REGIONAL STRATEGIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06708838
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 116
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-01836
• Publication Date: August 14, 2002

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THE DIRECTOR Oi CETRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR:
14 August 2002
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Counsel to the President
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: Regional Strategies
I draw your attention to the attached package of papers prepared at the request
of the Deputies. I believe that you will find them of interest.
Once you have read them, you will see that they provide a useful common basis
of understanding from which we can move forward in our planning and
developing testimony and public statements.
Attachment:
As Stated
CC:
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Iraq Papers for the Principals Committee
15 August 2002
Table of Contents
Tabs on Key Subjects
A: Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat
B: Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
C: Iraq: Saddam's Options in a Conflict With the US
D: Saddam's Asymmetric Options in a Conflict With the US
E:
The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq
F: Economic Consequences of a War With Iraq
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This assessment was prepared by the Offices of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Issue Manager, NESAF,
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1 August 2002
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Summary (U)
Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose
Growing Threat
Since the end of inspections in 1998, Saddam has maintained the chemical
weapons effort, energized the missile program, made a bigger investment
in biological weapons, and has begun to try to move forward in the nuclear
area.
Experience shows that Saddam produces weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) to use, not just to deter. Over the last two decades, his regime
came to look on unconventional forces as important instruments of policy
and routine components of military operations.
� Distinctions between civilian populations and troops in the field mean
little to Saddam when he is intent on preserving or projecting his power.
� Even before the Gulf war, Iraq hid and lied about its WMD capabilities,
and despite inspections after the war, Iraq never fully disclosed these
capabilities and was able to retain a small force of Scud-type missiles,
chemical precursors, biological media, and thousands of munitions
suitable for chemical and biological agents.
Iraq's concerted effort to enhance its chemical, biological, nuclear, and
missile infrastructure has resulted in a number of gains that increase the
capability of these weapons and the number of options to deliver them.
� Iraq has largely rebuilt declared WMD facilities damaged during Desert
Fox, expanded its WMD-capable infrastructure--ostensibly for civilian
production�and furthered UN-permitted ballistic missile programs that
have direct applications to prohibited weapons systems.
� Unmanned aerial vehicles give Baghdad a more lethal means to deliver
biological and, less likely chemical, warfare agents.
� Iraq's procurement of nuclear-related equipment and materials indicates
it has begun reconstituting its uranium enrichment gas centrifuge
program to produce fissile material for a nuclear device, a process that
could be completed by late this decade.
Based on information about Iraq's Gulf war-related stockpile, precursor
orders, and Iraqi intentions, we conclude that Iraq probably has restocked
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its chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents and upgraded weapons
capabilities since the Gulf war by continuing research on and development
of agents and agent weaponization, creating a network for procuring dual-
use equipment, using small-scale production techniques, and indigenously
producing CBW-related equipment. Iraq retains the capability to quickly
convert some civilian chemical, pharmaceutical, and pesticide facilities for
CBW agent production.
� Iraq probably has rebuilt a covert CW production capability by
expanding its chemical industry. It is rebuilding former CW facilities,
developing new chemical plants, and trying to procure CW-related items
covertly. We judge it has the capability to produce mustard blister agent
and the nerve agents satin, GF, and VX. Iraq's CW agent production
/ capability probably is more limited than it was at the time of the Gulf
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war.
� We remain concerned about construction, renovation, and expansion
\activity at dual-use facilities formerly associated with Iraq's BW
program. Moreover, Iraq has developed a redundant capability to work
on BW agents using mobile production centers, making this capability
more difficult to attack. It almost certainly is working to produce the
causative agent for anthrax along with botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and
ricin, and it has the capability to produce other biological organisms that
we believe it retains, such as the smallpox virus and the causative agent
for the plague.
We have little reliable information on Iraq's current CBW stockpile but
judge it consists of finished agents, chemical precursors, and feedstock
material. We have located several sites probably involved with precursor
and CBW storage, as well as some dual-use CBW production sites. The
paucity of detailed intelligence, Iraq's denial and deception efforts, and the
limitations of remotely monitoring known and suspected sites make it
extremely difficult to determine the location of most of Iraq's suspected
CBW stockpile and key production facilities.
The operational capability of Iraq's CBW stockpile is limited by the ability
to weaponize agents. Baghdad has few effective CBW delivery systems�
the most well known systems are long-range ballistic missiles, artillery,
multiple rocket launchers, and aircraft�but it has made advances in aerial
spray delivery and agent potency.
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� Iraq probably retains a small covert force of Scud-variant missiles,
" mostly the 650-km Al Husayn and possibly the 900-km Al Abbas
missiles.
Baghdad has made steady progress in rebuilding its ballistic missile
program, which is based on the al-Samoud and the Ababil-100.
� Iraq has conducted numerous flight tests of these two UN-authorized
systems and is currently developing an extended-range al-Samoud variant
with a range well beyond the UN-authorized 150-km limit.
Iraq is advancing both its liquid- and solid-propellant missile programs,
Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program gives it a delivery platform
for BW or, less likely, CW that threatens its neighbors and US forces in the
region. Iraq until late 2000 had focused on converting the L-29 jet trainer
aircraft for autonomous flight, but it is now looking to convert aircraft with
greater ranges, payloads, and speeds, and small UAVs that may be more
survivable in a threat environment.
� Aircraft�manned or unmanned�equipped with spray systems are
probably Iraq's most effective means to disseminate BW agents.
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Baghdad is attempting to
procure UAV-related components and topographical and routing software
specific to the United States.
We believe Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons program. Iraq
retains a significant number of nuclear program scientists, program
documentation, and probably the manufacturing infrastructure to support a
reinvigorated effort.
