THE IRAQI OPPOSITION: STRUGGLING TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06805183
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-02412
• Publication Date: April 26, 1993

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Directorate
of Intelligence
Intelligence Memorandum
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
26 April 1993
The Iraqi Opposition:
Struggling To Make a
Difference
Summary
The fledgling Iraqi National Congress has the potential to
develop into an instrument of pressure on the regime of
President Saddam Husayn, but has poor prospects for amassing
broad support inside Iraq or deposing the Iraqi leader. After
two years of halting efforts to build unity, the numerous groups
that make up the organization still agree on little beyond their
mutual goal to overthrow Saddam. The opposition movement
in general, including groups outside the Congress, is plagued
by divergent goals, personal rivalries, and intimidation by
Baghdad. Most opposition leaders have been exiled from Iraq
for many years and have little popular support, military
capability, or name recognition inside the country. The
support these groups derive from Iran, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia, with their differing and often competing interests,
hinders unity, and the perception that they are outsiders
detracts from the groups' credibility inside Iraq. Opposition
competition for influence could contribute to protracted
instability in Iraq after Saddatn falls. Only those opposition
leaders--particularly the Kurds and some Shias--who have
established support inside to play important
roles in a post-Saddam Iraq.
This memorandum was prepared of Near Eastern
and South Asian
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The Iraqi Oppoition: Struggling To Make a Difference-7
The Iraqi opposition movement comprises numerous ethnic, political, and religious
groups based abroad, principally in Middle Eastern and Western capitals. Most
opposition leaders have been exiled from Iraq for many years and--with the exception of
some Kurdish and Shia leaders--have limited popular support, military capability, or
name recognition inside the country. Outside backers frequently vie for control of
individual groups and for greater influence over the movement as a whole. Since the
Gulf war the number of new and splinter groups; individual dissidents, and umbrella
organizations has burgeoned, complicating efforts to unify the opposition and
intensifying competition between its sponsors.
The Western-backed Iraqi National Congress offers the opposition its best chance to
press Iraqi President Saddarn Husayn. Since its founding in June 1992, the Congress has
made visible progress in building unity and articulating a pluralistic, democratic national
agenda. The organization has capitalized on the widespread and deep-seated hatre4 of
Saddam to assume nominal leadership of most Iraqi opposition groups
Despite this progress, the Congress still faces serious challenges to its viability.
Arab Sunnis, Shins, and regional sponsors are concerned about the
large Kurdish role in the organization. Kurdish aspirations for self-determination and
federalism are part of the Congress's platform arid a point of con:cation with other
members. Damascus and Tehran have pressed their opposition clients to oppose the
policy. Arab Sunni and Shia groups seek a more proportionate representation in the
Congress's Presidential Council and Executive Committee and seine Shins want a more
Islamic agenda. The group has taken steps to assuage regional concerns about the Kurds
and to include more Shias and Sunnis, but such
measures have not eliminated these contentious issues and suggest they will continue to
generate underlying tensions
� This memorandum deals only with Iraqis who have innoteical themselves as oppositionisti and operate in exile.
Iraqis who are most likely to topple Saddam someday me those close to him in hit rosins. rj,r seem* forces.
Consi?eratioanfiliese Iraqi oppositionists- is beyond the imps of this
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. Looking For Greater Support from Washington
Iraqi National Congress delegates who are visiting the United States this week will
seek greater political and financial support and assurances that the United States is not
softening its stance on Iraq. The delegation is led by the Congress's Presidential
council, which includes the Damascus-based Suruti leader Hasan al-N ib Kurdish
leader Masud Barzani, and London-based Shia cleric Bahr al-Ulum.
Congress leaders will bring
reques
inclu mg:
� Creation of a security zone in southern Iraq.
� Help in lifting Baghdad's blockade of northern Iraq
� Placement of UN human rights monitors throughout Iraq.
� Establishment of a war crimes tribunal.
� Help in obtaining support from Iraq's neighbors.
� Money to create a Liberation Army under Congress control.
the Congress's agenda will also include a request to extend the
no-fly zones to include central Iraq and to release Iraqi funds now in frozen accounts
to the Congress.
The dissidents have little to offer in exchange for US aid. Congress leaders have yet
to follow through with a promise to issue
a statement recognizine Kuwaiti soveieignty and the newly demarcated Iraq-Kuwait
border.
