TALKS WITH LEADING SOCIOLOGISTS AND PHILOSOPHERS IN HUNGARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06530454
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-00903
• Publication Date: September 4, 1964

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SUBJECT Talks with Leading Sociologists and DATE DISTR
/- Philosophers in Hungary
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Because of the improvement in the economic situation and the re-
laxation of police terror, plus such other measures of liberaliza-
tion as travel abroad, the popularity of Kadar and the regime has
risen very considerably, and he is probably now considered to be
about the best Hungary can get at present.
Nevertheless, there is no indication of revival of ideological
commitment to Communism; on the contrary, the Revolution seems to
have killed that for good.
There is a considerable amount of ideological revisionism among
young intellectuals, but it is more of a cover for social democratic
sentiments, and an expression of how far it seems safe to go now,
than it is a genuine attempt to revise Stalinism and retain Leninism.
Western influence is great and increasing, and Hungary will probably
again become, as has Poland, intellectually a part of the Western
intellectual community. Hungarian intellectuals seem anxious for
the maximum possible contact with the West.
Agricultural collectivization remains, but with considerable mod-
ifications.
No major structural changes in economics seem imminent, but trade
with the West, especially with West Germany, seems likely to in-
crease rapidly.
The Hungarian regime seems loyal to the Soviet Union in the Sino-
Soviet conflict, although probably at; much out of necessity as of
conviction; Kadar probably would prefer not to have a complete Sino-
Soviet rupture.
Kadar is in complete control of the party and government.
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/said that Kadar would always follow
Khrushchev on Sino-Soviet relations, that he did not understand
much about economics, and that Hungarians in Transylvania are
betng treated extremely badly. As to economics, about which he
seems to know quite a lot, he said that Hungary's exports to
Western 'Europe of high-value agricultural products and meat are
being seriously endangered by the super-market demand there for
standardization, weight, measure, etc.
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Zoltan Horvath,
ian domestic and foreign policy.
Liberalization in Hungary has come primarily from the top,
from a conviction of strength and of its usefulness, but of course
popular pressure has had something to do with it. Horvath thinks that
intellectual liberalization has probably gone about as far as it will
in the near future, and that Hungary remains fundamentally totalitarian.
They both agreed that the economy has not undergore any fundamental
changes. Foreign trade probably will increase, prd_cularly with West
Germany, but incentives are still lacking. A o foreign policy, Hor-
vathemphasized repeatedly, with great emphasis, that for all Hungarians
Transylvania remains the key issue. Not only are t.-o million Hungar-
ians there, but it was the cradle of Hungarian cult,ure and independence,
and the Romanians are now treating the Hungarians terribly. Compared
to it, the Hungarians in Slovakia and Yugoslavia are unimportant.
Of course the Soviets could use it, as the Nazis did, to bind the
Hungarians, and as a means (probably unsuccessful) of pressure against
the Romanians, but it seems doubtful that they will do so, at least
publicly, in the near future, for two reasons: it would set them
back greatly in their struggle with the Chinese and their attempt to
set up an international conference against them, and it would hurt
them greatly with :the Czechoslovaks and especially with the Yugoslays.
Nevertheless, Transylvania remains perhaps the only issue on which the
Soviets could successfully play to assure Hungarian support. Hungarian
relations with West Germany will certainly improve on the economic plane
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Hungary will, although probably with some reluctance, completely
support Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute--i.e., it will not vol-
unteer support but will give it when asked.
Talks with two young regime journalists were quite routine and they
were naive propagandists. One of them runs the course given to
African and Asian journalists, and he did admit that in his exper-
ience Africans seem extremely uninterested in ideology.
talks with Dr. Istvan Gal
centered on the
Transylvanian problem. Gal had recently talked to two Hungarian
intellectuals who had been there. They reported that Romanianiza-
tion is progressing rapidly and severely. The Szekely area is re-
portedly almost cut off from foreign visitors, and no investment
occurs there at all. Gal said that the Transylvanian problem is an
extremely important one for almost all Hungarians but that he also
doubts that there will be any rapid or extreme developments.
Pal Gedeon, foreign editor of the daily Nepszava, was interviewed.
He is intelligent; not too dogmatic, and quite well versed in world
affairs, but said little more than a sophisticated version of the
regime line, including how worried he is about Goldwater.
four sociologists including the section direc-
tor, Andras Hegedus, who had been Prime Minister under Rakosi in
1955-1956. The others were younger, including the section secretary,
Vajda (?), Maria Markus (who is Polish), and Ivan Varga. HegedUs
(whose bad German somewhat inhtbited the conversation) told of their
empirical researches in villages, concerning such things as social
structure and communication systems; they hope to expand this to a
factory. It proved rather difficult to get much information out of
them, so the discussion turned into an ideological argument about
partiinostiand similar things. As an indication of how far heter-
odoxy is progressing, Hegediis defined it as being for objectivity in
methodology, a definition exactly that of Kolakowski in 1956.
