VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 22, 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05447459
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01443
• Publication Date: September 25, 1970

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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MEMORANDUI4 FOR THE FILES
INFORMATION
September 25, 1970
SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting, September 22, 1970
Sullivan referred to a Defense press statement on Madame Binh's POW
offer, and said that better coordination appeared to be necessary in the
Government on this matter. The President had issued orders that there
was to be strictly no comment.
Sullivan said he had been on the phone with Bui_Diem, and had learned that
Foreign Minister Lam was coming down from New York the evening of
the 22nd by car. Bui Diem was going on to Paris September 24, hopefully
in a quiet and private manner without press attention. Dr. Kissinger was
going to Paris on the evening of the 25th and would arrive there the morning
of the 26th. He would have a session with Bruce and Habib and go on to meet
the President in Rome on the 27th. While in Paris he would need to see Ky,
and Sullivan would telephone Dr. Kissinger to this effect., Dr. Kissinger's
call on Ky would assume the appearance of a "massive strong arm exercise"
to keep Ky away from the U.S. at this time, but was nevertheless required.
Sullivan had talked over the Ky issue with the Secretary and had said that all
this pressure on Ky might drive him further into a corner and make him
more stubborn Four only alternative was to offer-� him something else, e.g.
an official invitation to pay a visit to the U.S. after November 10. Sullivan
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felt the best people to turn Xy off were Bui Diem and Khoi.
Sullivan referred briefly to "Operation Counterpunch" in Laos, saying
that the word had gone out to Godley to undertake this operation. The
people in Washington had felt that those in the field were best qualified
to pass judgment on the desirability of the attack.
Sullivan remarked that the situation in Con Son was in a mess because the
tiger cages had been torn down, and there was no place to put the maximum
security prisoners. Evidently there was great confusion there.
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Sullivan turned to the PSYOPS field, noting that two NVA lieutenants had
rallied in Cambodia as a result of leaflet drops. The PSYOPS Committee
itself had now moved since the previous week with considerable dispatch
and had taken action on a number of things. Sullivan was encouraged by
the Committee's new energy.
Sullivan said that the action on the GVN Program Law might be completed
by the Lower House as early as the end of next week. The outside limit
would be around twelve days, since the new Senate would be coming in.
Sullivan referred to a CINCPAC message to the IVIACV Provost Marshal
\on how to organize and handle POW camps. He thought that this was an
'excellent message. In this respect, there was a simmering mess in the
Phu Quoc Prison Comp.�For example, -there was only a handful of doctors
for literally thousands of prisoners. Other facilities were inadequate as
well. The ICRC was calling attention to this.
General Smith indicated in response to a question from Sullivan that he
did not know the status of Secretary Laird's efforts to go to the Hill for
supplementary. He observed, though, that one plan for dealing with the
need for additional funds would be to see if additional funds might now be
added to the Senate version of the Appropriation Bill (which had passed the
House) with. the matter being worked out in conference. Sullivan felt
that this was a very dangerous approach, since the conference might end
up by taking the increase out of our hides, i.e. by having the Senators shift
funds to Vietnam from other areas with no increase.
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General Smith said that he had brought the ROK pay tables with him,
and was going out to the field to make a recommendation on what outlay
should be made for FY 71 for payment of ROK allowances. He favored
cutting out maximum payments for officers, and leaving the interrral
system for the lower ranks the same.
Nooter mentioned that he had met with Warren Nutter on funding for
FY 72, and could say that Nutter had not offered to pick up anything.
This came as no great surprise. As a means of generating more funds
for the GVN, Nooter suggested that we might wish to untie the AID funds.
I noted that there had been some thinking in the NSC directed toward this
- -same point.
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