ZARQAWI TARGETING IRAQI ELECTIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06763186
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-02379
• Publication Date: January 21, 2005

Approved for Release: 2019/07/02 C06763186
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Szlzzad
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Zarqawi Targeting Iraqi Elections (U)
Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's group Tanzim Qa'idat al-
Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) presents a
significant threat to participants in the 30 January
2005 elections in Iraq.
\Zarqawi intends to frighten potential
Iraqi voters by waging a campaign of bombings,
mortars, rockets, and harassment in the week before
and during elections. Although QJBR's activity
numerically constitutes a relatively small part of the
overall level of preelection violence, the group
continues to have a disproportionate impact because it
focuses on high-profile attacks against Iraai officials
and infrastructure.
QJ BR's operations almost certainly will continue
regardless of the election result. Any outcome that
increases Sunni concerns about their minority status
in Iraq could enhance the appeal of Zarqawi's brand
of extreme Sunni chauvinism and further his already
successful efforts to bring Iraqis into his organization.
Focusing on Election Preparations... (U)
QJBR is conducting attacks against targets directly
related to the elections, hitting voting infrastructure
and using intimidation tactics to scare off election
officials and potential voters. Zarqawi apparently
hopes to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the outcome,
exacerbate Sunni discontent, and punish those who
participate in the electoral process.
� Since late December 2004, the group has claimed
responsibility for attacks on election centers in
Balad and Basrah, the assassination of a polling
center director in western Baghdad, the
21 January 2005
assassination of a candidate associated with Prime
Minister Allawi, and the killing of seven other
individuals associated with election camnaigns
Zarqawi
has demonstrated the capability
to conduct attacks throughout Iraq, especially in
Mosul, Baqubah, and Ar Ramadi, as well as in the
predominantly Shia cities of Karbala, An Najaf, and
Basrah.
plans were in
place as of mid-January 2005 to harass election
workers, starting about six days before the elections
so the government would not have time to replace any
who are intimidated into quitting.
� QJBR also planned to attack
Iraqi police cars with small arms fire in the days
before elections to undermine government efforts to
portray a sense of control during the election
period.
This report was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis and the
Office of Iraq Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
OTA (U)
CTC 2005-30006
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Zarqawi probably assumes
compromised some of his plans, and he may decide to
adjust them. We assess, however, that regardless of
recent setbacks to his organization, he remains a
serious threat to election workers and participants.
�
QJBR had
assembled as of late December approximately 200
VBIEDs for use in various regions in Iraq on
election day. This number may be exaggerated�
Zarqawi has never taken credit for more than a half-
dozen VBIEDs over a several-day period, and he
lost some of his bombmaking facilities, when
Coalition forces swept Al Fallujah in mid-
November. Still, we suspect he remains capable of
deploying numerous VBIEDs on and during the
runup to election day.
� QJBR also has demonstrated proficiency with IEDs
rockets, mortars, and small arms attacks
...While Keeping Up the Overall Pressure (U)
Despite the group's loss of key logistic facilities and
materiel in Al Fallujah and the dispersal of its
leadership and personnel from that former safehaven,
QJBR has continued to conduct VBIED attacks,
assaults, and assassinations at a rate consistent with
QJ BR's operational tempo throughout the year.
Since mid-December 2004, QJBR has claimed more
than 30 attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces and
high-ranking Iraqi officials. The group has hit
Baghdad and Mosul particularly hard recently,
claiming responsibility for the 4 January 2005
assassination of the governor of Baghdad and for a
series of attacks against US, police, and Iraqi
National Guard forces in both cities.
QJBR has conducted attacks against Shia targets as
well. The group claimed responsibility for the 27
December 2004 assassination attempt on Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and leader of
Bin Ladin's Blessing (U)
Usama Bin Ladin's 27 December 2004 videotaped
message called for a boycott of the elections and
warned that any Muslim who participates in them is
an "infidel" who has "rejected God Almighty." The
statement welcomed Zarqawi's merger with al-
Qa`ida, saying Zarqawi and the groups affiliated with
,him are good and fight according to the orders of
God. He called upon "brothers in the group" in Iraq
,to heed Zarqawi's orders and "obey him in all that
which is good."
2
It is unclear whether Zarqawi will view Bin Ladin's
statement as sanctioning more attacks against Shia�
especially Shia civilians�a point of past contention
between Zarqawi and Bin Ladin. While condemning
all participating in the election, Bin Ladin's statement
calls on jihadists to limit the killing of innocents. He
also notes that Iraqis waging jihad against
Multinational Forces or the Iraqi Interim Government
are brothers in arms, "even if [they] are of Persian,
Kurdish, or Turkomen origin." Since the March 2004
Ashura bombings, Zarqawi has opted to avoid
indiscriminate attacks on Shia, targeting his attacks
instead on Shia religious leaders, probably at least in
part because of al-Qa`ida's concerns.
the Unified National Coalition�the list of electoral
candidates supported by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
� QJBR also claimed it carried out one of two VBIED
attacks against security forces on 11 Janury 2005
in the predominately Shia city of Basrah.
An Enduring Threat (U)
Zarqawi's group will persist regardless of the
outcome of the election.
� The transition to a new government will offer
Zarqawi a range of targets and attack venues that
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will present Coalition and incoming Iraqi
authorities an even greater leadership and facility
protection problem than exists now.
� An election outcome that increases concern among
Sunnis about their loss of power may enhance the
appeal of Zarqawi's brand of extreme Sunni
chauvinism and further his already successful
efforts to bring Iraqis into his organization.
� Even if the election launches a process that leads
some elements of the insurgency to put down their
arms, committed transnational jihadists like
Zarqawi�concerned more with establishing a
Salafist regime and a safehaven from which to
expand the jihad than with protecting the rights of
the Iraqi Sunni minority�will remain a long-term
terrorist challenge for the nascent Iraqi security
forces.
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Approved for Release: 2019/07/02 C06763186