Iraq is attempting to reconstitute its uranium enrichment gas centrifuge
program to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons,
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Iraqi front
companies nave made concerted efforts to purchase high-strength
aluminum tubes with dimensions and tolerances best suited for use in
uranium enrichment gas centrifuges.
� We assess that Baghdad may be able to produce material for a weapon by
late in the decade�or possibly as early as mid-decade if it has
established a facility to produce the uranium feed materials needed for an
enrichment effort and has taken significant steps to build and outfit a
centrifuge facility. Baghdad's successful denial and deception efforts
have left us few le r benchmarks with which to assess its progress.
The only scenario in which we think Baghdad could have nuclear weapons
in as short as a year or less is if it obtains fissile material from abroad.
While we have not detected Iraqi efforts to do this, we expect Baghdad to
exploit the prospective offers it receives.
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Scope Note
CIA's Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis, with
contributions from the Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms
Control Center, prepared this assessment to respond to senior policymaker
interest in a broad update on the status of Iraq's efforts to develop and
acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems in the
absence of UN inspectors. The Intelligence Community last addressed this
issue in a product in late 2000: A National Intelligence Council (NIC)
Assessment, Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities (ICA 2000-
007HCX), December 2000, discussed Iraq's continued development of its
infrastructure to produce WMD and delivery systems and those items
unaccounted for after seven years of UN inspections and monitoring. This
CIA study establishes a baseline assessment of Iraq's current WMD
capabilities and its efforts to enhance or ac uire new production
capabilities and delivery systems.
This assessment distinguishes between WMD and delivery systems. WMD
refers to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons�agents, nuclear-
weapons-usable material, related sub-systems, and components. Delivery
systems include but are not limited to missiles, aircraft, rockets, bombs,
and artillery. This distinction largely coincides with UN Resolution 687 of
1991, which established UNSCOM and laid out basic disarmament
requirements for Iraq.
� Resolution 687 prohibits possession, use, research, development, and
acquisition of all WMD, as well as the construction of support and
manufacturing facilities.
� The Resolution restricts Iraqi delivery systems by barring possession,
construction, acquisition, research and development, and use of ballistic
missiles with ranges greater than 150 km, as well as related major missile
parts and repair and production facilities.
� Although UN Resolutions 661 and 687 bar all states from selling or
supplying Iraq with arms and related materiel of all types, Iraq may
possess ballistic missiles with ranges of 150 km or less, aircraft�
including remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles�bombs,
artillery, and rockets.
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Iraq: Expanding WMD
Capabilities Pose Growing Threat
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Iraq has significantly expanded the infrastructure�
consisting of research laboratories, production
facilities, and procurement networks�that can
produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
IHowever, the dual-use nature of many of
its facilities complicates our ability to detect actual
WMD production. Iraq has rebuilt most of its former
WMD-related facilities damaged during Desert Fox
in December 1998 and is furthering UN-permitted
programs�such as the al-Samoud and Ababil-100
missiles�that could support prohibited systems.
and it is
continuing work on unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) as potential delivery platforms for biological
warfare (BW) or, less likely, chemical warfare (CW)
agents. (See Figure 1.)
Chemical Weapons Capitalizing on Dual-Use
Facilities
Iraq already has a CW agent production capability
within its chemical industry, and it probably is
concealing chemical agents, munitions, precursors,
production equipment, and sensitive program
information. We have been unable to corroborate
claims of large-scale chemical agent production
precursors, which could give Iraq the ability to
produce more chemical agents.
suggests Ba hdad is developing a mobile
production capability.
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Research, Development, and Agent Testing
Iraq probably is focusing its offensive CW research
and development on quality control and agent shelf
life of VX and other nerve agents, based on where we
think Saddam's CW program is headed. It may also
be hiding small-scale agent production within
legitimate research laboratories,
Baghdad
is covertly procuring the types and quantities of
chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited
CW agent production hidden within Iraq's legitimate
chemical industry, to include mustard blister agents
and the nerve agents sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. In
addition, UNSCOM was unable to verify that Iraq
had destroyed 1,300 to 3,200 tons of chemical
CW Agent Production
We judge that Iraq is expanding its chemical industry
primarily to support CW production because it is
rebuilding a dual-use infrastructure that it could
quickly divert to CW-related production,
By the end of the Gulf war we
assess Iraq had produced 700 metric tons of bulk and
weaponized CW agents�mainly mustard and G-
series nerve agents.
� The Habbaniyah II chlorine and henol lants,
I have legitimate
civilian applications--such as pesticides and
resins�but also can be used to produce CW
This assessment was prepared by the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the issue Manager, NESAF, on
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precursors. Chlorine-related imports on top of \Stockpiles and Storage Facilities
production from Iraq's other chlorine plants exceed
the country's need for chlorine, which is used
mainly for water treatment.
Iraq studied ways to
produce industrial chemicals for legitimate
purposes while retaining a capability to convert to
CW precursor or agent production during times of
conflict.
We do not know if Iraq is producing CW precursors
or agents at declared sites or if it is concealing
production capabilities at other dual-use facilities or
warehouses. Some Iraqi facilities, such as
Habbaniyah II, are suspect because \
CW program.
a declared pre-war involvement in the
Iraq can still produce blister agents, but the limited
availability of key types and quantities of chemical
precursors and the destruction of its known CW
production facilities during the Gulf war and the
subsequent UN inspections regime probably impede
its production of large amounts of G-series nerve
agents and VX. Iraq historically only has had
rudimentary capabilities to produce VX. We cannot
rule out, however, that Iraq has produced CW at a
small-scale level or that it has procured chemical
precursors.
