POTENTIAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY RAMIFICATIONS OF 'OPERATION CONDOR'

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 15754309
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-02161
• Publication Date: August 17, 1976

Approved for Release: 2019/12/02 CO2218144
17 AUG 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division
---/-;_a_
VIA � . Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT � . Potential Political and Security
Ramifications of "Operation Condor"
1. "Operation Condor" has been the subject of
previous correspondence to you and other senior officials
of the Agency; it has also generated considerable correspon-
dence in recent months and has (b)(1)
prompted discussions with senior officials of the Departmetbw3\
of State as to what action the U.S. G. could take in an at
tempt to assure that human rights were not violated by the
countries involved in "Condor". The most significant of
the foregoing documents are attached for your review. In
addition, the following is a precis of "Condor" and an as-
sessment by Latin America Division of the possible adverse
political ramifications for the Agency should "Condor" en-
gage in assassinations and other flagrant violations of
human rights.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
2. Initial reports on "Condor", the code name given
to the program of cooperation among the intelligence services
of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay,
beginning in April 1976, indicated that the thrust of the
program was to be intelligence exchange and that the target
of this effort was to be the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta
(JCR). The JCR is an international revolutionary coordinating
body which was formed by the Argentine Peoples Revolutionary
Army (ERP) and which includes, in addition to Argentina,
terrorist organizations in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay.
. VIARNO3 NTOCE
SENSITIVE INIELLIGE!CE SOURCES
AND METFIC:DS INVaVED
(b)(3)
S B C1ft ET
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The JCR has received financial, logistical and training
support from Cuba; in addition, it has been the recipi-
ents of millions of dollars obtained by the ERP through
the ransom of executives of U.S. firms in Argentina. The
JCR operates principally in the southern part of South
America, but it is known to have strong representation in
Europe and is suspected of having been involved in the
assassinations in Paris of General JoaquinZenteno
Anaya, Bolivian Ambassador to France, on 11 May 1976 and
Colonel Ramon A.Trabal, Military Attache of the
Uruguay Embassy in Paris on 19 December 1974. Zenteno was
the military region commander in the area where Ernesto
"Che"Guevara was captured and killed in 1967.
Trabal had previously been active in the successful efforts
by the Uruguayan security forces to suppress the Tupamaros,
a member organization of the JCR, in Uruguay.
�(b)(1)
indicating that the efforts by the security service:l13(b)(3)
e southern cone countries to undertake a regional ap-(b)) '
proach to meet a regional terrorist threat, i.e., "Condor",
would go well beyond the exchange of information -- to in-
clude plans to assassinate selected JCR leaders in
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
4. In an attempt to preempt potential political ram-
ifications for the Agency, should the "Condor" countries pro-
ceed with the European aspect of their plans, we have taken
the following action. As soon as we learned of the possible
(W(1)
(b)(3)
In addition, discussions were held with senior officials
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of the Department of State relating to the steps which
could be taken to dissuade the South America countries
from their planned course of action. Accordingly, agree-
ment has been reached on the text of an EXDIS message
from the Department of State to the �U.S. Ambassadors in
Buenos Aires, Santiago and Montevideo instructing them to
approach the highest levels of their host governments and
express the serious concern of the U.S. Government to the
alleged assassination plans envisioned within "Operation
Condor." The host governments would be informed, however,
that the U.S. takes no issue with "Condor" plans to collect
and coordinate information to counter r
the southern cone area.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
5. The State Department approach described above
could well have some adverse impact on the security of the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
In arycase, it is our
judgement that the potential repercussions must be accepted
in order to counteract the negative aspects of "Condor."
signed
Raymond A. Warren
Raymond A. Warren
Attachments, a/s
CONCUR:
we WellS
1 7 AUG 7976
Deputy Director for Operations Date
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
13 August 1976
SUBJECT Meeting at Department of State to
Discuss "Operation CONDOR"
PARTICIPANTS: Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs
James Gardner, Office of Deputy Director
for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research
Robert Zimmerman, ARA/LA/p
Deputy Chief, Latin
America Divicinn
1. At State Department request, DC/LAD and
met with Ryan, Zimmerman, and Gardner at the Department from
1000 to 1030 hours on 11 August to discuss "Operation CONDOR."
Ryan opened the meeting by stating that the implications of
"CONDOR" in the human rights field had reached the point where-
by some action was required by the U.S. Government. DC/LAD
said that the Agency wished to be as helpful to the Department-
as possible in that regard;i
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
Mr. Ryan said he (b)(3)
understood our problem and believed out interests had been pro-
tected in their proposed representations to certain of the
"CONDOR" countries regarding the assassination problem.
