SOUTH KOREA'S PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION: THE TESTS FOR ROH TAE WOO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05828933
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00238
• Publication Date: December 24, 1987

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Central Intelligence Agency
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Washington. DC. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 December 1987
South Korea's Presidential 7ansition-
The Tests for Roh Tae Woo
Summary
Public acceptance of Roh Tae Woo', plurality win in the
presidential election and disarray in the opposition have
blunted allegations of government cheating and won South
Korea's president-elect a "honeymoon" with most Koreans.
However, Roh's actions in the next few months will be
critical if he is to transfer this advantage into solid
support. He must consolidate his position inside the ruling
camp, make clear that he is proceeding to democratize the
political system, and avoid actions that bring about a
reunified opposition challenge. Most Koreans see Roh as
holding de facto power, and they are certain to judge him on
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how the government performs
in the weeks before 25 February,
when President Chun leaves
office.
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Challenges for Roh
A key challenge for Roh in
the days ahead will be to
consolidate power in the Democratic
Justice Party (DJP), a
by
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This memorandum was prepared
Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 24
December 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea
Branch,
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Northeast Asia Division, OEA
EA M 87-20235
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process that is already under way. Roh's comfortable plurality--
and a weak political party system in South Korea--almost
certainly will facilitate the effort, giving many who were his
critics little choice but to follow him. Still, the ruling party
has largely been Chun's personal machine, and Roh will need
either to co-opt or to eliminate some Chun backers, including
hardliners--mostly retired generals--who have viewed him as soft
on leftists and disloyal to Chun.
The strong presidential powers Roh will inherit in February
probably give him most of the cards he needs to consolidate his
authority. Potential challengers would have to weigh the heavy
odds against success, and the likelihood that Roh, once he
assumes office, would strip them of any sinecures they may have
received from Chun.
Still, Roh needs to proceed carefully. Because Chun is
still President, a blurring in the lines of political authority
could offer hardliners the chance to push their views rather than
accede to Roh's leadership and presumed softer line. Public
statements by Chun threatening a crackdown on radicals, along
with US military intelligence reports that suggest the police
initially saw Roh's win as license to return to tougher tactics,
indicate some may regard Roh's victory as carte blanche to get
tough with the opposition.
Given his political record in confronting his opponents and
his well-documented inability to share power, Chun also could
cause Roh trouble. Nevertheless, Chun appears to recognize that
his future depends on his successor's decisions.
the two men fell out during the
campaign, when Roh's public statements increasingly distanced him
from Chun and his regime.
presidential
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To bolster his standing outside the ruling camp, Roh must
begin to deliver on his promise of political liberalization. He
is already moving in this direction:
In a conversation with US officials last week, Roh vowed
to continue the moderate approach he took on a range of
issues during the campaign, including some tolerance of
dissent.
In his postelection address, Roh promised to establish an
advisory council of ruling and opposition party
politicians to begin national reconciliation even before
he takes office.
Rhetoric aside, Roh's first practical hurdle will come as
early as next month, when he will need to propose a revised
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National Assembly election law as promised during interparty
negotiations last fall. Government officials have announced
plans to hold legislative elections in early February. Talks
between the ruling and 17osition parties on a new law could
begin by early January.
In our view, these negotiations will test Roh's commitment
to democratization. On the one hand, his approach to political
reforms will measure how far Roh is willing to go in distancing
himself from Chun, who has clearly been identified with an
authoritarian, undemocratic political system. On the other hand,
by virtually all calculations, a more liberal election law would
reduce the ruling party's seats in the Assembly, presenting Roh
with some tough choices in dealing with his followers as well as
with the chore of legislating in an Assembly with a large,
aggressive opposition contingent. If the DJP's past position on
changing the election law is any guide, Roh has a difficult road
ahead:
Last November, the ruling party proposed retaining the
most objectionable elements of the old law--heavily
weighting rural districts that usually support the
government--and adding a new technical wrinkle that would
maximize the DJP's representation in the cities,
traditionally opposition strongholds.
Last week a ruling party official publicly said a failure
of interparty talks to produce a new law in time for
elections in early February would bring the government to
hold the contest under the existing rules.
Whither the Opposition?
Roh's ability to compromise on political reform also will
depend on the opposition, which faces an even larger trial in the
weeks ahead. Its two main leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae
Jung, appear discredited as well as disorganized after their loss
to Roh. Several widely respected South Korean political
commentators, as well as public opinion generally, are blaming
the two Kims' selfish presidential ambitions for their defeat.
So far, the two men have devoted most of their energies to a
public effort to discredit the election, but both face critical
political and personal decisions about their strategies.
1The National Assembly election law is stacked in the
government's favor, with a proportional distribution of seats
that virtually ensures the ruling party a majority even with less
than 30 percent of the popular vote. Talks on a new law stalled
last November, when the split between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young
Sam produced two "main" opposition oarties with differing views
on how to change the law.
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The ruling party's ability to control the political agenda
and the clock on legislative reform are the most immediate
sources of pressure on the opposition. Roh's plan to establish a
bipartisan advisory council, along with the ruling party
initiative for early National Assembly elections, should drive
the opposition to regroup, if only to hold its ground against the
government. For his part, Kim Young Sam has given permission for
his party's legislators to discuss election law reform, although
without abandoning his own spoiler's claims against Roh's
"fraudulent" election. A spokesman for Kim Dae Jung has said his
party is also ready to negotiate on a new parliamentary election (b)(3)
formula, although Kim himself has stated publicly that his part
nduct a non-violent struggle to nullify the election.
