THE GREEK JUNTA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03019339
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-01318
• Publication Date: May 24, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
THE GREEK JUNTA
4( 'ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
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24 May 1967
No. 1113/67 (b)(3)
1)P s2/4,1v7
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
I EXI LI:DED FROM AUTOMAT1C
DOWNGI1ADINCi AND
ASSIVW A T1ON
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 May 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Greek Junta
Summary
A month after their coup, the three principal
military leaders of the newGreek Government appear
to be developing a largely apolitical program for
Greece. Although they have been working well to-
gether, the leaders general uniformity of outlook
will be put to the test, should they stay in power
long, by the need to establish policy on the more
obviously political questions that are certain to
face them. Moreover, despite their administrative
abilities, they are without political experience
and this could spell trouble in the months ahead.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by the
Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared
by the Office of Current Intelligence and co-
ordinated with the Office of National Estimates
and with the Clandestine Services.
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1. One month after the establishment of the
military-backed government in Athens, the situation
is outwardly calm, and there is no sign of any ef-
fective internal resistance to the regime. For
the moment, although the public has not so far dem-
onstrated support for the new regime, it appears
relieved that the coup went off relatively pain-
lessly and that there is in prospect at least a
temporary respite from the political turbulence
that has plagued Greece since the downfall of the
Karamanlis government in 1963.
2. Three officers, Brigadier General Stylianos
Pattakos and Colonels George Papadopoulos and
Nikolaos Makarezos, have emerged as the most power-
ful figures of the new government. For the time
being, at least, they are the key persons in any
determination of the trend of events in Greece.
Their backgrounds are similar but their personali-
ties are not, and their ability to check any dif-
ferences which arise among themselves will be
critical.
Brigadier General Pattakos
3. Pattakos, 55, was born on the island of
Crete. He had held his present rank for only three
months at the time of the coup. As commander of
the tank and infantry units stationed at the Armor
Center just outside Athens, Pattakos played a
crucial role during the seizure of power. Before
the coup, he was considered pro National Radical
Union (ERE) Party, pro-NATO, and pro-US. He has
close relatives in the United States and two neph-
ews serving as officers in the US Army, one of them
in Vietnam. He has been described as a "courageous,
decent man, and above all, very devout."
4. As interior minister, Pattakos presides
over the program of investigation now being carried
out regarding the several thousand political pris-
oners still in government jails and over the contin-
uing campaign for the suppression of "leftists and
anarchists." Pattakos has relinquished command of
the armored troops in the Athens region and now
seems to be devoting his entire time to his govern-
mental duties.
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Colonel Papadopoulos
5. Papadopoulos, touted frequently as the .
most powerful member of the triumvirate, was born
in northern Greece, At 48, he has had a distin-
guished military career, graduating firSt in his
cadet class in 1940, serving with General Grivas'
resistance forces in World War II.
Intelligent and self-assured,
Papadopoulos is a forceful speaker and is consid-
ered an excellent administrator and organizer. In
dealing with the press and others who have quizzed
him on the future course of events in Greece, he
has fielded questions well and has given forthright
and reasonable answers, but has occasionally demon-
strated a touch of asperity.
6. Papadopoulos' preSent post is that of
minister to the prime minister, which allows him
to exercise the authority of the prime minister's
office while permitting a civilian--Kollias--to
hold the title.
Colonel Makarezos
7. Makarezos, also 48, was born near Athens.
Recently promoted to full colonel.
He is apparently the most
studious and best educated of the three, and has
an academic background in economics, political
science, and industrial management. Makarezos
speaks limited English but fluent German, possibly
acquired during his tour as Greek military attache
in Bonn in 1963 and 1964. Although at ease inApub-
lie appearances, he has kept more in the background
than have the other two members of the trio. He,
too, appears to be entirely pro-NATO and pro-US.
8. As minister of coordination, Makarezos is
chiefly concerned with matters of economic develop-
ment and--apparently--with the "cleansing" and re-
organization of the government bureaucracy
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9. A number of other field grade army officers
who were instrumental in carrying out the coup (the
deputy prime minister, General Spandidakis,Aoined
after it had succeeded) have remained shadowy fig-
ures whose significant. functions in the,government,
if any, are still not clear. One of them, hOwever,
Lt. Col, Dimetrios Stametalopolos, was appointed
director general of the Ministry of Communications
and Transportation.
