RAFAEL TRUJILLO, THE DOMINICAN DICATOR, WAS ASSASSINATED AT ABOUT TEN P.M. ON THE NIGHT OF 30 MAY 1961.

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06612953
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2019
• Case Number: F-2015-01112

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
The assassination
Overt knowledge of U.S. Government involvement
Recollections of CIA officials
The organization of the coup group
Why a coup failed to follow the assassination
Page
1
2
3
6
8
International activity in opposition to Trujillo
11
The cast
13
The first Farland memorandum
16
Level of CIA activity prior to 1960
17
Approach to Trujillo by General Clark
17
Operation Lancet
19
'State asks Farland if he could engineer a coup
20
Farland replies that he could
21
Farland says the dissidents need guns
22
The U.S. is prepared to assist in overthrowing Trujillo
24
Rubottom asks that sniper �ifles be supplied the dissidents
25
Acting DCI approves air drop of 12 Springfield rifles
26
Special Group approves small arms for dissidents
29
COS asks that one weapon be sent in each pouch
30
Dearborn learns of plan to assassinate by intercepting auto
3"
asks for submachine guns for plotters
_(b)(1)
Dearborn asks for three 38-caliber pistols for dissidents
:(b)(3)
The plot to kill Trujillo at his mistress' apartment
36
COS protestsrestriction on pouching weapons
36
Hqs guidance cable on policy and objectives
37
Station asks permission to pass three carbines to dissidents
38
Hqs approves passing carbines
4o
The carbines are passed to the dissidents
4o
Request for pouch waiver ref pouching submachine guns
41
Submachine guns pouched
42
Pleas from dissidents that submachine guns be passed to them
42
Hqs informs the station not repeat not to pass submachine guns
43
Post-Bay of Pigs standdown cable
44
Station acknowledges receipt of submachine guns
44
Draft cable (not sent) approving release of submachine guns � � .
-7
State Department disapproves passing submachine guns
48
The whereabouts of the three carbines
49
Special Group confirms not passing submachine guns to dissidents
50
The dissidents' assassination plans are firm
51
U.S. policy does not condone assassination
51
Dearborn and the COS protest
52
Critic No. 1 on the assassination
53
Vice President Johnson asks about arms delivery
54
Discovery of U.S. involvement with assassination group
55
Recapitulation of arms passed or considered for passing
59
The motivations of the assassins
61
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Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at
about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's
custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal
about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler
with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying
cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San
Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action:
after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a
khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristobal in an unescorted 1957
Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.
On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on
a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by eight
armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and
his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's
chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins,
and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. One was
never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed
while resisting arrest. The others . _ ,were arrested, confessed,
and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine
others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate
in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, while
resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.
(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved
in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the
small group that actually did the killing.)
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There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the
U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters.
Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty,
many of the details came out. Norman Gall, a reporter with the
San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The New Republic
issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts follow:
The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L.
Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US Central
Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the
69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highway4hear his
capital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at the
request of the assassins.
The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in
late 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry
Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the US
Consulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the plot was
Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.
As Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened,
talks continued between Dearbon, Barfield and leaders of the
anti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was
established between Amiama and a CIA agent who . . . was
named Plato Cox.
The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the arms
shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad
Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operated
a supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo also
lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing but
was later allowed to leave the country;
The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled
later by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments for
the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The
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gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans,
which were later turned over to the conspirators.
Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during
the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being
prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961,
invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was
focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a post-
ponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because
of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the
United States. But the order to hOld up came too late. The
needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators,
who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the
assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity.
This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out
into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a
rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with
Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.
It can be reported on excellent authority that close
associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within
a few days following the killing.
Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed
out of the Dominican Republic by US officials
Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has
returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket,
where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if
Trujillo had never lived.
We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then
Chief, WIT Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations,
WIT Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to
monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regime "but not
pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the
Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the
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furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute
tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency
role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King
and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's role as one of giving support
to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S.
interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation
involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not
have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons
supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo.
