BURR, WILLIAM; LETTER OF APPEAL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00668985
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 87
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2020
• Case Number: F-2011-00563
• Publication Date: August 25, 1998

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The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
25 August 1998
Agency Release Panel
c/o Mr. Lee Strickland
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20520
Re: F92-2660
Dear Mr. Strickland,
08/31/98
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
nsarchiv @ gwu.edu
http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive
This letter constitutes an administrative appeal under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 (a) (6). Through a
letter dated 7 July 1998, you provided me with a number of
intelligence reports concerning the Berlin situation during 1958-
1960, with most of them excised under the (b) (1) and (b) (3)
exemptions. For your convenience, I enclose a copy of your
decision letter.
I greatly appreciate the CIA's efforts to locate and
review these reports and release substantial portions of them.
Nevertheless, I ask that CIA initiate a fresh, line-by-line
review of these documents to determine whether any information
can be released from them without violating statute or executive
order requirements. I also ask CIA to determine whether any
substantive portions can be segregated from paragraphs that
disclose intelligence sources and methods that no longer remain
sensitive.
Most of the documents at issue in this appeal had excisions
relating to various types of intelligence information: that
concerning U.S. allies, such as the France, West Germany, and the
U.K., that derived through means that were secret at the time of
the Berlin crisis or which otherwise shed light on West Berlin's
role as an intelligence base. I believe, however, that CIA
should be able to release much of this information because in
recent years other federal agencies have routinely declassified
it. If the Agency's reviewers take into account declassified
intelligence information that other agencies have already
released, it should be able to declassify information relating to
all three of those categories without violating statue or
executive order.
The CIA's reviewers have consistently excised from these
documents almost any indication that the U.S. government was
interested in the perspectives of its allies in Berlin: France,
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the United Kingdom, or West Germany. Likewise, the reviewers
have withheld the section concerning "Western Statements" on
Berlin from the 8 May 1960 OCI "Handbook on the Berlin Problem."
I find it difficult to believe that any French, British, or West
German statements that were included in this "secret/noforn"
document are still so sensitive that they must continue to be
withheld almost forty years later. Other agencies, including the
State Department and the National Security Council have already
released so much formerly secret reporting on the attitude of
Allies during the Berlin crisis that CIA should be able to
release additional information on this point. For example, the
National Security Council has declassified a series of briefing
papers for the President, including the regular "Synopsis of
State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President,"
various dates, that-include information derived from intelligence
sources on allied attitudes toward the Berlin situation (see
enclosure 1). Moreover, the State Department has declassified
its own intelligence analyses and reporting on the French,
British, West German, and West Berlin government thinking about
the Berlin problem (see enclosure 2). It seems to me that if NSC
and State can release material of this sort then the CIA should
also be in a position to release information on allied attitudes.
At least one deletion, most likely about an allied
government, may be found in the chronology (annex 1) to the 23
November 1958 OCI report entitled "The Berlin Situation."
Information about an event on 17 November 1958 is deleted. I
suspect that this redaction has to do with a famous British
Foreign Office memorandum suggesting the possibility of
recognizing the former German Democratic Republic. The British,
however, made this memorandum available to the State Department
and it is summarized and analyzed in the Department's Foreign
Relations volume on the Berlin crisis (see enclosure 3) as well
as in a briefing for President Eisenhower on the "status of
Berlin," 25 November 1958 (see the first item in enclosure 2).
Again if the NSC and the State Department could release reporting
on the British memorandum, then CIA should be able to declassify
information about it in one of its reports. I suspect that among
the other excisions in this case there other instances of
withheld information about U.S. allies that came from the State
Department or U.S. embassies. Again, information of this sort
should be readily declassifiable and not automatically exempt
merely because it is about a close ally.
CIA may also have withheld material relating to intelligence
activities in Berlin or intelligence sources and methods.
Perhaps some of this information is properly classified but in
the years since the end of the Cold War, both the State
Department and U.S. military agencies have released detailed
information on intelligence activities in and around West Berlin.
For example, the State Department has declassified a document
about the role of the Marienfelde Refugee Reception Center in
gathering intelligence information on developments in East
Germany and the Soviet Union (see enclosure 4). Moreover, the
U.S. Army has declassified one of the annual histories of the
Berlin Command which discloses the Command's routine intelligence
collection activities and the targets of those activities (see
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enclosure 5). The Defense Department has declassified additional
information on the electronic eavesdropping activities that the
Command conducted against the former GDR (see enclosure 6). The
State Department and the Defense Departments have also released
information on the intelligence-gathering activities of the U.S.
Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in East Germany (see enclosure 6
and 7). Further, the National Security Council has declassified
a memorandum of discussion between President Eisenhower. and Allen
Dulles discussing Berlin as an intelligence base (see enclosure
8). With such documentation coming into the public domain, any
information in these documents discussing Berlin as an
intelligence base or otherwise discussing formerly sensitive
information derived from refugee interviews, electronic
eavesdropping, etc., should be readily declassifiable.
I also want to bring to your attention other previously
declassified documents that may include information that has been
excised from these reports. Declassified reports of the U.S.
Intelligence Board's Watch Committee may include information that
the CIA has excised from the USIB reports at issue-in this
appeal. For example, the reports from 27 February and 13 March
1959 (enclosure 9) include information about East German anti-
aircraft weapons and the operational readiness of the CGSF that
may be excised from "Special Report No. 1." or "Special Report
No. 2." Moreover, the Watch Committee report for 10 April 1959
(see enclosure 10) includes details on concerning restrictions on
the movements of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission that may be
withheld from "Special Report No. 5."
I also question whether CIA should unilaterally make decisions
on the declassification of these special reports on Berlin. For
example, given the CIA's apparent decision to excise references
to the 17 November 1958 British memo I suspect that other
withheld information on allied attitudes that appeared in the
USIB reports may also be derived from the U.S. embassy or other
State Department reporting. As the State Department has already
declassified its already voluminous embassy reporting on the
Berlin problem, I urge that CIA coordinate its response to this
appeal with State to determine whether it has any objection to
release of the withheld material from a foreign policy point of
view. Likewise, other information may be based on reporting by
Army or Air Force intelligence. Again, the review of this
information could best be coordinated with those organizations.
Thank you for considering this appeal.
sincerely,
William Burr
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Washington. C 20.50
Mr. William Burr
The National Security Archive
The Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Reference: F92-2660 (formerly F90-0858)
Dear Mrs. Burr:
(4001/iel 010
JUL 0 7 1998
RECEIVED JUL 1 6 1998
This is a final response to your Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) request of 21 May 1990 for "articles on the Berlin
crisis published in any CIA weekly or monthly intelligence
summaries or reports, between November 10, 1958 and December
31, 1960."
We have located documents responsive to your request
which were reviewed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. �
552 as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. � 431,
and have made the following determinations:
Enclosed, Tab A, are 53 documents, numbered 1 through
53, which can be released to you in sanitized form. The
deleted material is being denied on the basis of FOIA
exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). An explanation of the FOIA
exemptions is enclosed at Tab B.
CIA material responsive to your request that requires
coordination with other agencies has not been returned to us
as of this date. In order to avoid further delay in
processing your request we shall send that material, if it is
determined to be releasable, when received by us.
The official responsible for the above determinations is
Lee S. Strickland, Information and Privacy Coordinator. You
have the right to appeal these determinations. Should you
decide to do this, please address your appeal hrough me to
the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from th:b date of this
letter. Please explain the basis of your appeal.
Charges that were incurred during the processing of this
request consist of a ten cents per page copying fee beyond
the first 100 pages. Since the total page count is 825, the
fee amounts to $72.50. Please send your check or money order
in the amount of $72.50 to me, payable to the Treasurer of
the United States, adding our reference number, F92-2660.
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82 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII Khrushchev's November 10 Speech 83
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45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Germany
Washingtc November 1;�1.958, 7:45 p.m.
1012. Paris for Embassy and USRO. British Embassy as given De-
partment memorandum' setting foLth Eareign_afice views on current
Be � � � s asked whether De artnLageesvith analy-
sis. Following is substance o memoran um.
We should proceed on assumption Soviets will sooner or later
"hand over to sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are still
maintained by Soviet organs" as Khrushchev threatened in November
10 speech.
Among Soviet motives are (1) desire create atmosphere of crisis
which could produce climate of opinion in West favorable to high-level
discussions of future of Germany, in which Soviets would support re-
vised Rapacki Plan as measure to deny nuclear capability to Bundes-
wehr (Khrushchev considers that Americans are on point of supplying
West German forces with nuclear weapons and it may not be too late to
prevent this) and (2) desire force Western Powers ultimately to recog-
nize GDR, in order to consolidate satellite empire and imprison Poland
within status quo.
We cannot prevent Khrushchev from carrying out his threat; main
question is decide how react when he does it.
We must proceed from assumption we would resort to force, with
all risks that entails, rather than submit to Berlin's being starved out. But
immediate issue is whether submit to dealing with GDR representatives
on practical matters relating to transport and communications on same
basis we have hitherto dealt with Soviets.
It is clearly in our interest agree in practice we should deal with rep-
resentatives of GDR rather than refuse do so and thus precipitate new
blockade of Berlin which in last resort might have to be broken by force.
It would therefore seem worthwhile work out set of rules for our
authorities which would enable them when time came to deal with GDR
authorities without implying this action constituted recognition of GDR
Government and while maintaining theory Soviets remain responsible.
But such modus vivendi would not be allowed operate for very
long, if at all. We would soon find ourselves faced with further choice of
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1758. Secret; Limit Distribu-
tion. Drafted by McKiernan; cleared by Hillenbrand, Fessenden, EE, and BNA; and ap-
proved by Kohler. Repeated to London, Berlin, Paris, and Moscow.
A copy of the full text of the British memorandum was transmitted to Bonn in in-
struction CA-4536, November 20. (Ibid., 762.00/11-2058)
recognizing GDR or exposing Berlin to blockade which would in last re-
sort have to be broken by force. Khrushchev, who has been for long time
in position oblige us make this choice, has probably calculated we
would prefer recognize GDR. "So far as UK concerned, he would be
right." Nobody in West would believe avoiding recognition of GDR is
worth a war.
In short, we may have to choose between:
(a) abandoning Berlin;
(b) resorting to force;
(c) staying in Berlin but dealing with and, if necessary, ultimately
recognizing GDR.
"Course (a) is out of the question and course (c) is greatly to be pre-
ferred to course (b)."
Our decision re dealing with GDR must depend partly on our abil-
ity stage a successful airlift and continue it indefinitely, which Foreign
Office believes may be impossible. Airlift difficulties are such that it is
unlikely blockade could be resisted for longer than about fifteen
months. Would seem prudent accept this estimate for political planning
purposes.
Foreign Office is instructing British Embassy Bonn (1) push on with
negotiations with Federal Republic regarding facilities which would be
required from latter in event of airlift (financial aspect of airlift and ap-
propriate Federal Republic contribution will also require consideration
and (2) concert with US and French Embassies estimates of require-
ments of "miniature airlift" which would take care of Allied official and
military traffic only.
Full text follows by pouch.
British Embassy Paris has handed same memorandum to French
Foreign Office.
Addressees' comments urgently invited.2
Dulles
21n telegram 1065, November 18,8 p.m., Trimble replied that the British memoran-
dum was "defeatist" and based on the assumption that the West had no effective reaction
to Soviet moves in Berlin, an assumption that he did not share as long as the Soviet Union
was not prepared to risk war. (Ibid., 762.0221/11-1858) On November 19 and 20 the Em-
bassies in London and Paris replied. The former reported that the paper was hastily drawn
up and uncharacteristic of Macmillan's thinking, and noted that it agreed with the sub-
stance of telegram 1065 from Bonn. (Telegram 2737; ibid., 762.0221/11-1958) The Embassy
in Paris reported that the French Foreign Ministry was "very disturbed at weakness
shown in British memo", but that Couve considered it an intelligent statement of the case.
(Telegram 1862; ibid., 762.00/11-1958)
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86 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII
49. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the
Department of State
London, November 19, 1958, 5 p.m.
2752. Reference: Embtel 2737.' As were leaving a small dinner at
Gray's Inn last night I mentioned quite casually to Selwyn Lloyd that I
wondered whether we were not getting off our joint track re Berlin. It
was immediately apparent that! had struck a nerve and he asked me if I
would upon leaving the party come with him to his house. The.re_weizlis-
cussed UK memo' which I told him we had seen and which had oth-
ered me consideraiy since itined tQimply that thepreferred British
position involved the recognition of the East German Government. He
had not seen, he said, the whole messagrwherrit-volts-senrairertraretnot
have his specific approval. However, it was quite apparent that it had a
lot of his thinking in it. At the end of our discussion during which it was
clear to me that he was fearful that his office had loosed off a premature
rocket he asked that I not report our talk immediately but that we meet
again "with as many people as you want to bring" at noon the following
morning. After meeting with Lloyd at Foreign Office this morning, I be-
lieve we have obtained some clarification of British views and may
eliminate certain misunderstandings occasioned by original FonOff
memorandum.
Lloyd said that memorandum should certainly not be regarded as
more thiLutimuIrls for disnrsgan, since he had checked with none or
his colleagues in government. He said that he was anxious we should
remain on "same wavelength" re Berlin problem, but apparently we
had received impression that British Government way out ahead re
question recognition of GDR. Reading text of Bonn's 1065 to Depart-
ment,' he said that he could agree with everything stated in paragraphs
1, 2,4, 6, and 7. Paragraph 5 based on misunderstanding of British point,
and real point of difference between us that discussed in paragraph 3.3
Lloyd said that no disagreement about our being on "slippery slope"
when we begin to make de facto arrangements with GDR, but in British
view bottom of slope would be reached by recognition of GDR, and they
saw no reason why this should lead to our ejection from Berlin. We sug-
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762L0/11-1958. Secret; Priority; Limited
Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.
'See footnote 2, Document 45.
25 Document 45.
3 Paragraph 5 of telegram 1065 discussed how much the Western powers could deal
directly with the East Germans without recognizing them.
Khrushchev's November 10 Speech 87
gested that slope might not end there, and it would in any event involve
major revision of our policy against partition of Germany. We doubted
that it would be acceptable to Adenauer.
Lloyd said that everything of course depended upon acceptability
to Federal Republic. British first choice was that there be no change in
existing arrangement, and if Soviets or GDR interfered with access to
Berlin we should respond vigorously in first place. He did not agree
with his staff on ineffectiveness of air lift, feeling that if it could be main-
tained twelve months, that was as good as indefinitely. However, air lift
would be a nuisance and would involve large expenses which Germans
could afford much better than British. Lloyd felt that it would be absurd
of West Germans to refuse to deal with East Germans, if we made it clear
that we intended to stay in Berlin. Main point of British suggestion,
which had possibly been misunderstood, was that if West Germans
were to decide to make arrangements with GDR rather than bear cost of
provisioning Berlin, and such arrangements led or amounted to West
German recognition of GDR, certainly British for their part would have
no objection, no need to be more royal than the King. It all depended on
what West Germans willing to do.
We suggested that our presence in Berlin and position vis-�is So-
viets involved more than merely German considerations (i.e. what West
Germans willing to accept). It seemed to us of significance for NATO
and whole East-West position over and beyond West Germans and Ber-
liners.
Lloyd summed up by saying that there was not much difference be-
tween us. It was clear we could not go against wishes of Federal Repub-
lic, provided they realized that we might have to submit to some de
facto arrangements. This would create danger of slide toward recogni-
tion, and there was something in point that it might confirm partition of
Germany, which Lloyd would be against. However, we were not quite
in agreement that recognition of GDR would lead to further slide to-
ward our physical removal from Berlin. Agreed that at latter point issue
of force would be raised. Lloyd was worried lest British memorandum
gave impression that UK "almost welcomed" recognition, and hoped
that Germans would not receive wrong impression. Couve de Murville
had agreed with him that merely implied recognition of GDR was better
than risk of war. Lloyd felt that purpose of memorandum would be
served if it led to further study of problem, before Berlin situation be-
came acute.
I informed him that no instructions had been received from Depart-
ment, but I had wished to obtain his considered views for Department's
information.
As our meeting broke up, I asked Lloyd what he thought
Adenauer's attitude would be about recognition of GDR if this became
Khrushchev's November 10 Speech 89
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88 Foreign. Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII
issue. He replied that question will not arise in such clear cut way, but
there will be a de facto process which would lead step by step towards
Whitney
recogniti0n.4
4 In telegram 2753 from I...ondon, November 17 at 5 p.m., Whitney reported a further
discussion of the memorandum between an Embassy officer and a Foreign Office official
during which the latter indicated that the British could never go to war over the question
of recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The official stressed further that the
British were uncertain of the strength of the Federal Republic on the issue and would not
incur risks over Berlin if the West Gerrnans were reluctant to make sacrifices on the ques-
tion. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958)
at Berlin to the Department of
50. Telegram from the Mission
State
Berlin, November 19, 1958, midnight.
