BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR INTENTIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06820733
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-01987
• Publication Date: April 20, 1977

Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
2.
--Strerst
International Issues
EGIONAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS
-Secret
RP All 77-04
20 April 197
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
20 April 1977
CONTENTS
International Issues Division:
Statement of Mission 1
Impact of the US Stand on Human Rights 2
Brazilian Nuclear Intentions 15
The Politics of the G-77: Near-Term Implications
for the North-South Dialogue 21
Less Developed Country Demands for Technology
Transfer 28
The North-South Dialogue and Indonesia 33
UN Water Conference 36
This publication is prepared by the International Issues Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. The views presented are the best judgments of individual
analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to alternative
interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the
authors of the individual articles.
RP All 77-004
20 April 1977
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 006820733
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Brazilian Nuclear Intentions
The announcement by the Federal Republic of Germany
that it has approved export licenses for the transfer of
sensitive nuclear facilities to Brazil marked an im-
portant stage in the implementation of the 1975 FRG-
Brazil nuclear accord. In light of Brazil's determina-
tion to acquire plants that could greatly facilitate an
attempt to fabricate nuclear explosives, we assess
Brazil's actual and prospective intentions in this area.
The Brazilian government does not appear to have
plans to develop nuclear weapons at the present time.
However, two factors could change this situation in the
near future: the succession to the presidency after
Ernes toGeisel of a more nationalistic and "hard-line"
military figure, or heightened apprehensions about the
ambitious Argentine nuclear program.
The current regime in Brasilia appears to have
sincere economic and technical motivations for develop-
ing nuclear technology. Brazil's exposed energy position,
which results from dependence on imports for 80 percent
of its oil and the bulk of its overall energy require-
ments, is a strong incentive to develop nuclear power.
Brazil has a formidable hydroelectric potential, but
this source is probably inadequate to meet more than
about a third of anticipated 1985 energy demands.
Brazil also has a strong desire to catapult itself into
the ranks of the technologically advanced, modern
nations. It sees the access it would gain to high
technology through the West German nuclear deal as a
way of fulfilling these aspirations. Despite concerns
voiced in some quarters that this very access to sensi-
tive aspects of nuclear technology--specifically
uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing--would
pose a nuclear proliferation risk, there is no reliable
evidence that the current Brazilian government actually
intends to divert the German facilities to military or
explosive ends.
RP All 77-004
20 April 1977
�,0�1 5 -
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR
fffi.ce of the...President of the Rukiblici
Definition of nuclear energy policy
1
rMinistry of Mines and Energy
Planning, execution, and control of national nuclear
NATIONAL NUCLEAR ENERGY COMMISSION!
CNEN
1. Standards and authorization
for nuclear installations
licensing
2. Standards on safety and
protection during the construc-
tion and operation of nuclear
installations and in the use of
nuclear materials
3. Supervision and inspection of
nuclear activities in the country
4. Nuclear scientific research
5. Training of scientists,
engineers, and nuclear
researchers
4
ELECTRIC POWER SERVICES!
I__ CONCES.SIONAIRES 1
1. Nuclear powerplant construc-
tion contract
2. Operation of nuclear powerplants
----JELECTROBRASi
1. Advice on decision regarding
concession to build and operate
nuclear powerplants
2. Financing of:nuclear power-
plant construction
energy policy
1. Monopoly in the prospecting,
search and processing of nuclear
minerals
2. Monopoly on production of uranium
concentrates
3. Monopoly on the construction and
operation of plants for:
uranium enrichment
fuel element production
uranium and plutonium reprocessing
4. Monopoly on sale of nuclear
materials
5. Production of nuclear reactors
6. Assistance to provide industry
in production of components for
nuclear installations
7. Nuclear powerplant construction
engineering for electric power
service concessionaires
8. Assistance to electric power
service concessionaires in operation
of nuclear powerplants
9. Operation of nuclear technology
institutes and research centers
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Brazil's stand opposing advanced military develop-
ment of nuclear technology may be altered if present
political patterns change or if the Argentine nuclear
program progresses in a dramatic fashion. While attitudes
of the most likely presidential candidates toward nuclear
weapon development are not well known, some members of
the Brazilian military establishment, from which Geisel's
successor will be drawn, are likely to give more serious
attention in the future to the military application of
nuclear technology. If a highly nationalistic figure
should ascend to the presidency in 1979, the chance of
the Brazilian military for getting a green light on
nuclear development would be increased.* The Argentine
nuclear program is developing rapidly and may accentuate
a long-standing rivalry with Brazil. Recent intelligence
estimates indicate that Argentina, which is quickly mov-
ing to develop an independent fuel cycle, could conceiv-
ably produce a nuclear explosive within two years.
Neither Argentina nor Brazil is a Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) adherent. Brazil has complained that the
NPT is discriminatory against nonweapon states and in
the past indicated it wished to be free to develop its
own nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes (PNEs).