Hegedlis also said that for him sociology was an empirical science
whose fields of research would be selected by the party but whose
methods would be empirical.
Prof. Imre Vajda of the Karl Marx Economic University was next.
Vajda, who had previously been head of the State Planning Commission,
is Hungary's leading expert on CMEA. An old-time Communist who
lived in Vienna for 20 years, he is anything but orthodox now, and
talked quite freely. As to Romania and CMEA, Vajda said that of
course the� DDR and CSSR attitude toward Romania has been a neo-col-
onialist one. Furthermore, Romania does have much more economic
base' (in raw materials) than other countries in East Europe. Never-
theless, he continued, in spite of the fact that Romania's revolt
represents economic (and political) nationalism, he doubts that it
will be permanent. On the contrary, the facts of economic life will
bring it back more toward cooperation with OMEA in a few years.
Wheirhe was told that Yugoslavia had gotten around thitt problem in
1.9Z48 with 'Western aid, he replied he thought that a unique case. He
Teas Uimself, he said, in favor of the widest internationalism in
Anadel with CMEA EEC and MA negotiating as groups..- He did not see
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how Transylvania could become a major issue. Nor did he think that
the USSR could or would try forcibly to make Romania come back into
line. For Hungary, CMEA was most helpful. As to Hungarian econom-
ics, he said that there had been no drastic changes although, as
one could see, the situation had considerably improved. Almost all
leading Hungarian economists were in favor of the Lange model (de-
centralization and a market economy) but the party leadership moved
slowly and the resistance of the middle party and economic bureau-
cracy, whose jobs would disappear, was very great. Nevertheless, Ite
said, the tendency would probably be slowly in that direction.
I.
10. Ivan Varga, one of the young sociologists, said he would like to talk
more. As it turned out, it was perhaps the most interesting conver-
sation in Hungary. Varga, who specializes in sociology of religion,
is highly intelligent, extremely well irformed about developments
in the West, very interested in Pcland (where he was in 1957 and
1962, and learned Polish), and very much of a young revisionist.
He had been conducting surveys on religion in the countryside, and
said that it was still quite strong, Lore among the Catholics than
among the Protestants. In the cities, the young peasant sons who
had come to work in factories were suffering from psychological
alienation (Ulam's description of the most fertile ground for Marx-
ism) but, Varga went on, they tended much more to try to overcome
it by religion than by Marxism-Leninism. A general discussion of
alienation in capitalist and especially in socialist societies
followed, and Varga's position on it was typically revisionist--
influenced primarily by the young Marx and by Italian Communist
thinking. He apparently reads Italian Communist publications reg-
ularly, and is also much influenced by the PCI Gramsci Institute,
a member of which he met. He told source of a controversy on aliena
tion which has been being carried on in Valosag, a periodical which,
from what he intimated, is trying to push these semi-revisionist
ideas quite strongly. Varga himself has written a strong article,
but does not yet know if it will be published. General Hungarian
developments were discussed somewhat, and he indicated that in his
orinion there is no serious possibility of a real revival or engage-
ment in Marxist-Leninist ideology. He was very curious about recent
developments in Poland, where he knows many people (he said he knew
Kolakowski well). He also reads many Western periodicals regularly;
he mentioned Encounter, Preuves, Monat, and Forum. He has great
respect for Lukacs intellectually and says he has much influence on
the brighter philosophical students. He did not think Lukacs to be
in sympathy with his own and his friends idea. He also asked a lot
of questions about Africa and we talked about that for a long time.
Like so many others, he also wanted to know about Goldwater. He
says that he hopes that studies of factory workers can be done with
a view toward justifying the introduction of true workers councils--
he is abviously quite out of sympathy with the total power of the
party leadership. He said that the Hungarian press was still quite
mololithic and therefore had little influence. Foreign broadcasts
were listened to regularly; he said lie did not like RFE but preferred
BBC because it was calm and objective. He said that they were planning
within a year or two to introduce a course in sociology into the univer-
sity and he asked for material about what such a course might cover.
He spoke very good German, his mother and wife both being Austrian,
and this may well account for much of his knowledge of the West.