360. Paris also pass Topol. Re Deptel 236) Mission interprets UK
position as based on assumption "we cannot prevent Khrushchev from
carrying out his threat" and proceeding to acceptance inevitable recog-
nition GDR. nusttain d "course C"
tinued Allied occu-
ni i orded GDR four- ower statfi;c7t-
stripped of legal
pation Berlin. Once r
.10
ci
While compromises possible which could prolong Allied "occupa-
basis.
tion" in one form or another, stated objective of Communists is to get
Allies out and continued pressures, harassments and threats would, we
believe, force us ultimately either abandon city or resort to force. Mean-
while, with "writing on wall," there little expectation city could survive
economically with industry depending on GDR acquiescence for im-
ports -exports and Allied position on wane.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958. Secret; Priority. Also
sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.
I Printed as telegram 1012 to Bonn, Document 45.
llied occupation cit
British suggestion of GDR recognition appears ignore fact that all of
Berlin is claimed as capital GDR. It also overlooks effect such recogni-
tion on East German population and on stability GDR which could em-
bark on harder Stalinist program internally and appreciably step up
pressure on FedRep. UK proposal appears ignore fact that Berlin policy
is but one segment of our German policy. Ramifications of our recogniz-
ing GDR would be manifold. One clear result would be to discredit our
firmest German friends who support Western European integration
policy and encourage disenchantment US leadership, with probable
consequent boosting of stock of German neutralists. British, it seems to
us, have failed to recognize that Sovs deal with Berlin as part of world
power balance.
For foregoing reasons, mission has viewed askance any steps in di-
rection acceptance GDR control of access routes even allowing GDR
"agents" place date stamp on surface travel orders as tripartite policy
now envisages should GDR take over controls (Berlin tel 298 to Bonn,
rptd Dept 345).2 In mission view, basic decision needed on whether:
1. Allies play for time allowing GDR to nibble away until Allied
position untenable, thus postponing day of decision re use force or
abandoning city. Berlin's economic position likely suffer severely mean-
while.
2. We take forthright stand now by refusing accept GDR controls
in any form and making clear our determination remain Berlin.
On basic assumption of British that we cannot prevent Khrushchev
from carrying out threat, we leave it to the appropriate world capitals to
determine whether this assumption is correct. We hope it is not. We be-
lieve that trap Soviets are laying for us could result in such serious con-
sequences that every effort should be made to stop them.
We venture one suggestion:
Khrushchev statements on Berlin beginning Nov 10 have implied
willingness negotiate question and at least some Soviet and Soy Bloc in-
terpretations of that speech seem to have piaced Khrushchev declara-
tion within framework all-German settlement. Important factor now
would seem to be to insure that possible four-power negotiations not
begin under Soviet preconditions. Allies might therefore consider pro-
posing immediate four-power conference with sufficiently vague and
limited preconditions to permit Soviet acceptance without loss of face.
Idea would be to take advantage of what may be short-lived opportu-
2 Telegram 298, November 16, reported that at a meeting on November 14 the three
Western Political Advisers had reached agreement on tripartite positions on air access to
Berlin and procedures to be followed if the Soviet Union transferred its remaining occupa-
tion responsibilities to the East Germans. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/
11-1658)
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�
November 25, 1958
Briefing on Status of Berlin Crisis
1. Developments, 18 Nov. - 25 Nov.
a. A British working-level paper was received by State on
November 18. It indicated a readiness not only to deal with East
German authorities but also eventually to recognize East Germany
rather than expose Berlin to a blockade which would in the last re-
sort have to be broken by force. A conversation of Ambassador
Whitney with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd indicated that the Foreign Secretary
thought that there was no reason why the recogniticnofth
should
1i-n. He also said that French
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville agreed with him that implied
recognition of the East German regime was better than the risk of
war.
b. Ambassador Srnirnov on November 20 informed Chancellor
co
Adenauer of Soviet plans to abolish the "Occupation Statute" for Berlin.
The Chancellor stated emphatically that the action proposed by the
Soviets would not contribute to the relaxation of tension but, on the
contrary, would heighten it. He felt that the reaction of the Three
Western Powers would be negative and that the move would be adversely
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received by the German public and would undoubtedly lead to a further
deterioration of German-Soviet relations.
c. The same day the British Ambassador in Bonn gave Foreign
Minister von Brentano a copy of the British Memorandum on Berlin.
On November 21 Brentano informed Ambassador Bruce that he was
"horrified" by the British paper, in particular by its statement of
the three alternatives the last of which accepts de facto recognition of
the GDR. He declared the drafters were grossly ignorant of the im
tions and consequences of the paper.
d. Chancellor Aidenauer addressed a letter to the Secretary of
State, received November 21, pointing to the gravity of the situation,
observing that the first Allied concession will not be the last, and
suggesting talks between the governments of the UK, France, the
Federal Republic, and the US as soon as the details of the Soviet
position on Berlin become known.
e. An ad hoc committee has been established including repre-
sentatives of State, Defense and other interested agencies, plus the
British and French, to consider the Berlin problem.
f. On 22 November, in response to the urging of Adenauer,
Macmilin sent the following message to Khrushchev:
"I am sending you this personal message to tell you
of the anxiety which your recent statements on Berlin
have caused me. I must tell you frankly :that I find
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those statements difficult to reconcile with your many
previous expressions of the desire to reduce tension in
the world. The British Government have every intention
of upholding their rights in Berlin which are soundly based.
"That also I believe to be the position of our Allies as is
well known to you. At the moment discussions are taking
place in Geneva. I still profoundly hope that fruitful re-
sults will come both from the political conference 04
nuclear tests and from the technical conference on measures
against surprise attack. I cannot imagine anythinxrecl-
cIl�d to increase t sion at a moment of opport 'ty for
an Giprovement in our rela e in of action which
your statements appear ow. efore that
u will seriously consider what I say before deciding to pro-
ceed to such action."
g. On 22 November (Saturday) the State Department instructed
Embassy Bonn to submit to the UK and France there the proposed text
of a note to be delivered in Moscow ostensibly on 24 November
(Monday.). This message, noting the announced intentions of the
USSR with regard to Berlin, emphasizes that the proposed Soviet
action would be invalid in international law and would be hardly con-
sistent with the Soviet Government's protestations of a desire to re-
lax international tensions. Embassy London has since notified State
that the Foreign Office approved the tripartite demarche, subject
to possible suggestions from legal advisers. The French, however
(Couve de Murville), feel that delivery this soon would be premature;
and, since the Soviets have not yet taken action, would give the
impression that we are. "nervous." Accordingly, the sending of the
note has been delayed.
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h. An offshoot of the proposed tripartite note to the Soviets
is the matter of publication of such a note. The Ambassador in
Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, favors publication because of its
effect on the Germans. Whitney and the British Foreign Office
\ feel that a note not published would have a greater deterrent effect.
2. Reactions of the Countries Concerned
S
a. Germany
Official German as well as press reaction nn?nirnously supports
a firm stand on Berlin now. The Foreign Minister summarized his views
on German opinion to Ambassador Bruce as follows: There is universa
belief that any concessions to the GDR by the Allies (specifically the
showing of documents even under protest in order to maintain access to
Berlin) will start an avalanche which nothing can stop and which will have
catastrophic conseqtiences for Europe and the Free World. Thereby
"The West will have lost the first bloodless blow of World War Three."
A firm stand now will cause the Soviets to back down. He referred
Berlin Mayor Brandt's recent statements and to Bundesta.g President
Gerstenrnaier's mention of the possibility of the Federal Republic
breaking off relations with Moscow as evidence of undoubted solid
German support for firm Allied reaction.
Other West German sources bear out the same view,
41
5 November the State .Department reported that Mayor Brandt of
On
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Berlin has made it plain to the deputy commandants of Berlin that
the West Berliners expect the allied occupying powers to maintain
their right to be in Berlin as conquerors, subject in no sense to
control by any German officials or agencies. Alluding to reports
that the allies might submit to control by Soviet Zone German of-
ficials as agents of the USSR, Brandt asserted that submission to
any such controls would destroy the western allied position in Berlin.
The views of the Germans are well summarized by the
message from Adenauer to Secretary Dulles which is being appended
for your information.
b. UK
As evidenced by the British working-level paper, preliminary
British official reactions to the Berlin crisis have not been firm. Embassy
London reports, however, a desire for firmness on the part of certain
Conservative MP's and a good deal of press comrrent, both pro and con
on the GDR recognition question. The conflict in British statements
is over the question of whether recognition would affect the Allied
occupation, not as to whether we should abandon our position in Berlin.
Prime IMinister Macmillan has stated that he expects the Berlin crisis
to be settled peacefully.
On Friday (21 Nov.) the Foreign Office seriously questioned
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the US policy of non-recognition of East Germany. In this connection
the Foreign Office informed Embassy London that its legal experts
"unanim.ously rejected" our position that non-recognition of the
East German regime, was essential to the Western legal position in
Berlin.
There are indications, however, that the working-level
attitude in the Foreign Office is not necessarily Mr. Macmillan's
attitude. This possibility is suggested by the note which he sent
to Khrushchev on 22 November (mentioned above) and by the fact
of the British support for the proposed tripartite demarche.
c. France
Earlier in the week Embassy Paris reported that the working-
level in the French Foreign Office had recommended to Couve that
the Allies adopt a policy of firmness in the fact of Soviet threats, even
to the extent of refusing to accept GDR personnel at checkpoints. How-
ever, a final Foreign Office position has not yet been reached. Laloy
commented that the British Memorandum was not helpful in stimulating
the Foreign Minister to adopt a strong stand. He noted that Couve
already was inclined to feel that the continued insistence on the "non-
existence" of the GDR may be unrealistic. Couve informed the British
Ambassador that he was reserving the French position and would not
give any definite views on the British Memorandum, other than that
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he considered it an intelligent statement of the case. Couve is,
as has been mentioned, the principal apparent stumbling block
in the submission of a tripartite note to the Soviets.
3. Views of Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, in Moscow
The "Afternoon Summary," Department of State, dated 21 Nov.,
included the following:
"Prompt, Forceful Stand on Berlin Advocated - Thompson in
Moscow believes that while the USSR would refrain from any
action which it was convinced would cause us to use force, once
it had turned its functions in Berlin over to the East German
regime it would take great risks rather than back down in the
face of our counteraction. In this circumstance he thinks our
worst policy would be one in which there is any uncertainty as
to what to do. He is inclined to consider the UK memorandum
disingenuous, and thinks it likely that the British have in fact
decided they would not risk war for Berlin, since they must
know that acceptance of their position -- including recognition
of the East German regime and its control over our access to
Berlin -- would have a most serious effect on the German, and
particularly Berlin, population and government. In dealing with
the UK memorandum, Thompson suggests we start by trying to
get an agreed evaluation of what the Soviet objectives are, and
then try to get from the UK a commitment as to how and under
what circumstances it would agree to the use of force to main-
tain our position in Berlin. He recommends we attempt to
reach an agreement with the UK and France that we will be
prepared to use force to maintain road and air communications
with Berlin, and that we so inform the USSR and West Germany
promptly but confidentially."
4. Views of General Norsta.d
On 16 November, General Norstad informed Secretary McElroy
and General Twining that unless directed otherwise, he will order
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the dispatch of a lir-mai Berlin-Helrristad convoy with authority
to "extricate US military personnel and equipment by minimum
force necessary if the Soviets again detain and prompt protest does
not effect early release" (2-3 hours). This stand was overtaken
by the suspension of convoys by the JCS on 18 November and the
withholding of approval by them. (Mr. Murphy met with the JCS
later in the week.)
On 24 November, Houghton (France) advised the State
Department that he wad Norstad agree that there is considerable
merit in suggestions for Western initiative in proposing a four-power
conference on the German question. He reports that Whitney, who
was in Paris Saturday, supports Norstadls view that we should take
a forthright stand and make clear our determination to remain in
Berlin.
(This has been done, it would appear, by both your state-
ment and that of Mr. Nixon on 25 November.)
Houghton finally points out that a conference would assist in
preventing our being maneuvered into a position of appearing to
oppose Soviet withdrawal from East Berlin.
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5. Developments on 26 November
a. Discussions on 26 November seem to center chiefly on the
way to approach a possible administrative harassment of the land
lines to Berlin on the part of the GDR. At this time the official
State Department position is that administrative dealings with the
Soviets have never indicated any compromise of rights. There-
fore, any dealings with the GDR would also be free of any implica-
tion in that regard. Murphy has stated that we do not contemplate
an airlift and will "push through" on surface lines if necessary.
This is contrary to the recommendations of the Deputy Commanders
in Berlin, who prefer to prepare for airlift.
b. Talk of tripartite positions shifted from possible note to
Soviets to a possible note to the Federal Republic of Germany. A
copy of the draft note to Germany is available. Again, the French
are reticent to join. The British are willing to join a tripartite
statement but feel that if the French demur, a unilateral U.S. note
would be better.
c. Adenauer and De Gaulle are to meet today and Berlin will
be an important item on their agenda.
d. An unconfirmed radio report this morning stated that a covered
convoy was permitted to pass the guards without interference. This
will be checked into further.
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6. Summary
In summary, the following points stand out in all the discussions:
a. None of the Western governments nor members thereof advocate
pulling out of Berlin.
b. The main issues of discussion are: (1) the degree with which
the Western powers can deal with the East German government without
undue loss of prestige or undue damage to Adenauer, (2) the procedures
to be followed (including the degree of force to be used) in the event of
serious harassment by East German police, and (3) timing of Western
moves, such as the proposed tripartite demarche to the Soviets or
the proposed message to the Federal Republic.
c. Of the nations concerned, West Germany has taken the firmest
and most unequivocal position; the British working level appears the
most conciliatory. France is uncommitted. Apparently De Gaulle
prefers to wait a little longer before moving.
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December 16, 1958
Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President
MIDDLE EAST
UAR-Iraq
Nasser is reported to be expressing stronger concern than heretofore
that the Qasim regime will fall under the influence of Communist
elements. S
On December 11 a Soviet ship delivered the second consignment of
arms to the Iraqis under the deal with the Soviet Union. This included
antiaircraft and field artillery pieces and vehicles. S
Meanwhile, there are reports that the four Iraqi division commanders
have decided to oust Premier Qasim in the near future. They are con-
vinced that he is incapable of controlling the Communists or preventing
further disorders. This feeling may have been spurred by the action
of the Communist-led mob in Basra on December 8 which beseiged the
army garrison for a day. S
A report today (December 16) indicates that a foreign office official
has told Embassy London that the U.K. still hopes and believes that
Qasim will prove able to prevent the domination of Iraq by either Com-
munists or the UAR. The British Charge in Iraq believes that Qasim
has been playing a cautious, skillful game and some time may elapse
before his final course is discernible. TS
Israel-Syria
On December 12 Hammarskjold told our UN mission that he had authorized
the Chief of UNTSO to request Israeli and Syrian authorities to introduce
observers to inspect the borders. The Syrians had immediately given
unqualified approval and the Israelis answered later. Inspections began
the morning of December 16.. S
As of December 15 the Israelis were complaining about the lack of a
U.S. position on the Israeli complaint in the UN. I.
Eban has written that he doubts
DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, S.C. 3.4(b)
Agency CaseN5C F 'Th j,'iL.
NLECaseqt.)-,v�>ro
By NLE
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that Israel will in the future see any use in turning to the UN if we do not
support them now. Lloyd also has expressed his concern to the Secre-
tary of State that Israel is being maneuvered into a position which might
result in its taking aggressive action against Syria. TS
As of this morning it was reported that both sides are maintaining a �
state of precautionary alert but tension does not seem to have increased.
A patrol action occurred on the night of December 13-14. Firing took
place on the following evening and Israel accused Egypt of making recon-
naissance flights on that day. S
Jordan
On Deceml4r 15 Prime Minister Rifai prepared a bill which would place
full control of the armed forces in the hands of the Defense Minister, a
post presently held by himself. This action is aimed at curtailing the
power of the potent Bani Sakhir Bedouin faction. Rifai expects that
Jordan's legislature will approve the bill this week but his proposal
may set off more difficulties. �S
A report on December 15 indicated that Adenauer remains concerned
L(-T.
what he considers British softness on Berlin. He indicated to
Brandt that Bonn might block approval of London's free trade area pro-
posals if the British fail to support his position on Berlin. S
Spa.ak told Burgess on December 15 that he had learned the Germans
were pressing for a firm, precise communique on Berlin following the
quadri-paftite meetings in Paris. Spaak expressed a strong conviction
that the issuance of such a communique by the four prior to consultation
would
in NATO have most unfortunate effects, particularly with Italy.