� Iraq's attempts to procure precursors�often
involving efforts to circumvent UN sanctions�
indicate Baghdad is not yet self-sufficient in
producing chemical agents,
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Iraq probably
possesses CW-loaded chemical munitions, possibly
including artillery rockets, shells, aerial bombs, and
ballistic missile warheads, based on what it had
before the Gulf war. It probably also maintains bulk
chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors,
but possibly also mustard or VX. Several sites are
sus ected of storing CW because
e involvement of tanker trucks during
transshipment activities and trucks associated wi
the CW program prior to 1991
Virtually any structure, however,
could store CW�Iraq during the Gulf war even
stored CW in the open \
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Our information and conclusions about Iraq's CW
stockpile have changed little in the past two years.
We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable
intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment,
and filled munitions that are still militarily useful.
Moreover, we assess the size of the CW agent
stockpile to be at least 100 tons�an amount
sufficient for strategic retaliation, regime defense, or
to threaten civilian populations in and outside Iraq.
We are uncertain about the extent and condition of
Iraq's stockpile, although we believe it mostly
consists of mustard agent, the G-agents sarin and
cyclosarin, and VX.
UNSCOM has accounted for some of Iraq's filled
munitions but not for thousands of empty munitions
that Iraq could quickly fill with agent. Iraq also
retains the capability to produce many types of
weapons that it could fill with chemical agents.
� Iraq provided little verifiable evidence that it
unilaterally destroyed 26,500 artillery rockets after
the Gulf war. Although Iraq can produce some
types of rockets for delivering CW agents, the
unaccounted-for Italian and Egyptian rockets and
multiple rocket launchers in this category were
Baghdad's preferred tactical chemical weapons.
� An Iraqi Air Force document discovered by
UNSCOM inspectors in July 1998 suggests that
Baghdad overstated by at least 6,000 the number of
chemical munitions it used during the Iran-Iraq war.
Iraq has refused to hand over the document and has
� not accounted for these munitions. In addition,
UNSCOM could not verify the disposal of 308 R-
400 bombs, which Iraq claims it unilaterally
destroyed.
� UNSCOM was unable to account for about 550
artillery shells filled with mustard agent.
Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq conducted dozens of field
tests of a large Variety of bombs, artillery shell's,
rockets, ballistic missile warheads, submunitions, and
spray tanks.
� At the end of the Gulf war, Iraq was testing
submunitions�which permit better, agent
distribution�for bombs and may consider them for
ballistic missile warheads in the future.
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, � Iraq is likely to continue field-testing CW delivery
systems to improve their effectiveness,
Iraq denies that it loaded VX into Al Husayn ballistic
missile warheads, despite strong forensic evidence to
the contrary. An independent laboratory detected
degraded products from VX on metal fragments
collected from Al Husayn warheads in 1998.
� We do not know how many VX warheads Iraq had
filled and deployed, but test results strongly suggest
that Iraq had filled with VX at least three of the 45
warheads it declared it had unilaterally destroyed.
Doctrine, Training, and CW Defensive Posture
Our information on Iraqi CW doctrine is based
largely on chemical attacks against Iranian forces
during Baghdad's war with Tehran in the 1980s.
However, just as its CW doctrine changed during the
Iran-Iraq war, we expect Iraq continued to fine-tune
its doctrine in the years that followed.
� Saddam delegated the authority to use CW to his
Corps-level commanders after realizing that his
troops could not act fast enough if he maintained
release authority. Saddam used couriers to
overcome communications difficulties and to avoid
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were carried out.
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WMD defensive training is part of the normal
training cycle for the Iraqi military, but Baghdad
appears to have accelerated such training.
Baghdad since September 2001 has slowly been
readying military forces to respond to an attack,
including preparing them to fight in a nuclear,
biological, or chemical BC environm
� Iraq
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has aggressively sought
atropine auto-injectors�a nerve agent
Iraqi troops could use NBC equipment defensively
against 'a WMD attack or as a preventive measure
during an offensive attack. If Iraq used a
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them, and if it used a persistent CW agent, such as
VX, Iraqi troops would need defensive e ui ment to
enter the contaminated area.
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Proliferation Behavior
It is difficult to tie Iraq's procurement of CW
precursors, technology, and specialized equipment
from foreign sources directly to Iraq's CW program,
but it is working to set up CW-related clandestine
procurement networks.
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� Iraqi entities also have sought dual-use precursors
or production equipment from firm
We do not know
the intended use of the materials or whether any
have been delivered.
Biological Weapons�Easiest to Conceal
We are confident that Iraq is researching, producing,
testing, and weaponizing BW agents, but we do not
have specific information on the types of weapons,
agent, or stockpiles available. Baghdad is attempting
to increase the antibiotic resistance and virulence of
bacterial agents, to produce large quantities of agent
covertly, and to develop delivery systems capable of
spreading BW agent over a wide area
� In addition to the threat posed by BW agents
covertly deployed against US troops and interests in
the Middle East or elsewhere, Iraq could also use
missiles, rockets, artillery, UAVs or manned
aircraft carrying spray tanks or aerial bombs to
transport and disperse BW.
� Iraq declared that prior to the Gulf war it conducted
BW agent testing and weaponization using missile
warheads, aerial bombs, rockets, spray tanks, and
artillery shells, all of which BaQhdad coald still use
to deliver BW.
Baghdad probably is producing the causative agent of
anthrax, as well as botulinum toxin, ricin, and
aflatoxin�all declared to UNSCOM as part of Iraq's
former BW program. However, Iraq probably retains
20 to 25 other biological organisms�such as the
causative agent of plague and the smallpox virus�
that are suitable as biological weapons.