More important for the future of the two Kims--and perhaps
for the opposition movement as a whole--are growing demands from
younger politicians for a share of the leadership:
A group of young opposition politicians who dropped out of
the Kims' factions last fall is calling for the two to
take responsibility for their defeat by leaving the
political scene.
The Kims have also been criticized by radical nationalist
Paek Ki Hwan, who entered the presidential race briefly to
press them to decide on a single candidate. Paek has
hinted he may establish a new leftwing party, which would
tap into Kim Dae Junq's longtime base of dissident
support.
The opposition's effort to lay blame for its election
defeat, the lingering animosities of the campaign, and the
pretensions of younger politicians to power will complicate how
the two Kims and their parties deal with Roh and political
reform. At the same time, the fact that neither Kim is willing
to cooperate with the other presents those in the ruling camp who
seek compromise on a new election law with a real question about
rw_b_ft�lin the opposition can strike and deliver on any deals.
Neither Kim appears ready to leave politics without a
fight. Both will probably use their influence over party
nominations for parliamentary seats to keep challengers on the
defensive and foster competition within the rank and file. Kim
Dae Jung's greater political savvy and tighter grip on his party
makes it hard to write him out of the picture. We believe Kim
Young Sam lacks the same degree of authority and respect, making
him the more vulnerable of the two.
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Pressures From the Left and Right: The Radicals and the Military
The public's seeming acceptance of Roh's election has dealt
the r d. al movement a major setback.
many radicals expected a victory by Roh to trigger a
wi espread backlash and drive mainstream university students and
workers into their camp. This has not happened. Nonetheless,
there are down sides to Roh's success: frustrations over his
election and anger against the two Kims could impel some radicals
to consider extreme measures--possibly terrorist attacks on South
Korean or US facilities. We suspect the election outcome also
will convince the hard core that fundamental political change can
only occur through violent revolution. The highly fragmented
radical movement has displayed remarkable powers of regeneration,
and, ironically, Roh's promised political amnesty could help
revitalize its ranks.
For the military, Roh's election almost certainly represents
a major step toward domestic stability and a safeguard for its
place in the power structure. According to a variety of sources,
many officers have viewed Chun's departure as the only way to
restore the military's image, tarnished by its close association
with his rise to power and role in the brutal suppression of
riots in the provincial city of Kwangju in 1980.
'reporting suggests many senior
otticers support his political aims. Growing military
recognition of the need for at least modest political reform was
evident last June, when senior officers opposed Chun's decision
to declare martial law and instead endorsed Roh's reform
proposal. Roh's ties to retired senior officers, such as his
brother-in-law Kim Bok Dong and Defense Minister Chong Ho Yong,
also will help him retain military loyalty. Both have extensive
power bases in active-duty ranks and were instrumental in lining
up the Army's support in June, when Roh went out on a limb with
his democratization initiative. Roh
will try to avoid frictions in dealing with the Army leadership
by giving greater weight to professional rather than political
promotion criteria should also allow him to win poiT with
senior officers who have criticized Chun's approach.
Nonetheless, Roh's public commitments include promises that
run some risks for his ties to the military. He has said that
his administration would get retired officers out of big
business, tolerate greater levels of political dissent, and renew
dialogue with North Korea, all sensitive topics with the Army.
For these reasons, we do not believe Roh's course will be trouble
free and expect skeptical senior officers to continue to monitor
how he implements his platform.
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Roh's Future: Some Room and Some Restraints
Several factors suggest Roh is well equipped to deal with
the challenges before him:
The size of his plurality victory has undercut the
opposition's claims that he stole the election, giving him
a honeymoon with a public that appears willing to take a
wait-and-see attitude toward a new Roh administration.
Roh's postelection political style, characterized by an
astute use of themes focused on compromise and
reconciliation, also augurs well for the next few months,
when the president-elect will be able to set the tone, and
perhaps even the agenda, for the political season.
And Roh's reputation as a leader and a listener, rather
than a Chun-like autocrat, suggests he will be able to
draw new supporters into his network, instead of
alienating those who have yet to join his political
bandwagon inside the military and the ruling camp.
If Roh is adroit, there is some chance his honeymoon could
be extended simply because of the contrast he will present to
Chun in the public's eye. At this point, we do not expect Chun
to cause trouble for Roh, given the President's potential
personal as well as political vulnerabilities. Other factors
could work to Roh's advantage as well: the Olympics, continued
tensions in North-South relations that put an even greater
premium on strong leadership, and sustained economic growth all
could add credits in Roh's column.
Even so, Roh's campaign commitments to reform and
democratization have yet to be tested. In the weeks ahead, he
will face a new, more assertive legislature, an outspoken press,
and an active radical element, all representing challenges that
will not abate. These pressures will severely test his
willingness to tolerate a level of dissent and political
competition that im ortant elements in South Korea's society have
come to expect.
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SOUTH KOREA'S PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION: THE TESTS FOR ROH TAE WOO
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