Another important Congress objective will be to obtain assurances that Washington
will not reduce pressure on the regime of Saddam Husayn. Recent US press reports
claiming "depersonalization" of Washington's Iraq policy and rumors of impending
cuts in support to the dissidents have made Congress leaders nervous.
In response to any perceived erosion of
wastungton s support, some opposition leaders may reduce cooperation with the
Congress and increase contacts with regional supporters like Iran Syria, or Saudi
Arabia, presenting further risks to opposition unity.
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The Kurds�Strongest Opposition Faction
Iraqi Kurds, with a long history of resistance to the central government, are the most
powerful and organized opposition to Saddam, have the most cohesive base inside Iraq,
and are a strong component of the Iraqi National Cong.ess. The Kurds have had some
success since the Gulf war in asserting their political autonomy from Baghdad and
forming basic institutions of government and local administration, including a Kurdish
legislature, Council of Ministers, and a nominally unified Kurdish opposition front. The
primary Kurdish leaders, Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, compete with each other for
leadership of the Kurds and the allegiance of many smaller Kurdish political and tribal
groups Barzani and Talaban, also represent the eight-group Kurdish Front in the
Congress.
Despite the Kurds' recent success in asserting autonomy, their unity will remain
vulnerable to recurring personal rivalries, interference by Iran and Turkey, and economic
and military pressure by Baghdad. The regime's economic embargo of northern Iraq and
effectiveness in impeding UN humanitarian and security activities there could eventually
motivate some Kurdish leaders to break ranks and seek an accommodation with Baghdad
to ensure their survival and well-being. Moreover, Kurdish unity depends on Western
political support, symbolized by Operation Provide Comfort and the coalition-imposed
no-fly zone above the 36th parallel. A significant reduction in such support probably
would cause some Kurds. oricularly Mas'ud Barzani, to reopen negotiations with
Baghdad.
The Shias�Disorganized and Dominated by Iran
exiled Arab Shia groups are highly factionalized, heavily
influenced by Iran, and wary of Western intentions and other dissidents. Tehran created
the largest Shia opposition group--the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq--headed by Iraqi cleric Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim. Tehran also holds sway over the
second largest group, the divided Da'wa Party. Both groups have been contentious
participants in the Iraqi National Congress. Tehran provides these groups substantial
financial, political, and military support, as well as access across the Iranian border to
Shia areas of southern Iraq. Tehran also supports several Iraqi Shia military forces in
Iran and maintains contact with rebel units in southern Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Shia
rebels' persistent lack of unity and military coordination has kept them from advan!ing
beyond small-scale hit-and-run attacks against regime forces
Tehran's control of its Iraqi clients has fragmented the exiled Shia opposition and
alienated many Iraqi Shias who, like their Arab Sunni countrymen, fear domination by
Iran. Published theological debate shows that many Iraqi Shias oppose the Iranian
system of clerical rule and resent Tehran's perceived aspirations to create an Iraqi regime
in its own image. Sharp disagreements over the extent to which to submit to Iran's
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control have have split the Da'wa Party. Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim�with Tehran's tacit
support--is trying to portray himself as independent of Tehran in a so far unsuccessful
effort to broaden his Iraqi and foreign support and protect Shia and Iranian interests in
the -backed hal* National Congress
The Rest�More Talk Than Action
Other exiled Iraqi opposition groups share the problems of internal rivalries, divergent
agendas, and competition for sponsors, but have the additional impediment of a weak or
non-existent infrastructure inside Iraq. These groups comprise a broad range of secular,
religious, political, and ethnic groups based in London, Damascus, and Saudi Arabia.
Many are members of the Iraqi National Congress, but a few Syrian- and Saudi-backed
groups, under pressure from their sponsors, have tried to form rival organizations:
� Some independent London-based groups, such as the Iraqi National Union and the
Independent Iraqi Alliance�both Congress members--comprise a mixture of mostly
liberal and secular Sunnis and Shias. Many individual oppositionists from various
political and religious backrounds�including Congress members Ahmad Chalabi,
Hani Fukayki, Layth Kubba, and Muhammad Muhammad Ali�also reside in
London.
� Syria controls a handful of Arab Sunni and nationalist groups and former Iraqi
officials and officers, including renegade elements of the Iraqi Bath Party, the Iraqi
Free Officers movement, and some small Communist groups.
