THE COLLECTIONOF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE FROM OVERT SOURCES ABOARD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02820723
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-01131
• Publication Date: January 5, 1953

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5 January 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Collection of Scientific Intelligence
from Overt Sources Abroad
1. In pursuance of the exchange of letters between the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for
Intelligence, Department of State (attached hereto as TAB A)� discussions
have been held by the appropriate offices within CIA and the Department
of State.
2. As a result there has been prepared a paper entitled "Under-
standings Between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence
Agency Regarding the Collection of Scientific Intelligence" (TAB B).
It should be pointed out that this understanding is in no sense an
attempt to catalog all of the recognized responsibilities of the
Department of State, but is rather directed at matters which are in
need of clarification. It is not believed necessary for this document
to be approved by the DCI or the Special Assistant unless there is some
change which either wishes to make and therefore is submitted for your
information.
3. In addition there is attached (TAB C) a staff paper dealing
with the coordination in the Missions abroad of the activities of agencic
having resources or responsibilities to collect scientific intelligence.
This paper outlines steps to be taken by CIA and State:
a. the issuance of an instruction from the Department of
State to the Chiefs of Mission;
b. the transmittal of a letter from the DCI to the Secretary
of State, to be used as an enclosure to;
c. a letter from the Secretary of State to the IAC and non-
IAC agencies who have representatives abroad concerned with
scientific matters.
Upon completion of the discussions and preparation of these communica-
tions they will, of course, be submitted to the DCI and Special
Assistant for Intelligence for approval as appropriate.
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4. No additional formal report is believed necessary at this time
on this problem. Informal discussions will continue, however, with
respect to working out day-to-day problems relating to the responsivenesf
of the Foreign Service to scientific requirements falling within the
general reporting functions of the State Department,
5. This has been concurred in by the Office of the Science Advisor,
State, the Intelligence Acquisition and Distribution Division, State,
the Assistant Directors for Operations and Scientific Intelligence, CIA,
and the Deputy Director, Plans, CIA.
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination
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. TAB A
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12 September 1952
Dear Park:
Thank you for your memorandum of June 3, 1952, which raises the
question of the possible expansion of the activities of the Department
under its responsibilities in NSCID 10. General Smith has asked that
I reply for him.
This Agency has under review the adequacy of the collection of such
intelligence information from overt sources abroad as is of interest to
our offices, including scientific intelligence information. The results
of that review will be discussed with you to ascertain what can be done
to improve such collection and what assistance may be necessary and prope
from this Agency.
Our reaction to the considerations put forward in your letter
regarding NSCID 10 are as follows:
1. The Agency regrets that the Department finds it advisable
to keep the collection Of basic scientific information on the part
of the Science Advisor and attaches aloof from intelligence.
2. It is believed that the Office of the Science Advisor and
the scientific attaches need not jeopardize their work by an appro-
priate relationship with intelligence. It is believed that adequate
briefing of outgoing scientific attaches on specific intelligence
requirements is essential, if NSCID 10 is to be effectively
implemented.
3. Because of the responsibility of CIA in the production of
scientific intelligence, it is suggested that the Department might
usefully consult the Agency on its suggestions for attaches or its
view on proposed attaches even as the Department of Commerce is
consulted with respect to our economic attaches.
4. This Agency would prefer, where appropriate) to utilize
the existing facilities of the Contact Division under NSCID 7 for
the briefing of outgoing scientists and engineers and debriefing of
returning scientists and engineers who have been traveling abroad
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.
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as private citizens, rather than expanding the Office of the Science
Advisor for these purposes. Where it is inappropriate to use this
procedure the Agency would appreciate working out an arrangement
with the Science Advisor which would achieve the same objective.
5. In general, International Congresses, which should be
attended by U. S. scientists in an unofficial capacity, might be
handled by the Department submitting a list of names to the Agency
which, after making a.selection� would directly finance the travel
as necessary, Where for any reason this is impracticable, specific
arrangements with the Department could be made.
6. In some cases it would be desirable for a well known
scientist to be recruited by the State Department for carrying on
specific short-term missions of interest to this Agency and financed
by this Agency. It is considered very important that thorough
briefing be provf.ded, In other cases the Agency has found that
scientific missinns cn be carried out abroad to advantage under
its direct sponsorship.
