NEW INFORMATION ON SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND SOUTH AFRICAN-ISRAELI NUCLEAR AND MILITARY COOPERATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06746166
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date:
April 23, 2020
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2018-00226
Publication Date:
March 30, 1983
File:
Attachment | Size |
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NEW INFORMATION ON SOUTH [15799700].pdf | 120.04 KB |
Body:
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�NO.ruktr-tieeeNTRACT__
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Central Intelligence Agenry
VVasiinon.O.C2O5OS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 March 1983
NEW INFORMATION ON SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
SOUTH AFRICAN-ISRAELI NUCLEAR AND MILITARY COOPERATION
StuIrmary
Nuclear Weapons Program
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expands and confirm q nnr knnwlpdop of South Africa's nuclear (b)(1)
weapons program. (b)(3)
indicates that South Africa formally launched a weapons program
in 1973. Its scientists reportedly were tasked to develop a gun-
assembly, implosion, and thermonuclear weapons designs. In 1979,
identified a probable underground nuclear
test site in the Kalahari Desert. The resulting international
uproar reportedly caused Prime Minister Vorster to order a halt
to further nuclear weapons development. lIr-tHLJUZ.
We have had no direct indication of any subsequent
activities in the weapons program. We believe, however, that
South Africa already either possesses nuclear devices or has all
the components necessary to assemble such devices on very short
This memorandum was requested by the National Intelligence Officer at
Large. It was prepared by
African and Latin American Analysis,
Weapons Research. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer
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for Africa and the Directorate of Operations. Information as of 28 March 198.1
was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and questions are welcome and
should be addressed to ALA,
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ALA M-83-10042
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Office of
Office of Strategic (b)(3)
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notice, confirms the following
already known details about South Africa's nuclear weapons
program:
-- The Kalahari Test Site was intended for nuclear weapons
testing.
South African scientists anticipated a yield, had they
tested, of 20 kilotons.
Research on both a gun-assembled device using two modified
naval guns and on the firing system for an implosion
device was conducted at the Somerset West explosives
facility over the period at least from 1973 to 1977. s'113.
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-- South African scientists believed that nuclear testing was
not required, because of the favorable nuclear weapon
modelling results they had obtained.
-- Possible nuclear-related high explosive testing also
occurred in the Kalahari Desert in 1977 to 1978.
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-- a plutonium separation plant was contemplated in 1977 to
provide South Africa with a complete nuclear fuel cycle.
South Africa's Valindaba
uranium enrichment plant has been producing highly enriched
uranium since 1978. We estimate that this is long enough to have
produced hically enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons.
South Africa-Israeli Nuclear Cooperation
South African and Israeli military officials hold meetings
every four to six months to discuss the status of their
military relationship, but conduct routine business
through military attaches in their respective embassies.
South Africa supplied the Israelis with depleted uranium
for anti-tank rounds, as well as natural uranium rods
during the period from 1972-75.
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We believe that military cooperation between Israel and
South Africa has been extensive, necessitating regular contact
between Israeli and South African military officials. Israeli
officers are regularly invited to lecture in South Africa and
South African military personnel have participated in a variety
of Israeli training programs. The intelligence relationship is
also quite intimate, as is symbolized by Tel Aviv's appointment
in 1979 of the former head of the Israeli intelligence service as
Ambassador to Pretoria. The list of weapons of Israeli origin in
the South African arsenal--Reshef-class patrol boats, Gabriel
surface-to-surface missiles, Gallil rifles, and Uzi
submachineguns--is testimony to large-scale arms deals in the
past. Delayed deliveries from agreements reached before the UN
arms embargo in 1977 and the South African use of Israeli
middlemen to gain access to commercial international arms deals
makes it difficult for us to assess current arms trading between
the two countries. We have no hard evidence refuting Tel Aviv's
official denials that it has violated the UN arms embargo.
Iff<
Other than South Africa's sale of 10 tons of nominally
safeguarded uranium to Israel in 1963, we have little confirmed
information about South African-Israeli nuclear cooperation,
despite numerous reports and/or rumors linking the two states.
Given Israel's overall technical expertise and South Africa's
uranimum resources and enrichment technology, each side could
contribute to the nuclear weapons program of the other.
Nonetheless, we have no
confirmed reports of equipment or technology transfer, nor do we
know whether South Africa is still providing uranium. -173-1414,_
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