[The Canadians also expressed the view that the NATO communique should
be the first substantive statement on this issue, and the quadri-partite
communique should stay within its bounds. However, the communique
was actually issued. It reaffirmed our determination to stay in Berlin;
it found unacceptable the Soviet unilateral repudiation of obligations; and
indicated the foreign ministers found themselves in agreement on basic
issues and would consult NATO allies prior to reply. TS
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Meanwhile, in a tri-partite meeting in Paris, Secretary Dulles told
the British and French that we should revise existing contingency
plans for Berlin. The ministers agreed (a) that convoys would turn
back rather than accept East German processing at check points;
Cb) to tell the Germans we did not treat East German officials as
...., th agents for e Soviet Union; and (c) in this regard, Selwyn Lloyd
gave some difficulty at the discussion noting that our whole position
was the East German officials were merely stooges of the Soviets. - TS
DE GAULLE
As was indicated in the President's message from Secretary Dulles
this morning, De Gaulle is insisting on tri-partite organism for
cooperation in NATO. He expressed support for firm position re-
garding Berlin and extreme dissatisfaction with our actions in the
UN on Guinea and Algeria. TS
HONDURAS
Tension is rising in Honduras between the civilian government and
the military forces. Clashes could occur at any time. TS
BRAZIL
Government officials apparently intend to establish new machinery to
expand trade with the Soviet Bloc but not to broaden diplomatic rela-
tions. TS
NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands will probably be without an effective government for
several months as a result of resignation of the Labor Party from
the governing coalition. S
SAUDI ARABIA
Dissatisfaction in the Saudi army is growing as a result of curtailment
of military perquisites under Faisal's economy program. S
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U.7� ULA5SIFIED
'January 27, 1959 material
Reported January 27
Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President
USSR - FINLAND
In talks with Finnish President Kekkonen, Khrushchev renewed earlier
Soviet offers of trade credits and aid in developing Finnish industries.
The two men agreed to negotiate a 1959 trade protocol "very soon" and,
in the spring, a new long-term trade agreement. In a highly publicized
speech on January 23, Khrushchev warned against forming such govern-
ments as the recently fallen Fagerholm coalition, and against allowing
elements in the Finnish press -- "well paid by reactionary circles and
possibly subsidized by third countries" -- to criticize the USSR and
Soviet-Finnish relations.
State Department has gone to some length to note the extent to which
FinlAnd has been required to pay in advance for the restoration of Soviet
benignity and feels the dangerous precedent may bedevil Fir)land for a
long time.
THAILAND
Marshal Sarit may now be near total incapacitation and is expected to
be succeeded by a duurnvirate .composed of General Thanom and General
Prapat. '
CEYLON
Colombo, on January 24, signed a contract accepting the USSRIs offer
to design a steel mill which has been under consideration since early
last year.
ITALY
President Gronchi is expected to begin a search for a successor to the
Fanfani government on January 28. Possibilities for Premier include
left-of-center ex-Premier Segni and two rightists, Interior Minister
Tambroni and ex-Foreign Minister Piccioni.
DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case'u C96-fiIL
Ce CP -3C) F4d57 NLE ,
8v NLE
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MEXICO-GUATEMALA DISPUTE
Despite Mexican severance of diplomatic relations with Guatemala
on January 23 over a shrimp boat dispute, there is no confirmation
of Guatemalan charges that Mexican forces are massing on the frontier.
Guatemala President Ydigoras seems more interested in making poli-
tical capital out of the dispute than in settling it rapidly.
CUBA
Castro, during a visit to Cuba, attack the U.S. both publicly and pri-
vately, caiiiAg for the liberation of Puerto Rico from the U.S. along
with the overthrow of Latin American dictators.
BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
In commenting on the harmful effects which press speculation could
have on our Belin contingency planning, Embassy London fully agrees
that it is most important to avoid giving the USSR the impression or
intelligence that under anticipated circumstances the West would im-
mediately resort to an airlift rather than try to force the issue on the
ground. It believes that discussion of the problem by the NATO Council
[n. ' volves the danger of having the USSR learn of Western intentions.
At the same time, the Embassy doubts that the British or French
Governments are likely to commit themselves now to a course of action
some months hence, which might lead to another world war. The Em-
bassy believe the present British reluctance over Berlin contingency
planning should'not be taken as a sign of weakness, but rather as an
indication of Macmillants concern that we may be heading into a situa-
tion where we would be urging the use of force without the support of
public opinion.
IS
Israel has requested an immediate Security Council meeting to con-
sider a list of recent Syrian border incidents culminating in the slaying
of an Israeli shepherd. Our mission comments that the Security Council
cannot be effective in this matter in view of Israells unwillingness to
cooperate through other UN channels. Our mission believes that unless
the Security Council puts the burden on Israel, they will succeed in
putting it on us.
p Ftmni r
a aft
CYR Z:1119
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3
TEST TALKS
The 42nd meeting of the Geneva test talks was devoted to a discussion
of the methods of staffing control posts. The Soviets opposed the con-
cept of an international staff on grounds that it endangered Soviet
national security and argued for the Soviet proposal of a national staff
with "controllers from the other side."
BAGHDAD PACT
Since the bilateral agreements are not expected to be concluded in this
session, our delegation believes it desirable to extend an invitation to
hold the seventh session (July 1959) in Washington. Our delegation has
been told to "hold the door open."
UK-UAR
Foreign Minister Fawzi has apparently agreed to the establishment of
a British mission in Cairo with diplomatic facilities and immunities.
In the meantime; Embassy Jidda has been informed that Prince Faisal
is prepared to discuss resumption of relations with the UK.
SSIFIED
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`..67. :Ur ECH 1
March 18, 1959 material
Reported March 18
Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President
USSR - IRAQ
Plans being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi officials to return 500 Kurds
to Iraq from the USSR are "well along, " according to an Iraqi diplomat
in Moscow. At the present time, Moscow and Iraqi Communists appear
to be playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish state in favor
of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progressive" Qasirn regime.
SUDAN
A dissident officers group in Sudan, led by Brigadier Sharman, Commanding
General, Northern Command, is reported to be attempting to take over
control of the government on March 19th.
WEST GERMANY
C14�,
Mao
Chancellor Adenauer has publicly made a sweeping rejection of all plans
for limiting or withdrawing armed forces in Central Europe. Despite
an appearance of "complete unanimity" in his March 12-13 talks with
Macmillan, Ad,enauer's attack on disengagement is aimed at London; it
is also designed to correct any public misinterpretation of Bonnr-i�position.
A top foreign policy adviser in Adenauerts party, feeling it necessary to
make concessions to public opinion, favors putting forward a disengage-
ment plan designed, however, to be unacceptable to Moscow.
PANAMA
A coup attempt by Vice President Diaz is expected today, March 18th.
JORDAN
�
DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 2.4(b)
Agency Case k) Pq0-11(g.,
NLE
By
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April 7, 1959
.Surnrnary of Intelligence Items reported to the President
Top Soviet Foreign Ministry officials showed great relief to
he importance-Of a Surrunit Meeting. Thompson sees this
rranged, and adopted an "arnost pleading" attitude stressing
hompson that a Foreign Ministers Conference has been
s * result of Khrushchev's pressure on Foreign Ministry
officials and their realization of dangers of Khrushchev's
Berlin move in November.
East German workers are becoming "testy and assertive,
according to a former party leader, refusing to cooperate
in forced programs, "voltmtary" work and in-creased produc
tion norms.
Intermittent clashes continue between Bedouin tribesmen and
Iraqi security forces on Syrian-Iraqi border. Cairo has sent
three million rounds of rifle ammunition to the tribes, but is
not supporting with regular Army elements.
British.Arnbassadoi in Baghdad has advised London that the
arrest and questioning' of the senior Iraqi official of Mosul
Petroleum Company operations may have purpose of providing
a basis for sequestering the company.
U. S. inform French of decision in principle to furnish arms
to Morocco. Couve de Murville said de Gaulle would react
unfavorably arid be spurred to take further unilateral action in
other fields relating to NATO. The Acting Secretary then sent
a personal message to Couve reassuring that we have not acted
without consultation, and have simply stated an intention to help
Morocco.
Von Brentano, in explaining the negative nature of German i3osition
in recent discussions, p 0 the daintscs; alof iiiver.slion by East
oermany and poasibilities of a coalition "b-6en the West German
,
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E.O. 12-a56. SEC. 3.4(b)
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opposition and the Socialists and Communists in East Germany.
�,
Nasser and Hare have been conducting discussions regarding
possible aid to Egyt -- Hare citing the difficulties relating to
Egyptian cotton, but stressing desire to improve relations with
the UAR. Possib "ty of additional PL 480 wheat also discussed.
In Indonesia Sukar o is preparing to assume a stronger leader-
ship role under ,the 1945 Constitution, and to"return" to the
Constitution. The effect of the move will be to lessen the in-
fluence and infiltration of the Communists.
I
there remain only a few
thotisand Germans in the territory turned over to Poland who have
retained German nationality. Perhaps a million have assumed
Polish nationality, the rest have left.
� 'N.
- restrictions con-
ti.ntie against the'immigration of anyone of other than the white
\race into Australia.. Although restriction has been changed to
be based upon "tests,'", the effect is to exclude other races (there
were less than a dozen exseptions in 1945).
I � _ �
� :
N��
1(5
A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General USA
� /
� /,
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April 18 thru 20, 195 9 material
Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President
IRAQ
Communist pressures have resulted in a number of personnel changes
in important Iraqi government posts, and a major revision of the Iraqi
cabinet is reported to be impending.
According to a UK Foreign Office official, the British Ambassador to
Iraq - - now on consultation in London -- holds that there is no alterna-
tive to continuing the present UK policy in Iraq, avoiding actions
embarrassing to relations with Qasirn, and trying to find ways to help
him. So far no decision has been reached on an arms offer, but the
Ambassador favors it and other projects. He feels Qasim has not given
in to every Communist demand, and the label "Communist" is being
used indiscriminately in regard to Iraq.
SUDAN
Premier Abboud is again reported preparing to retire. Meanwhile,
continuing dissension in the Supreme Military Council makes a shake-
up of the Sudanese cabinet appear increasingly likely.
YEMEN
Crown Prince Badr and Nasir have agreed that all foreign diplomatic
missions in Yemen will be closed and that representation will be con-
ducted through Cairo. The move may be aimed primarily at reducing
Communist-bloc influence in Yemen and suggests the heretofore pro-
Soviet Badr is falling in line with Nasir's anti-Communist campaign.
BERLIN
In summing up the first week's deliberations our delegation lists the
following remaining important issues to be either resolved by the
working group or referred to the respective Governments: (1) the
extent of the responsibilities of the proposed all-German Committee;
(2) the details of Western security proposals; (3) the UN,role in Berlin;
(4) the possible extension of the basis for the West's Berlin rights; and
(5) the tactics to be used at the Foreign Ministers Conference.
DECLASSIFIED
I.Mfat
...
E0. 12355, SEC. 3.4 (b)
ittart 90 -3or>"
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r1.1 SWF ik
a,
*maw' itla 6 :zio,
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Meanwhile, Embassy Paris has been informed by the Foreign Office
, at Hammarskjold had stated to the French UN Representative he
felt it would be desirable if the UN could be associated in some manner
with the Foreign Ministers Conference. He therefore suggested he
might give a brief welcoming address in Geneva but then leave the con-
ference. According to the Foreign Office the USSR, the UK and France
'have alread�y,agreed to this suggestion.
We informed the British Embassy on Friday it would be necessary for
us to undertake further flights into Berlin above 10, 000 feet if the press
continued to speculate on a split on this subject between the Allies and
within the US Government.
Moscow is preparing a bloc foreign ministers' conference in Warsaw,
probably in April but certainly before 11 May, according to the Yugoslav
Embassy in Moscow.
("Foreign Minister Gromyko told the West...Germa.4asador recently
that the USSR will concentrate on discussing the Berlin issue and a
German peace treaty at the forthcoming foreign ministers' conference,
but will not evade other questions. Gromyko expressed doubt regard-
ing the prospects for a "successful" foreign ministers' conference. The
West German ambassador believes this reflects Khrushchev's desire to
go on to a summit meeting. In the ambassador's view, Khrushchev is
convinced he can gain Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern
Europe without making any concession in return because he does not be-
lieve the West is united.
...)
VENEZUELA
We have informed Embassy Caracas that in order to forestall the adoption
by Canada of nationalistic oil policies, which might impair our joint de-
fense arrangements, we are seeking authority to notify Ottawa that oil
imported by pipeline will be exempted from the restrictions imposed by
the mandatory oil import program. The Embassy has replied, express-
ing serious concern that when this becomes known in Venezuela, there
will be an across-the-board denunciation of the exemption as discrimin-
atory. The Erribassy urges that our action vis-a-vis Canada be tied in
with some more constructive move such as a hemispheric exception.
MED
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BOLIVIA
A rightist revolution broke out briefly in La Paz on the morning of
19 April but the government apparently has the situation under control.
TEST TALKS
We have informed our test-suspension delegation that no new proposal
on staffing should be advanced at present. We believe the recent
Soviet answers to questions on staffing, although representing a move
toward integration of foreign specialists into control post staffs, do
not constitute a move of sufficient importance to justify our abandon-
ing the principle that no host-country personnel should serve on a
technical staff.
INDIA
Despite major economic advances during India's First and Seconf Five-
Year-Plan periods, Nehru's Congress party apparently is losing popular
support. In recent municipal elections in the southern state of Madras,
one of the Congress party's strongholds, the party lost control of Madras
city and of most other large towns.
CEYLON
Embassy Colombo reports that manifestations of anti-Chinese Communist
feeling as a result of the Tibetan revolt are continuing, including sug-
gestions during the past week that the Prime Minister raise the Tibet
issue in the UN or Afro-Asian Conference forum, and that the World
Fellowship of Buddhists summon a conference to discuss the situation.
ICELAND-BRITAIN
The Icelandic parliament and public are more aroused over the recent
intervention of a British naval vessel in preventing the arrest of a
British trawler than at any time since last September when Iceland ex-
tended its fishing limit to 12 miles. With elections scheduled for this
summer, all political parties are seeking to appear as champions of
Iceland's rights, and the Icelandic foreign minister says the Com-
munists have gained considerable ground as a result of these incidents.
TOP SECRET
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May 12, 1959
Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President
IRAQ
In a long interview with Nasser on Saturday, Hare raised the question
of Syria's need for economic aid and the UAR.'s failure so far to�present '
its needs specifirnlly. Nasser said there was confusion resulting from
the imprecise nature of Syrian agreement with the USSR, which had
talked of little except "studies, studies, studies." He had become im-
patient with these dilatory tactics. Hare emphasized we were not trying
to drum up business but wished to make clear that mention of need for
aid in Syria by Nasser himself had not progressed to the point of specific
suggestions. We would not want to be placed in a position of having it
said later that we had failed to respond to a request which in fact had
never been made. Nasser said he understood this.
Hare found Nasser's thinking on Qasirn very much like ours. Despite
somber aspects of the Iraqi situation, Nasser felt there were a few
hopeful glimmerings. He made clear he did not wish to obstruct any
constructive developments in Iraq. Agreeing in principle with the
d.esirability of closing Arab ranks to the Communist menace, the UAR
leader nevertheless saw practical difficulties arising from extraneous
circumstances. Nasser said he had no plans whatsoever for renewing
full relations with the British. Referring to the UK's decision to supply
materiel to Iraq, he said the British had not yet marde their views known
to him.
TURKEY
7
Minister of Defense Etem Menderes, whose relations with the prime
minister and other Democratic leaders have become seriously strained,
claims that if the present repressive tendencies of the Democratic
regime continue, military leaders will intervene and a dictatorship
will result. Menderes' views are probably colored by his own political
ambitions. There is, however, information from other sources regard-
ing the stringent measures the government has taken and is planning to
take against the opposition.
71W01--)1
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WEST GERMANY
West German and West Berlin political leaders have given up their
previous opposition to the acceptance of the East Germans as Soviet
"agents" in operating checkpoints on the routes to Berlin. They are
more firmly opposed than ever, however, to any change in West
Berlin's status or in the four-power responsibility for the entire city.
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Dp Pi.psoi-lx",11 PA ne,...1P2, 7--1:=
June 24 thru 26, 1959
Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President
JAPAN - KOREA
MacArthur and Gruenther met on 23 June with high official of the
Foreign Ministry of Japan. Gen. Gruenther outlined his opposition
to the ICRC lending its good name to any screening and repatriation
plan which did not have the full confidence of the world. Kishi later
impressed MacArthur as being vague on the entire matter. Mac-
Arthur thinks that the whole issue would be best shelved and this
could be implemented by an ICRC refusal to participate in the plan
or ICRC insistence of carrying out a truly effective supervision of
screening.