� Iraqi scientists were secretly working
at the Microbiology Department of Saddam College
of Medicine to make plague and anthrax more
resistant to antibiotics and environmental factors,
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Stockpiles and Storage
After over four years of claiming it had conducted
only "defensive research" on biological weapons, Iraq
in 1995 admitted that it had produced about 30,000
liters of concentrated BW agents such as anthrax,
botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin. We are not
certain how much biological agent the Iraqis actually
produced, and UNSCOM estimates that Iraqi
production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin
could have been two to four times higher than
claimed.
� Although the nature and amounts of Iraq's stored
BW material remains unresolved by UNSCOM
accounting, in practical terms it has been
overshadowed by what can be produced by the
growing transportable production program, which
may already have used up all of Iraq's previously
procured growth media.
� Iraq's capability to build equipment and to procure
� other necessary materials covertly, such as growth
media, make large-scale BW agent production
easily attainable.
Iraq has never explained serious discrepancies
between the amount of BW growth media it procured
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before 1991 and the amount of finished agent it
declared�or could have made using the media�
leading UN experts to believe that Iraq produced
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We believe Iraq retains an offensive BW capability,
but we do not know the size or condition of the
arsenal.
� Iraq claims it filled 157 R-400 aerial bombs with
BW agent and later destroyed them, but its
accounting of these bombs from construction
through destruction remains problematic.
UNSCOM cannot verify that the 157 bombs Iraq
destroyed were those filled with BW agent.
� Iraq claims that it produced four aerosol spray tanks
by modifying a Mirage F-1 fuel drop tank. There is
no evidence that the Iraqis destroyed these tanks,
and they may have produced others. Such tanks are
well suited for dispersing BW agent, and the
technology would be critical in developing similar
tanks for the UAV program.
� Iraq's "Full, Final, and Complete Declaration"
admits the production in 1988 of aerosol generators,
another critical component of BW agent aerial
dissemination. UNSCOM interviewed Iraqis who
acknowledged they produced six aerosol
generators�named the Zubaidy device�and
admitted they were for BW dissemination.
UNSCOM also uncovered evidence of a
parallel effort to develop a more sophisticated
aerosol generator but Iraq refused to provide
additional information.
� UNSCOM's final report from January 1999
indicates that about 20 mobile double-jacketed
storage tanks remain unaccounted for. These could
produce, store, or transport BW agents.
Using Transportable Production Facilities
Iraq is pursuing mobile BW production options, in
part to protect its BW capability from detection.
Baghdad has transportable facilities for producing
BW agents and may have other mobile units for
researching and filling them into munitions or
containers These
plants provide a redundant, mobile, large-scale, and
easily concealed BW production capability that
probably surpasses that of the pre-Gulf war era.
� Iraq in 1999 had seven transportable BW agent
production units, according to an Iraqi defector
deemed credible by the Intelligence Co
� Seven mobile BW plants were built under the cover
of the "Grain Purification Project," according to the
source. One mobile production plant comprises two
railroad cars and the other six plants consist of three
truck trailers each. The source reported that one of
the truck mobile plants was producing BW agent as
early as 1997. Following difficulties in operating
the original truck production plants, designs for a
more concealable and efficient two-trailer system
were completed in May 1998, possibly increasing
the overall number of truck production plants.
� In mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile
laboratories to research BW agents in order to
evade
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� The transportable production units
Llllwere to produce five different BW agents,
assessed to be bacterial agents or toxins. Two of
the five agents probably are anthrax and botulinum
toxin.
Other Dual-Use Facilities Available
Baghdad also can produce and research BW agents at
fixed dual-use facilities.
� Since 1999, the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine
Institute has expanded its cold storage capacity
magery has revealed increased levels of
activity. This facility has research, testing, and
production capabilities, and reportedly was the site
where Iraqi scientists conducted quality testing on
BW agents produced on the transportable
production units,
� Iraq is operating a castor oil plant�completed in
early 2000�at Habbaniyah. Castor oil has civilian
applications, but the bean pulp byproduct easily
could be used to make the BW agent ricin.
the Dawrah Foot
and Mouth D.
this facility produced botulinum toxin and probably
anthrax. UNSCOM inspectors reported that the
facility was one of two in the country capable of
containing highly pathogenic biological organisms.
The inspectors disabled the facility's air-handling
system by pouring concrete and foam into it and
removed and destroyed the equipment associated
with botulinum toxin production but left other
research and production equipment in place
R&D and Pr
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inue
Iraq in attempting to
improve its J W agent research and development
capability. UNSCOM assessed in 1999 that R&D in
support of Iraq's offensive BW program was
continuing at several different universities. Without
UN inspectors, Iraq probably has intensified and
expanded these efforts.
� Iraqi scientists have been working secretly at the
Microbiology Department of Saddam College of
Medicine to develop new BW agents and to
increase the resistance of other a ents to antibiotics
and environmental factors
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Iraq continues to seek laboratory research equipment,
auxiliary production equipment, and materiel from
abroad through piecemeal acquisition and
intermediaries, making detection and tracking
difficult.
We assess that Iraq also maintains a capability to
manufacture some BW-related equipment
indigenously.
� UNSCOM inspected the State Establishment for
� Heavy Engineering and the Al Numan Factory and
credited them with the capability to manufacture
equipment for BW agent production such as
fermentors, fermentor components, and holding
tanks for biological agent or culture media.
� The Al Zawra'a Electronics Factory and the Salah
al-Din State Establishment may provide Baghdad
with the capability to manufacture electronic
control units associated with bioprocessing
equipment such as fermentors.
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Baghdad maintains a robust network o rmediary (b)(1)
firms in
elsewhere at assist with procurement of dual-use
and support equipment for Iraq's offensive BW
program. Since the embargo was imposed in 1990,
this network of front Companies appears to have
circumvented import controls through denial and
deception techniques, exploitation of UN
humanitarian exemptions, or emphasizing the civilian
applications of dual-use technology.