10. There have been reports stemming chiefly
from speculation and gossip of nascent conflict
within the junta, especially between Papadopoulos
and Pattakos. This has been denied by both men, and
the idea has been scoffed at
Nevertheless, the rumors persist, and
even if they are untrue, constant reference to a
conflict between Papadopoulos and Pattakos might in
time serve to evoke it. At present, however, the
triumvirate seems to be working well together.
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11. There are a few tentative indications of
rivalry between Pattakos and Papadopoulos, however.
Papadop-
bulos,,expressed-uhhappihes that ,U.S. offieia/s deal, with (W(1)
the King and Pattakos rather than with him. For (b)(3)
his part, Pattakos made a strong pitch to come to
the US for the Greek-American celebrations sched-
uled for 21 May, Doubtless, Other man would like
to be considered the one with the "American connec-
tion," and if one is singled out the other could be
alienated. The King, for his part, prefers to deal
with Pattakos rather than with the austere and
rather humorless Papadopoulos, and hopes to exert
a moderating influence on the junta through him.
The Leaders. Speak
12. None of the military leaders of the new
government has shown a great inclination toward
speechmaking or public harangues, but all have been
fairly explicit in statements to the press and in
private conversations. Some indicatiOn of their,
thinking emerges from a sampling of their reported
statements.
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Pattakos:
On the future form of government:
"We believe the parliament will be the
Greek people".
"We will have the Greek people vote if
they like the new constitution or the
amendments we may make."
Papadopoulos:
On his attitude toward representative govern-
ment:
"The meaning of freedom and democracy is
diametrically opposed to that of anarchy."
On the precoup situation in Greece and measures
needed to remedy it:
"We are before a sick man whom we have on
the operating table, and if the surgeon
does not fasten him to the table during
the operation there is the possibility
that he could lead him to death. The re-
strictions imposed by the government are
only the bindings fastening the patient
to the operating table."
On returning Greece to a representative govern-
ment:
"Our intention is to bring back as soon
as possible parliamentary government to
this country, but don't ask me to become
a prophet."
On the handling of political prisoners:
"They will soon be called by security
councils which operate according to law
and in which judges participatel If
they are described as persons not dan-
gerous they will be freed."
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SECR-E4.1.
TRI�FoTerig�nizaELA
On the effect of the coup on public opinion
abroad:
"Saving the nation is more impprtW than
the effect on internation'alop'inion.."
Makarezos:
On the security situation in Greece as of mid-
May:
"We are certain that the Communist threat
is over."
On the need for continued suppression of the
leftists:
"We will never permit Greece to become a
second Vietnam;"
On the date when parliamentary rule can be
restored:
"When social and political conditions
in Greece are healthy and sound."
The Junta's Program
13. Immediately after the coup, it seemed
evident that the new leaders lacked a well-thought-
out program for running the country once they had
control of it. In fact, they may have been some-
what surprised at the ease of their take=over. The
consolidation phase, which they had probably envis-
aged as a lengthy onel was completed quickly, and
the process of purging undesirable elements from
the military forces and from the government bureaus
had to be started. When questioned about their
future plans for Greece, the new leaders had few
specific positive aims they could incorporate in a
general program for presentation to the public.
Instead, while they dismantled the old structure,
they found themselves obliged to react piecemeal to
individual situations. For example, they.issued a
decree increasing benefits to farmers,;and another-L.-
later rescinded--against beatniks.
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14. This conveyed an impression of a lack of
planning and coordination. Nevertheless, although
they did not begin their take-over armed with a
ready-made five-year plan for Greece, the coup lead-
ers have achieved impressive results in some of the
things they have set out to do. They have restored
public order and near-normalcy to Greek economic
life and have sought to conciliate rural opinion
by taking steps to increase farm income. They have
won at least the reluctant cooperation of the King,
and have achieved a limited degree of success in
winning the confidence of Western governments.