BERLIN
West German officials have received reports of "voluntary" action to
ibe taken by East German workers to interfere with the West German
presidential election in West Berlin on 1 July. A Moscow commentary
has called the decision to hold the election a gross and dangerous
provacation. Brandt does not expect serious trouble but has agreed
that if such trouble comes about the assembly should be convoked
1 elsewhere. He has incidentally indicated some relish for interference
which would require such action.
rroresed
Meanwhile the Italians in the NATO Council have cppee-e41 a special
ministerial meeting prior to July 13th. Most delegates have been cool
to this idea although Spaak has sent a message indicating his approval.
Decision has been postponed to 1 July. The Germans_a fixst
objectors advancing the opinion that such a meeting would indicate
rifts irrttre�AILTa position, capable of exploitation of the Soviets.
Lo o o je cts
USSR-BALKANS
Moscow has sent a formal note to 10 nations caning for an atom- and
rocket-free zone in the Adriatic. The notes suggest a "great-powers
guarantee" of the security and independence of the countries in the
zone. They could have some impact on the Greek attitude on the IRBMs. ,
I DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS I
n ?: .i.� 1 n-po prses P:.577777.: 7-3.77.-N, E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4b)
'3 ' '....- -:;.1 44 il 'Cs.% .'4:-.;.:-.c3 '4 .;,'�.1 A I Agency caw NS(' PIO-I/q.t. '
1 flLE �-,.,.,21,.. QO -30V�43_ ..'!
BY 0 e - -i N LE
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588 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII
to further forms of diplomatic or other pressure, including the with-
drawal of the Ambassadors of the Three Powers from Moscow.
b. The Three Powers will intensify their military preparations. At
this point the preparations could include measures which would be
readily observable.
11. Use of Military Force
a. The Three Governments will make jointly the appropriate deci-
sions for restoring freedom of passage. The measures required for their
implementation should be the object of a study by the tripartite staff in
Paris.'
b. Supplementing military decisions, consideration might be
given to possible economic measures.
12. Air Access to Berlin
a. As a concomitant to the above courses of action regarding sur-
face access to Berlin, the Three Powers should, from the start, take steps
to maintain their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essen-
tial to maintaining the status and security of the city.
b. The Three Embassies at Bonn, in consultation with the tripartite
staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate, should
review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following as-
pects of the Berlin air access question:
(1) Possible Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center;
(2) Possible Soviet or East German threats against the safety of -
flights in the Berlin corridors and control zones; . ,
(3) Measures which might be taken to continue civil air services as
long as possible in the event of any change in the resent situation; �
(4) Possible establishment of a "garrison airlift' to transport Allied
personnel and material as necessary in the event of an interruption
Allied surface traffic;
(5) The possible substitution of military for civil aircraft to maintain
air services to Berlin if civil aircraft cease operations;
(6) Possible direct interference by the Soviets or East Germans
flights in the Berlin corridors or control zone; and
(7) Flights in the Berlin corridors above 10,000 feet. (This
might be resolved by a simple tripartite agreement to fly at an alti
appropriate to efficient operations of individual aircraft.)
c. Planning regarding b (4) and b (5) above should be cond
on the understanding that no policy decision has been taken on a
son airlift" or on the substitution of military for civil aircraft.
2 See Document 227.
Preparations for Conference, March�May 1959 589
13. Planning Responsibilities and Coordination
a. The Tripartite Ambassadorial Group meeting in Washington is
responsible for the over-all coordination of Berlin contingency planning
and for the drafting of the statement mentioned in paragraph 3 above.
b. The Three Embassies at Bonn are primarily responsible for the
development of recommendations regarding identification of Allied
movements (paragraph 7 above), iristructions regarding detailed proce-
(paragraph 12 above).
dures at the checkpoints (paragraph ?above) and air access planning
c. The Tripartite Staff in Paris, under the supervision of General
Norstad, is responsible for coordinating the preparatory military meas-
ures and the planning described in paragraph I above, for studying
measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access (paragraph
11 above), and for assisting the Three Embassies at Bonn in carrying out
their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.
d. The Ambassadors of the Three Powers to the United Nations are
charged with making reconunendations to their Governments regard-
ing the basis and timing of a possible approach to the United Nations (cf
paragraph 10 a above)
e. The Headquarters of the Three Powers in Berlin will give the
Three Embassies at Bonn whatever assistance the latter may require in
carrying out their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.
f. The military authorities in each of the Three Countries are re-
sponsible for the planning of measures on a purely national basis, as
measures.
mentioned in paragraph 1 above, in support of tripartite by planned
256. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelli
NO. 7994 and Research
Washington April 7, 1959.
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITION
ON THE BERLIN SITUATION'
IHere ws a two-paragraph abstract of
'rend: Government Position
Throughout the current Berlin crisis the French official position has
firm, but the French have been extremely reluctant to initiate any
Department of State, MIR-NIE Files. Secret; Noforn.
7996, were prepared on Aprii 8. (Ibid.)
r reports on the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, Nos.
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590 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII
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negotiating positions which might be taken by the West. This is not to
say that the French position is flabby but rather one of "stand-pattism"
and not showing one's cards. The French approach is undoubtedly
based on the French interest in preserving as much as possible of the
status quo. The French are most reluctant to assist in steps which might
lead to a general European settlement adversely altering the relative
power status of France vis-�is Germany or weakening the security of
Western Europe.
Several factors need to be taken into account in explaining the
French position. Unlike the German and the British governments the
French government is not faced with a vigorous and effective opposi-
tion party in Parliament. This, of course, enables the French government
to reveal as little of its position at any particular time as it sees fit with no
need to parry the critical curiosity of the opposition party. It also means
that the position taken need not represent an internal compromise�
there is no need to accommodate the position to opposition demands.
The result might well be a more stubborn, rigid attitude. A further factor
related to this is the dominating personality of General de Gaulle. For
the foreseeable future French policy is likely to be de Gaulle policy no
matter what other views may be held at Foreign Officetor other ministe-
rial) working levels. De Gaulle may, as in the past, fail to coordinate his
policy in any very thorough manner with his Western allies but none-
theless, the end result is likely to be a position in favor of a firm Western
stand, including the will to force access. De Gaulle's policy is less likely
than that of any Western power to encompass any disengagement�
thinning out of forces�compromise schemes.
Of all the Western allies, France is the least interested in the reunifi-
cation of West and East Germany. While the other Western allies see the
Berlin crisis in terms of achieving general European solutions, the
French are happy with the status quo and anxious to avoid the Berlin
issue bringing about any weakening of the Western position via disen-
gagement. This undoubtedly helps to account for the rigidity and legal-
istic character of the French approach. Whereas the French believe the
other Western allies consider that the status of Berlin is only negotiable
in terms of wider issues�Germany, Central Europe, disarmament�the
French prefer to stand on legal rights and to confine the issues to the ac-
cess question. This may be further reflected in a reluctance to engage in a
Summit conference.
French Estimate of Soviet Objectives
In considering the Soviet objectives in precipitating the Berlin crisis
the French Foreign Office at the outset (Nov. 14) believed that Khru-
shchev wanted to get US forces out of Europe and to prevent an armed,
unified Western Europe. In a subsequent analysis, presented by the
French delegation of the Four Power Working Group in Paris on March
10, the French amplified their views. In an effort to perpetuate the pre-
sent division of Germany the Soviets, in the French view, wish to con-
strain the West, by explicit recognition of East Germany, to share the
responsibility for maintenance of the division of Europe. To achieve this
goal, the Soviets are using Berlin and threat of war over Berlin to wring
concessions from the West which France in particular is not willing to
make. While France has nothing against the division of Europe in its
present form, it cannot countenance this division within the framework
of disarmament, disengagement, or weakening of the West's military
posture vis-�is Soviet military strength.
French Views on Reunification, Disengagement, and Disarmament
De Gaulle has in private conversations clearly stated that he is no
frien enng it ip-service in puSTIZ
pronouncements). The reasons are obvious. France does not want the
balance of power in Western Europe altered so as to increase the
strength of Germany. Nor does it wish to see Western Germany cut
loose from its Western military and economic ties. Quite apart from Ger-
many, per se, reunification on terms acceptable to the Soviets would al-
ter the entire military balance in Europe to the almost certain detriment
of the West and this is an added reason for French aversion to reunifi-
cation.
The French are very leery of disengagement and under the firm
hand of General de Gaulle, whose thinking on this problem is premised
on military rather than political considerations, there is likely to be great
reticence on the part of the French government to-agree to.any of the
disengagement plans currently under discussion (e.g., Rapacki plan,
Kennan plan, Gaitskell plan).2 Any partial disarmament as a possible
concomitant of a Berlin settlement is equally unappealing to the French:-
Both disengagement and partial disarmament in the French view are
likely to lead to a situation in which France is impotent and isolated in
the face of a Soviet military threat. General de Gaulle has stated categori-
cally (in his March 25 conference) 3 that disengagement has no value for
the French and that disarmament would only make sense in terms of a
zone extending to the Urals. The French are against disarmament being
one of the themes for discussion at a Ministerial or Summit conference
with the Russians, since they consider that the West has no agreed posi-
2 Regarding the Rapacki Plan, see footnote 2, Document 43. The Kennan plan is pre-
sumably a reference to George F. Kennan's "Disengagement Revisited" in Foreign Affairs,
January 1959, vol. 37, pp. 187-210. The Gaitskell plan probably refers to Hugh Gaitskell's
"Such a Policy Might Pay" in Western World, Spring 1958, pp. 36-44.
3 For a transcript of de Gaulle's press conference on March 25, see de Gaulle, State-
ments, pp. 41-51.
592 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII
Preparations for Conference, March-May 1959 593
tion on disarmament and discussion of this subject would give the Sovi-
ets a chance to maneuver Communist China into the discussions.
Jules Moch has been uoted a
view any two o t et ree ro sals--reunification, an armed Germany,
a neutral any� are acceptable but not alItli TQtHt is no
�aoubt with this in mind�even if only subconsciously�that the French
are suspicious of reunification and German neutralism. They realize
that a reunified and neutral Germany would hardly be left unarmed.
Berlin�Access and Rights
France, like the other Western allies, wants to maintain access to
Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin. This has to do with prestige and
with the fear that loss of Berlin (or weakening of the Allied position in
Berlin) would inevitably result in the gradualbreakup of NATO. In the
French view, the Soviets are using Berlin a6'a gambit to maintain "a state
of constant tension tending to weaken German resolve and bring about
a desire for neutralism in Germany." For this reason, regardless of other
considerations, Berlin must be held. There must be no drift towards
neutralism. The French consider that there are groups in West Germany
of all political colorings that are inclined towayds neutralism. Failure of
the West to take a firm stand in Berlin might well enable these groups to
impel West Germany into the neutralistic camp.
It is hardly surprising that the French have a rigid position�a legal-
istic approach toward the Berlin crisis. They want to maintain the Euro-
pean status quo including that of Berlin�not at the price of Berlin. They
accordingly take a "tough" line, and de Gaulle is known to advocate
maintaining access by every means possible not excluding_f9rce. He
te9apexs..thisby-sa-Ying that the West should not be provocative or use
force first. The French For dult k.m_M4.1Couve de -M-urville, has also
stated categorically that the -West cannot broo in e erence wi air,or
land communications with_B rli . He considers it essentianhat the
Western Allies retain the rights which they acquired by the German sur-
render, including freedom of communication with Berlin.
Berlin and the UN
As was to be expected, the French do not want to take the Berlin
problem to the UN because they fear that UN debate could tie the hands
of the West. They have reluctantly agreed to exploratory discussions
with the UK and US Ambassadors at the UN but obviously intend to
remain adamant regarding Western introduction of the issue into the
UN for UN consideration. The most they would be willing to do is to go
to the Security Council under Article 51 of the Charter to inform the
Council of Allied measures taken in response to interference with access
to Berlin. The French are especially concerned lest the approach to the
UN might occur following a probe by the West but prior to the use of
of
force by the West with a resultant blockade situation in which the initia-
tive passed from the Western Allies to the UN.
Foreign Office Views on Berlin
Although there is no French opposition attitude on Berlin there has
been some indication that there have been some divergent views within
the Foreign Office upon various aspects of handling the crisis. For some
weeks following the Khrushchev speech of Nov. 10, the Foreign Office
(
took no official position on the crisis in spite of the fact that the working
level in the Foreign Office had consistently advocated a firm policy. The
French Foreign Minister indicated at an early stage that he was inclined
to_feel that continued Western insistence on the "non-existence" of the
East German government might be unrealistic. In earl December
Couve w,as reported as tentatively proposing negotiations on,the w ole
German question as a means of appearing to give a positive reply to the
Soviet Note of Nov. 27. In January Couve stated that althoughFrance in
its reply to the Nov. 27 note was resolved to reject anything prejudicial
to France's incontestable rights in Berlin, France is prepared, if there is
any prospect of arriving at an accord, to discuss the entire German prob-
lem including reunification and a peace treaty. The Foreign Office has
also had some internal divergence of opinion re arding Sovirnotives.
(ine leadirWiticial (formerly, Finch Ambassador_to Moscow) believes
1 the Russians may be willing to lose East Germany (in the sense of troop
withdrawal) to obtain a neutralized, united Germany. The working
level of the Foreign Office rejects this view. _
Regardless, however, of these apparent divergent opinions, the
Foreign Office is certain to follow the line met [set?] by de Gaulle, and
part of the "rigidity" of the French position may stem from the fact that
the Foreign Office must wait to receive its cue before disclosing its posi-
tion. Because de Gaulle (as is recognized by the Foreign Office) is unpre-
dictable, it is necessary to adopt an extremely circumscribed approach
on any theme on which de Gaulle's views are not yet known.
[1 paragraph (20 lines of source text) not declassified]
Berlin and NATO
Since the accession of de Gaulle to power, it has been apparent that
the French are determined to acquire a role in NATO equal to that of the
UK and superior to that of Germany. The Berlin crisis may prove to be of
great assistance to them in this endeavor because of the close working
arrangements, both military and political, among the Three Powers,
which the new situation has necessitated. It seems likely that the French
will exploit the situation to the full. (French anger towards the US in con-
nection with the Algerian-Moroccan problems may also provide a
manipulatable lever in achieving French NATO aims. The French For-
eign Minister has very recently stated that US unilateral action in decid-
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594 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII
ing in principle to supply Morocco with arms would encourage de
Gaulle in taking unilateral French actions vis-�is NATO to achieve
French goals. The US and other NATO countries, faced with the Berlin
crisis, will be obliged to discourage any actions which would impair the
cohesiveness of NATO as a military force.)
One rather strange suggestion, somewhat unemphatically made by
the French on one or two occasions, is that a tenuous relationship for a
reunified Germany with NATO (parallel perhaps to the Russo-Finnish
relationship) might somehow be developed as a part of the solution of
Berlin. This idea, still very nebulous, seems likely to remain so in view of
the improbability of Russian acceptance of any kind of military affili-
ation of a united Germany with the West.
Conclusions
There are undoubtedly large segments of the French population,
particularly the Communists, which are opposed to the firm policy of
the French government on Berlin. However, in view of the existing po-
litical situation in France, it seems unlikely th4-dissident groups have
had, or are likely to have, any significant influence upon decisions taken
by the de Gaulle government. While fear of war as a consequence of the
Berlin situation certainly exists in France as in the rest of West Europe,
the absence of an effective opposition to exploit this aspect has meant
that the government has not had to cater to the public's fear.
In sum, the French throughout this Berlin crisis, both because of the
present political situation within France and the foreign policy aims of
the French government, have taken a very firm stand. They will bend
every effort to maintaining the status quo in Berlin with freedom of ac-
cess for the Western Allies. They will balk at any step which may be
taken to solve the Berlin crisis if it seems likely to have an adverse effect
upon France's military security. For various reasons�e.g., the existence
of a strong government, lack of opposition, France's geographic posi-
tion on the continent, concern regarding Germany's future vis-a-vis
France�France has responded to the Berlin crisis in a manner that
seems to take into account to a far lesser degree the actual dangers and
implications of war than has been the case in the UK or even West Ger-
many. While General de Gaulle's actions and pronouncements are often
unexpected as to timing and content, there seems no reason to think that
France's policy on Berlin will become any less firm. The French are un-
likely to cause the US any major difficulties in any aspect other than pro-
cedural matters, provided that the US position itself remains firm.
France's own firm policy, as de Gaulle himself has said, is predicated on
American power and leadership.
Preparations for Conference, March-May 1959 595
In a conversation with the Acting Seci etary of State on March 31,4
the French Foreign Minister outlined several of the principal elements of
the French position on Berlin. In particular he stressed the need for
maintenance of rights, a tough policy rather than flexibility, a desire to
avoid implicating the UN, and general mistrust of British policy.
4 See Document 246.
257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the
Department of State
Moscow, April 9, 1959, 7 p.m.