(b)(3)
Delivery Systems�Iraq Increasing Its Options
Iraq since late 2000 has rebuilt and continues to
expand many facilities damaged during Operations
Desert Storm and Desert Fox, providing the
infrastructure necessary to develop ballistic missiles
with ranges equal to or greater than its pre-Gulf war
systems. Baghdad is in the process of fielding its
UN-authorized liquid- and solid-propellant short-
range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), the al-Samoud and
the Ababil-100, which we assess have the capability
to exceed the UN-imposed 150-km range limitation.
Iraq is now developing longer-range systems like the
extended-range al-Samoud variant and longer-range
liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles. With
substantial foreign assistance, Baghdad could flight-
test a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)�
liquid- or solid-propellant�by 2006. This timeline
presumes Baghdad is willing to risk detection of
developmental steps, such as static engine testing, by
2004.
Significant discrepancies in accounting and Iraq's
domestic production capabilities suggest that Iraq
retains a small force of Scud-variant missiles. In
addition to two missing Scud-B SRBMs, Iraq's
hidden Scud-variant force could contain at least seven
Iraqi-produced missiles, based on UNSCOM
accounting. The UN holds that Iraq's accounting of
its unilateral destruction of these missiles is seriously
flawed. We assess that Iraq has retained a small
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Scud-variant force with some level of operational
readiness, that may consist of up to a few dozen
SRBMs, probably the al-Husayn 650-km SRBM and
possibly the al-Abbas 900-km SRBMs.
We are concerned about other discrepancies as well:
� Iraq has not accounted for more than 500 metric
tons of liquid Scud missile propellant (TM-185),
which Baghdad claims�without evidence�it
destroyed. This propellant is used exclusively for
Scuds.
� Iraq produced 120 of its own Scud-type warheads.
Twenty-five of these were used as "special"
warheads and filled with CW or BW. Iraq claims it
unilaterally destroyed the remaining 95
conventional warheads, but it has failed to account
for 50 of them. UN excavations at Iraqi burial sites
have uncovered no sign of the 50 warheads.
-� Iraq has not accounted for a large number of
sophisticated Scud missile components�including
combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies�that it
claims it destroyed in 1991. Iraq presented to
UNSCOM a large number of metal ingots it
claimed were made from destroyed, melted
components
Solid-Propellant Ballistic Missile Program
Iraq's UN-authorized solid-propellant Ababil-100
SRBM program has advanced rapidly since 1998,
e a in late 1998 was
in the early stages of development, and Iraq began
flight-testin the s stem in late 2000.
The Gulf war and UN inspections destroyed the solid-
propellant infrastructure required to build motors for
the Badr-2000, a pre-Gulf war development program
for a two-stage SRBM with a 750 to 1,000-km range.
Most of this infrastructure has now been rebuilt, \
Iraq in 2000 was developing large-diameter motor
cases for a longer-range solid-propellant SRBM, or
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possibly MRBM. We do not know how far the
program has 'progressed, but recent solid-propellant
infrastructure improvements including mixer
buildings and a casting plant suitable for larger
diameter motors�suggest Baghdad will be able to
move forward with this system.
Liquid Propellant Ballistic Missile Program
Iraq in January 2002 began to field its UN-authonze
al-Samoud liquid-propellant SRBMI
I The al-Samoud is a hybrid of Scud-
B SRBM and SA-2 surface-to-air missile technology,.
capable of flying 180 km downrange, based on Trail
desi s rovided to UN ins ector
� Iraq is nearing completion of a liquid-propellant
engine test stand that probably will be capable of
testing engines more powerful than the
engine.
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A variety of intelligence strongly suggests that the L-
29 is intended as a biological agent delivery platform.
� The Iraqi organization managing the L-29 program
also is heavily involved in aerial spray systems
echnologies easily applied to BW
dissemination.
� The L-29's limited payload capability and the
system's poor accuracy make it more suited for BW
rather than CW delivery.
The UAV Threat
We assess that Baghdad continues to develop
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)i�including the L-
29 jet trainer aircraft�as delivery platforms for BW,
and less likely CW, agents, which would threaten
Iran's nei hbors and US forces in the Pe
� The L-29 is a 1960s vintage Czech-made jet trainer
aircraft with an operational range between 546 and
746 km. Iraq acquired 90 of them in the 1980s, all
of which were subsequently retired./
1
A UAV operates autonomously using an
autopilot. A remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) is
operated by ground controllers using a remote
control unit. Since 1995, the L-29 has operated
mainly as an RPV,/
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We believe Baghdad is attempting to convert aircraft
with greater payloads, ranges, and speeds into
remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs).
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Although much less sophisticated and more
vulnerable than ballistic missiles, aircraft such as the
L-29 and the L-39 are far more effective BW delivery
platforms. A manned or unmanned aircraft armed
with CBW spray tanks launched from southern Iraq
would pose a serious threat to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
and other areas of the northern Persian Gulf.
Maintaining a non-threatening flight profile, avoiding
air defenses, and operating at night in cooler
temperatures, these aircraft could disperse a line
source of BW agent upwind of its intended target,
leaving a large wind-borne plume in its wake.
Another concern is Iraq's current development and
flight-testing of small- to medium-sized UAVs and its
recent procurement of significant amounts of UAV-
related equipment. Although armed with smaller
payloads, smaller UAVs' would be more difficult to
detect and shoot down than manned aircraft and could
pose a greater danger to US forces and allies in the
region.
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An Iraqi UAV procurement network is attempting to
procure commercially available route planning
software and an associated topographic database that
will provide coverage of the "50 states"�referring to
the United States
an effort that would provide precise guidance,
tracking, and targeting in the United States for the
small UAV.