15. As the new government moves into its sec-
ond month, apparently convinced that its chances for
survival at home and acceptance abroad are reasonably
good, the outlines of its program for Greece are be-
ginning to take shape. A full system of priorities
may not yet have been worked out, but the following
are quite likely among its aims:
--Restaffing the government bureaucracy with
nonpartisan functionaries who combine occupa-
tional skill with integrity. This will be a
difficult and frustrating task, Which will
either force the new government into compro-
mises or delay its turning matters over to an
elected government,
--Revamping the legislative and executive branches
of the government to give increag4d power to
the prime minister.
--Redrafting the constitution to provide checks
on the direct action of political parties.
--Reversing the leftist-neutralist drift in Greek
foreign policy which characterized the post-
Karamanlis period, to include strengthening ties
with the West and perhaps adopting a more forth-
coming attitude toward Turkey.
--Emphasizing development projects in poor and
backward regions, coupling this with a program
of aid to villages. The importance of this
objective was underlined by the recent surprise
announcement of an $840-million, agreement with
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a California-based firm (Litton Industries)
for the construction of roads, bridges, and
other projects on Crete and the Dodecanese
Islands. This basic agreement had been
worked out by the Stephanopoulos government,
but its implementaion had been Stymied by
leftist parliamentary opposition.
--Modernizing and improving the image of the
Orthodox Church by appointing clerical
dignitaries sympathetic to the new govern-
ment and by setting an official example of
moralistic behavior in public life.
16. The domestic aspects of this program are
essentially apolitical: they call mainly for ef-
fective, "decent" administration willing to ignore
the complaints of special interests or the demands
of the relatives of would-be contractors. If the
junta stays in power for a prolonged period, how-
ever, it is likely to become involved in what will
be more obviously political questions, at which
point its present general uniformity of outlook
will be tested by the need to provide specific
policy answers. The junta members seem intelligent,
able, and strong minded. They lack experience in
political matters, however, and despite their ad-
ministrative capabilities there could be trouble
ahead. (Photos)
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Minister to the Prime Minister
Colonel George Papadopoulos
Minister of the Interior
Brig. Gen. Stylianos Pattakos
Minister of Coordination
Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos
-CONFIDENTIAL-
66672 5-67 CIA
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Memo Cortrol Form
ASV.
0 NOTICE NO 51.47
-5-itefflelliterMtEntle$327r
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LLASJI I-IL-A I ION or mcritv V6"..11
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COVER SHEET DISSEM AU THORI ZATION
MEMO NO 11.1.3/67 DATE 24 May 67
SUBJECT: The Greek junta
REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY: self-initiated
Due D/OCI Review
Dates: Dissem Ot, May 67
PURPOSE: Suitunary of composition of Greek junta aryl atiatudes of three principal
members, as well as symptoms of disarray in the junta.
ASSIGNED TO:
GRAPHICS
DISSEMINATION
� Preliminary (DDI, D/OCI, and their staffs)
oCategory Recommended to D
El Category E. Finally Authorized By:
0 Specified Other
Cat. E (Routine internal and external)
Cat. D (Routine internal CIA only)
Cat. B (Subcabinet and internal CIA)
Cat. A (Elite--External top officials only and internal CIA)
COORDINATE DDPANE
OUTSIDE OCI
OBSOLETE
FORM 2024 PREVIOUS
8-66 EDITION
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CATEGORY E � ROUTINE
OCI Sp.,. 1,1i Vpei Not :L(
SUI3JECT:
Ctreroc Japta
,Jontrol No.
Inv67
Da t e 214 T,Tay, 6-7
No. Copies
(b)(3)
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BECKET
�77CrIFOREIGN�DISSEAL--
24 May 1967
Talking Paper for "The Greek Junta"
1. A paper on this general subject was suggested
by D/OCI. The memo summarizes what we know about the
composition of the Greek junta and the attitudes of its
three principal members. It also discusses the symptoms
of disarray in the junta.
2. The paper concludes that the junta members have
basically a very similar outlook, and, for the time, are
working well together. Their personalities differ, how-
ever, and there are signs of rivalry. Given their polit-
ical inexperience, there may well be trouble eventually.
3. The memorandum was coordinated with the Office
of National Estimates and with the Clandestine Services.
Recommend routine internal and external dissemination.
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