FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEIPING
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06761225
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
March 8, 2023
Document Release Date:
July 30, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2017-01898
Publication Date:
January 23, 1964
File:
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FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEI[15676848].pdf | 161.02 KB |
Body:
�Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C06761225
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2.4 January 1964
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WEEKLY SUM.MA
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C06761225
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIC/NAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE 'TRANSMIS-
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DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
This document
It marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
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CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 23 January 1964)
Page
FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEIPING 1
The formal announcement may come next week, but an
exchange of envoys will probably await resolution
of French relations with Taiwan. Other governments
are watching the three-way diplomatic maneuvering
in the apparent hope that France will come up with
an acceptable "two Chinas" solution.
�SECRET__
23 January 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
�
NR Record
ii
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Nies'
REZ
FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEIPING
France plans soon to an-
nounce formal recognition of the
Chinese Communist Government,
possibly by the first of next
week
An exchange
of diplomatic missions, however,
will probably he held up pending
a resolution of French relations
with the Chinese Nationalist
Government.
French officials profess
to believe that Paris can rec-
ognize Peiping without admitting
Chinese Communist rights to
Taiwan and without the with-
drawal of Taipei's representa-
tives from Paris. Whether Paris
really believes that it can ex-
change diplomatic missions and
ultimately ambassadors with
Peiping while retaining relations
with Taipei is questionable. �
Little is known about the actual
Paris-Peiping negotiations, how-
ever, and it cannot be excluded
that additional agreements have
been reached on specific points
of mutual interest.
The Chinese Communists,
playing for big stakes in the
matter of French recognition
are displaying a new diploma ,
flexibility and have thus far
remained silent in the face of
Western press speculation con-
cerning the "twwChinas" ques-
tion. Peiping, however, has
almost certainly not abandoned
its claim to be the only le-
gitimate government of China and
thus to hold sovereignty over
24 Jan 64
Taiwan. It is therefore very
unlikely to be willing to rec-
ognize even tacitly the exist-
ence of a separate government on
Taiwan by agreeing to the exist-
ence of two embassies in Paris.
Chinese willingness to
avoid the issue temporarily prob-
ably reflects confidence that,
while Paris need not break re-
lations with Taipei at the time
recognition of Peiping is an-
nounced, De Gaulle can be counted
on to force a Nationalist with-
drawal. Paris seems confident,
however, that it is under no
compulsion to push the Nationalists
out if they do not break relations
on their own volition.
The Chinese Nationalists
continue to assert officially
their unwillingness to maintain
diplomatic relations with France
if Paris recognizes Peiping.
Taipei, however, may refrain from
immediately severing relations
with Paris, in the hope that
Peiping would refuse to exchange
diplomatic missions with France
as long as the Nationalist mission
remains in Paris.
Broad political factors
appear to have induced the
French to act at this time. De
Gaulle probably sees a more rapid
evolution of events in Southeast
Asia opening the way for his
favored neutral and independent
status for the area, and he holds
that Peiping's acquiescence is
,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
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Vas,
required to to bring it about. Paris
has long felt that the Chinese
Communists, as the de facto
government of a large and power-
ful state, have a legal right
to recognition, and that the
West can more effectively exploit
Sino-Soviet differences if it
is represented in both capitals.
Finally, by taking this initiative,
Paris is again demonstrating
its own power on the world scene.
No other nation has announced
an intention to follow the French
lead at this time, although many
are watching the three-way dip-
lomatic maneuvering apparently
in the hope that Paris can come
up with an acceptable "two
Chinas" solution. Canadian
Prime Minister Pearson,who saw
De Gaulle last week, indicated
that Canada may take another
look at its policy of nonrec-
ognition if Taiwan's independ-
ence can be maintained, although
another government official said
that Canada would take no action
prior to the US presidential
elections.
Domestic political pressures
for recognition of Peiping have
increased in Belgium and Japan,
but spokesmen for both nations
say that they do not intend to
recognize Peiping at this time.
(b)(1)
Paris has explicitly
discouraged the 13 Paris-oriented
states of the Afro-Malagasy Union
(UAM) from recognizing Peiping,
and that the French move probably
will not set off a chain reaction
of recognitions.
Several UAM states have al-
ready expressed their intention
not to follow the French lead--
a position based on the dual
considerations of showing their
independence of France and main-
taining relations with Taipei,
which in three UAM states pro-
vides modest technical aid.
Some of them, however, may be
influenced toward eventual
adoption of a "two Chinas" policy,
or even abandonment of Taipei,
by internal changes such as those
which occurred in Congo (Brazzaville)
and Dahomey last year.
Senegal alone of the UAM
states has extended recognition
to the Chinese Communists. This
has not led to the establishment
of diplomatic relations, however,
because the Senegalese Government
refused to break with Taipei--
which, in this instance, chose
to stand fast.
-3E-GREZ_
24 Jan 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 2
(b)(3)
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