2034. As Four Power Working Group prepares resume preparation
of Western negotiating position for Foreign Ministers' Conference, be-
lieve it should be useful sum up various aspects of Soviet position as
they are likely to unfold at Geneva. Developments for possible later
Summit meeting are largely excluded since too much will depend on
interim events.
Kremlin objectives now seem clear. Primary one is to achieve result
which will in fact amount to Western acceptance of East European status
quo epitomized by some sort of recognition of GDR. This is, of course, to
be accomplished with as much loss as possible of Western prestige and
political stature so as to produce maximum disorganization of NATO,
West European unity efforts, defense measures, and West German do-
mestic stability. However, latter gains would at present time serve es-
sentially as icing for Soviet cake, main ingredient of which is to be
legitimization of "irrevocable" incorporation of Eastern Europe and
Eastern Germany into "socialist camp". This does not mean that
achievement of latter aim by Moscow would herald end of Communist-
led political warfare against West in Europe (or elsewhere), but it would
create new phase and changed conditions of struggle, perhaps related to
Khrushchev's concept of economic competition of two worlds which
has prerequisite in his eyes of full consolidation of Eastern empire (So-
viet hegemony).
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-959. Sec, et. Transmitted in two
sections and repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.
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AND RESEARCH
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ul FILE COPY
PLPASE RrETUP.N
'
73/-764i-1'e)
No. 7996
0
;Ay
;ace Report
Copy No.
April 9, 1959
THE UK 03VE,R3\1;LNT 20SITION
ON THE KRLIN SITUATION*
Abstract
The British are determined to exploit every
opportunity to press for a summit conference on the Berlin
crisis, since they believe that a satisfactory solution
can be reached only at that level. They have no illusions
that such a meeting will reduce all, or even most, of the
East-West tensions, but the imperatives of UK public
opinion require that the West make every effort to approach
the forthcomintfonference pragmatically and not appear
intransigent. More openly than other Western European
poweri:Ithe UK considers reunification no longer a practical
possibility and the Berlin issue to be separable from an all-
Germany solution as well as from the broader problem of
European security. As for the immediate problem, the British
see the possibility of exchanging de facto recognition of
East Germany in return for a reaffirmation of Western rights
in Berlin. As a first step towards a broader detente they
see the possibility of establishing a controlled and.
inspected "limited forces" zone in Central Europe. The
other major Uestern European powers, whom the Britiili consider
"too doctrinaire," consider the UK "soft" on these tactical
proposalJT The UK is, however, firm in its strategic
commitments. It has reiterated its opoosition to the abandon-
ment of Hest Berlin, its opposition to a neutral Germany or
the pulling apart of forces in Germany, 4nAits opposition
to the unbalancing of East-West forces. !Fully cognizant that
their maneuverability is limited, furthermore, the British
are not likely to engage in any further initiatives that
will weaken the Western position in general or their
"interdependent" relationship with the US in particu1ai70
* Related Intelligence Reports No. 7994 and No. 7995, dated April 8,
1959, discuss the positions of France and of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
SECHET/NOFORN
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'
Introduction
The UK pastf..on .Ln the mist be considered in the
context of that:ceuiltry lorg -s;taraing. detente with the
USSR and a demonstration of 1fiestern_2olitical initiative in resolving
the dangers of a divided Germany. 25ummitry" and "flexibility,"
furthermore, derive fundamentally from the profound fear felt by the
British public of a nuclear war. These factors have only intensified
the traditionally pragmatic approach that has long characterized the UK's
diplcmatic relations-.3 Although stimulated by the campaign fever of the
forthcoming General Election, British eagerness to go to the summit does
not stem basically from electoral pressures but will continue to be an
essential element in UK foreign relations.
Essentials of the British Position
4
Status quo. .The UK found the status quo -- i.e., a divided
Germany and a Berlin enclave within the GER -- a workable, albeit
vulnerable, arrangement, and would be satisfied if this situation could
be continued. IR also appealed to an underlying prejudice in Britain
that a strong Germany has historically proved to be the troublemaker of
Europe. While the division of Berlin was an awkward arrangement, it was
also-a�useful "showcase" and intelligence outpost in a.Soviat satollito.
It is unlikely, however, that the British ever believed that this
situation could continue indefinitely, or that they now believe the pre-
November 10 status quo can be restored. The British recognize that the
long and the short term goals of the USSR are to weaken the 14estern
alliance by every conceivable tactic, and that their Berlin gambit has
struck at one of the 1Zestts weakest positions. Convinced, however, that
the Soviets intend to exploit the vulnerability in this salient, and
estimating that this is a potentially explosive issue, the UK is inclined
to accommodate itself to the political "facts of life" in Central. Europe.
The leadership of both parties has drawn encouragement from Soviet state-
ments that Moscow is ready to negotiate, and they believe that every
effort must be made to wring concessions that will save West Berlin and
Western face.
In a broader sense, the UK sees in the present crisis an op2ortunity
to alter the status quo in Europe by enabling the West to formulate a more
positive foreign policy than they believe has been advanced since 1955.
the absence of Secretary Dulles both the British Government and British
public see the Berlin problem as an oppartunity to fill a vacuum in
Western leadership and thereby to enhance their sense of self-esteem2
They have no illusions about the difficulties of bridging the gap between
the V'estern powers and the Soviet Union, but they are ready to engage in
protracted discussions and negotiations toward this end. If there is no
detente, and lack of success is the result of Soviet rather than Western
intransigence, they see the effort itself as a victory for Western initiative.
SECRET/NOFORN
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Berlin. The British see the German issue as two separable
problems: 1) tl-,e i7-redate stetus of l'ect .erlin and the imminent threat
of transfer of zsc'oess cont:'olz to the.GDII, an 2) thc broader German
question, incluc:ing .qucpps:of rednifi(:a:Ao,.5.ecp.rity zones, etc.
The British consider the Berlin problem negotiable, on an interim basis
at least, but they recognize that the Test may to pay a price of
de facto recognition that may compromise an overall German settlement.
They are less optimistic as to the negotiability of the broader German
question. They have little expectation that the western formula of
"reunification by free elections" will be acceptable to the Soviets in the
foreseeable future, and will resist the inclusion of this formula in any
7::estern proposals except as a long-range objective.
Nore specifically in regard to Befilin,British thinking has not
changed since November when the crisis crystallized. The abandonment of
Vest Berlin to East Germany is in the foreseeable future out of the
question. gey are still certain that the USSR will eventually transfer
access controls to the GDR unless Eas-to.Wost nogotiations are under way* A
Once control is transferred, and assuming the 7.estis inability to supply
Berlin by airlift for more than a year, the British see the. West confronted A with the the alternatives of dealing with GDR authorities or using force to
break a blockade. As between these, the British Foreign Office has said
that "it would seem clearly to be in our interest to choose the first...."
They recognized that this might put the Uest on a "slippery slope" leading
to the alternatives of full and formal recognition of the GDR or a blockade
that would have to be broken by force, but again the Foreign Office �
&insiders the recognition of the GDR the lesser evil. Lloyd has attql,grad
to dispel the Allusion that the Britis n ft ion of the RI
an e a e unw in ness of the UK to o e wishes
of the e eral Repul_Ilic. He has indicated, however, that the Federal
Republic must recognize that the Wes mi de
facto recognition, and doubts furthermore that de-r-gEtT-11YealpitioW1Hwill
neceeasaxd to the removal of the ',lest froml.'est BerliN
In return for de facto recognition, the British believe that they
,an exact from the Soviets a reaffirmation of Vestern rights in Berlin.
ITIWY welcomed Soviet statements that the "free city" proposals are
tamenable and that an interim solution in Berlin is feasible. Essentially,
de facto recognition would be tied into the "agent" theory in that the
GDR would function, not as a government in its own right, but as the
designated authority of the USSR. The USSR in return would assure that
its obligations to keep open the Berlin corridor would continue.
Should it not be possible to effect such an agreement with the
Soviets, he British would have the West "get off the hook" by recourse
.....:
to the UN They believe that world opinion can be mobilized in support
of the 'lest if the matter goes to the Security Council, and that an
interim solution might be effected by providing a UN presence in Berlin.
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Such a p-eoonP,howciver, could not conceivably displace western forces in
the city, There: is virtual unanimity :L:1 th2 UK on the retention of
lestern forces in eilii as a LivAcT o stern stryc..zth vis-a-vis the
Soviets, as well:to:uphulA:t.be:mpnale.of ;lest I;estern
Europeans, and all countries identified with the lqestern Alliance.
ntingency Planning, The British position on this matter
rests on the conviction that nothing should be done by the nest that
would appear to be provocative, or that might spark off military
hostilities without satisfying public opinion within the NATO countries
that the Soviets :Tie the first use of force. In principle the British
have agreed to milit,ary preparedness measures, possibly including a
NATO general alert, bt.t they have reserved their right of final review
before any contingency plan is implemented. Should surface traffic be
interrupted, the British still seem reluctant to test Soviet intentions
by ground action where it is difficult to determine clearly who has
been the aggressor. At the outside, they hope that any ground test would
be limited to an "access probe" rather than a "military action."
I4ore to their liking, if the liest must make an effort to run a
blockade, would be a garrison airlift which -would be more difficult to
obstruct without overt use of force on the part of the Soviets or the East
Germans. This latter situation, the British feel, would more likely
elicit NATO and popular support for a '.estern response that might involve
the risk of general war.
Notwithstanding the appearance of "softness" in this British
position, it is likely, as Embassy London has observed, that tn.:hen
the chips are dowri," both the British public and British government would
show determination and. firmness. The key to thc British position is the
need on the part of.the leadership not to get too far away from public
opinion and to find itself in a position where the US government is urging
the use of force while the British public is either split or negative on
this issue. British public opinion, however, may be expected to harden
if the Soviets take a "tough" line in forthcoming negotiationS
Reunification of Germany. The British still maintain their
"declared policy" that Germany is to be reunified by free elections.
There is, however, probably no British leader who considers such a
solution feasible in the foreseeable future. Macmillan, and th.2 Labor oppo-
ition, welcomed Ses;retary Dullest observation-that free clections
need not necessarily initiate the reunification process. ite aside
from their min doubts about the desirability of a united Gernani2 the
British are convinced that the Soviet Union will maintain the division of
Europe and that East Germany is increasingly becoming an integral part
of the Soviet bloc. They do not even believe that a confederation or
economic union between the East and Hest zones is possible until there
can be Four Power agreement on an all-German settlement. So long as the
present deadlock continues, the British believe that relations between the
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two zones can be improved largely through. technical and professional
contacts- They evt.:h dcub'. that this. felatIlve;-y, .r,o4st contribution to
"reunification s:-.1.iXely;toke.mucn pro.,;re5, arit;i. more liberal
conditions are :e,dh-vdd 'in- Za'st GeFmanY; Cr the:,atgroard of living in
East Germany improves to such an extent that the Ulbricht regime would not
be likely to suffer in prestige from greater contact with the Federal
Republic.
Lin the British view, therefore, Western proposals for reunifica-
tion are to be advanced as maximum objectives, and largely for their
propaganda effect. They fully recognize that there must be fall-back
positions, and that these come close to involving_Ihe 'lest in de facto and
ultimately de jure recognition of "two Germanies,2J
Limitation of Forces and Disengagement. The British ye been
waging a strenuouScampaign to clarify widespread misunderstanding as to
the differences between disengagement and limitation of forces, and their
view of which concept best suits the present crisis. This confusion of
terms reached a climax with the release of the Anglo-Soviet communique
of kiarch 3rd which discussed "the possibilities of increasing security
by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional
and nuclear, in an agreed area cZ Europe, coupled with an appropriate
system of inspection." Much to the displeasure of :acmillan this state-
ment was characterized in many Western capitals as a disengagement
proposal. The British maintain that disengagement specifically means
the separation of the main land forces of the East and I.!est by the
establishment of an area which is demilitarized, occupied by indigenous
forces alone, or denuclearized. The
E agree with critics of "full"
disengagement that the creation of�i-Uch a neutral belt invites rather
than avoids substantial risks of war. Limitation of forces, as they
have advanced the concept, means either fixing the total of forces and
armaments without regard to nationalityp.cr their reduction to agreed
ceilings without regard to nationality on some basis of parity. It would
not involve the withdrawal of any particular forces (including foreign
forces), nor the exclusion of particular (i.e. nuclear) weapons. They
insist that the idea is not new, that it was part of the 7estern proposal
at Geneva in October 1955, and reiterated by Selwyn Lloyd during the
foroi.0 affairs debate in Parliament on December h, 1958. Even Hugh
Gaitskell, comionly associated with a neutral belt proposal, considers
that a limitation of forces plan is the best that can be considered at
the present time.
The UK sees such a proposal as having several principal advantages:
(1) it would bring about a lowering of tensions between the two German
territories that might gradually lead toward reunification; and (2) it
might prove a useful experiment in international control which if
successful could be extended to other fields. The British also feel
that such an agreement would not necessarily confirm the division of
Germany as some critics fear, since the areas could be described without
reference to the lino dividin. ast hrid. West Germany.
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It may be expected that the British continue to advance
limitation of forces s part of a p'an wLiu:1 the So:iets may be prevailed
upon to accept along with Ln interf.m Berli�'settlem-mt -- if they do not
offer it first. Hlt:has .tien.reportd,tha't:theyyru.2.,1 define the so-
called security zone to.incluie Berlin and the surrounding territory.
Such a proposal, it is believed, would protect the frean and contribute
to the oconomic viability of ':est Berlin. From the British view this
would be worth the Oice of de facto recogniticn of East Germany. The
Briti3h meanwhile are seeking to avoid the isqpression that they will
press this proposal 'fat llco.51;3,11 but the concept has so captured the
imagination of the Briti:ih prEs and public that it wiill be difficult
to abandon
Special Pressures
In addition to the presence of a continuing and articulate Labor
opposition that has long advocated negotiations with the USSR, the fact
that a General E2ection must be held this year creates special pressures
in Britain that are not found invest Germany, France, or the US. It is
often said in British politics that foreign policy issues rarely play a
vital role in elections, but the coincidence of the Berlin crisis and
the election campaign may modify this judgment. The two parties are now
so evenly balanced that every factor, foreign and domestic, will affect
the scales, and it is certain that the Conservatives are counting heavily
on foreign policy accomplishments to help provide their margin of victory.
.viost notable among the public's "expectations," and suggestive
of the specific pressures liacmillan is under, is the conviction that a
summit meeting is certain to be held sometime this summer. Every Shade
of press opinion is in agreement that i;acmillan has convinced the other
,western leaders that Khrushchev is the only man who can speak for the
Soviet bloc and that this present crisis can be resolved only at a
summit meeting. Should events suggest that such a meeting was not to be
held owing to Ilestern rather than Soviet intransigence, liacmillan will
suffer political embarrassment and chances of a Conservative Party
re-election will be somewhat diminished. The Labor Party will
exploit every manifestation of German, French, and particularly US
reluctance to go to the summit, while indications that such reluctance
is deflating the image of 1-acmillan will engender strong anti-US
resentment among the Conservatives AS Well.
Conclusion
r�
iIn summary, the UK is eager to avoid any action by the lest that
would appear intransigent or provocative, and is losing interest in
identifying a detente in Europe with reunification by free elections.
whereas "summitry" and "disengagement" were previously relatively academic
issues, the UK now sees the potentially explosive Berlin issue as enhancing
the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets. De facto recognition of
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:East Germany, albeit dangerous, seems to the UK to be dictztcd by the
realities of the itrption. Th British uld trLde it, however, for the
reaffir7lation of tie AI.Liest position in :t 3ezlih, as well as a sign
of progress toward a "sccarity;zpner n Crtra brcfle.
the British appcar to be soft on tactics, their position is
essentially hardened by the fact that they cannot solve the Berlin
issue bilaterally and that their area of maneuver is very narrow.
spiacmillahis latest trip to the .:estern capitals deonstrated the diverse
approaches to a Berlin solution, as well as the prevalent suspicion
of the British role in this isue. He has been obliged to defend his
present views in Bonn, Paris, and liashington and to remind his allies
that if the UK was "soft" in 1938 it was not soft in 1939-h1:11 1.1acmi1lan
recognizes that there can be no solution that does not take full cognizance
of lest German and US views, if only because the latter are the principal
elements in the military defense of 1estern Europe. He and Selwyn Lloyd
have reiterated their opposition to the abandonment of nest Berlin, the
establishment of a neutral Geimany andtte pulling apart of forces within
Central Europe, as well as their opposition to the unbalancing of East-
West forces. The Labor Party, sometimes shrill in its demands for
greater independence from US leadership, would itself be obliged toward a
much more moderate position if it came to power. For all of the pressures,
therefore, for flexibility, realism, and detente, the British may be
expected to back away from any independent proposals or actions that will
weaken the Ilestern position in general, or their "interdependent"
relationship with the US in particular.
