IRAN-IRAQ: LULL IN THE GULF ANTI-SHIPPING WAR

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05799133
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-01318
• Publication Date: June 17, 1987

Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05799133
C.entral Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 June 1987
Iran-Iraq: Lull in the Gulf Anti-Shipping War (U)
_Summary
Both Iran and Iraq see short-term advantages to the
current lull in attacks on ships in the Persian Gulf. The
last attack by Iran took place on 24 May and Iraq's most
recent strike was on 18 May. Iraq is pleased by the recent
increase in international efforts to press Iran to end the
war and by heightened tension between Tehran and the
superpowers. In short, the Iraqis have little to gain for
now by renewing the anti-shipping war in the Gulf. Tehran
hopes to strengthen its longstanding claim that the key to
peace is ending Iraqi attacks. Iraq started the
anti-shipping war and Iran claims it has struck ships largely
in retaliation. Iran also hopes that its restraint will help
to undermine UN actions directed at ending the Iran-Iraq war.
Despite the current hiatus, mounting pressures on Iran
and Iraq are likely to lead to renewed attacks on Gulf ships.
Iraq probably will resume attacks if it perceives that the
This memorandum was prepared by Iran/Iraq
Branch, Persian Gulf Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA, (U)
NESA M 87-20063
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superpowers are reducing efforts to end the war or are losing
interest in the Gulf. When the US implements its protective
measures for Kuwaiti shipping, Iran is likely to renew
strikes against non-escorted shipping, lay mines near Kuwait,
and possibly look for opportunities to strike escorted
US-flag vessels. The chances also will increase that Iran
will conduct terrorism against US interests in the Gulf.
* * * * * * * * * *
Iran and Iraq have halted attacks on Gulf shipping after hitting a
total of 52 ships so far this year. The last Iraqi airstrike was on 18
May, a day after the attack on the USS Stark. Iran's most recent ship
attack occurred on 24 May, when it hit a Panamanian oil tanker.
The View From Baghdad
We believe Baghdad presently sees little to be gained by initiating a
new round of airstrikes against shipping. From Iraq's perspective, the
Stark incident and Iran's attack on a Soviet ship on 6 May have proved to
be blessings by leading to increased US and Soviet efforts to end the war
and by creating new strains between Iran and the superpowers. The Iraqis
are relieved and pleased that US--and world--attention has shifted from
Iraq's attack on the USS Stark to the Iranian threat in the Gulf. Baghdad
probably hopes that Tehran will carry out its threats against the
superpower ships protecting reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers. Iraqi officials
almost certainly calculate that renewed attacks by Iraq against Iranian
ships would anger the superpowers, help the Iranians justify retaliation
against US and Soviet flagged tankers, and possibly jeopardize efforts to
obtain an effective arms embargo against Iran and a UN Security Council
resolution with sanctions against the side refusing to end the war.
Iranian Calculations
Iran almost certainly hopes to use the lull in the ship attacks to
achieve a permanent cease-fire in Gulf waters--a longstanding policy
objective--and be free to continue the ground war where it has the
upperhand. We believe that Iran expects the hiatus to remind the
international community that Iraq started the anti-shipping war and to
substantiate Iran's claim that Tehran attacks ships only in retaliation for
Iraqi strikes. The lull, therefore, strengthens Iran's argument that the
key to peace in the Gulf is a permanent Iraqi halt to ship attacks, in
which ease superpower protection of Kuwaiti shipping becomes unnecessary.
Tehran probably also hopes to weaken superpower efforts to achieve a UN
Security Council resolution calling for sanctions.
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Pressures for Renewed Attacks
Baghdad is concerned that Iran will enefit if the superpowers shift
attention away from the Iranian threat bofore a comprehensive agreement on
the ground war, or at least a UN Security Council resolution with teeth, is
achieved. The Iraqis realize that a de facto cease-fire against Gulf
shipping reduces the pressures on Iran. Even though Baghdad knows that its
attacks in the Gulf have had negligible effects on Iranian oil revenues and
morale, it values them because they provoke Iranian retaliation against
international shipping, demonstrate to Iraqi citizens that Baghdad is
prosecuting the war, and may at some point help influence Iranian
policymakers to negotiate an end to the conflict.
Because Baghdad appears to view attacks on tankers as one of its few
options to press Iran to end the war, it is likely to resume attacks
against shipping to and from Iran or against Iranian land oil facilities,
including those on Khark Island, if it perceives that progress toward a UN
Security Council resolution and other pressures on Iran are waning. The
Iraqis will be fearful of accidentally attacking superpower combatants and
noncombatants, however, and will exercise care to avoid another accident.
Iran probably believes that superpower protection of Kuwaiti ships sets
a precedent that, if unchecked, will lead to steadily expanding superpower
intervention on the side of Iraq and its Arab allies. This would threaten
to foreclose an Iranian victory over Iraq and to neutralize Iran's aim of
achieving hegemony in the Persian Gulf. We believe Iran prefers to force
the superpowers and Kuwait to back down without having to resort to a
military clash.
If Iran fails to achieve this objective and the US implements its
protective measures, Iran is likely to resume attacks against unescorted
Kuwaiti ships and perhaps lay sea mines near Kuwait. The possibility would
also increase that Tehran would launch terrorist operations against US
interests in the Gulf and elsewhere. We believe that Iran would probe
cautiously for opportunities to attack escorted US-flag ships, hoping to
increase significantly the Gulf states' concern and intensify debate in the
United States about the wisdom of US involvement. Tehran is likely to hope
that such a debate would weaken US resolve and lead to a US withdrawal.
Tehran probably will forego attacks on Soviet-flag ships as long as it
perceives that its strategy of easing tension with Moscow is making
progress.
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SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq: Lull in the Gulf Anti-Shipping War (U)
NESA M 87-20063
Distribution:
1 - Robert B. Oakley, NSC
1 - Edward P. Djerejian, State
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Marion V. Creekmore, Jr., State
George S. Harris, State
John Craig, State
Peter Burleigh, State
Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., ISA, DOD
Cmdr. Ruth Shaughnessy, JCS, DOD
Roger Pajak, Treasury
DIR/DCl/DDCl/Exec
DDI
NIO/NESA
NIO/CT
C/PES
C/NID
C/PDB
C/NE/ARN
CPAS/IMC/CB
D/NESA
DD/NESA
C/PPS/NESA
NESA/PPS
C/NESA/SO
C/NESA/IA
1 - CfNESA/AI
8 - MESA/PG
DI/NESA/PG/I/
Staff
(16Jun87)
�3LTRE'?
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05799133