ANTICIPATING SADDAM'S LAST-GASP GAMBITS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06794683
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02409
• Publication Date: March 10, 2003

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Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Red Cell
A Red Cell Special Memorandum
10 March 2003
In response to the events of
11 September, the Director
of Central Intelligence
commissioned CIA's Deputy
Director for Intelligence to
create a "red cell" that
would think unconventionally
about the full range of
relevant analytic issues. The
DCI Red Cell is thus charged
with taking a pronounced
"out-of-the-box" approach
and will periodically produce
memoranda and reports
intended to provoke thought
rather than to provide
authoritative assessment.
Please direct questions or
comments to the DCI Red
Cell a
Anticipating Saddam's Last-Gasp Gambits
As Saddam's options diminish, he may exploit the latest Blix report or President
Bush's press conference for last-minute ploys in the hope of forestalling an
invasion. Saddam might announce his intention to comply with key demands,
perhaps by hauling all his WMD to visible inspection zones, agreeing to honor a
"full-compliance" deadline along the lines of Canada's proposal, turning over
Zarqawi or other terrorists, or offering to go into exile after negotiations to
"safeguard Iraqi interests. "Saddam might even fake a coup, expecting an
UNSC call for the US to stay its hand until the Iraqi political situation was
sorted out. Any or all such 11th-hour gambits might induce war-wary states to
dispatch delegations to Iraq, the presence of which might. in Saddam's
calculus, complicate US military action.
The Red Cell was asked to speculate on the sorts of last-minute tactics Saddam might use
to forestall an imminent invasion once the UNSC concludes its deliberations. (S//NF)
Last Dance�The "Saddam Stall"
Although Saddam is probably gratified that he has sown divisions in the UNSC, he may be
concerned that this will not do him much good in light of continued US resolve. As Saddam
calculates ploys to buy additional time before US action, he may mine aspects of the latest
Blix report or President Bush's recent press conference for ideas. In doing so, he might
take particular care to hit sensitive notes that:
� Take advantage of the desire
to thwart US action or at least delay an invasion as long as possible.
� Seem directly responsive to points raised in the Blix report and in the US President's
press conference so that the US would face overwhelming pressures to pursue these
in the interest peace.
Empty the Cookie Jar
Saddam's track record of drawing out inspections ad nauseum suggests that seeming to
make new concessions on WMD inspections would be one option. In agreeing to destroy
his missile stocks, Saddam can claim that he has displayed willingness to sacrifice his WMD
to thwart an invasion. He can now cite Blix, who noted the missile destruction as a
significant positive development, and, if feeling imminent US military heat, offer to follow
up on an more extensive scale�while saving selected weapons of choice should he face
an invasion. Saddam might:
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� Exploit US/UK interest in a short deadline by offering his own "date certain" for full
compliance as Iraqi officials "discover" new weapons caches. Saddam might see a
"short deadline" for full WMD disclosure�two months out or so�as well worth the
loss of inventory if he believed the worldwide gratitude and relief at his "concession"
would force a US delay until hot weather. Saddam would be confident he could later
wriggle out of his own deadline.
� Take up the US President's challenge and start to place suspected WMD materials "in
a parking lot" or open field�inviting the UN and even the US to inspect and destroy
the material. Saddam might believe that yielding to a White House dare would
significantly increase pressure on the US to agree "inspections are working."
� Build on UNMOVIC claims that Iraq is being more responsive on interviews with
scientists by allowing a set number of carefully selected experts to be taken abroad�
with their immediate families�for interviews. Again, the idea would be to ostensibly
meet a UN and US demand, and to force calls for a delay in military action until "free
and unfettered interviews" were complete.
� Invite the US to set up a base in Iraq to join the search for WMD, a possibility raised
in one intelligence report. If Saddam made such a desperate offer in public, calls for
the US to exploit this "dramatic concession" before starting a war would be loud and
long.
Exit Saddam
Saddam might also try to stall by addressing President Bush's comments that exile is an
acceptable outcome as long as a successor regime disarms. We can conceive a range of
imaginative ways that Saddam might use this opening to create confusion and pressure on
the US to "wait for the dust to settle" before embarking on war.
� Exile offer. Saddam could accept the Saudi offer of exile but first require "brief"
negotiations over terms that would guarantee the safety of Saddam himself, his
entourage, and their families, and would define the modalities by which a successor
regime would disarm. Saddam could invite a high-level foreign emissary�such as the
Russian or Saudi foreign minister�to Baghdad, dragging out talks while Saddam plots
his next move.
� Resignation. Saddam might try to achieve similar results by resigning and putting
someone in his place who could be controlled from behind the scenes.
� Fake coup. Because so many foreign states have hoped for a brave general to
depose Saddam, the dictator might stage a coup himself, using his doubles to sow
confusion about his fate�perhaps even "executing" one a la Ceaucescu�and
continuing to run the show from behind the scenes. A loyal general might pretend to
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take power and proclaim intentions to fully cooperate in disarming Iraq, turning over a
limited number of weapons to show his sincerity but preserving most of Iraq's
capability. Once Saddam thought weather or political conditions no longer permitted a
US invasion, he could reemerge in a counter coup and regain power.
� Election day. Saddam might try to use the US President's vision of a democratic Iraq
to "agree to pressure from the West" for a transition to democracy. Saddam could
agree to call a constituent assembly that would result in internationally monitored
"free elections" and a transfer of power to take place in a few months.
Join the War on Terrorism
Saddam might exploit the more detailed US charges linking him to terrorism and offer to
"join the war" by tracking down and expelling the al-Qa' ida members believed to be in
Iraq. Just as Saddam dispatched Abu Nidal when the terrorist was no longer useful, Saddam
might arrest Zarqawi and some of his supporters and promise to turn them over to the
West, once details are worked out�which would prove to be a process sufficiently long to
make US military action more difficult.
� Given warnings about the poison plant by both the US President and Secretary of
State, Saddam could say that, although he does not control northeast Iraq, he invites
foreign forces�even those of the US�to go after al-Qas ida in the Kurdish areas.
Create a Diversion.
Although it would be more difficult for Saddam to orchestrate a sufficiently large diversion
to disrupt a US invasion, several gambits remain available to a desperate dictator.
� North Korea. Saddam might see escalating tension in Korea as the best prospect of
diverting the US from Iraq. He might offer Kim Chong-il a massive monetary incentive
to stage a military confrontation with the US.
� Middle East. Saddam might try to stall US action by destabilizing a key US ally in the
Middle East.
� Terrorist attack. Using Iraqi security personnel positioned abroad, Saddam could
launch a major terrorist attack or series of attacks against the US or US interests that
he would try to attribute to al-Qa' ida.
� Preemptive strike. A really desperate Saddam looking for any way to stall a US
attack, even for a few days, might gamble on preemptive WMD strikes on the US
forces deploying against him. Saddam would know that such action would draw down
on him possibly unprecedented military wrath, but he might count on the shock value
of first use of WMD to induce calls for a ceasefire before more WMD was used.
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