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BUREAU Of INTELLIGENCE
etio 628.7)
AND RESEARCH
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No.
RTMENT OF STATE
RARY DIVISION
SEP 1 81959
BASIC Allil.T6/31t WPME UNIT
PLMSOCRETURNIMEB,
. �
. .
.eqce polo t
bTT3
ri
Copy to. U
fL ii)
R.E7.7%:..2.7-i � V
( )
(
August 20, 20, 1959
3
9 PSti � AW
AND GERHAN QWESTIONS
Since the beginning of the Berlin crisis in November,
1958, the positions of the major Western European powers --
the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of
Germany -- have remained essentially unchanged. The
positions of these governments toward the Berlin crisis and
the questions of German reunification and European security
are reflected in their attitudes toward the forthcoming
exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and
Khrushchev and the prospects of later silmmit meetings.
[spite its continued advocacy of the maintenance of
Western strength in Europe and the 'Astern position in
Berlin, the United Kingdom is convinced that a detente with
the Soviet Union must be achieved. It doubts that a general
German settlement favorable to the Wrest can be reached in.
the foreseeable future, and seeks a modus vivendi which will
avoid the risk of hostilities and preserve Western presence
in Berlin for an interim period without jeopardy to Allied
rights therafter. To this end the United Kingdom is mill-
ing to consider concessions leading toward de facto
recognition of the East German regime and limitations on
Western troops in Berlin] The United Kingdom views the
Geneva Foreign Hinister-g Conference as a success leading
to continued negotiations, and as a long-time proponement
of sumnit talks it welcomes the Khru.shichev-Eisenhower
visits.
France views the Berlin crisis as an attempt by the
Soviet Union to weaken German solidArity with the West
which must be resisted firmly at all points. It believes
that the status of Berlin can be negotiated only as part
ATE E tt_L_ PO LI CI
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of an unlikly,- wider.set;leert of ..che problems :of German
'reunificaticn znd disz....rmament. It'spports.cldse
Franco-German cooperation as a means of bolstering French.
security and of augmenting current French efforts toit�-
equal status with the US and UK in determining Western
policy. Because of these fears and nationalistic senti-
ments, the regime of General de Gaulle has grave
reservations about joint United States-Soviet talks at this
time
The Federal Republic of Germany is primarily concerned
with maintaining full Western support, political and
military, for its security and its search for reunification.
It sees the Berlin crisis as .a. Soviet attempt to split West
Germany from its allies and to perpetuate Communist control
of East Germany. The Federal Republic has therefore
attempted ti9 restrain its allies,girticularly the US and
the 9E1 from wavering in their no recognition policy
towards the German Democratic Republic and from making
security concessions without getting equal political con-,
cessions from the Soviets. It has welcomed the Eisenhower-
Khrushchev visits, 'but seeks reassurance that United States
commitments in Europe will not be changed.
1e sharpest difference between the three powers is
that which divides the UK from the other two. France and
West Germany insist on maintaining firm resistance aOinst
Soviet pressure until such time as a general European
settlement may be possible. The United Kingdom also
seeks a general settlement but believes a start must be
made now. It considers a limited Berlin agreement
important enough to warrant some Western concessions. The
French and West German positions. while tactically $imilar,
differ in'tbat West Germany is preoccupied with the
close relationship of security and reunification while
France is concerned with controlling German power as well
as with preserving Western Security in the .face or Soviet
pressure and adding to her own prestige:1 �
--J
-
- � The Vestern European powers are unlikely to change their
Positions significantly during the forthcoming series of
top-level negotiations. All three remain uncertain, 41-
although in varying degrees, as to whether the
Khrushchev�Eisenhowpr visits mean a 11:aap if limited, �
thaw in the cold War ot whether they .54 signal United .
States concessions to Soviet pressure; if the latter, only
the United Kingdom might interpret concessions as anything
but a dcf3at for tte'Vest4 while tie French and the Germans .
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would be driven to urgent #amination ofalmeint.tives,
includingthe.formcitip. of -a coDanantalbl..x.:�,.in order
to .protect themselves against anticipated Soviet moves. �
. i�
I. THE BRITISH 'POSITIGN �
Tfle'adjournment of the GeneVa Conference of Foreign .}-iinisters and
the accompanying announcement :of forthcoming:talks between President
Eisenhower and Premier hlrushchev found UK Views on the problem of Berlin
and of German unification largely unchanged. the major characteristics
of the UK position on. these to issues maybe summarized as follows:
I. The British areyelUctant.to.risk war over Berlin: They
il
do not believe the Western'pOsition in Berlin can be maintaineel �intact,
without any concessions.fo the USSR, unlessthe't4eSt &�prepared to show
v-- t will risk war. ' . '. � - .
. .
2. The British-feel that the Berlin'issue has to be sefp'arated from
the broader problems Of German reunification and European security and
negotiated' since no solution' of or security problems is
likely now. . � �
3. They-believe.thai itlia be neceSsary *eonsider. de facto-
recognition of the East German regime and limits on Western farces in
Berlin in exchange for Soviet agreement to an interim solution that
permits the continuation of Western presence in Berlin for a cert-qin period
without jeopardy to Allied rights thereafter.
� �
4. Although the British still declare that it is their iatcy
that Germany should be reunified by free elections, they dot* that this
solution is feasible in' the foreseeable future; they believe, rather, that
Western proposals for reunification should be advanced as maximum
objectives. There is some UK willingness to consider the Seniiet
proposal for permitting the Germans to negotiate with each oilier on
reunification. . . � �
5. They maintain that: the questions of Berlin and reunification must
be kept the 'subjects of continuing negotiation', with. meetings at the
highest levels as often is necessary.
. .
Adherence to this stand haS.Pxovokedatcusations of "softness" from
. . . ..
some of the United Kingdom's allie.-2y-The UK continues to be firm,
owevegin its strategic dozinitments. It remains opposed to the
aandonment of West Beflin,'to the establishment'of a neutral Germany, and
to the disengagement. of'fordeSin Central Europe (although it has indicated
willingness to consider so-calied,"limitation of foroes". in an agreed
area in Central�Eur4e).. .Moreover, the UK remains convinced that the
fundamental thrt:fro;it &vies from'the :.3ovietiUnlon'while its security
�
* See IR NO. 8020 entitled "A Critical Appraisal of Western Unity' for
an analysis of this topic.
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derives from its part=s4p :with the United Sta:;es. .Therefore, the United
Kingdom is determilled:ta remair. loyal.and ectiYemeDller of NATO and .a firm
partner of the US. The British realize that their security is based-on a
nuclear deterrent composed of SAC, augmented by their own strategic bonb9r
force, and the system of US bases in Britain and around the world'. but they
do not believe .that certain concessions on the German issues would'necessar-
ily alter the nuclear stalemate.
The post-Geneva thinking of the UK on Berlin and reunification must be
considered in the context of that country's awareness of its helplessness in
nuclear war, it-Vraditionally pragmatic approach to foreign relations in
general and unrepnesentative governments in particular, and its long-standing
desire for a detente with the USSR. The British, bb longer sure that "there
will always be a Britain" after a nuclear attack, believe it is essential for
the Soviet Union and the West to seek a modus vivendi b7-negotiatirg. They
do not expect negotiations to yield immediate and far-reaching results, but
they do believe fervently that it is cf supreme importance for the West and
the USSR to achieve some agreement, however limited. They feel that con-
tinuous diplomatic activity ,can deflect Soviet threats and improve chances
of working out a reasonable adjustment between the USSR and the West. The
pressures for negotiation are intensified by the prospect of an early
election, but they do not derive solely from political considerations.
-
Moreover, the British believe that because only Khrushchev can speak
for the Soviet Union, there is no alternative to periodic summit conferences.
Prime Minister Macmillan has said that a slimmit meeting should not be thought
of "as a single peak, but as one of a continuous chain."
The .British by no means viewed the Geneva Conference as a failure
because it did not reach agreement; on the contrary, they considered the
very fact of its having been held an accomplishment because the participants
were no longer�in Macmillan's phrase--"in an atmosphere of ultimatum" but
rather "in an atmosphere of negotiation." When the Conference adjourned;
and. the Eisenhower-Khrtshchev visits were announced, government; opposition
and press all expressed relaxation. Announcement of the visits has reduced
pressures for an early summit meeting since the British now regard such a
meeting as inevitable.
The British feel that the announcement of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev
visits represents a justification of the approach to the easing of East-West
tensions that they have followed since their Prime Minister Eden invited the
Soviet leaders to visit the UK in 1956. Many credit Macmillan with breaking
the ice for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks and an expected summit conference
by having gone to Moscow last February.
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THE 7R.EkH POSITIOO: �
Throughout the Geneva Conference of Foreign Einisters the French
have taken a firmer and more uncompromising stand on all issues discussed
there with the Soviet i than either the UK or even the Federal Republic..
They have Avoided anyzttempts.at,"m...-3eting the Russians halfway" or making
.1Doecia1 efforts to reach compromises with the Soviets on' specific issues
, �
a\ la
French official reaction to the proposed Khrushchev visit to the
US :has been cool. No statements were made at the top level. De Gaulle, .
as part of his effort to display French independence of the US and the UK,
rejected the idea of a Western suninit preparatory to Ehrushchevls visit to
the.US, leSt this appear as a Mandate to the US to act as the spokesman in
dealing with IChrushchey.- .
.',.- During the entire period of. the Present jerlin.crisis the French .
� . .... . .
,...,-
have been eitmliely. reluctant to initiate any negotiating positions. nis'i,:.:-
is not to say that the French poSition is flabby' but rather one of i
"stand-pattise and not showing .one Is cards:.-7. The French want to maintain
the European status v...2 inclur!ing that of Berlin -- not at the price of
Berlin. Both-ie tial that
the 'Astern Allies re the Ge
stlrrend Berlin. .
. . .
(ile French are extremely reluctant to assist in steps which might
lead to a general European settlement weakening the security of Western
Europe or adversely altering the relative power status of France. vis-a-vis
Germany. Of all the Western Allies-therefore,'France.is the least
interested in the reunification of Germany. . .
- Whereas the-French believe that the other Western Allies consider
that the Status of Berlin is only negotiable in terms of wider issues --
Germany, Central Europe, disarmament -- the French would prefer to stand
on legal rights and to confine the issue to the access question. This '
maybe further reflected in a reluctance to :engage in a SumMit.conference.
While France has nothing against the division of Europe in its present- .
form, it cannot countenance this.divisiOn within-the framework of
----...
disarmiment, disengagement, or weakening'Of the.West's.militarY posture.. ;
. .. frame does not wish to see Western Germany. cut loose from its
-Western-military-and economic ties. The present Franco-German -'
.r.approc nt is, from .the French. point of view, designed to preclude
this. te apart frirmany;lper se; reunification on terms acceptable
F
from
to the oviets would alter the entire:Military balance in Europe to the.
almost' certain detriment of Frante and this is an added reason for French .
, . . .
aversion to reur-IfIcatdor;-1,
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-6-.
In the FrenCri.view. toe .Soviets are.u6-inE. Dirlir. as a gambit to
maintain "a state:of:conStant:tenSieri.tendng tr weaker. German resolve and
. .... � - -
bring about a desire for neutralism in Germany." For this reason,
regardless of other consideratIPP. Berlin !lust be -held.
. .
. 1
As was to .'b expected, the French do not want to take the Berlin
problem to the UN.beciuse of their :great distrust of the UN, bated on their
own experiences with it in Connection with'Sues and Algeria. and because
they fear that UN debate Could tie .the hands of the West. The French are
especiP"1-1.Y concerned lest the ePproach to the:UN might occur following a
probe by the Jest. but prior to the use of force by. the West with a :
resultant blockade situation in i�ihiCh the initiative passed from the
Western Allies to the UN._ ... ' *. � - �
For various reasons ,..-:e.g., thii existence of 4 strong government,
lack of-oppositlon, France's geographic position on the continent, concern
regarding Germany's future via;.a-Vis France -- France has responded to the
Berlin crisis in a manner that seems to take into acCount to a far lesser
degree the actual dangers and implications of war than has been the case
in the UK or even West German] While General de Gaulle's actions and
pronouncersents areoftfen unexpected as to timing and content, there seems
no reason tothin15...that France's policy on Berlin will become any less
firm in the ne6. rutUre. ;:- -
1 � �
. ..... . �
. . .
� However France's firm policy up to now has, according to
general de.Gaule, been predicated on American power and leadership. It
is apparent that the developments in the Berlin crisis during the past
eight monthslave led the French to distrust the British completely and
to have grave doubts as to the firMness of the US. ThiS, combined with
the re epee of French nationaliSM since De Gaulle's takeover in .:- *
May 195 , has caused the French to try to force the US. to consider a :
r cOmple revamping of the NATO Alliance so that, in 'French eyes, the -
Alliance would be 'a reall,y"effective instrument of Western Military policy
and the French voice in this policy would be equal to that of the UK and
-the LG. '
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tgq./TJ211
!II. 401 urEsT22Eamtaii,
� . - ,.� .
� �
. The WeatGernan Government'reMaino firril�.* cpPosed to any
. agreement en Berlin that -might.adveraelY raffeoft West Getman Security: -
,It rejects both Soviet propos41 fora *free City* and', GerMan:peace.
'Areaty, and the.propoaal:that..seunification should be left to the
. German's themselves throng/1.0e creation:ofin all-German commission.
:-When Khrushchevaade his initial demands ift November 1958) the�
-:-,- --:
West Germmnsmere concerned primarily with.their-long range Problem.
.:. Of recnifivatiowend securityw rTileyestern response to'the Soviet. �
threat in Berlin, espeoinily-thn-of.the UK, .pertuaded iknt that:the.'
chance of reunification was remote and that the Soviets might succeed
in undermining West German internal and idlitary sectriteA; Thisnew:..
preoccupation led the West Germans to regard the Geneva-Conference .
,'-'411Siply-as a holding operation. .They believed that the Western
�negotiating pisition contained an increasingtendengy teward accommodation
the USSR, and they' grow more' fearful thata.settaiMient inimical to:
:' 7their long range security -interests Might be accepted 'in return for a
. .tetporary respite Of Soviet pressure on Berlin.- At Geneva the West-
. 'German actions left the impression..of-infl and. a negative .
- attitude towards any effort to reach agreement.- anceUorAdr* \
o ls eramed his concern about UK and US motives' e �,4311)117 r
. 1 s vie ee. � :veri /I
i
fre
, rm from
an concern dates an earlier period ii 195.-6 when revision' Of
: lirigarMIMMILWrirTIMM.Tillnx17.11111,70
Allied military.etrattaras symbolized by the British White Paper and
the so-called RadfordiPlan created donbta about the intention and .
ability of the.Alliancei to defend thecontine'hInternal political
difficulties ,in Gerhanr since November,- notably e efumenge'of Ludwig
''Irhard to AdenaUerte'-dominating role,lave increased Gerian.Agidity,
AlthoUgh thh Official response to the Khrusfichev-Eisenhower meeting '
was faVorable,ItheTederal Government 'Is eager to be reassUred that
. both US assesSbentja.Soviet intentions and the US commitment to European
�
� defense are'unaltered.ri- � .. - ! �
. _ ......
- � , -
A4 The Basic West German Position
The policy of the Government of the Federal Republic is dominated
by the long range goals of reunification by peaceful and democratic
means and the attachment of a reunified Germany to an integrated Europe.
The Federal Republic relies for military security and for diplomatic
support on its NATO allies, particularly the US. It maintains that the
former occupdng powers -- .the US, UK, France and USSR -- are jointly
responsible for the solution of all-German questions including the
status of Berlin* It can accept the division of Germany as a temporary
expedient, but feels that it cannot be indefinitely maintained and that
unless some progress toward reunification is achieved the East German
population will become permanently separated from the West. Pending
reunification, the Federal Bcpuhlic cleino t: be the only legitimate
spokesman for the Gc,rmaa p6opla; &(.;.:ordingly the. Government refuses to
recognize the 3Germkn D.uroc.ratio Repubaiou or to 4loncede anything to
Soviet pressure unless conceselfT10.11.re clearly 11 niced to a guaranteed
program for reunification.-: -:."..:-
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Within this framel:o.7.1c. the .t'e.l.eral G3'vernme.lt ha e expressed itself
on the following ;..;pcifi(: qu,ast5uns.
�
6 Berlin settlement can be reached only in the .context of reunifica-
tion and a broad Suropean.security arrangement, The Western Powers should
neither accept -.est-German controls over access to the city nor grant de
facto recognition to the East German regime in any other manner as the
price of insuring access. The maintenance of an allied garrison in West
Berlin is indispensable to its safety: a UN garrison would be an un-
acceptable substitute since it could not automatically commit the allied
powers in the event of aggression. The Federal Government is ready to
accept for as long as may be necessary the present status of Berlin since
it is basei on allied responsibility for the security of the city.
