LAR: JAMAICA: OPPOSITION GAINING FOR FALL ELECTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00342552
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02021
• Publication Date: June 27, 1980

Approved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
4�-�.,*�,,,, � ��
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
LATIN AMERICA REVIEW (U)
27 June 1980
CONTENTS
The moderate opposition is increasing,
its lead over Prime Minister Manley's
forces, despite ruling-party efforts to
promote a US "destabilization" campaign
and to provoke political violence.
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Jamaica:
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
�NePeRN-NOGGNIVii4Cr�
Opposition Gaining for Fall Election (U)
Summary
The Moderate opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP)
is increasing its seemingly unassailable lead over Prime
Minister Manley's People's National Party (PNP), despite
efforts by PNP leftists to promote a US 'destabilization"
campaign and to provoke political violence. The pre-
ponderance of evidence suggests that the JLP will win
the election, that Manley will, have little choice but to
step down, and that covert assistance from Cuba probably
will cushion but not prevent his downfall. Manley--in
contrast to his actions in the 1976 election--apparently
is not fully backing the radicals' strategy.
JLP Fortunes
The 1JLP's strong position
has improVed in recent months,;
despite aisurge of urban vio-
lence. Reliable polls show an
increase in the JLP's lead from
12 percent to 15 percent between
November and May. A widely re-
spected pollster, who has ac-
curately predicted Jameican
elections since 1972, stated in
March that the JLP probably
would secure 44 to 48 of the 60
seats ir Parliament if the con-
test is basically fair. (U)
Fundmental political and
economic inmtability on the
island precludes a sanguine pre-
diction of election results.
Trends favorable to the JLP ap-
pear to be_increasing, however,
as party leader Edward Seaga
27 June 1980
1
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
lines up what is likely the broadest base of support ever
recorded in a Jamaican election campaign. The JLP can
count on large majorities of the island's 200,000 union
members and of its 7,000 members of the police and Army.
Moreover, with the manpower of organized labor, it ap-
pears to have the financial backing of virtually the
entire private sector.
Political Violence
The attempt by some ruling-party leftists to provoke
the JLP into violent confrontation reached an early peak
in April when 10 to 30 gunmen--at least two bearing sub-
machineguns--attacked a JLP dance and killed five people.
In the same period, thugs armed with automatic weapons ,
raided a police station in a Kingston ghetto in a calcu-
lated effoit to intimidate the security forces. In
addition, 60 ruling-party youths were sent to Cuba for
weapons training. 1
The blo:+dbath widely predicted after these incidents
bas not materialized, however, although isolated polit-
icrl violence has continued and will likely increase as,
!� tction approaches. The JLP has so far maintained
a f!'t. pline that is undercutting the ruling party's
,Moreover, the JLP, which has its own thugs
in the wings and is now supported by the most powerful
urton in Jamaica, apparently has the resources to defend
turf and to outmatch Manley's supporters in the
stretcs.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
The scurity forces, however, have provided the
radicals with their most surprising setback. In late
May, Jamaica's influential police union publicly demanded
the removal of leftist National Security Minister Dudley
Thompson after it accused him and the administration of
political interference and of covering up illegal gunrunning.
The police later arrested Roy McGann, another government
official and political radical who had been the chief
intermediary arranging the weapons training in Cuba.
Both the police and Army have since made strong public
pledges to guarantee an open and honest election.
27 June 1980
2
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
(b)(3y
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
(b)(3)
Manley, who made an early
rousing defense of Thompson,
apparently is now caving
in to strong pressure from
the JLP and a host of
Jamaica's most influential
professional groups. :he
Prime Minister (b)(1)
intends to
replace his increasinyly
controversill security (b)(3)
minister.
Alleged Rightist roup
Publicity following the
recent arrest of 27 alleged
rightist coup plotters will
provoke some local sympathy
for Manley, but it is un-
likely to improve his poor
chances for reelection or to
provide a pretext for in-
creased security measures
against the JLP. ODA
Sega has compounded local rumors by charging that
the PNPieither fabricated or exaggerated the conspiracy
to justify a state of emergency. These rumors could have
some basis in fact, as additional security measures would
increase Manley's leverage against the opposition.
(b)(3) -
On the other hand, the largely anti-Manley Army
evidently took the lead in the investigation of an in-
cipientland seemingly foredoomed conspiracy wainly con-
centrated within its own ranks. The accused include
three jianior Army officers and 23 noncommissioned officers
led by i virtually unknown political rightist. Whatever
its origins, however, the coup scare is havin little
impact On the growing fortunes of the JLP. 0:0(3)
(b)(3)
27 June 1980
3
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552......mow
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
Manley's Role
Manley apparently has refused to join local radicals
in exploiting the coup plot as part of an alleged US
"dentabili2ationn camnAien
Manley also
asserted that Seaga himself was the target of political
assassins and that Washington should provide the opposi-
tion leader with tight security during his current visit
to the United States.
Manley has done little this year to restrain the
anti-US pronouncements of PNP radicals, but he has kept
his "own rhetoric in check. While'the leftists have tried
to revive the US "destabilization" campaign of 1976, Manley
has stated publicly at least twice since last November
that he does not believe that the CIA is trying to destab-
ilize his government--a significant about-face concerning,
his once favorite whipping boy.
I
Manley' S influence in the preelection period will
continue to be crucial, because he now represents the
last obstacle to a radical takover of the PNP. While he
has both projected and protected the leftists during his
seven-year administration, he also has channeled their
considerable 'energies away from subversion and toward
support for an established political party. Ironically,
the moderate forces bent on Manley's defeat now are de-
pending on the Prime Minister to hold the PNP to its
commitment to electoral reform and to an early election--
a year before the end of Manley's constitutional mandate.
The pace of the enumeration process now underway--
about half the island's one million eligible voters have
been registered--suggests that Manley's original target
of an October election is realistic. The JLP so far is
satisfied that the process is establishing the groundwork
for a fair election.
Prospects
4
27 June 1980
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)13
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
Local rumor persists that Hanley, with Cuba's help,
will forestall or fix the election by inciting violence
that will lead to a state of emergency and to his entrench-
ment in power. The attempt to escalate violence undoubt-
edly will continue to be an important element in the PNP's
campaign to stop the JLP, as well as the principal threat
to a fair election. Cuban-trained thugs, moreover, might
help PNP radicals forcibly to hold some constituencies in
an opposition sweep. That any PNP strategy can success-
fully prevent the advent of a Seaga government, however,
appears increasingly doubtful.
27 June 1980
pproved for Release: 2019/06/24 C00342552
(b)(3).