Nuclear Wea
Efforts
ons�Ramping Up Procurement
Iraq's persistent interest in high-strength aluminum
tubes indicates Baghdad has renewed an indigenous
centrifuge uranium enrichment program. Iraq's
efforts to acquire these tubes, combined with the
other more tenuous indicators noted below, suggest
that Baghdad may be able to produce the fissile
material needed for a nuclear weapon by late this
decade. Iraq would need approximately 6,000 to
10,000 centrifuges of the type that use these tubes as
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rotors to produce enough highly enriched uranium
(HEU) for one nuclear weapon per year.
� Use of aluminum in a centrifuge effort would be a
major step back from the specialty steel machines
Iraq was poised to mass-produce at the onset of the
Gulf war�perhaps indicating the loss of key
personnel and manufacturing capabilities. Iraq has
been willing to use inefficient and outdated
enrichment technologies before, such as in its
prewar Electromagnetic Isotope Separation effort.
Baghdad could probably build these small
centrifuges without foreign assistance.
Iraq would be able to shorten fissile material
production to mid-decade if it had somehow
accomplished significant work on fissile material
production during the years of intrusive inspections.
To get nuclear weapons by mid-decade, Iraq would
have to establish a host of support facilities such as
those used for uranium conversion and feed
production, metal production, and weapons
component manufacturing and testing.
� Foreign-supplied uranium still in Iraq could help
shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear
weapons. Iraq retains approximately two-and-a-
half tons of 2.5 percent enriched uranium oxide,
which the IAEA permits. This low-enriched
material, if converted to uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) and fully utilized, could produce enough
HEU for about two nuclear weapons. The use of
enriched feed material would also cut the initial
number of centrifuges that Baghdad would need by
about half. Iraq could divert this material�the
IAEA inspects it only once a year�and enrich it to
weapons grade before a subsequent inspection
discovered it was missing. The IAEA last inspected
this material in late January 2002.
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Why The Aluminum Tubes are Destined for
Centrifuges
CIA believes that the high-strength aluminum tubes
Iraq is seeking are destined for its gas centrifuge
program. We base this assessment on analysis of a
body of intelligence reporting that describes the
materials involved, the exceedingly stringent
tolerances, high cost, and the secrecy surrounding the
procurement attempts. We believe Baghdad will
depend on these tubes to restart work on uranium
enrichment for a nuclear weapons program.
Although we have considered alternative explanations
for the tubes�such as their use in multiple rocket
launchers (MRLs)�CIA concurs with ground forces
weapons experts in the Intelligence Community that
such an explanation is inconsistent with the overall
body of intelligence on the subject.
� Experts at National Ground Intelligence Center
(NGIC) indicate that the materials, surface finish,
and other tolerances far exceed those required for
MRLs.
� While the IAEA
is not convinced that
these tubes are destined for this purpose. The IAEA
reached this conclusion, however, without the
benefit of all of the information currently available
to the IC and classified US centrifuge experience.
Illicit acquisition of weapons-grade fissile material
from a foreign supplier could shorten the time
Baghdad would need to produce a nuclear weapon
� Iraq's nuclear weapons design work had progressed
sufficiently at the time of the Gulf war that it could
probably use either HEU or lutonium in a crude
implosion device.
The UN and the IAEA have assessed that Iraq is
currently incapable of producing fissile material in
sufficient quantities to produce nuclear weapons and
that there are no critical outstanding disarmament
issues. However, the IAEA has concluded that Iraq
continues to withhold significant information about
�
enrichment techniques, foreign procurement,
weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and
intelligence services in obtaining external assistance
and coordinating post-war concealment.
� Iraq continues to withhold documentation on the
technical achievements of its nuclear program,
experimentation data, and accounting.
� Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction
between its nuclear program and its ballistic missile
program.
� Iraq has not provided the IAEA with documentary
evidence of a political decision to end, cease, or
discontinue the nuclear weapons program. Iraq is
obligated to enact penal laws prohibiting nuclear-
related activities banned by the IAEA and UN
Security Council.
Other gaps in our understanding of Iraq's nuclear
program include:
� Iraq's declaration prior to the Gulf war of a UF6
production capability, which is inconsistent with it
being poised to begin mass-producing uranium
enrichment gas centrifuges. Iraq claimed to have
been able to produce only kilogram quantities of
UF6in the laboratory, yet it was moving to produce
thousands of centrifuges, which would have
required larger amounts of UF6feedstock.
� The extent of Iraq's post-Gulf war procurement
activities.
� Recent technical achievements, activities of key
scientists, and the existence of new facilities.
� How much4fanv.outside assistance Iraq is
receiving.
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Key Assumptions for Nuclear Timeline
Our current estimate that Iraq could develop nuclear
weapons by late in the decade is based, in part, on
recently acquired information obtained from
defectors, seized documents, and intrusive inspections
about the overall capabilities and progress Baghdad
made in its prewar nuclear weapons program. This
information paints a fairly clear and consistent picture
of the overall capabilities and accomplishments of
that program.
From the end of the Gulf war until intrusive
inspections were halted in November 1998, we
enjoyed significant access into Iraq and witnessed
further exposure and dismantlement o
weapons ro am.
During this period, we doubt that Iraq would have
been able to use much of its prewar nuclear
infrastructure to pursue any significant weapons
efforts, as these facilities either had been bombed or
were subject to frequent inspections. Therefore, we
believe Saddam would have located any resumed
weapons work at other facilities where there would
(b)(1) have been a lower probability of detection.