2. Reunification
German reunification should take place by phases, if necessary over
a period of years, and in connection with the -development of a European
security system. Contributions to this program by either East or West
Germany should bkpade only under Four Power auspices and with Four Power
consent. .Provision for free elections to determine the character of a
united German government is indispensable, but such elections mayAle post-
poned to the last phase of the reunification process. To negotiate'w#h
the "German Democratic republic" as an equal would destroy any genuine hope
for an acceptable solution of reunification and would raise the Soviet price
for an all-German peace treaty, particularly in the security area.
4 �
3. Security and Disengagement
The Federal Republic is dependent on its Western allies for its
security. Both the Government and people have indicated that security
must have priority, at least for the present, over reunification. Unless
the Federal Republic is protected and integrated into the Western system,
West Germany may lose its chance for reunification or even its national
existence. West German security demands not only Western support, but
optimum development of the armed forces of the Federal Republic, implying
progressive.rels&ation of W7,U restrictions on types of West German military
equipment. The -Federal Government is unwilling to accept any disengagement
prt?posal based on reduction or "freezing" of forces of armaments in a zone
encompassing Germany, partiCularly if limitations were applied specifically
to West German forces, unless such a proposal required commensurate
political concessions by the USSR.
�
�
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4. ,E14L-T22.9.1q1
The final peace :settlement rm,:st e nego2i,3tet uith a united
Germany and its terms must 'leave her 21.ee to deterndLe her own foreign
policy. The military status of a united Germany should depend on the
establishment of a European security framework, preferably based on a
general disarmament agreement. The territorial limits of a united
Germany should be delineated according to its 1937 frontiers: the
Oder-Neisse line is not' acceptable as part of a definitive treaty of
,peace (but this point may be moderated by stating the Oder-Neisse line
-will not be altered by German force).
B. West German Viow pf Soviet Cb ectives
. The Federal Government believes that Soviet objectives in the
-et/meat crisis extend for beyond Berlin. They believe that these
objectives are a series of interrelated elements:
� 1. Isolation or neutralization of the Federal Republic, to be
achieved by forcing its withdrawal from NATO, likiting the West German
_military effort, and demanding the removal of US forces from Germany.
2. Elimination of' West Berlin as i Western outpost, to be achieved
by forcing abandonment of the city by Allied garrisons or ref-establishing
effective Soviet participation in West Berlin's administration.
�
�
3. Consolidation of the Soviet and Communist hold on East Germany,
to be achieved by obtaining de facto and eventually de ure recognition
of the East German regime aria-demonstrating that Wes?iIIn is at the
mercy of the East Germans.
.The West Germans believe that an interrelated series determined
the timing of the Soviet diplomatic 'offensive: growing military power
particularly in missile capability; increased confidence which it gave
to Soviet leaders; desire to prevent the development of the military
power of German armed forces backed by the US-strategic deterrent; concern
over pctential West German influence on Soviet Satellites, especiplIy
Poland; Khrushchev's desire fox' increased domestic prestige; and the
dynamiaM of 'the -Communist philosophy of international politics. The
Federal Government is deeply impressed by Kbrushchev's display of Confidence
� 'and is inclined to believe that since Western objectives maybe extremely
'difficUlt to adcomplish it is necessary to buy time.
. 0. West German Attitude Tovard Allies
. The Federal Republic recognizes that it is not sovereign in:
matters affecting Germany as a whole or the status of Berlin. The �
Government is aware that the national interests of West Germany's allies
may oppose the accomplishment of German reunification despite the
pledge to supprm It. rnditicnal foam cud rescntment of German power
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persist in sorre, quarters and have been increased in consequence of the
rapid economic x ecovery cf the Fod,?.ral rind highly favorable
trade position. ''.;ht-t -role 1.f-tite AATO defense
planning has become increaSingly iMportant and it. claims equality in
the making of Western policy* at least in the security field:
- 1. 210 PrIlted States
The Federal Government has pinned its hopes on the US because
the US is the strongest of its allies and US interests conflict
least With those of West Germany, The West Germans are extremely
sensitive to the possibility of losing. US protection and will strongly
resist plans or proposals to reduce US military commitments in �
continental Europe: - *-
.
2. Tslo UX and France
7: A
ge West Germans are fully aware that in the current crisis
they axtg-ulner4le to British and French pressureliWithout aried
supiport the Federal Government risks the loss of .Berlin and a severe
setback in its long-range aims for reunification and for expanded power
and prestige within the Western community. It therefore seeks to delay
or modify the.affect of tendencies, toward compromise with the USSR
on the basic questions of an?.-terman settlement or a change in the
status of Berlin.
Et6Federal Government makes a clear distinction between the
UK and France. It has been particularly chary of British policy in
Contral Europe and British efforts to promote detente between the West
and the USSR. Chancellar Adenauer has become _snapiciou.s that Prime
Minister Macmillan may convince the it i ta to
a general European settlement with the USSR. Adenauer fears such an
arrufgement would be made at the expense 6T-German security interests
and would preclude reunificati6E;7
Because of his concern for possible US-UK moves and because
rapprochement with France is a cornerstone of his policy* Chancellor
Adenauer has leaned heavily on General de Gaulle for political and
diplomatic support in the Berlin crisis. In return* Adenauer has
supported Da Gaulle's efforts to build up French prestige and power
through the EEC and weapons development.
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D. Future Develontent of the Wt German Fnsition
- .
Within the CovetEnent tha/e).re ilppr,)ache 'to: the problem
17:iof the futuxe.devlopm4i.0)i Gernar. policy.: Sdile Mhders Seel that
--.;-:the .Federal Republic must'concepip some. degree of de facto recognition
to the East German regime in order to preseive the safety of West
Berlin and to preclude arrangements toward some form.ofAisengagement
that night jeopardize development of West.Gernan-seCurity resources.
Another group is convinced that steps toward recognition and concessions
on security would equally menace the continuation of basic West German
foreign policies. This group sees _no chance cif solving, the current
crisis without A broad!.East-West.detente-and a general .disarmament
agreement.. A minority low holds that Germanyts military statuS must
be fixecrby Four Power agreement before any effective progress can be
expeoted either on Berlin's Status or remification. This group is
closer to the opinion of the opposition Social DeRocrate.-::
The key aspect of current West German policy,..hPwever, Is .
sunned in Adenauerl -c.oicessipns-
}oncessions". Against the background of his strong convictions and ,
personal:1'1755714s implies a substantial degree of rigidity i but this:,
is modified by..wilIingneas to negotiate bcna fide Solutions oft.
key problems involving Germany in -the broadest iterms.
;
SE:MT/NOP:EN State - FD, Wash, D.C.
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BUREAU Of INTLIGENCE
� AND RESEARCH
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
nte: igelice. Report
EP I :13 1959
LIBRX04' t'W7slOttzpARTIAT.TT0gt 1?,/6C-D1C'n,a1.
LR FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
11:(02).;1".:."."1:-
GMMTfA THE4ESTEkN'AtiLIANCE
DATE.F/, YA-) �
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- A L
"/"WP.,
) DOWNGRADE T3 Lo ( ) C.: or ( ) C, 0
' Because of Germany's eposed position, the Government
of the Federal Republic places the greatest importance 4D united
political and military support from its MATO'allies. is there-
fore profoundly disturbed by divisive tendencies among them,
especially in a period of increased Soviet pressure on Germany.
.24.the assessment of the Adenauer Government, the degree to t'�
WHICh it can rely on the US as Gdimany's principal ally may no/
be impaired' by the growing emphasis of the USIsince 1956, on '
long-range weapons- and apparent American reluctance to increase
'defense spending-i coupled with. German fears that the US, as
indicated in the Berlin crisis, may now be less willing to take
military action to meet-its 'commitments. In Western urope, �
the Federal Republic has been dismayed by UK pressure for a
.detente with the USSR, and by French willingness to weaken TO
in support of its nationalist policies, though France's firm-
.ness on the Berlin issue and its Challenge to US-UK leadership(
have augmented West Germagi's efforts toward Franco-German
rannrochemeniti The German Government believes that an increas-
ingly confident gSSR is seeking to isolate, and eyentually
absorb, West Germany, and that Western...disunity .and conciliation
will only abet Soviet objectives, i this framework, the .
'Adenauer Government is ,eager to repair the Western Alliance,
, particularly the breach between the US, and France. If this
fails, and a US-UK combination appears to be movipg toward an
understanding with Khrushchev, Adenauer will be forced ..to
'shift, his main reliance to France and De Gaulle:1.
�
( ) CLACTiTV aL;
Intrcducrtiorl
� . ; The Federal Republic is more exposed to foreign pressure and more de-
petdent upon outside political and military stip'porf:than any other Western
.European country. ' � WiMont: spppqrt WISP �Girtnettel :3 � exitCtafte is in jeopardy
. �
aqui
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because of its gipgrit.ghirisx.ilin.iinchgoirit Mcreover, its inter-
mediate and long term objectives, respectively European political and
economic integration and reunification of Germany, would be unobtainable.
. Under the leadership of Chancellor Aeensuer, the 'Jest German.Govern7
ment has sought to broaden the base of its external supnort in the form of
US guarantees and military presence, Franco-German ranprochement, and member-
ship in NATO and other multilateral 7uropean organizations such as the Coal
and Steel Community, Euratom and the Common Market. However, in German eyes,
developments since 1955 culminating in recent manifestations of growing
Soviet power and confieence combined with indications of US and UK uncertainty
and willingness to compromise on such issues as 2er1in, are cause for reviving
dormant German fears that some of the vital external underpinnings for Germany
may be shifting. Because of the vulnerability of. the Federal Republic, this
raises more acutely .than heretofore, the need for German reappraisal of alter-
native courses of action. The seriousness with which the German Government
currently weighs even day to day variations in American, British or French
actions reveals that it believes decisions vital to its interests are in the
offing. or the first time, since the critical perind of 1954 when 7DC
collapsed, the German Government sees that there is a real possibility of !
withdrawal of US forces from %ro and a rearrangements of the alignments
and power factors on the continent.
I., CrlillANIFISPIRSHIP IN THE ALLTAUGE
When the Federal Republic* entered NATO on May 5, 1955, its longstanding
moral end political affinity for the West was formalized and a device was pro-
vided for it to participate directly in Western military security, While the
opposition Social Democrats charged that the national goal of German reunifi-
cation would be precluded by this decision since the USSR would never agree
to a unified Germany:retaining its NATO membership, the Christian Democratic-
conservative coalition was able to carry the German public with it. The .
principal affirmative arguments were the German need for security and far .
Western support in the face of Soviet pressure. Simultaneously, the princi-
pal Western Powers asaisted the German entry into NATO and ITSU by relinquish-
ing their occupation status in the Federal Republic, by pledging to work for
German reunification through retention of their responsibilities Tor Berlin
and Germany as a whole; and by'guaranteeing-West German security through the
presence df-their forces', under the NATO label, in the Federal Pepublic. Thus
Germin objectives were adequately met by the specified polfcied of the Western
.Alliance.- .
IL� � GWAN GOV7.114Err Asstrilr c r..7cExr immortiEns
In the Weet.
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shifting policifea..4614t4W& lesttnn*A2.12.es:aind. -Che growing might of the
USSR. The following are widely, held views in the German Government: .
The US, regarded as Germany's strongest and stauvhest partner, has
. begun to revise its national strategy beginning with the so-called Radford
Plan in 1956. The loss of Absolute American military superiority over the
USSR, the changing military technology with increased reliance on long range
weapons systems and nuclear energy, and the ostensible decline of American
willingness to make sacrifices from current consumption to meet increasingly
expensive military requirements have been interpreted by the German leaders
as signs of a lag in American determination to rise to the challenge of, the
Soviet Union. The application of American power in specific cris A_such as
Lebanon and Quemoy, have helped restore German faith in the USf but American
flirtation with UK willingness to make concessions in the Berlflrtisis has
driven home to many Germans in all parties the' dread that parhaps the US can
no longer be counted upon in absolute terms and that it is urgent to Weigh .
alternative policies should US weakness become more pronounced through steady
erosion of its position in Europe.
While the Suez fiasco, in 1956 and the prolonged Algerian conflict
demonstrated to Germans that their principal European Allies were inclined to
.put national interests above all others, the actions of the UK and France
during the.Berlin Crisis have been interpreted by Germano as proof that these
'Powers may even go to the extreme of sacrificing the unity of the Alliance
and individual members of the Alliance to.. gain their, goals.
The tiacmillan trip to Moscow and the readiness of the. UK to come to
terms with the USSR over Berlin by recognizing the division of Germany as .
permanent and by making military concessions on "liquidation.of forces" in
Gentral,-,urope have aroused the normally suspicious Adenauer so that he was
� reluctant to agree to any Uestern proposals at the Geneva Conference of
Foreign lanisters even for tactical purposes. .
The French withdrawal of its fleet from wo, the De Gaulle decision
.to refuse stockpiling of nuclear warheads in Frahce for American NATO squadrons,
:and the De'Gaulle.stateMent 'supporting the Oder-Neisse line as the frontier.
between Germany and Poland have shown the Germans that France is willing to
press hard on her Allies to aChieve her goals.
However, tixne3j French support of the Federal Governmentlp hard..posi-
:\tion on Berlin and French efforts to curtail the dominance and the tendencies
�of the US-UK leadership in the .West have resulted not only. in GermAniccePt-
.--ance,of but even plaudits fOi:\French actions.. tie result is unprecedented
:A"Yaneo-German'cooperation andA. discernible trend.tbward..even closer associa-
tion .
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As to its 7astern.nroblems, the German Government has not altered its
longstanding estimate of - the nature of the Soviet threat and Soviet designs
in Germany. The Germans, of every political leaning, including the Communists;
are convinced that the Soviet aim is to isolate, neutralize and absorb the,
Federal Republic and Berlin. The Germans believe that the Soviets over-
emphasize the potential military ane political threat of Germany to the USSR,
but they consider Soviet fears of a resurgent Germany and Soviet des5.res to
obtain German resources basic elements in Soviet nolicy. The Soviet d.avelop-
ment of the East German area, both as a base of operations against West Germany
and as a 'valuable .a0dition to the strength of the Soviet bloc, is considered a.
corollary of the general policy.
ReCent Soviet moves, particularly the Berlin crisis and Khrushchev's
personal diplomacy, are seen by the German Government as evidence of Soviet
confidence in the growing� strength of the USSR and the bloc. The Federal
Government .believes the USSR's objectives in the Berlin crisis began with
Berlin but go far beyond it. This assessment has been confirmed, to the .
Germans, � by Khrushchev's Summit Conference efforts. The Germans consider that
efforts to split the Western Alliance-militarilY, to gain large 'potential
economic increments to Soviet power and to restrict the military bldld-up of
West Germany with nuclear weapons are' linked to important internal objections .
in obtaining Berlin, strengthening East Germany and stabilizing the satellite
:bloc. The -Germans believe that any RUB sian gains will .be dxploited as rapid-
ly as possible, commensurate with-Soviet estimates of .Western reactions. The
Sovlet appetite is innntiable.. But they will avoid war to gain their ends .
.8 ince ' hostilities would threaten internal .Soviet ani. bloc security... �
C. � Moderating Factors .
� ..,-- A.'
. .
' . There have en a number of moderating factors in the German Govern-
. ' mentlk assessment whicb have helped to affect its gloomy estimate of. the -
2 declining fitrength, unity and purpose of the Western Alliance and the nature
and strength of the Soviet challengaT - ,
. .
Externally, the rapid progress and consolidation in France under
. De Gaulle and the gradual steady growth of 'functional integration in Western
Europe, with German participation, have encouraged the Ge'rman Government.
Internally, the gederal.Republic is enjoying unprecedented prtOsnerity
with full emplOyzent, bountiful exports end increased standards of living.
.1.11ore070er'il, the internal political situation is ,pot:thi-eatenipg to _the. Covern-
mont. This Spring's \power. stimggle irf.the. Christian Democratic Union between
Adenauer4hd. Ludiag Erhard weakened the party but it is at *least counter-
balanced 1::17 the ejrea is�1ai fgr. pok Mon in the.oppoe-
ition:Social":,DeModrapp. 1;t:is pnitIoly Zhht th cm3rrbflt Adenauer
lieideri;abiP .dIftradoect iC .e ex 1174, yekns . 7:Pdaltical action and, .
.diatattheer..d46rfinMit te.rine � Of winning a fourth
. , �
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pr.� Aarirt 'CDVAN' ItLIOItt*
Given the exposed posj.tion and natiOnal objectives of Ittte Federal
� jlepublic, there are three possible courses of action open .to ttny:German
Government: Alignment with the West, neutrality, and al i gnr:entr with the ZSR.
� . .