Based on our interchange of correspondence I propose that our
representatives meet for discussion of these matters and that a joint
report be prepared for your and my consideration.
LOFTUS E. HUM
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
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June 3, 1952
Dear General Smith:
As you know, National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 10 places upon the Department of State primary responsibility
for the collection abroad, by overt means, of information in the
basic sciences. The Department, under this directive, has addi-
tional secondary responsibilities for collection in other scientific
and technical fields.
On a limited scale, the Department has, during the past two
years, endeavored to meet these responsibilities. The experience
gained during this period of time has confirmed the importance of
several factors in the collection of scientific information:
a. Except in the case of the USSR and its satellites
(including China), the traditional and normal channels of
intercommunication between US and foreign scientists are
capable of furnishing a large portion of the information
required for intelligence purposes. The normal channels com-
prise interchange of published works and scientific period-
icals, reciprocal visits and attendance at international
meetings and conferences.
b. In the case of the USSR and satellites, the limited
information available through normal channels can be effec-
tively supplemented only by carefully planned covert activities.
c. In the case of non-Soviet areas, the information
which is needed to supplement that received through the normal
and traditional channels mentioned above principally relates
either to a specific field of scientific effort and to
research which has not yet reached the publication stage, or
to an overall evaluation of scientific potential in one or
more broad fields.
d. The types of information mentioned in (c) above can
be acquired most efficiently and economically through overt
means, provided the following factors are kept in mind:
1. The use
General Walter B. Smith,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington 25, D. C.
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1. The use of relatively young or scientifically
unknown individuals will, in most cases, not only be
ineffective, but may tend to dry up even the normal
channels of intercommunication. Profitable contact with
foreign scientists can usually be expected only where
there is a reasonable quid pro quo, that is, when the
US scientist is a qualified leader in a given field, and
when the basis of the contact is a legitimate exchange of
scientific ideas and experiences. Relatively unknown
individuals who only ask questions quickly arouse resent-
ment and reluctance, since it is obvious that their
principal purpose is to extract information, giving
nothing in return.
2. Every effort must be made to keep the collection
of basic scientific information removed from the taint of
intelligence. 1
1. The degree to which a US scientist can be success-
ful in collecting information on a specific or general
scientific field depends upon his own ability and competence
in that field rather than upon any detailed briefing by
intelligence.
The Department is keenly aware of the importance of carrying
out its responsibilities under NSCID-10� and desires to expand its
current activities in this respect. The following steps should be
taken in this direction, some of which can be accomplished within
the Department's present resources; others will require additional
support.
a. The Department can collect the bulk of basic
scientific material available in published form which
CIA requires.
b. The existing scientific attaches can undertake to
collect specific additional information which CIA may require
within their individual fields of competence.
c. With appropriate financial assistance, known and
competent specialists can be selected and sent overseas for
limited periods of two to three months to cover specific fields
of science
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of science on a strictly overt basis. These consultants
would function in the same manner as normal science attaches;
and would make their reports to the office of the Science
Advisor, Department of Statel, They would have no direct
connection with CIA in any way,
d. The office of the Science Advisor, with additional
staffing assistance, could undertake a more extensive program
of debriefing scientists and engineers who have visited foreign
areas under private sponsorship. The use of this office, which
while it has no apparent connection with intelligence, is
directly and openly concerned with science, will in many cases
be more fruitful than debriefing by the intelligence agencies
themselves.
e. With adequate financial assistance the Department can
increase the competence and scope of coverage of US represen-
tation to international scientific conferences and congresses
abroad. It is believed that such meetings are extremely
profitable occasions for the interchange of scientific infor-
mation and ideas, particularly in acquiring prepublication
knowledge of work in progress.
In accordance with paragraphs 1,d and 1�f of NSCID-101 the
above views and suggestions are submitted to the Central Intelligence
Agency for consideration, both as to their validity, and as a basis
for further discussion as to the degree of support to the overt
scientific collection activities of the Department which might be
appropriate and justifiable.