(b)(3)
�
for several years many of
Iraq's nuclear weapons scientists and engineers
were kept employed on civilian or other non-
nuclear projects. We assess these activities helped
to preserve the competence of the nuclear cadre
while exposing them to other technologies that
would improve their overall skills.
Saddam's Actions and Intentions Constitute a
Growing Threat
Since the end of inspections in 1998, Saddam has
maintained the CW effort, energized the missile
program, made a bigger investment in BW, and has
begun to to move forward in the nuclear area.
Experience shows that Saddam produces WMD to
use, not just to deter. Over the last decade, the Gulf
war, and Iraq's war with Iran, his regime came to
look on unconventional forces as important
instruments of policy and routine components of
military operations.
� Distinctions between civilian populations and
troops in the field mean little to Saddam when he is
intent on preserving or projecting his power.
� Even before the Gulf war, Iraq hid and lied about its
WMD capabilities, and despite inspections after the
war, Iraq never fully disclosed these capabilities
and was able to retain a small force of Scud-type
missiles, chemical precursors, biological media, and
thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and
biological agents.
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Iraq: Composite of Key WMD and Missile Facilities
Jordan DEI Facto
r Boundary
- �
0 50 100 Morraters
0
100 Miles
Saudi
Arabia
BW
CW (major)
9 CW (minor)
Nuclear
Caspian
Sea
Persian
Guff
Boundary tunpresentonon
nol nootospnly aothontatue.
DI Cartography Center/MPG 760667AI (R00667) 7-02
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(
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Figure 6
Iraq's Ballistic Missile Force
Ill Potential launch area
Potential launch areas are based on
deployment and launch locations
used during Desert Storm.
a !rag is developing an
extended-range Al Samoud
we believe this missile may
have flown 240 to 300 km
downrange. This missile
uses the same Al Samoud
engine, and hag extended
the range by lengthening
the burn time. This can be
done by either lengthening
and/or widening the
airframe.
Med.
Sea
Egypt
Black
Sea
400 Nlometers
L
400 Miles
Turkm.
rotr7 b ord
Saudi
Arabia
650 km from
900 km from
DI Canography Center/MPG 759494AI 4-02
lit" Ito 11
%I ,thit Li 11,1111-III I
P.ro,ni ii.i oki :01 .L00 1110 IIWI
PnLpell it, i.pL
I.1.1t311 uji14,1111
DI Design Center/MPG 385742AI 7-02
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Ira
ons of Mass
estruction Progra
July 2002
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Iraq's Weapons of
ass Destruction Programs
In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare,
destroy, or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and production
infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq forgo the future
development or acquisition of WMD.
Baghdad's determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its arsenal, agents, equipment, and
expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN inspections. Elite Iraqi security
services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating
documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues in each WMD category: Iraq's
missile, chemical warfare (CW), biological warfare (BW), and nuclear programs.
o Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent resolutions
demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the inspection process
and to provide United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA officials
immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to inspect.
� While outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently denied
access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an effort to conceal critical information
about their WMD programs.
Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad's pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became
more accurate between 1991 and 1998 but only because of sustained pressure from UN
sanctions, coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections facilitated by information
from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and
inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely
destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.
� Despite the destruction of most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era
chemical and biological munitions, Iraq probably still has a small force of Scud-variant
missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for
chemical and biological agents.
� Iraq has managed to preserve and in some cases even enhance the infrastructure and expertise
necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile and
possibly to increase its size and sophistication.
Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as
required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN
at known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate.
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UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for inspections
and Monitoring: Theory and Practice
Resolution Requirement
Reality
Res. 687(3 AprIl 1991) Requires Iraq to declare, destroy,
remove, or render harmless under UN or IAEA supenrision
and not to use, develop, construct, or acqiire all chemical and
biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with ranges greater
than 150 km, and all nuclear weapons-usable material,
including related material, equipment, and facilities. The
resolution also formed the Special COMMiS81011 and
authorized the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site
inspections 01MM-related facilities based on Iraq's
declarations and UNSCOM 's designation of any addlional
locations.
Baghdad refused to declare all parts of each WMD
program, submitted several declarations as pad of its
aggressive efforts to deny and deceive inspedors, aid
ensured that certain elements of the program would
remain concealed. The prohibition a *nst developing
delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 kin
allowed ghdad to research and develop shorter-range
systems with applications for longer-range systems and
did not affect Iraqi (Mods to convert full-size aircraft into
unmanned aerial vehicles as potential WMD deivery
systems with ranges tar beyond 150 km.
Res. 707(15 August 1991) Requires Iraq to allow UN and
IAEA inspectors immeciate and unrestricted access to any
site they wish to inspect. Demands Iraq provide lull, final, and
complete disclosure of all aspects of its WMD programs;
cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move, or destroy
WMD-related material or equipment; allow UNSCOM and
IAEA teams louse fixed-wing and helicopter Nights
throughout nal; and respond fully, completely, and promptly
to any Special Commission questions or requests.
Baghdad in 1996 negotiated with UNSCOM Executive
Chairman Ekeus modakties that it used to delay
inspections, to restrict to four the number of inspectors
allowed into any site Baghdad declared as "sensitive,"
and to prohibit them altogether trom sites regarded as
sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over
individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger
numbers of inspectors into such sites but only alter
lengthy negotiations at each site.
Res. 715(11 October 1991) Requires Iraq to submit to
UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD
programs; arid approved detailed plans called for in UNSCRs
687 and 707 for long-term monitoring.
Iraq generally accommodated UN monitors at declared
sites but occasionally obstructed access and manipulated
monitoring cameras. UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring of
Iraq's WAS) programs does not have a specified end dale
under current UN resolutions.
Res. 1051 (27 March 1996) Established the Iraqi
export/import monitoring system, requiring UN members to
provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials
exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production,
and requiring Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items.
