MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FROM JIMMY CARTER

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02795352
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
March 8, 2023
Document Release Date: 
August 23, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2018-02530
Publication Date: 
January 23, 1980
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTO[15710519].pdf462.42 KB
Body: 
'Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352;1 Findin4-Pursuant to Section 662 ofthe Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, -Concerning Operations in Foreign Countries Other Than Solely for, the Purpose of Intelligence Collection � � I find the following operation in a foreign country is important to the national security of the United States and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the concerned committees of the - Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings _ as necessarT., DESCRIPTION Using any and all possible means; effect the rescue and safe departure from Iran of persons held hostage in the 'United States Embassy in Tehran and United States persons and their dependents held against their will in Iran or otherwise- unable.freely to depart from the country.' TOP SECRET/SENSITIvaLxr,SONLY - Drivative Cl by DCI 705953 Review on Jan 2000 Derived from D9d.5 & pproved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 'T,41 Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 4 1 't THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON' TOP SECRET/EXTREMELY SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR January 23, 1980 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE I have today signed a Finding pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance �Act of 1961, as amended, covering operations to effect the rescue of persons held hostage in the United States Embassy in Tehran and other United States persons and their de- pendents who are held against their will in Iran or who are other- wise unable freely to depart from that country. I hereby instruct you, and determine that such instruction is consistent with the timely notification provision of the law, to give notice to the Congress of this Finding or of any operation pursuant to this Finding only at such time as, in your judgment, such notice can be given without undue risk of loss of life should an inadvertent disclosure 'occur. You may determine, in accordance with this instruction, that notice should be given only after such operation is commenced or completed. TOP SECRET/EXTREMELY SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY Derivative Cl by DCI 705953 Review on Jan 2000 - Derived from D9d.5 & D9c.3 OP SECRe pproved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 TS-800011/1 Copy f- ... Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 SEN E Political Consequences of a Hostage Rescue Operation in Iran 1. There are three possible results of a hostage rescue operation in Iran: a. Total success: The Hostages are freed; the armada returns unscathed. b. jotal failure: The armada fails to achieve its mission, and suffers significant losses; the hostages remain in Tehran under the militants' control. c. A mixed result, with major casualties to both sides: The U.S. force reaches the Embassy; shoots and kills a substantial number of militants; perhaps rescues a few hostages; but m my hostages are killed before they can be rescued. In all of the above cases, it is likely that a sub- statial number of Iranians will be killed, given the targeting of the helicopter gunships, etc. 2. These possibilities could lead to different results, as described below. However, in all cases American military aircraft would overfly Iran and inflict casualties on Iranian civilians, some of them probably innocent bystanders. We cannot assume that Iranians, other perhaps than fanatic supporters of the ancien regime, will be able to reconcile themselves to our behavior. In short, we can expect a wave of anti-Americanism to engulf the country. Even the moderates-- or whomever one places in this category-- will condemn us for this action; for most Iranians who regard trN %Aw d 0 Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 ek Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 riLtC.E w the holding of the Embassy hostages as titmag=6* provocation will feel that-we should have waited for history to take its course. MOMMINOlose who, on the other hand, fed that we halkendured enough humiliation would be likely to conceal their sympathy for us because of the fear of political reprisals. (b)(1) (b)(3) 3. (b)(1) ODA If the operation was a success, the militants and Khomeini could suffer serious consequences. The raison d'etre for the militants would evaporate. They and their allies, possibly including Khomeini, might well be viewed as having invited defeat and humiliation by their intractability on the hostage issue. Doubtless the various political elements in Iran would be busy attempting to place the blame for the debacle on their adversaries ft In blifef, a successful operation could lead to a plitical A vacuum( with the diminished influence of Khomeinf)iand to serious, possibly violent political infighting. Ethnic groups could attempt tc? take advantage of this situation to press for greater autonomy. The left would certainly attempt to exploit anti-Americanism-to gain greater influence. Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 SECRET SENS 4. 5V13;; (b)(1) (b)(3) S. Total failure, on the other hand, would represent victory for Khomeini, the militants, and the radical elements of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, and, what is equally important, a defeat for the U.S. Iranians in country would be reluctant to oppose the regime. 3 AkT.50. (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352 SECRET (�y4 ; 7 . E Qit s 6. There is also the possibility of a mixed result, %.6artial failure, partial success). The probability is that this result would convey to Iranians a sense that the U.S. had attempted, but not completed, its mission. There would be an apprehension of another rescue attempt, or some sort of follow-up operation. Government propaganda would probably play up the successful aspects of the Iranian defense and glorify fallen heroes as martyrs. This could place the country on a war footing, go far to unify opposing factions, �ih 1.4 Lian 4 4-1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352