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11. The famous Marxist-Leninist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs was seen in
his apartment. Two main impressions were formed: his brilliance
and culture, and his strong adherence to Leninist Communism. In-
deed, although he may have been a revisionist in 1956, he is not
now; as a Hungarian remarked that evening, Khrushchev should really
make him the head of the Marx-Lenin Institute in Moscow! The talks
began about the Sino-Soviet dispute and the general international
situation. On this he was neither penetrating or particularly
original; he took very much the Soviet line on Vietnam, said that
a US attack on North Vietnam could bring Moscow and Peking back to-
gether again, etc. However, when the discussion turned to ideology
and philosophy he was obviously in his element, and his ideas were
as precisely formulated as his German was elegant. He agreed that
Marxism was ideologically in a confu3ed state today, but he said he
expected a revival within 5 or 10 years of true Marxism, or zuire
accurately true Leninism, as a result of the controversy now going
on. He said he was very impressed by Italian Communist thought,
and clearly he follows it in detail. As to his present ideological
position, he said that he felt, as had Lenin, that partiinost' should
not be extended to creative artistic activity. As to the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, he said he could conceive that it might not
be necessary, and that after internal and external threats to it had
disappeared (reactionaries, CIA, etc.) it was also possible that more
than one party might be allowed. Nevertheless, he strongly defended
democratic centralism, the Leninist ban on factionalism, etc. On
more general subjects, he said that Freud had little or nothing to
offer (a mythomaniac), and (when source said he seemed like Marx, to
be incurably optimistic about human nature, indeed a Promethean) he
declared that indeed he was a Promethean, and if it were not for
Prometheus we would all still be apes up in trees eating bananas!
As to the cult of the personality, the question of the system, and the
limitation (by institutions) of the total power of the party leader-
ship, he said that there was no such thing as absolute civil rights,
that the extent of civil rights reflected a social and economic sit-
uation, and that improvement in that and party democracy was the only
real solution (i.e., the Leninist position.) As or the alienation
debate, he said that it arose from social causes and by changing them
it could be ended; he rejected concentration on the young Marx, or the
idea that alienation was insuperable. He said he was quite unconvinced
that Oswald had killed Kennedy. He had voted against Hungary leaving
the Warsaw Pact in the decisive cabinet meeting on No. 1, 1956--and
thereafter resigned.
12. Lutacs is short, white-haired, smokes black cigars or cigarettes con-
stantly, and has much of the arrogance and totalitarian beliefs of
Naphtha in Zauberberg--not surprisingly so, since reportedly he as a
young man was Thomas Mann's model for the character. He has made many
people revisionists by his teaching, and therafter'they abandoned
Leninism entirely--but there is a doubt that he ever will himself.
13. Later, Dr. Istvan.Gal Again .discussed topics of historical interest:
but he did say that in his view the regime would likely not stifle the
younger, more independent-minded Hungarian writers, although there had
been a few moves in this direction recently. He thought there was a
serious group of.Stalinists in the party apparat--with pro-Chinese
sympathies. The great populist writers (Nemeth, Illyes) still have the
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most influence in Hungary; attempts should be made to get them
abroad, and Veres too, by cultural exchange. Bibo cannot see
foreigners for thrse years, the police told him, or he will be
rearYested. His ideas are certainly politically the most original
it '4ungary.
14 That evening talks were held with DT. Temas Szecskg, head of the
economic department cf Radio Budapest and a researcher with HegedUs
in political sociology--i.e., surveys in factories. He was much
like Varga, much influenced by the West well-informed, and clearly
no orthodox Leninist. He said. thatjAkacs by npw resaly was 4 diggmatist,
and had no influence on the younger and more revisionist intellect-
uals. As to economics, he agreed with Varga, and said that go did
some of the people he knew in the economics section of the party
central committee, but the resistance of the middle-level function-
aries was too great. Trade with West Germany would probably in-
crease considerably. The Romanians would not make out so well;
they don't have enough trained workers to run modern factores
(Vajda had said this too)--rather, they will ruin them. The end of
jamming of foreign broadcasts has made Radio Budapest react more
rapidly to events, lest it be "beaten" by the competition. Indeed,
he said, he thought the competition of foreign broadcasts ("Free
Europe, BBC") was a good thing. The regime was still acting,
foolishly, as if it had a monopoly on mass communications, but it
doesn't and will have less so all the while. Foreign newspapers
can be gotten; it is absurd not to sell them. In a sense the Rev-
olution did win, although even so most of the present changes would
have come. Source replied that however the Revolution had probably
permanently ruined "friendship" with the USSR and engagement for
Marxist-Leninist ideology; he said that was true.
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