WHAT HAPPENS IF SADDAM "GOES MISSING"?

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06794692
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02409
• Publication Date: February 7, 2003

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Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Red Cell
A Red Cell Report
Number 102 7 February 2003
In response to the events of
I I September, the Director
of Central Intelligence
commissioned CIA's Deputy
Director for Intelligence to
create a "red cell" that
would think unconventionally
about the full range of
relevant analytic issues. The
DCI Red Cell is thus charged
with taking a pronounced
"out-of-the-box" approach
and will periodically produce
memoranda and reports
intended to provoke thought
rather than to provide
authoritative assessment.
Please direct questions or
comments to
What Happens if Saddam "Goes Missing"?
Defying his "die in the bunker" image, Saddam could try to spoil a US victory by
pulling an UBL -type disappearance to prearranged bolt holes and leading a
WMD terror war from the shadows. Saddam's aims in such a war would include
personal survival, revenge, raising the cost of a US occupation, and, by making
Iraq ungovernable without him, eventually returning to power. Armed with
biological and chemical weapons and dismissive of Iraqi casualties, Saddam
and terrorist allies could lay waste to villages and harass coalition troops with
far greater lethality than renegade Afghan warlords or Taliban.
The Red Cell was asked to consider the implications of a Saddam gone missing
Could Saddam Reprise Usama?
Many observers anticipate that a Saddam flushed from Baghdad and fleeing for his life will
meet his end like Mussolini, captured by fellow countrymen and left to swing by his heels
from a lamppost�or worse. However, Saddam's instinct for self-preservation, decades in
power, and early experience as an underground revolutionary suggest that he has planned
escape routes and safe havens inside Iraq�and possibly in neighboring states�where he
could go to ground. Coalition forces might be surprised by a host of factors that could help
Saddam slip the noose.
� Gaps in coalition understanding of tribal dynamics and loyalties might lead to
mistakes that alienate tribal leaders and cause them to look the other way or
clandestinely support Saddam or his cronies. Beneficiaries of Saddam's rule who fear
they would suffer under US occupation would be especially prone to mischief.
� Bribes, inbred antipathy toward US occupiers, local politics and economics, and
family and tribal ties could all prompt selected individuals to provide aid or safehaven
to regime remnants. Greater fear of a Saddam-on-the-loose with WMD than of US
occupiers might also figure in calculations.
� Although Iraqi terrain is not as conducive to prolonged hiding as are the mountains
and caves of the Afghan/Pakistan border, there are pockets of favorable landscape
and anonymous enclaves in the Sunni center of the country where Saddam could
remain at large. Because coalition forces cannot cover every square inch of Iraq,
success at capturing him would depend upon active cooperation from locals.
� Hoping to tie down the US and prevent action against them, elements in Iran and
Syria might quietly offer a fugitive Saddam clandestine refuge, allowing his followers
to nip across the border to inflict non-attributable pain on occupying forces.
Although the political leadership in Damascus and Tehran might be cowed by an
overwhelming US presence on their border, intelligence and security personnel
already supporting terrorism�particularly in Iran�might relish the chance to hit US
forces so conveniently close to home.
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� Saddam is known for his use of doubles and has access to plastic surgeons. He could
alter his appearance and disappear for a considerable period, perhaps planning to
reemerge later.
Saddam On The Loose: Sendero Luminoso with WMD
While a Saddam not in command of his military forces is a Saddam who has lost the war, a
Saddam who escapes capture could still cause serious problems for the US and its allies.
Relying on pre-established safe havens and support networks, weapons caches and secure
communications, Saddam could launch a surprisingly resilient effort to crash the coalition
victory party.
� Drawing upon lessons from the failure of al-Qa' ida and Taliban remnants and various
Afghan warlords to make significant dents in coalition control of the Afghan
battlescape, Saddam might squirrel away enough WMD to make hit and run attacks
from his roving thugs significantly more painful than the improvised conventional
strikes ongoing in Afghanistan.