Only the Communists favor Err b-Soviet orientation. They prefer to
approach it via neutrality 'both to obtain broader popular support, since most
Germans are anti-SOviet, anti-Comm-list, and ;anti-SIM, and to harness the
. I-dissident Social 'Democrats and other Gorman elements whose Iiiiews encompass.. .
fear of nuclear weapons, 'permanent loss of German national identity and re-
�' unification, and abandonment. 6f, the East German people to the Soviet bloc.
The sentiment for neutrality accommodation with the USSR has tended to
increase since 1957 and Sputik and since hbpes for roUniftcation have receded
� � in the Berlin c:ri,sis'. Howe er propoitentS of these policies are still a
minority in the leading po tical parties 'and in the Government rend the :danger
they portend is not immediate although the potential is present.
As to alignment With the West, there is no'doubt. that this represents
the preference of the people and the policy of 'the. Government of the .Federal �
�. -Republic: However, the form and content of-, pro-Western alignment is no./
subject to the external, changes which are unfolding in terms of growing Soviet
power, De Gaulle's objectives, for Prance, and the threatened decline of US-UK
�-� polder and 'influence on the continent. The Adenauer Goverment is concerned
that it may be forced .to 'choose between IIATO as it now exists and a Continental
Brloc. based on the EEC Mtmbers and led by France. This will pose 'a dilsprma of
great moment both. for Germany and for the future of the Western Alliance.
Therefore, Adenauer la efforts will continue' to Ilk directed toward persuading
the US to cane o an understanding with De GauLle and to avoid a showdown.
has clearly demonstrated thie .effort in'word and deed in conversations with
� Mr. McCloy and. General Norstad urging American feappraisal of De Gaulle and
in German support for Prench policy in Algeria. However; if the LIS rebuffs
Pe Gaulle, increases' its support for the JJK and appears to be moving toward
an understanding with Khrushchei, Adenauer will be forced to opt or''De Gaulle
in order to preserve the *existence of the Federal Republic. UhettSer this
decision will be required 'depErrxis, ih German eyes, .upon factors �
. which are outside her direct influenee. Therefore Adenauer has placed-the
� gteatest importanCe on. hia chance to consult with President Eisenhower on" '
Atigust .22.. �
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- isdreening of refugees
A
Working group set up to study possible UN role in Mar elde Refugee
rneived USIB'clearance toda
Reception Center has produced following paper, whichbarsaUlgrangx=taMMXIM
XiiiniiiriairSAINCiariZZAMEPDaralicir
XXERWANV (Reference TOSEC
VERBATIM TEXT Jo the RM/R Cantrai Fj4e4
.018 Documen(must be
Problem
To determines 1) whether the UK could play a role inthe MarienfeldeRefuge
Reception Center; and 2) whether a UN role in Marienfelde would adversely affec
the present intelligence exploitation of refugees.
Discussion
The Marienfelde Refugee Reception Center processes 75% of the refugees
exiting from the GDR. The Center is utilized by the three Western occupation
powers and by the West Berlin administration for screening refugees both for
security and for intelligence exploitation.
The security screening has direct relationship to the security of West
Berlin and U.S. forces stationed there. About 3% of the refugees processed
are found to have had previous contact with hostile intelligence organizations.
Wfthin this 3% a much smaller number of refugees have left the GDR with the
-object of conducting hostile activities against the Western allies. The
at Marienfelde serves to identify such hostile aglOs.
� CP ),
CAt
Toloopoottic trostiabkRiaR sad
thi....1,..6.....,..mwebv
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c612ft -Mr. Vigde vGER - Mrs. Dullesio:Ar INMX-USIB at IL JOS melting 1t144.q.
EUR -Mr. Kohler U/OP - Mr. tis ---Y XtEkokEMMEZX .Y:,Ing. re,
1NR - ?fr. Cumming 4.. (d
� � .Z.1
I A
1.1
. Classification
Jr �
RemmucnoN num-lt
COPY, IF CLASSIFIta;
PROHIBITED.
901 048 -/SC
�
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Page 2 of v.'s-ram to GENEVA TOSEC
Clas11411.
Intelligence exploitation of refugees is also conducted at Marienfelde. The U.S
agencies have first access to the refugees who have came directly from the GDR. The
US IB estimates that 751Lif cur intelligence on Soviet and GDR military forces stationed
in the GDR is derived from refugees. Substantial intelligence on Poland and Caecho-
slovakia is also derived from this source.
sumed
From the Soviet point of view the/Objectionable features of Marienfelde probably
can be stated as follows:. 1) it exists primarily to handle the refugee outflow from
the GDR, which is innately disadvantageous from the Soviet viewpoint; 2) it provides a
convenient and early opportunity for the Western powers to screen refugees for hostile
agents; and 3) it affords apportunities for intelligence exploitation of the refugees.
Overshadowing these concrete disadvantages, the Soviets undoubtedly view the size and
nature of the Mariana:Olds operationsas a disturbing psychological factor, i.e., as
something highlighting West Berlin's convenience as a haven for disaffected East Germans
and as a free world enclave within the Soviet Bloc,
The Soviets would 'regard a diminution of *stern activities concerning, refugees in
Berlin as a net advantage because this mould serve to deempbasize West Berlints militant
anti-GDR and anti-Soviet posture.
Giving the UN a Role in Marienfelde
The four-power working group report suggested the possibility of "a Ult role" in
Marienfelde as a possible element in a limited interim solution of the Berlin crisis.
This report did not indicate what kind of a role the UN could play in Marienfelde. The
implication, however, is that the introduction of the DI into this process would
kEleviate some Soviet objections to Nest Berlin's position as a gateway for refugees 1
11111.1111ft
Classification
901048 /1�-
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Page 3
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of teicarain to GENEVA TOSEC
iiieeing the GDR.
Since the U.S. cannot deny asylum to refugees fleeing the (DR, the basic Soviet
objection to refugee reception can not be removed. The introduction of UN administrt
or even observers, into the Marienfelde Refugee Reception Center, would make the nec(
aary security screening conducted by the three Western powers and the Wrest Germans mc
difficult. Intelligence exploitation of refugees, which is conducted in conjunction
C a 71111111107
with the secu2ity screening, would be rendered almost impossible whether the UN role
were to be
in the refugee reception process/was in effect either before or after the security
screening by U.S. and other agencies. The UN Observers or administrators, reporting
back to the UN Secretary General, would at beat include personnel from the neutral
nations, and at worst might include nationals from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It must be
assumed that a UN role that would-be acceptable to the Soviets as part of the price
for a limited interim Berlin settlement, would have to include UN observation of all
stages of the refugee reception process. The result would be the exposing of
gence exploitation operations to representatives of neutral, and possibly even hostil(
countries V1 -4
a ��� � -
4.�
and the exposure of familie,
of refugees to possible reprisal.
Conclusions
1) As long as US forces are stationed in Berlin security screening of refugees
is necessary. UN presence in Marienfelde would make effective security screening
more diffictli.
2) UN role would make intelligence exploitation of refugees virtalelly impossible.
3) In view of value of intelligence derived from refugees in Marienfelde we
(should not take steps which would endAnger their intelligence exploitation.
ell-Le 1
ACT110
011111111i
Classification
DILLON
_
�
901048-156
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VERLI
itrorical 'Report
:
� .,
REPORTS CO OL SYMPOL
f.10 25;'ijJ1U AE
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111110.1M1.1
INTELLTGENCE AND SECURITY1
1. COLLF,CTION OF MILITARY INFORMATION:
a. Collection within the Command:
(1). During the past year the collection effort of
BC was expanded to include the following activities:
(a) Soviet and East German interference with
convoys and individual vehicles.
(b) Indrease of Border Guards on the West
Berlin Border.
(c) Current events in East Germany.
(d) Close observation of the Berlin-Helmstedt
'railroad line.
(2) Overt collection of information by .G2 BC is
accomplishedi. through the following agencies:
(a) Individual members of BC in the performance
of their duties and in their off-duty periods.
(b) Battle Group Reconnaissance Platoons.
(c) Military Police during normal patrols
through the US Sector and along the US Border.
(d) Military Police Liaison Officers through
a monthly street-to-street reconnaissance of the US Sector Border.
(e) Autobahn travelers to and from Berlin
through the Solaet Zone of Germany.
1G2 Ann Hist Report, dtd 31 Aug 59 (S).
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(f) Train Commanders and Military Police Rail-
way Guards.
(g) Helicopters assigned to G2 Division which
patrol borders of the Western Sectors of Berlin and. observe some
5 Miles into East Berlin and the East Zone of Germany. (This
operation is an efficient means of intelligence patrolling9)
(h) Department of the Air Force aircraft which
it
have been utilized by G2,. BC for specific missions within the 20-
mile Control Zone of the Berlin Air. Safety Center.
b.. Specific requests for information are placed with
IO/DSCOB in order to obtain locally-produced information from
Intelligence Lodger Units which receive logistical support from
BC. but are not under operational control of G2, BC.
C. Specific requests for information were forwarded to
USAREDR whenever information needed was not available locally or
was beyond the capability of local collection agencies.
2. (S) Production, Maintenance and DisSemnation of
Intelligence:
a. G2 collectedvevaluated and interpreted information
for the command on a continuing basis.
b. Intelligence information was maintained by G2 in a
current and usable form for.the.CG and the BC General Staff.
Publications included Periodic Intelligence Reriorts, Intelligence
Summaries and Spot Reports. In addition, Order of Battle maps
were posted with the latest information available on the Berlin
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Area, East Germany and the Satellites Order of Battle books
were maintained on the GSFG, EGA, and East Security Forces.
c. Communist Forces in East Germany (Berlin and Vic-
inity): ,
(a) As of 30 Jun.591 four Soviet Divisions (Tank,
Arty, AAA and Inf) plus one (1) EGA Infantry Division were stationed
within a twenty (20) mile radius of Berlin.. These, plus supporting
units, separate guards units and the East German Garrisoned Security
Forces (asp, SAP, DAP) make a formidable grouping of forces in the
Berlin Area. (see Annex A).
d. Developments Affecting the Command:
(1) Reports emanating from the Soviet Zone of Ger-
many werei similar, to those received during the previous year.
They include reports of political purges, student clashes, friction
between church and state, complaints about high work norms, short-
ages of consumer goods and a growing concern over the. defector
problem. All this dissatisfacti was displayed in spite of the
fact that the Communist regime has made an all-out effort to in-
crease the standard of living and.. provide an increase in consumer
goods..
(2) Among last year's changes in the East German
f-Venal cod was a law which made watching western TV a crime punish-
able by imprisonment. There was also a stiffening in the.attitude
toward defectors to the West. As a rule, their property was con-
fiscated and those who wished to return to their homes in the East
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faced charges of desertion.
(3) With the threat of KhruschevTs 27 May 59 dead-
line hanging over the heads of the Allies in Berlin, the situation
was tense during the latter part of 58 and the first six months
of 59.
(a) May Day passed without incident. East Ber-
lin and West. Berlin held their Labor Day demonstrations as usual.
The East claimed 100,000 participants. Official estimates of the
crowd at the West Berlin demonstration varied from 300,000 to
750,000.. The parade in the East was marked by the consbicuous ab-
sence of Soviet Forces, which in the past have been prominently
featured in these events. (See Annex B for. detailed report.)
(b) Despite all the laws, restrictions and
other efforts aimed at steming it, the refugee flow from East
Germany continued at a steady if somewhat diminished rate. An
appreciable increase in medical and scientific professional per-
sonnel left East Germany during the year.
(c) ThrOUghout the year, East German funct-
ionaries (with or without higher-lever or Soviet sanction) have
continued harassment of vehicles and trains in transit to:;and
from Berlin. However, no serious incident occurred during this
period. The.harassment of Allied trains has not created a serious
disruption in traffic. At the same time, many private vehicles
have been stopped by East German Police on the Berlin-Helmstedt
Autobahn with demands that the occupants submit their documents
to. East German authorities for permission to continue. US travellers
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have complied with USAREUR policy and have refused to submit their
documents to any person not wearing a Soviet uniform. This policy
has achieved.,favorable results since East German Police have per-
mitted travellers to proceed with very little delay once it was
made clear that they would submit their documents only to Soviet
officials.
(d) Summary:
The events of the past year (particu-
larly the fact that there were no major incidents) serve to
point out the "Wait and See" attitude adopted by East Germany in
the face of the inflexible stand of the Allies in Berlin. It may
be inferredthat they will push forward at the first sign of
Allied weakness.
3. (C) Eilitary Security:
a. General:
(1) Security of military information continued to
be of vital importance to all members of the command. Increased
�:,phasis was placed on the proper safeguarding of classified
information at all times to prevent compromise and loss.
(a) Periods of instruction for key personnel
of the comMand and all persons designated as "sensitive" were
conducted by instructors made available by Region VIII, 66th CIC
Group. These classes were designed to alert personnel to the
grave dangers to which they are exposed in Berlin and to give them
the necessary background for instructing their subordinates in
security matters. Attendance was required for all Commanders and
er"7-77,77- 77""
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American Forces in Berlin
1945 1994
Cold War Outpost
by
Robert P. Grathwol
Donita M. Moorhus
Department of Defense
Legacy Resource Management Program
Cold War Project
Washington, D.C.
1994
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1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
152
Persistent Uncertainties
Tension diminished for most West Berliners
after the quadripartite agreements, and recog-
nition of the eastern German Democratic
Republic followed. In September 1973, both
German states joined the United Nations. In
1974, the United States prepared to open an
embassy in East Berlin. Still, tension did not
disappear.
Differences in interpreting the four-power
accords provoked open clashes of interest.
Throughout 1973 and the first half of 1974,
the Soviet Union objected to plans by the
Federal Republic to establish in Berlin an office
of the German (Federal) Environment Agency.
When the West German government finally
opened the office in the summer of 1974, East
German and Soviet officials began a series of
harassing actions affecting land transportation
to and from Berlin. After several days of harass-
ment, the U.S. Department of State announced
a postponement of recognition of the German
Democratic Republic until the diplomatic
atmosphe.-e improved. The harassment stopped,
and in September 1974, the United States
opened its embassy in East Berlin.
The temporary disruption of overland access to
and from Berlin showed that the cordial cooper-
ation following the accords implemented in
1972 could be disrupted at any moment.
Tension never reached the levels of the early
1960s, but neither did relations proceed as
smoothly as in the months immediately follow-
ing the quadripartite agreement.
The U.S. Air Force, 6912th
Security Squadron, based at
Tempelhof, manned the
Facility at Marienfelde.
Threats to the allied or American position came
indirectly as well as directly. In the mid-1970s,
authorities uncovered over 1,000 agents operat-
ing covertly against American interests in West
Germany. The incidence of terrorism also
increased in West Germany. In 1977, a terrorist
group, the Red Army Faction, carried out a
series of bombings, abductions, and assassina-
tions, including the execution of two West
German business leaders and a public
prosecutor.
Counterterrorism and espionage played a part
in the U.S. military mission in Berlin. By the
1970s, the Berlin Command operated sophisti-
ted e ectronic listening station n t e
Teulsbc rn and at Man toe to nitor
message traffic
in East
Germany.
/--Ele-ctronic
eavesdropping
was o
command's
itlicbgence
II
a)
0
a)
2
�
CD_
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1931
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
154
The four occupying powers had engaged in mil-
ince they arrived in
Berlin. In 1947, they had agreed to accredit
liaison missions to operate in one
another's zones of occupation and to
observe military activities. The Soviet
Union operated military liaison mis-
sions in all three western zones, with
one team near Frankfurt in the
American zone. The American counter-
part, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission
to the Commander in Chief, Sovist_
Western Group of Forces (USMLM),
operated from a.4.5-acre estate near
Potsdam in the Soviet zone. The grounds
included a substantial villa and four addi-
tional buildings.
The U.S. Military Liaison Mission had 14
positions, filled on a rotating basis. Members
of the team lived in West Berlin but traveled
throughout East Germany from their base in
Potsdam. Their mission was to assert the
American right to free movement in the zone
and to gather intelligence information. The
Soviet Union barred access to certain areas,
often the ones the Americans most wanted to
sec. Members of the mission knew that their
assignment involved great danger. They expect-
ed harassment from Soviet guards. Through the
years, team members reported incidents in
which they encountered harassment, beatings,
and hostile fire. In 1984, a member of the
French liaison mission died whcn an East
German Army truck rammed his vehicle
head-on.
The headquarters of the
U.S. Military Liaison
Mission was in Potsdam,
just outside Berlin.
Lc)
co
co
cou)
cD
cD
"A colleague of mine had gone ou'r
and seen a military train loaded e:fi
with missile equipment, had folleil
in his car and attempted to phottN..
graph the missile equipment. An
they shot at his car, hit it, knocke'fl
out his windows, his tires, and hl 8
left immobile and then was arreig
by Fint German and then Soviet
authorities.... This happened un