Sincerely yours,
(sgd) W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
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Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 CO2820723 TAB B
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UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REGARDING
THE COLLECTION OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
1. The Department accepts the suggestions contained in the
following paragraphs of Mr. Beckerts letter to Mr. Armstrong, dated
12 September 1952 as a basis for cooperative action on specific cases
and problems as they arise:
"3. Because of the responsibility of CIA in the production
of scientific intelligence, it is suggested that the Department
might usefully consult the Agency on its suggestions for attaches
or its view on proposed attaches even as the Department of Commerce
is consulted with respect to your economic attaches.
"4. This Agency would prefer, where appropriate, to utilize
the existing facilities of the Contact Division under NSCID 7 for
the briefing of outgoing scientists and engineers and debriefing
of returning scientists and engineers who have been traveling
abroad as private citizens, rather than expanding the Office of
the Science Advisor for these purposes. Where it is inappropriate
to use this procedure the Agency would appreciate working out an
arrangement with the Science Advisor which would achieve the same
Objective.
5. In general, International Congresses, which should be
attended by U. S. scientists in an unofficial capacity, might be
handled by the Department submitting a list of names to the Agency
which, after making a selection, would directly finance the travel
as necessary. Where for any reason this is impracticable, specific
arrangements with the Department could be made.
"6. In some cases it would be desirable for a well-known
scientist to be recruited by the State Department for carrying
on specific short-term missions of interest to this Agency and
financed by this Agency. It is considered very important that
thorough briefing be provided. In other cases the Agency has found
that scientific missions can be carried out abroad to advantage
under its direct sponsorship."
2. With respect to the relationship between intelligence and
Science Attaches:
a. The greatest difficulty in recruiting Science Attaches
is that of obtaining scientists of sufficiently high caliber and
reputation. Whenever it is possible to select men who both have
the necessary qualifications and are personally willing to cooper-
ate knowingly and fully with intelligence, the Department will do
so.
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b. In the case of Science Attaches who have indicated a
willingness to cooperate with intelligence and whose discretion
and aptitude for such activities is demonstrated, arrangements can
be made for relationships
c. It is agreed that, in basic science or fundamental
research, the Science Attaches will, of necessity, be limited
generally to access to information of an unclassified nature and
will usually be unable, without jeopardy to their status, to inquire
as to projects, data, etc. classified by a foreign government for
security or commercial reasons,
d. It is agreed that there may be instances in which it would
not be appropriate for Science Attaches to inquire as to specific
projects, data and developments in laboratories, etc. (including
industrial research establishments) which are not clearly engaged
in classified research, when such inquiries are not within the
specialized competence of the Attache!
3. CIA may address to the Department any requirements which it
believes can or should be met by the Foreign Service, including Science
Attaches. The Department will make final determination as to which
requirements shall be finally levied on the Foreign Service.
4. It is recognized that the present uncoordinated activity of
several intelligence and non-intelligence agencies seeking scientific
information from foreign countries presents a potential danger both to
U. S. policy regarding scientific cooperation and to the flow of
scientific information of intelligence value. The Department and CIA
will cooperatively seek appropriate measures to correct this situation.
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TAB C
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COORDINATION OF OVERT SCIENTIFIC COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD
PROBLEM
1. To coordinate overt activities concerned with the collection
of scientific information from foreign governments, business and researd
organizations and scientists.
DISCUSSION
2. A number of U. S. Government agencies, and of separate offices
within these agencies, are obtaining scientific and technical informatiol
and data from foreign governments, institutions and individuals. These
agencies and offices include the following:
Department of State
Naval Attaches
Army. Attaches
Air Force Attaches
Office of Naval Research
Research and Development Command, Air Force
Mutual Security Agency
Geological Survey
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Research Council
Civil Aeronautics Administration
Coast and Geodetic Survey
Department of Agriculture
The fields of scientific and technical interests of the above agencies
frequently overlap, both because of statutory responsibilities, and
because of the interrelationships between fields of scientific endeavor.