� Saddam might apply tactics Sendero Luminoso used in Peru, brutally striking civilians
in remote villages to showcase the inability of US forces to be everywhere at all times
to protect the innocent. Because Saddam has utter contempt for Iraqi citizens and
many bitterly despise the dictator, there would be no limit to his ruthlessness�
calculated not to return Saddam to power right away, but to embarrass the US and
raise the costs of occupation.
� The mobile BW labs and small caches of chemical weapons that confound arms
inspectors could make it easier for Saddam to project lethal force even while on the
run. His cronies could spread powdered anthrax or other WMD contaminants to deny
coalition forces and their Iraqi allies access to certain spaces, such as government
buildings, airports and oil facilities.
� If some SCUDs remained undiscovered�perhaps hidden in barns, warehouses, or
wooded areas�Saddam might be able to arrange their launch even after the coalition
achieved a general military victory.
Terrorist Collusion for WMD Chaos
If Saddam planned to abandon Baghdad and lead an underground terror war, he would
have strong incentives to supply WMD materials to a variety of terrorist groups to conduct
attacks outside Iraq�and make this known to attract extremist support for his cause.
Saddam would hope a wave of terrorism abroad would impel the US to divert forces.
� With the general battle for Iraq lost and much of his WMD arsenal either spent,
suppressed or subject to discovery by occupying troops, Saddam would have few
incentives to refrain from distributing some of his remaining WMD materials to
terrorist groups like al-Qas ida and Palestinian extremists�or even to the Iranian Qods
force or Syrian conspirators in exchange for safe passage.
� Encouraging al-Ansar and al-Qa' ida to unleash their WMD-armed fighters in
northeastern Iraq could provoke fighting with and between Kurdish factions leading to
intervention by Turkey, with the US forced to play peacemaker. The anti-Iranian MEK
might also benefit from Saddam's WMD largesse to provoke destabilizing Iranian
reactions.
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In addition to motives of revenge and spite against those who aided the US, Saddam might
see trying to stay one jump ahead of US forces and unleashing WMD attacks as allowing
him to cut a more romantic figure as a "rebel for Islam," and thus gain support from violent
extremists that he could not command as a secular tyrant.
� Saddam, like the jihadists, would be out of power, on the run, and an underdog
against an overwhelming enemy. His goals might begin to look more like those
trumpetdd by Islamic extremists�driving the Crusader infidels from Muslim lands.
If
Saddam were to escape the US blitzkrieg and transform himself into a revolutionary
folk hero, he could attract a steady stream of jihadist recruits for a long war.
Without Saddam's Body, A Propaganda War Against the US
As long as Saddam is thought to be on the loose, the hunt for the disappearing dictator
risks overshadowing coalition accomplishments in Iraq, much as UBL's flight allows critics to
question the success of the Afghan campaign. We would expect foreign detractors to
personalize the failure to capture Saddam and UBL as a competition between the US
President and his two nemeses, with scores kept unflatteringly as 0-2.
� Doubts about US ability to "finish the job" might accompany recriminations harkening
back to the first Gulf war about whose fault it was that Saddam escaped this time.
Terrorists would draw encouragement, perceiving that the US might be good at
overthrowing regimes, but is bad at apprehending individuals.
� Iranian and Arab audiences disposed to conspiracy theories might even suspect a US
"secret deal" to facilitate Saddam's disappearance.
More serious commentators would wonder about the uneasy effect a missing Saddam might
have on efforts to rebuild Iraq. They would ponder what mischief Saddam might make,
question where the loyalties of second-tier military and government men really lie, and
assess Saddam's chances of a Phoenix-like rise from the ashes.
� Saddam has been in exile before, and his successful escape would raise fears that Iraq
had not seen the last of him. Iraqis cowed by two decades of his brutal tyranny might
need a long time to be certain he would not reappear, undermining coalition efforts to
exert political Control.
� As long as proof of Saddam's demise were lacking, surviving sons or lackeys could use
uncertainly about his fate to raise questions about the legitimacy of a US-installed
successor regime, perhaps drawing on bank accounts and other resources hidden
abroad to fund opposition activities.
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