case
The challenge to US policy arising from the threat of
additional nuclear proliferation is twofold: to slow or pre-
vent the spread of nuclear weapons while, at the same time,
coping with the consequences of additional proliferation
that cannot be stopped. Pursuit of these objectives can
sometimes conflict with other important foreign policy goals.
In the short term, for example, the costs incurred by the US
in attempting to prevent or delay the acquisition of a nu-
clear weapons capability by a particular country may be quite
high in terms of damage done to bilateral relations. The
potential for bilateral strain arising from US nuclear policy
is especially great since countries which seek a nuclear
capability want it for what they perceive to be critical
national security or prestige reasons.
Short-term policies adopted to prevent or slow nuclear
proliferation can also have adverse long-term consequences.
For example, a major effort by the US or a consortium of nu-
clear suppliers to hold back proliferation could actually
increase the prestige that aspiring regional powers might
attach to acquiring what the nuclear establishment is at-
tempting to deny them. A further problem could arise if a
state, which has been badly estranged by US efforts to hamper
its nuclear effort, nonetheless succeeds in acquiring a
weapons capability.
The following article, which originally appeared as a
memorandum prepared by the Latin America Division of ORPA,
highlights some of these difficulties as they are developing
in Brazil-US relations. It is republished here for the bene-
fit of non - Latin American experts because of its broader
implications for US nuclear proliferation policy.
US criticism of the Brazil - West German nuclear accord
has caused an extremely hostile reaction in Brazil's highest
policy circles and could result in long-term damage to US-
Brazilian relations.
Within the past few weeks the "special relationship"
proclaimed by Secretary Kissinger a year ago has dete-
riorated to the point where military and government leaders
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speak dramatically of an "undeclared war" and threaten
a critical review of official relations with the US.
Such rhetorical outbursts could be translated into strong
retaliatory measures; they have already begun to strain
the close diplomatic ties that made Brazil the strongest
and most important ally of the US in Latin America for
most of the 20th century.
The rapid escalation of a difference in views over
nuclear proliferation into a major diplomatic dispute
is in large measure attributable to a basic conflict in
aims and perceptions. It is clear that Brazil sees US
efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons technology
as a deliberate attempt to impede the country's economic
and technological development. This reaction is not sim-
ply a manifestation of nationalistic paranoia. Rather,
Brazil sees atomic energy as a supplement to increasingly
costly hydroelectric power during the 1980s and beyond,
and as a means to eventually reduce dependence on imported
fossil fuels.
These fuels currently constitute the most serious
drain on the nation's financial resources. Oil imports
provide 40 percent of the country's energy requirements
and last year cost approximately $3.5 billion in foreign
exchange.
Ambitions for world prestige also play a role.
Brazilian military leaders firmly believe that a prereq-
uisite for great power status is the ability to explode
a nuclear device.
Despite the fact that Brazil is one of the strongest
and most moderate of the so-called less developed nations,
it still seeks major concessions from the industrial powers
This frequently leads its leaders to adopt aggressive and
uncompromising positions. As one knowledgeable observer
has noted, "The intense focus on rapid modernization tends
to lead Brazilian policy makers to perceive almost all
foreign policy conflicts as potentially threatening to
Brazil's most basic interests."
Brazil still looks to the US for military defense
in the hemisphere and for economic investment, but its
rapidly expanding economy has enabled it to establish
close ties with other powerful nations, thus reducing
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US leverage. Over the past decade the US has lost ground
in trade as Brazil has expanded its exports and imports
to all corners of the globe.
The US still leads other foreign investors by a wide
margin, but West Germany and Japan are moving up quickly.
US investment there--which doubled between 1969-74--now
is approximately $2.4 billion. West European investments
already exceed those from the US and are growing at a
more rapid rate. Moreover, Japanese holdings since 1969
have increased eightfold. Agreements signed during
President Geisel's visit to Tokyo last summer will prob-
ably add $700 million to the current $841 million value
of Japan's direct investment over the next decade.
Washington is clearly no longer as vital to Brazil
as it once was, and its influence will probably decline
further in the coming years. It is becoming increasingly
obvious that Brazil is willing to take economic risks in
its relations with the US on the nuclear issue.
Brazilian intransigence is being reinforced by do-
mestic political developments. President Geisel is
clearly benefiting politically from his refusal to con-
sider revisions in the Brazilian - West German nuclear
accord or to delay its implementation. Under the agree-
ment, West Germany will sell Brazil plans for uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. The support
Geisel is receiving from military leaders and politicians
in both political parties is apparently stiffening his
resolve to persist in his hard-line approach.
Brazilians view US pressure on the nuclear issue as
an insult and have rallied behind Geisel's decision.
Pro-government sentiment is so strong that widely cir-
culating reports that the administration will not permit
direct elections for state governors in 1978, and that
Geisel intends to reorganize the party structure next
month--issues that normally would have produced strong
outcries--have provoked little public comment. Both
rumors, however, are causing extreme uneasiness among
the political opposition.
In the past, the Brazilian government has rarely
used foreign policy issues to rally domestic support; it
has preferred to tie diplomatic relations closely to
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national economic objectives. Brazil regards nuclear
development, however, as essential to continued techno-
logical and economic progress. For this reason it is
increasing its pressure on Bonn to fulfill the terms of
the agreement. Brasilia has strongly intimated that if
the Germans renege on the provisions for reprocessing,
it will look elsewhere to purchase the eight nuclear
reactors--currently worth $4-5 billion--that will pro-
vide 'lolls for thousands of West German technicians.
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