SUDAN: JINJAWEED MILITIA STILL USEFUL TO KHARTOUM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06691347
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-01687
• Publication Date: July 23, 2004

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
23 July 2004
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
71111.111M11711.1MI)(3)
Sudan: Jinjaweed Militia Still
Useful to Khartoum
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Sudan: Jinjaweed Militia Still Useful to Khartoum
We will use the army, the police, the mujahedeen,
the horsemen to get rid of the rebellion.
�Sudanese President Bashir speaking about
Darfur and the Jinjaweed on 31 December 2003
Using Jinjaweed To Counter Rebels
The Jinjaweed' are an irregular Arab militia
recruited from nomadic tribes in the region and
used by Khartoum to augment the Sudanese
Army's counterinsurgency campaign against two
rebel groups. The Jinjaweed were formed and
armed by the Sudanese regime in early 2003
following a series of embarrassing military
setbacks The
Sudanese military�
Intended to use the
militia to clear suspected rebel areas and patrol
key roads
When the Darfur rebellion began, two-
thirds of the regular Army was tied down in
southern Sudan during peace talks with southern
rebels:
� The senior Sudanese general in Darfur claimed
in June that his forces would have been defeated
in early 2003 by the rebels if he had not
immediately responded to the attacks with the
I Jinjaweed�an Arabic word�is literally defined as "devil
riding a horse and carrying a gun."
13 July 2004
support of hastily recruited Jinjaweed
� Over the last 18 months Khartoum has supplied
the militia with small arms, ammunition,
vehicles, money, satellite telephones, and radios,
Basics of the Darfur Rebellion
Longstanding grievances over Khartoum's
marginalization of the western Darfur region
exploded into armed rebellion in early 2003 when
rebels. fearful that the ongoing peace talks
between the southern-based Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) and the government
would ignore their demands and emboldened by
the success of the SPLA in wringing concessions
from Khartoum, began successfitlly attacking
government garrisons and convoys in the region.
Early on in the conflict the Sudanese military
suffered a string of humiliating defeats in clashes
with the rebels, forcing Khartoum to bring in
large numbers of reinforcements from southern
Sudan and simultaneously arm local Arabs. Once
reinfbrced, government forces in January 2004
launched a successful counteroffensive to regain
control of key towns and villages, driving the
rebels into central Darfur. Fighting has internally
displaced more than 1 million people and sent as
many as 200,000 Sudanese refugees across the
border to Chad.
This report was prepared by the Office of Asian Pacific, Latin American, and African Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Africa Issue Manager, APLAA, o
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Despite its denials, the Sudanese military has
worked closely with the Jinjaweed over the past
18 months. Khartoum has overseen Jinjaweed
operations through an office in the Ministry of
Defense formed in early 2003 called "Border
Intelligence," which has been headed by an army
brigadier general and managed jointly by the
Sudanese military and the Sudanese intelligence
service,
In addition to
providing arms and other supplies, the
Jinjaweed Fighters
Estimates of the overall Jinjaweed strength vary
from 11,000 to 30,000, and they operate in groups
of 100 to 200 fighters. conducting raids often on
horseback or camel.
The force size varies from week to week.
with some fighters join'ng in and others dropping
out.
It is often difficult to differentiate between the
Jinjaweed and other formal Sudanese military
units�such as the PDFH
Jinjaweed report to Sudanese
military officers, wear government-issued
uniforms, and have fought in the Darfur conflict
with regular Army units.
Not all Jinjaweed are from Sudan; an unknown
number offighters, some of whom are most likely
bandits, come from Chad, the Central African
Republic. Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali.
Sudanese Army has attempted to use the
Jinjaweed in a military role as a supplement to its
regular forces:
� Khartoum's counteroffensive in January 2004
included the coordinated use of fighter-bombers,
attack helicopters, ground forces, Popular
Defense Force (PDF) militia, Jinjaweed, and
police units against suspected rebel-held towns.
After the Army captured key towns, Jinjaweed
patrolled roads to ensure that lines of
communication remained open
� Numerous refugee accounts state the Jinjaweed
operate in coordination with Sudanese aircraft;
Khartoum has
provided close air support to the Jinjaweed and
that the radios supplied to the Jinjaweed are used
for ground-air communications.
Also Targeting Civilians...
After initially focusing their attacks on the rebels,
the Jinjaweed quickly moved to attacking civilians
in towns, villages, and the countryside. Over the
past year, Jinjaweed raiders destroyed hundreds of
villages, driving tens of thousands of people from
their homes. In the process, they killed thousands
of civilians and livestock, raped women, abducted
people for ransom, stole property, contaminated
wells, and destroyed irrigation systems:
In targeting civilians, the Jinjaweed were
motivated by ethnic animosity, a desire to settle
scores, and promises that they would be allowed
to loot possessions and confiscate land from the
rebels and their supporters. The Arab nomads
have long been at odds with ethnic African
farmers�who make up the bulk of the Darfur
rebels�over pasture, agricultural land, and water:
� Quarrels over scarce resources became
particularly acute after the extended drought of
the 1980s hastened desertification of northern
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and central Darfur, putting increased pressure on
wells and grazing.