Both Esterline and King believe
has a vague impression that
The Agency officers most
they were
one of them
immediately
not. Bissell, however,
was.
involved with the plotters
are now widely scattered.
who was chief
of station
(b)(3)
until October 1960, is now
retired.
who was chief
(b)(3)
of station
at the time of the assassination,
is in.
(b)(1 )b)(3)
(b)(3),
the station's operations officer,
is in
(b)(1(b)(3)
(b)(31
the station's administrative assistant who was used as a
(b)(3)
communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1964
and is believed to be living in
quarters branch chief, is in
We
the head- (b)(3)
elected not to call (b)(1)
(b)(3)
back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able
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to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records,
we think it unlikely that they would be able to add significantly
to the quite complete record that appears in the operational (WO)
(b)(3)
files.
Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime were
assigned the cryptonym
One segment of
was known as
the cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo by
violent action. We have reviewed the voluminous
files.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(31
Most (b)(1)
(b)(3)
of this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significant
documents were not put into the
files but were kept in a
private file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us.
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the
From the records,/, we can
operational files)
trace the origins and the course of
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo. We also can
ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support
of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the
U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo. What we cannot discover from the
files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group
was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly
accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in
�the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the
U.S. Government was actually working. Excerpts follow:
The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of
conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved
too ragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group
had its purpose and its separate personnel.
The function of the Action Group was to assassinate
Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in
the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the
Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup,
taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed
Forces.
The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to
have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert
Barreras and Salvador Estrella They were joined
by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military
corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio
de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been
killed by the government because of his involvement in the
* Robert D. Crasgweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a
Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 19-77
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Galindez case; Huascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro
Livio ,Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was in
Moca on the night of the 30th and saw none of the action.
The Political Group had a less distinct membership. It
included Luis Amiama Tio, Modesto Diaz, General Juan Tomas
Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support
of General Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the Armed
Forces, and his brother Bibin
The over-all authority appears to have centered principally
in General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficient
prestige to command authority
The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When
information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going
to dftve to Estancia Fundacion . . . Garcia Guerrero in the
Palace would inform the others by personal message
The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace
came to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the evening
of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at
this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza
threatened to act by himself if the others lagged. In any
event, the plan went into execution Each of them
had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his own
sawed-off shotgun and two M-1 semiautomatic rifles
The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never
very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurely
to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was
now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Immediately after
the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to
reach General Roman. . . . . .
The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up its
planned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail as
wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of
de la Maza's car, parked in the garage of General Tomas Diaz,
where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators
were all hunted down very quickly, except for Amiama and
Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for months until
the danger had passed.
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(b)(
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(b)(
The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took
place against a background of international activity in opposition
to the Trujillo regime, with both the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-
cut stands. These are some of the highlights:
a. A briefing paper prepared in WH Division for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned
for December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed
pending receipt of arms from Venezuela. The plot was discovered
and was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in the
OAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation of
human rights, freedom and democracy" following the mass arrests
in the Dominican Republic in January 1960. A committee of the
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OAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June 1960
that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.
b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President
Betancourt on 24 June 1960 killed two in his entourage and
injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government
announced after capture of most of the assassins that the
Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betan-
court's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the
OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under
Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture
Committee on 24 August in support of a request by President
Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota,
is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic
sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictator-
ship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The
United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican
Republic on 26 August 1960, although consular relations were
continued.
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As a further prelude to a chronological review of operation
we think it would be useful to identify the people
involved, especially since officers of the Department of State
played a very prominent role.
Washington 7 Department of State
Roy R. Rubottom
Frank Devine
John C. Hill
Washington - CIA
J. C. King
Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
, Special Assistant to Rubottom
Special Assistant to Rubottom
Chief, WIT Division
Chief, Branch III, WIT Division
Ciudad Trujillo - Department of State
Joseph S. Farland
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is
pertinent to note that King and Ester-
line attribute U.S. and CIA involvement
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(b)(3)
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Henry Dearborn
with the plotters in the Dominican
Republic to Ambassador Farland. They
describe him as a former FBI employee
who considered himself quite a clandestine
operator. who later served
under him in Panama, called him "a wild
man who bugged the Agency to support a
move to assassinate Trujillo." He had
direct,dealings with a number of the key
plotters.