Mr. Ryan then read the draft of a proposed EXDIS telegram to
Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Santiago. In essence, the tele-
gram briefly outlined "CONDOR" objectives. It took no issue
with "CONDOR" plans for collecting and coordinating informa-
tion .on terrorists and terrorist plans and activities in the
Southern Cone countries. It did express the most serious
concern regarding. "CONDOR's" alleged assassination plans. It
requested that this concern be taken up at the highest levels
of the host governments, stressing that-any assassinations
would violate the norms of civilization and would, if they
became. known, generate profound adverse reactions around the
world, to the countries concerned.
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2. While DC/LAD approved the general thrust of the
draft, certain changes were suggested and adopted. Among
these were:
� a. There should be separate instructions in the
cable to the individual ambassadors keyed to the
different situations in each of the three countries.
For example, Ambassador Siracusa's demarche should be
to General Vadora, rather than to the President, since
the Ambassador had a recent conversation with Vadora
along these general lines arid information on "CONDOR"
is reportedly not known above the level of Vadora in
Montevideo.
b. The Charge in Buenos Aires should stress with
President Videla directly, if possibley the adverse �
effect revelation of the assassination scheme will have
on Argentine efforts to obtain loans and otherwise come -
up with solutions for improving it economy. (There
was general agreement that Argentina is the country in
which we should be able to exett the most leverage.)
c. Each ambassador should emphasize that overtures
are being made in other "CONDOR" countries so that
there:will be no feeling on the part of anv host govern-
ment of being singled out for attention. I
� d. Embassies in Brasilia, Asuncion, and La Paz
should be information addressees. : �
�
3.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
4. DC/LA asked that State provide us with a copy of the
cable. They agreed to do so.
outgoing cable.
(W(1)
Mr. Ryan agreed to add that in the (b)(3)
Deputy Chief .
Latin America Division
a
(b)(3)
(13. Aug 76)
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WARNING NOTICE
24 JUL 976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division
VIA Acting Deputy Director for Operations
� SUBJECT
Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation
Among Latin American Intelligence Services
Against Terrorism
v
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
1. During recent months, the intelligence services of
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay have
embarked on a new concept of regional co-operation against
terrorism which includes the mounting of offensive operations
outside of their own countries against Latin American terrorist
leaders. The code name of "Condor" has been assigned to this
cooperative effort. The intelligence services of Chile,
Argentina, and Uruguay are now orinizin cni.11v trnincld
teams to operate' 1(b)(1)
The purpose of these teams will be to liquidate (b)(3)
key' Latin American terrorist leaders. kum)
2. The plans of these countries to undertake offensive
action outside of their own jurisdictions poses new problems for
the Agency,/ 4
But more important, it (b)(1)
raises the question of what action the Agency could effectively(b3)
take to forestall illegal activity of this sort. Also, every
Precaution must be taken to ensure that the Agency is not wrong-
fullr accused of being a party to this type of activity.
3.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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SUBJECT: Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation Among
Latin American Intelligence Services Against Terrorism
4.
1(b)(1)
(b)(3)
signed
Raymond A., Warren
Raymond A. Warren
CONCUR:
Thecaore C. Shockley
. 2 4 JUL
,Actincz Deputy Director for Operations Date
197b
23 July 1976
�� .
(b)(3)
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET .7
i
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Potential Political and Security Ramifications of
"Operation Condor"
FROM:
Raymond A. Warren
Chief
Latin America Division
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
17 August 1976 (b
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1. --------------------
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
b)(3)
2 4 JUL lq-ir
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
VIA
SUBJECT
Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation
Among Latin American Intelligence Services
Against Terrorism
1. During recent months, the intelligence services of
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay have
embarked on a new concept of regional co-operation against
terrorism which includes the mounting of offensive operations
outside of their own countries against Latin American terrorist
leaders. The code name of "Condor" has been assigned to this
co-operative effort. The intelligence services of Chile,
Argentina, and Uruguay are now oreanizinv specially trainpa
teams to operate
The purpose or these teams will be to liquidate
key Latin American terrorist leaders.
2. The plans of these countries to undertake offensive
action outside of their own iurisdictions noses new problems for
the Agency (W(1)
But more important, it (b)(3)
raises the question of what action the Agency could effectively
take to forestall illegal activity of this sort. Also, every
precaution must be taken to ensure that the Agency is not wrong-
fully accused of being a party to this type of activity.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
- -
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SUBJECT: Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation Among
Latin American Intelligence Services Against Terrorism
4.
Signed
EarnOnd A.
Raymond A. Warren
CONCUR:
-1 crir
Lui
ions Date
23 July 1976
2
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t(S '1"-.14 CT: poo:1130 Operation Condor - Regional Co-operation Among Latin
American Intelligence Services Against Terrorism
FROM:
C/LAD
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE (b)I
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
L
Ex Reg
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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