TREASURY DRAFT LETTER OF AMENDMENT 2173 TO H.R. 4151 AS PASSED THE SENATE.

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05579339
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02270
• Publication Date: July 15, 1986

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SUSPENSE
16 July 36
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Name/Date
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TO:
SUBJECT:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. 1101103
July 15, 1986
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
Legislative Liaison Officer -
Department of Justice
Department of State
National Security Council
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense (Windus 697-1305)
SPECIA
COMMON, AMA&
Treasury draft letter on Amendment 2173 to H.R. 4151 as
passed the Senate.
(Conference action may occur this week. Accordingly,
we will clear this report on July 16 and will presume
you have no comments if your agency has not responded
within the deadline.)
The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your �
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship
to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular
A-19.
A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
20:00 A.M. WEXIESDAY, JULY 16, 1986.
Questions should be referred to SUE TEAU/ANNETTE ROONEY
(395-7300), the legislative analyst in this office.
Enclosures
cc: M. Margeson
R. Neely
F. Seidl
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
SPECIAL
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Dear
I am writing to you to express therave concern of the
Department of the Treasury regarding the severe diminution
in the ability of the Secret Service to protect foreign
diplomatic missions located in the District of Columbia that
would result from the enactment of Amendment Number 2173
(S. 2508) to H.R. 4151.
As you are aware, on June 25, 1986, the Senate, with
very little debate and without having obtained the views of
the Administration, adopted an amendment to the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Bill, H.R. 4151, that
would repeal Section 22-1115 of the District of Columbia
Code that currently prohibits demonstrations within 500 feet
of embassies, legations and consulates in the District of
Columbia. The amendment would, in effect, eliminate all
spatial restrictions on demonstrations in proximity to
foreign embassies unless it could be established that the
demonstrators willfully attempted to intimidate, coerce,
threaten, or harass a foreign official or an official guest,
or willfully attempted to obstruct a foreign official in the
performance of his duties. Where such intentional intimi-
dation, coercion, threat, harassment or obstruction could be
shown, demonstrations could be restricted to an'area only
100 feet distant from the embassy.
It is the view of the Secret Service, which)pursuant to
Title 3, Section 202 of the United States Code, is tasked
with the responsibility to protect all foreign missions in
the District of Columbia, that the repeal of D.C. Code
Section 22-1115 runs directly counter to the stated
objective of H.R. 4151 "to provide enhanced diplomatic
security and combat international terrorism" since it would
cripple the ability of the Secret Service to provide
security for the representatives of foreign nations who live
and work in our Nation's Capital.
In many respects, the obstacles currently confronting
the Secret Service in providing security for foreign
embassies, legationsiand consulates are much greater than
those it encounters in protecting personnel and property of
the United States. At the White House and at the residence
of the Vice President, for example, the Secret Service
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maintains a presence inside the structures which enables it
to deploy a defensive network consisting of a number of
manned perimeter posts radiating out frgm's centralized
.command center. The Secret Service's permanent on-site
presence has also facilitated the installation of
sophisticated equipment which enables Secret Service
personnel to continuously monitor the area which surrounds
the site. Although the task of insuring the safety of the
White House complex and the residence of the Vice President
is extremely difficult, it would be impossible were the
Secret Service subject to the same diplomatic constraints
that control Secret Service operations at foreign embassies,
consulates, and legations.'
The structures which house the diplomatic operations of
foreign nations provide a tangible focal point to those
wishing to demonstrate against the policies of the foreign
government. Recent events underscore the fact that
demonstrations near embassies or other official foreign
government. buildings, even if initially peaceful,
exacerbate tensions and often lead to violent confrontations
among the police, demonstrators and occupants of the
protected premises. Yet, in contrast to the White House and
other official buildings of the United States, Secret
Service personnel are prohibited by international law and
comity from entering onto the premises of any foreign
embassy, legation, or consulate except with the expressed
prior approval of the foreign government. At such
locations, the Secret Service has no secured perimeter which
might otherwise be available if it were permitted to
position personnel inside the protected premises, and,
consequently, the Secret Service must avail itself of every
available legal means to guarantee the most secure
environment possible.
In this context, it becomes clear that the buffer zone
provided by Section 22-1115 of the District of Columbia Code
is essential if the Secret Service is to be able to provide
a minimally acceptable level of security for foreign
diplomatic personnel and property. Yet, as important as
D.C. Code Section 22-1115 is to the safety and well-being of
foreign diplomatic personnel, it also serves to protect
demonstrators and security personnel as well.
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,
It should be recalled that on April 17, 1984, a British
policewoman, Constable Yvonne Fletcher, was killed in the
line of duty, and eleven peaceful protesters were wounded by
gunfire during a demonstration in front .of the Libyan
embassy in London. This incident underscores the importance
of keeping demonstrators a safe distance away from
diplomatic missions. While it may be that demonstrators
have the option to jeopardize their own personal safety in
order to express their views and may even desire such a
confrontation to gain additional publicity for their cause,
security personnel who must always position themselves as a
protective buffer between demonstrators and the occupants of
protected premises do not. As the incident in London
demonstrates, police can be literally caught in the
crossfire--with tragic results.
In addition, a demonstration in close proximity to an
embassy could provide an extremist with a human shield of
innocent bystanders from which to launch a terrorist act.
It is the view of the Secret Service that the 500 foot rule
deters those who might otherwise infiltrate and exploit a
demonstration in close proximity to an embassy in order to
perpetrate such an act of violence. Without question, the
presence of a demonstration close to a targeted embassy
would aid the terrorist since the risk of injuring innocent
demonstrators would impede the ability of the Secret Service
and other law enforcement agencies to respond effectively.
Thus, although the occupants of foreign diplomatic missions
in the District of Columbia have been traditionally
identified as the principal beneficiaries of the protections
afforded by Section 22-1115, it is clear that a
demonstration in close proximity to foreign missions is
fraught with danger for others as well.
The need for the 500 foot rule is particularly acute in
the District of Columbia, which like London, is a national
capital. The sheer number of, and the high visibility of,
diplomatic embassies and missions located in the Nation's
Capital distinguish Washington, D.C., from other cities in
the United States, and may account for the fact that while
the Secret Service is authorized by Congress to protect all
foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan area
of the District of Columbia, its authority to protect such
missions outside the Washington, D.C., area is much more
restricted.
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District of Columbii Code Section 22-1115 constitutes a
vital element in the ability of the Secret Service to
successfully carry out its protective misiion as it pertains
to foreign embassies and missions located ih the District of
Columbia. The 500 foot rule strikes a carefully calculated
balance between a demonstrator's right to freely express his
or her views and the need of the government to assure that
the missions and embassies of foreign countries located in
the District of Columbia remain secure and inviolate.
It is my opinion and the position of the United States
Secret Service that any diminution of D.C. Code Section
22-1115 is untenable in view of the very real threat to
human life that would result.
Director John Simpson of the Secret Service has
expressed the hope that you would be willing to meet with
representatives of the Secret Service so that his concerns
regarding .the repeal of D.C. Code Section 22-1115 might be
more fully explained. A representative from Director
Simpson's staff will contact your office regarding such a
meeting.
Sincerely,
Francis A. Keating, II
Assistant Secretary
(Enforcement)
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