Counsellor of Embassy until 26 August
1960 and Consul General thereafter. He
used the code name in corresponde0X1)
with the plotters. (b)(3)
Ciudad Trujillo - CIA
Key Dominican Plotters
Chief of Station until October 1960
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
Chief of Station from 20 January until (b)(3)
4 June-1961. Code name used with the ,
plotters: (b)(1)
(b)(31
(b)(3)
Operations Officer
Administrative Assistant
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Two documents provide a useful point of depaure, from an
historical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from
Ambassador Farland in the.Dominican Republic to Assistant
Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal
CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had
been played by CIA prior to 1960.
16 November 1959
Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum
to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today
than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the
principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:
It . . . within this group there is growing militant anti-
American feeling based on the premise that the United States
should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the
overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on
this subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the
position of the United States and its adopted doctrine of non-
intervention This group is in possession of
clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation
when the strike is made. CAS has been informed and joins with
me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."
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15 February 1960
A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WH Division, discusses
a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic
in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives
stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event
Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by
Castro-type forces.
b)(1)
b)(3)
10 March 1960
This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files
of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft
is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower
from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years
of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo,
with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to
persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was
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no one who could succeed him, and that to protect his family and
to preserve his image as El Benefactor, he should step down and
allow asylum to be arranged for him. His family would have the
wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune
by
inside would be placed in trust, to be administered internationally-
known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.
This proposition received high-level attention in Washington,
including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter,
and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo,
the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative
of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the
President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and
met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it
appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented
as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done.
The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official
U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the
meeting.
22 March 1960
Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom,
forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plottingTrujillo's overthrow
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bearing the code name "Operation Lancet." It was basically a
proposal for a course of political action reinforced by the threat
of being backed by muscle. The operation was to begin with the
who
arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy"/1d tell Trujillo
to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; he will
give him 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that
if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which
would be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming
Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatun, the plan then outlined steps
for transition to an operating representative government. The army
would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for
free elections. Ambassador Tbrland forwarded the plan with these
comments of his own to Rubottam:
. . . this segment of the dissidents is psychologically
conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the
ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect
United States assistance
"Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of
our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement
a definite constructive program to influence the course of events
in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary.
and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities
of this type of approach !t
30 March & 7 April 1960
The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the
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event of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. On 30 March, fearing
that Cuba might be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S.
civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the
possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic
from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo. On
7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo
fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving
willingly:
. . . it is evident that Trujillo will not consider
making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but
that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the
country on short notice, a la Batista."
9 April 1960
from which
the following is an extract:
"Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements
within next few weeks with appropriate civil and military
dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized
to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they
should immediately request United States recognition, and ask for
United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio
Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored
invasions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro
or pro-Communist elements within or outside Dominican Republic . .
"What, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements
tf
prior to takeover
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"FYI wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency
planning purposes only and in no way indicates higher authority
I t
at present contemplates such action
11 April 1960
(b)(3)
in part as follows:
"Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make
arrangements with appropriate civilian dissidents whose leaders
are known to me including names their selectees for top
governmental positions, and with one military dissident, a
general, who is expecting an exchange of passwords for purpose
secret discussions
"Regardless of . . . seething unrest which exists,
indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly
poorly armed, loosely organized and lack working liaison with
military dissidents, will find it difficult to effect take-
over of GODR without existence one or more or combination of
following developments (which we summarize below):
(1) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.
(2) An invasion to serve as a signal to the populace.
(3) Implementation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."
(4) Advance psychological conditioning by radio.
(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."
(6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding
the coup and for the period following it.
Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican
military dissidents. He added:
"One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to
dissidents would be to let them know we are prepared to assist
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them; transmission of armament and sabotage material . . . could
fully substantiate this cooperation
9 May 1960
(b)(1
(b)(3
A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads,
in part, as follows:
"The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United
States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered
rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw
no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the
arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises
the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in
this activity.
"Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He
said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want
to support.
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(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations.
Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28
June 1960, it appears that he did not actually return to duty
in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated
13 June, but he never took the post.)
3 June 1960
Farland met with
in WH Division.
memorandum of the
meeting includes this comment:
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
"Farland then told me that the underground opposition are
planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planned to
use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of
Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote-
control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty
well along and could be executed at any time."
Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and 13 June)
The author is not identified nor is there any indication that
the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To
precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August or as
soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a
prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo
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refused to abdicate, consideration should be given to other covert or
overt actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A
deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.
17 June 1960
Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence,
queried
, asking for confirmation on
certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader,
He stated his understanding of the U.S. position
as follows:
a. The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against
the Trujillo government while it is in full control.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely
to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthrow.
c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly
until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional
government which controls a substantial section of the
Dominican Republic.
20 June 1960
(b)(6)
asked Rubottom and Farland
if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a
meeting with
another dissident leader.
Farland replied
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
in the affirmative.
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28 June 1960
Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with
He said that
felt that the time to concentrate on,
for planning purposes, was the period extending through the
"incapacitatiorrof Trujillo; too much planning for what would
follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.
Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October) Rubottom told J.C
King that the Government of the United States was prepared to
participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following
extent: "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices
for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene
Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this
time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the
undergound to accomplish a revolt.
29 June 1960
Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with
said that
had recommended a temporary standdown on "action
toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's
He (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt. W
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Dearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for picking
in
up arms at sea and for cachingfirjarby caves. He also described an
airdrop site.
1 July 1960
A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approval
for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.
"It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground
opposition forces in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile U.S.
rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together
with five hundred rounds of ammunition for same
It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD
facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the
opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by
air, plans are currently being studied in the GA staff for
delivery by sea.
"Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by
Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that
the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the
earliest possible moment.
The memorandum was signed by
for Chief,- WH Division; was (b)(3)
concurred in by Rithard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by
C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.
to airdrop twelve
30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed and
sighted." The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop
site and for a four-man reception team with flashlights. The cable
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added that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Hqs now studying
means of effecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."
8 July 1960
Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:
tive learn from and/or (W(1)
what plans and capabilities are to be (b(b)(1)
employed simultaneously with action to incapacitate Trujillo (b)p)
and what is needed in way of material support for implementation
of plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extent
of military participation in preparations. In spite of (W(1)
apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, most (b)(3)
logical that he is acti.lely collaborating with a group that
must have some plan and capability for action which will assure
stable interim gove ter f Trujillo
In your opinion are and members of same group (W(1)
or if not could the two groups be merged? (b)(3)I t
8 September 1960
The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department
of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September)
proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom
of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal
approach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would be
best and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.
18 October 1960
Chief, WE Division, prepared a memorandum summarizing approvals
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obtained for action in support of the Dominican internal opposition.
The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your
verbal request on 13 October 1960 . . .
ft
This is the memorandum
to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.
29 December 1960
The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read,
in part:
"Bissel gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan
for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed
against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although
support would be given to there is no (b)(1)
intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such (b)(3)
He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of them-
selves bring about the desired result in the near future,
lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that
overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be
mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations
it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time
no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention
may be."
(Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with
such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific
plan of about this date.)
12 January 1961
The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the
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Special Group on this date:
"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of
State that limited supplies of small arms and other material
should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican
Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed
securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final trans-
portation into the group being provided by the dissidents
themselves. The Group approved the project."
19 January. 1961 `-
Cable from headquarters:
"For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable,
authority has been given Hqs for delivery to internal front
of limited supply of small arms and other material on condition
that introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Dams.
Above coordinated with State."
24 January 1961
Memorandum for the record of a discussion.of Project
members of the CA Staff and of WIT Division:
by (b)(1)
(b)(3)
"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the
Special Group now has approved that a 'limited supply' of
small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to
the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been
dealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approval
on 29 December 1960 of our Operational Proposal."
(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we know
none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)
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31 January 1961
"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State
Department:
"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my
friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been
made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too
long the question of actual delivery since they are eager
and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only
lead them to question our sincerity."