Iraq is negotiating contracts for procuring�outside of UN
controls�dual-use items with WtiA)appications. The UN
lacks the stall needed to conduct thorough inspections of
goods at Iraq's borders and to monitor imports inside Iraq.
Res. 1060 (12 June 1996) and Restitutions 1115, 1134,
1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205: Demand Iraq cooperate with
UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate,
unconcklional, and unrestricted access to facilities for
inspection and access to Iraq officials tor interviews. UNSCR
1137 condemns Baghdad's refusal to alow entry to Iraq to
UNSCOM officials on the grounds ol their nationality and its
threats to the safely of UN reconnaissance aircraft.
Baghdad consistently sought to impede and limit
UNSCOM's mission In Iraq by blocking access to
numerous facilities throughout the inspection process,
often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and
routinely attempting to ny inspectors access to
requested sites and indvidnals. At limes, Baghdad would
promise compliance to avoid consequences, only to
renege later.
Res. 1154 (2 March 1998) Demands Iraq comply with
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary
General's memoranckim of understanding with Iraq, providing
lor "severest consequences" if Iraq tails to comply.
Res. 1194 (9 September 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to
suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
Res. 1205 (5 November 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to
cease cooperation with UNSCOM.
UNSCOM could not exercise is mandate without Iraqi
compliance. Baghdad refused to work with UNSCOM and
instead negotiated with the Secretary General, whom it
believed would be more sympathetic to Iraq's needs.
Res. 1284 (17 December 1999) Established the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), replacing UNSCOM; and decides Iraq shall
allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, uncondlional, and
unrestricted access to any and all aspects ol Iraq's WMD
program.
Iraq repeatedly has rejected the return of UN arms
inspectors and claims that it has satisfied all UN
resolutions relevant to &armament. Compared with
UNSCOM, 1284 gives the UNMOVIC chairman lass
authority, gives the Security Council a greater role in
delining key disarmament tasks, arid requires that
inspectors be full-lime UN employees.
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Location-Date
Al Muhammadiyat � Mar 1988
Al Muhammadiyat � Mar 1988
Al Muhammad iyat � Nov 1989
Al Muhammadiyat �Nov 1989
Al Muhammadiyat �Nov 1989
Khan Bani Saad � Aug 1988
Al Muhammadiyat � Dec 1989
Al Muhammadiyat �Nov 1989
Al Muhammadiyat �Nov 1989
Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range � Sep 1989
Abu Obeydi Airfield � Dec 1990
Abu Obeydi Airfield� Dec 1990
Abu Obeydi Airfield �Jan 1991
Abu Obeydi Airfield�Jan 1991
In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad's ability to work on prohibited programs without
risk of discovery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting
prohibited programs.
� Activities since 1998 clearly show that Baghdad has used the absence of UN inspectors to
repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missile-development facilities and to increase its
�
ability to produce WMD.
� Iraq has expanded trade with the outside world and has gained steadily growing access to
specialized and dual-use technology and materials that could be diverted to prohibited
programs, as well as access to foreign expertise in WMD delivery systems. -
� In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food program for
military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurements�outside the
Oil-for-Food process�that almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and other
weapons programs.
Biological Weapons Program
Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to SW
production and already may have done so. This capability is particularly troublesome because
Iraq has a record of concealing its BW activities and lying about the existence of its offensive
BW program.
Iraqi-Declared Open-Air Testing of Biological Weapons
Agent
Bacillus Subtilis'
Botulinum Toxin
Bacillus Subtilis
Botulinum Toxin
Aflatoxin
Bacillus Subtilis
Bacillus Subtilis
Botulinum Toxin
Aflatoxin
Ricin
Water
Water/potassium permanganate
Water/glycerine
Bacillus Subtilis/ Glycerine
Munition
250 bomb (cap. 65 liters)
250 bomb (cap. 65 liters)
122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
aerosol generator � M1-2
helicopter with modified
agricultural spray equipment
R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
155mm artillery shell (cap. 3
liters)
Modified F-1 drop-tank (cap.
2,200 liters)
Modified F-1 drop-tank (cap.
2,200 liters)
Modified F-1 drop-tank (cap.
2,200 liters)
Modified F-1 drop-tank (cap.
2,200 liters)
Bacillus Subtilus is commonly used as a simulant for B. anthracis.
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� After four years of claiming that they had conducted only "small-scale, defensive"
research, Iraqi officials finally admitted in 1995 to production and weaponization of
biological agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with evidence of their
procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn Kamil, former
director of Iraq's military industries.
� Iraq admitted producing thousands of liters of the BW agents anthrax,2 botulinum toxin,
(which paralyzes respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to 36 hours) and aflatoxin,
(a potent carcinogen that can attack the liver, killing years after ingestion) and preparing BW-
filled Scud-variant missile warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks before the Gulf
war, although it did not use them.
Two R-400A bombs in foreground (with black stripe) photographed by UNSCOM inspectors at Murasana Airfield near
the Al Walid Airbase in late 1991 bear markings indicating they were to be filled with botulinum toxin. Other bombs
appear to have markings consistent with binary chemical agent fill. This evidence contradicted Iraq's declarations that
it did not deploy SW munitions to operational airbases and that it destroyed all SW bombs in July 1991�declarations
that were subsequently retracted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
2 An infectious dose of anthrax is about 8,000 spores or less than one-millionth of a gram in a non immuno-
compromised person. Inhalation anthrax historically has been 100 percent fatal within five to seven days, although
in recent cases aggressive medical treatment has reduced the fatality rate.
6
Approved for Release: 2020/06/15 C06708838
Approved for Release: 2020/06/15 C06708838
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