� In past droughts, disputes over land ownership
and access to water were settled through
traditional leaders; but this mechanism broke
down in the 1990s after automatic weapons from
regional conflicts were introduced to the area in
large numbers.
.. With Khartoum's Backing
We cannot confirm that Khartoum has sanctioned
Jinjaweed atrocities, but it did facilitate them by
bombing rebel-held towns and took little or no
action to stop the targeting of civilians. Indeed,
until pressured by the international community to
condemn the Jinjaweed's actions, Sudanese
officials publicly
denied the militia had done anything wrong.
Sudanese Army units were aware of the atrocities
being committed by the Jinjaweed,
Nome military
commanders and government officials have
continued to defend the Jinjaweed or downplayed
their activities
� President Bashir praised the militiamen for their
role in combating the rebels in December 2003,
� A senior Sudanese official in May downplayed
Jinjaweed attacks, saying that the current crisis
was no more than an internal conflict due to
tribal rivalries,
Khartoum Failing To Rein In Jinjaweed
(C//NF)
Despite President Bashir's pledge in late June�
made under international pressure�to stop
Jinjaweed attacks, and recent government claims
it has arrested 60 militiamen, the Jinjaweed
continue to violate the cease-fire agreement
reached with the rebels in April.
the Jinjaweed, with Sudanese
Air Force support, attacked 48 villages in southern
Darfur State between 30 June and 4 July 2004;
according to press reporting, more than 75 people
were killed, dozens injured, and seven villages
burned in the attacks. Other attacks and
harassment have taken place:
� On 6 July, rebels reported to the African Union
cease-fire monitors that Jinjaweed and
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government forces were attacking camps north
of Nyala in Southern Darfur State,
�
�
On 3 July, UN aid officials reported that a relief
truck driver was killed and two others were
injured in a Jinjaweed attack in Western Darfur
State. Another truck driver in the same area
reported having to pass through 16 Jinjaweed
checkpoints where he was repeatedly threatened,
Jinjaweed members surround some displaced
persons' camps, raping women who leave the
camps in search of firewood and water.
... Which Remains Useful and Feared
Khartoum will probably continue to support the
Jinjaweed in some fashion because the militia
provides a low-cost means of countering the
rebels. Without the Jinjaweed�its most mobile
force the Sudanese military will be vulnerable to
rebel attacks:
Fundamentals of All Monitoring Mission
The African Union (AU) is charged with
deploying observers to Darfur in order to monitor
Khartoum and the rebel's implementation of the
April cease-fire agreement. The AU-led Cease-
Fire Commission (CPC) is headquartered in Al
Fashir�the logistic base and primary command
center for the monitoring mission. Regional CFC
headquarters in Al Fashir. Nyala, Al Junaynah,
Kabkabiyah, Tine, and Abeche (Chad) will each
have an administrative staff and two eight-person
monitoring teams. Monitoring teams�each with
two AU members, a US or EU member, a
government representative, two rebel
representatives, a mediator, and an interpreter
have the mandate to verik and implement the
cease-fire agreement:
�
as of 21
July, 40 CFC monitors are operational in Al
Fashir, Nyala, and Abeche, with plans to deploy
a total of 138. The Al Fashir team has carried
out five investigations as of 14 July: preliminary
information confirms rebel reports of
government attacks,
� An AU military force of at least 300 will protect
monitors�Nigeria and Rwanda have pledged
troops so far�the majority of which will be
stationed in Al Fashir with smaller contingents
in each of the regional headquarters.
� The rebels continue to operate over much of
Darfur but the mobile Jinjaweed by patrolling
the countryside�can deny them the use of key
towns and roads, permitting the Sudanese
military to safely remain in well-protected
towns.
Even if Khartoum were convinced it could survive
without the Jinjaweed, it would be reluctant to
confront them, fearing a new war:
� The now well-armed and capable militiamen
will not easily give up the land and other
property they have seized and will certainly
refuse to surrender their arms as long as the
rebel forces remain intact.
�
after being
armed, the Jinjaweed became more and more
difficult for Khartoum to control, and the
militiamen repeatedly disobeyed orders,
A
Sudanese Army general in mid-May 2004 said
that the government had lost control of the
Jinjaweed and needed monitors to prevent cease-
fire violations
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� At least some of the Jinjaweed leaders,
moreover, are respected tribal leaders who could
call on their supporters to fight Khartoum if it
moved to disarm or disband the militia.
Sudanese officials in mid-July rejected a US
request to arrest and try alleged Jinjaweed
leaders�including Musa Hilal�saying the
proposed action would create sedition and
intensify the war, according to Sudanese press
reporting. Sudanese officials added that Hilal is
a popular figure and provincial leader.
Instead, Khartoum is more likely to respond to
international pressure by trying to reduce the
militia's visibility�integrating some forces into
military units and police or by withdrawing
fighters into areas where no relief organizations or
AU monitors are active.
Khartoum
began integrating Jinjaweed units into the military
in May. US officials also noted in late June that
some of the new policemen assigned to Darfur
were in fact Jinjaweed:
� UN personnel report that militiamen around
internally displace persons camps in Northern
Darfur appear to be pulling back,
possibly in response to
international pressure.
Integration ofJinjaweed into military and police
units may allow Khartoum to exercise a greater
level of
control over the militias, potentially limiting
attacks on civilians.
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