Brazilian political leaders are currently avoiding dis-
cussion of PNEs, probably to deflect attention from the
fact they have not renounced this option. The PNE route
is thus left open for the present and future governments
to demonstrate Brazil's nuclear prowess, if a perceived
need should arise.
* Geisel's successor will take office in March 1979 for
a six-year term. If the West German nuclear agreement is
carried out, Brazil will obtain all or most of the nu-
clear fuel cycle during that period. While there is
little information on the attitudes of the major presi-
dential possibilities toward nuclear weapons development,
there are philosophical differences between two senior
military leaders which could be pertinent. General
Reynaldo Mello de Almeida, a political moderate and a
man of intellectual bent, would most likely view nuclear
technology as a tool to sustain Brazil's economic growth.
(Footnote continued on following page.)
RP All 77-004
20 April 1977
-17 -
-SE-61441--
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
MILITARY
-
MILITARY NUCLEAR SECTOR
Ministry of the Army
Department of Research and Training
(DEP)
Directorate of Research and Technical
Instruction (DPET)
Military Engineering Institute (IME)
*Heavy Water Research and Development
Group (GPD/APE)
(Chief)
[General Sylvio Couto
Coelho da Frota]
[General Ariel Pacca
da Fonseca]
[General Ayrton Ribeiro
da Silveira]
[General Paulo Cesar
Pinheinro Menezes]
* In the past has produced reports advocating development of
nuclear explosives
RP All 77-004
20 April 1977
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
It appears unlikely that Brazil entered into its
agreement with West Germany to purchase enrichment and
reprocessing facilities with the firm intention of us-
ing them to build nuclear explosives. Indeed, there is
some indication that President Geisel has specifically
ordered that there be no discussion within the military
of development of nuclear weapons. Geisel's views are
probably not shared by all parts of the military estab-
lishment. The Armed Forces General Staff has emphasized
the necessity of keeping part of Brazil's nuclear re-
search structure free of safeguards, presumably to
leave the nuclear explosives option open. While Geisel's
wishes will probably not be openly challenged during the
next two years, pro-nuclear views could remain latent
now but emerge later. All the nuclear facilities sold
under the 1975 accord with West Germany are to be covered
by extensive international safeguards, more stringent
than those provided by the NPT. Brazil even agreed not
to duplicate the German facilities and not to use them
to build PNEs. If the Brazilians later decide to develop
a nuclear explosive facility, they might violate their
agreements or draw indirectly on the acquired technology
to construct indigenous facilities.
Thus Brazil's capability to build nuclear weapons
will clearly be increased by implementation of the FRG
deal. But Brazil will not necessarily "drift" into a
nuclear weapons program. A decision to do so would be
conscious and made at the highest levels, and probably
only after considerable debate the consideration of the
implications for Brazil's foreign relations.
* (Footnote continued from previous page.)He has publicly
defended the West German agreement but has privately ex-
pressed uncertainty as to the long-term benefits for
Brazil and has voiced the opinion that by signing the
treaty Brazil may have pawned herself to another nation.
The nuclear views of another presidential possibility,
General Joao Baptista Figueiredo, are not a matter of
record. He is chief of the National Intelligence Service
and is associated with then/lard-line" conservative fac-
tion of the militaru.I
Figuel.redo is obsessed with
national security. Therefore, any perceived advances by
Argentina in the nuclear weapons field would probably
stimulate activity in that area in Brazil during a
Figueiredo administration.
RP All 77-004
20 April 1977
-19 -
46CAF-T�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733
M C I
Proposals that Brazil
go ahead and develop purely
national nuclear reactors
have already been made by
leading members of the
Brazilian scientific com-
munity. These reactors
would use natural (unen-
riched) uranium in heavy
water or graphite moderated
reactors. It is notable
that the scientists making
these suggestions are far
removed from the centers of
political power and not
viewed with favor by the
military regime. In fact,
the mere suggestion that
Brazil alter its plans for
cooperation with West Ger-
many along the agreed upon
lines appears to have led
to attempts by the Brazil-
ian government to suppress
these opinions.
Brazil's Angra I nuclear power plant
(under construction)
Signs that Brazil might be more actively consider-
ing developing a nuclear explosive or weapons option
have not yet been detected. The construction of indigenous
unsafeguarded natural uranium reactors would be a
critical benchmark. Other warning signals would be ex-
pansion of the nuclear engineering and research efforts
of the Brazilian military. In the past the Brazilian
military has had a small group working on heavy-water
production. The head of this group was an active advocate
of nuclear arms. He has not risen to political prominence,
however, and his views appear to have carried little
weight. A sudden increase in this individual's impor-
tance might signal a serious new interest by the military
in the nuclear option.
RP All 77-004
20 April 1977
-20 -
-RE�CFrET�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/11 C06820733