�
Saudi Arabia holds sway over a small number of Sunni groups and individuals,
including a splinter faction of the Iraqi National Union led by Salah Urnar al-All, and
former Iraqi officials Ibrahim Da'ud and Arshad Tawfiq. Riyadh also backs a newly
formed group�intended to rival the Iraqi National Congress�led by Sad Salih Jabir
who also heads the London-based Free Iraq Council
Many of these dissidents began to oppose Saddam publicly only after he invaded Kuwait
and are perceived by many Iraqis and sponsors as opportunists eager to enrich themselves
with Western and Arab support, None have a significant
following inside Iraq or measurable military capability. We believe they could play
meaningful roles in a new regime only if most of the current Ba'thi7 military and
political apparatus were swept away with Saddam
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The Role of Foreign Backers--With Friends Like These...
The diverse goals of sponsors in the region reduces the chances the opposition can
succeed against Saddam. Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia all compete for control of
individual groups and greater influence over the opposition movement as a whole.
Although each aims toward Saddam's downfall, all are using the opposition to further
more narrow interests:
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Syrian intent is to replace Saddam with a regime of (b)(1)
BaIlust military officers or Arab Sunni nationalists sympathetic to Damascus. (b)(3)
Syria's concern that Kurdish federalism will contribute to the fragmentation of Iraq
and create several unstable and possibly hostile entities on its eastern border have led
it to oppose the Iraqi National Congress, and Damascus has repeatedly tried to
obstruct Congress efforts to unite the oPposition. Syria also competes with Iran for
influence over Iraqi Shia groups to broaden its sway over the opposition movement
as a whole.
believe Iran's primary aim is to use its Iraqi
. Shia clients and its contacts with Iraqi Kurds to gain influence inside Iraq,
particularly in a post-Saddam regime. Tehran has tried to lure Iraqi Kurdish
opposition leadersinto�ratinagainstIranianKurdishdissients.whnarebs
in northern Iraq
Saudi Arabia's involvement in the opposition is aimed
at ensuring the continuation of Arab Surmi rule in Iraq and preventing the
fragmentation of the country which could leave a large, Iranian-backed Shia
enclave on Saudi Arabia's northern border. Riyadh's attempts over the last two years
to recruit Iraqi dissidents backed by Iran and Syria suggests in part that it intends to
use these clients and contacts to foment discord between Iran and Syria to further
isolate Iran in the region.
All three sponsors of the Iraqi opposition have expressed doubt
that the opposition will achieve enugh unitv.militry strength, or influence to seriously
threaten Saddam's hold on power.
Saddam's Agents--Trying To Terrorize Dissidents
Saddam's campaign of terrorism, intimidation, and propaganda threatens to set back
opposition activities inside Iraq and abroad. Iraqi operatives over the last year have
carried out assassinations and bombings against dissidents in northern Iraq and Jordan:
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believe Baghdad is behind numerous bombings
opposition offices in northern Iraq, as well
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smce the Gulf war of Kurdish and other
as assassinations and attempted poisonings
of regime opponents,
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establish a network of informants and assassins in northern Iraq to monitor and
eliminate regime opponents
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Many
Iraqi Arab Sunnis are receptive to
Saddam's propaganda that portrays the
opposition as traitors and Western lackeys
bent on partitioning Iraq.
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Saddam is showering some Shia tribal
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leaders
with cash, gifts, and weapons in exchange
for their support against Shia rebels
and dissident tribes.
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After Saddam�Little To Bind the Factions
Saddam's ouster would probably find Iraqi oppositionists still arguing over basic issues
and unable to implement a coordinated plan for a post-Saddam government A sustained
period of unity before Saddam's departure would help the opposition build influence
inside Iraq, but it would have a long way to go to develo the olitical and military
muscle necessary to make it a viable political entity.
Opposition competition for power in a post-Saddam regime would contribute to a
protracted period of instability in Iraq. In the worst case, opposition demands, rivalries,
and military moves could increase domestic tensions or lead to violence that a new and
weaker regime would find difficult to control. These could lead to civil war and the
partitioning of the country�at least temporarily�into several ethnic/sectarian enclaves.
Despite the stated intent of almost all opposition leaders to maintain Iraq's territorial
integrity, their demonstrated lack of coordination would limit their ability to stem
widespread unrest. In any case, we believe Saddam would not be succeeded by the kind
of pluralistic, democratic government envisioned by the Iraqi National Congress, but
some opposition leaders, particularly those with strong domestic constituencies like the
Kurds, could play important roles in post-Saddam Iraq.
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