In meeting their needs for foreign scientific data, certain of these
agencies utilize both the normal information collection facilities of
the Government (i.e., the Foreign Service and the Military, Naval, and
Air Force Attaches), also on occasion certain ones undertake or establis
special information collecting missions on their own. The results of
utilizing these various facilities has been on several occasions an
embarrassing duplication of requests to foreign organizations and a
multiplicity of uncoordinated requests. This has incurred the waste of
time of foreign scientists, which they resent, and made them suspicious
that all requests for scientific information arise from intelligence or
other ulterior motives. The traditional flow of scientific information
into this country is in serious jeopardy because of lack of coordination
The importance to national security of access to sources of foreign
scientific information and of collaboration between U. S. and foreign
science on both governmental and private levels warrants careful con-
sideration of measures to avoid the potential dangers described above.
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Measures should also be taken to ensure that information which has been
collected is made available to those who need it.
3. In the case of the "normal" information collecting activities
of the Government regulations (NSCID-2) exist which place responsibility
and a measure of authority in the hands of Chiefs of Mission for coordin
ating the activities of the Foreign Service and the Service Attaches.
These regulations envisage that each Chief of Mission be aware of the
stated needs and requirements of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and
that he ensure that representatives of these agencies correlate their
activities to ensure the maximum collection of needed information in
the most efficient and economical manner possible.
4. Experience has shown that NSCID-2 has not been completely or
effectively implemented for the following reasons:
a. Some Chiefs of Mission have either not been fully cognizant
of their responsibilities or lacked time or adequate staff to carry
them out.
b. Faced with duplicatory or conflicting requests levied upon
Attaches or the Foreign Service, Chiefs of Mission have been
reluctant to jeopardize the relationships of a collecting officer
with his parent agency by exercising a perhaps nebulous "Coordinat-
ing" authority in a manner which would limit or restrict the col-
lecting officer's ability to meet directly and personally his
agency's request.
c. Contributory to b. above, Washington agencies have apparent:
not in all cases communicated to each other on a regular basis thei/
plans and specific requirements for collection activities so that
initial steps could be taken here to pool resources and efforts.
5. In the field of science and technology, perhaps more than in
any other field, "normal" collection activities are supplemented by
special efforts to collect information which are undertaken in many
cases by non-intelligence agencies and offices. These non-intelligence
offices are usually unaware of NSCID-2, and do not participate in the
general interchange of information conducted by the intelligence
community. Frequently their activities are not normally communicated
in advance to the Chief of Mission, or not communicated at all.
6. The consequences of inadequate implementation of NSCID-2,
and of uncoordinated activities of non-intelligence agencies in the
scientific field will be felt most seriously with respect to Western
European countries. These countries (France, Italy, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) possess a potential in
scientific knowledge which make them important both as sources of
information and as collaborators in scientific research and development.
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Efforts to develop a more systematic and rational approach by the U.S.
to sources of scientific and technical information may logically be
centered initially on these countries. In view of the above considera-
tion, it is believed that necessary measures can be taken at the presen
time by a series of specific actions, without the necessity of any
additional directives or coordinating machinery.
STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY CIA AND STATE
7. a. State and CIA will jointly determine which Western Europew
(or other) countries, in addition to those mentioned above, are
affected by this problem.
b. (1) State will prepare a draft communication to the Chief
of Mission in each country drawing his attention to the problel
of coordinating scientific collection activities and his
responsibilities under NSCID-2, as further elaborated by
NSCID-10. Each Chief of Mission will be requested to under-
take these responsibilities personally or to designate a memhe,
of his staff or to appoint an ad hoc committee from his staff
to whom responsibilities as regards science and technology are
delegated.
(2) The above draft communication will be discussed with
and have the concurrence of CIA and Army, Navy and Air Force,
and information copies of the final agreed communication will
be sent to the service attaches by their respective agencies,
as well as issued to Chiefs of Mission by State.
(3) The identity of the coordinating officer of officers
designated by each Chief of Mission will be communicated by
State to CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force.
c. Upon completion of the above action, the DCI will address
a letter to the State Department, indicating his approval and
support of the coordination measures taken by State.
d. State will address a communication to the IAC and non-IAC
agencies which have or may in the future have overseas activities
in the fields of science and technology. This letter will emphasi
the necessity for ensuring proper dissemination to the intelligenc
agencies of information reaching the United States.
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