6 February 1961
Cable from headquarters:
"1. Realize details not now available but Hqs would
appreciate 5issidents17 reaction to offer of armed assistance
to include Lassidentsj current plan . . .
"2. Also request initial assessment
Lassidentsf capabili7,7 carry out plan of action once limited
armed assistance provided."
10 February 1961
The station cabled its reply:
"No solid reaction except
joy as of 9 Feb.
"Initial assessment is
c.nii1
npt
(b)(1)
carry out plan. But with access
now
(b)(3)1)
approaching point when will
better be able evaluate
group
(b)(3)
potential for action. We some weeks away from being able
make solid preliminary assessment. J
"Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small
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size high fire power weapon so at least gesture in right
direction can be made if we all thrown out. Ammo could
come later."
14 February 1961
At the Special Group meeting of"this date, Mr. Bundy:
VT . . . asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher
authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a
successor government to Trujillo."
(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum
in CIA files.)
15 February 1961
the headquarters branch chief, met with
in New York City. Excerpts from his
memorandum record of the meeting follow:
It
played down somewhat the necessity for (b)(1)
delivery of arms, although he did say that it is desireable (b)(3)
and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of
the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quanitities
of arms from Army contacts . . . but that any arms so obtained
would have to be used very quickly before their loss is
discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desireable to
have arms delivered by us that could be stored for use at any
moment desired.
said that the object of obtaining this kind of help (b)(1)
anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms M(3)
or grenades he began to speak df more exotic materiels and methods
. . . a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of
Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a nearby
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electronic device . . . (or) . . . the possibility of poisoning
the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles
of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take
regularly
"A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward
was one that they said had already been planned at one time
before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for
his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the
dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in
the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally
is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a
given intersection at which time young men who belong to the
action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and
grenades to finish off the dictator."
4 March 1961
Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of
of his meeting with
memorandum, (b)(3)
On 4 March, the chief of static(b)(1)
(b)(3)
cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage
and kill him with guns and grenades:
idea . . . almost certain fail if applied. That
type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified
cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement vehicles
plus olice practice detour traffic bloc way from entourage
make idea fatally childish in view."
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1) (b)(3)
(b)(3)
(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out
through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and
took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements
in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)
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The station cabled headquarters on 4 March:
. . . if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost,
believe . . . imperative make sure arms with ammo ready for
immediate entry DomRep . . . if necessary at air drop sites . . .
5 March 1961
from
As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication
"We have in our hands chance to speedup
events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be
'assured as much as human fallibility permits
7 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the field, in part:
"Existing authorization precludes introduction arms into
Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans
for possible alternate delivery method, request station
determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned
Request type and quantity arms desired
8 March 1961
Cable from the station:
ft
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
told Dearborn on 7 March that and(b)(1)
group -n1 an try k-i l l Tru iillo by ZEntercepting his caly at point
_V. Date not set and obviously depends MO)
not aware has tol,(b)(1 )1 )3)
us but interesting that Charge' Papal Nunciatura also aware plot(b)(3)3)
exists but possibly not of personnel involved."
near L
on Trujillo travel . .
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8 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
"Hqs deeply interested plan . . . and request urgently
additional details in order make plans timely assistance.
Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes
His seeking commitment for such speicific assistance as that
It
requested
13 March 1961
(b)(
(b)(
1)
3)
15 March 1961
Cable from the station:
asked for (b)C(b)(1)
small supply fragmentation grenades 'for use in next week or so.00130)
By note, the chief of station checked back with and (b)(1)
learned the dissident group must jcill Trujillg this (b)(3)
month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths (b)(31
are apparently aware renewal plan asked for five (b)(1)
45 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar, 1,500 rounds ammo for (b)(3)
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same, . . . 50 fragmentation grenades, . . . ten 64mm tank
fr
rockets
16 March 1961
Headquarters cabled its reply:
"Hqs exploring possibilities for arms delivery and will
advise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: Is
making request on own initiative or is he speaking for
ft
17 March 1961
Cable from the station:
"For issue to several 5f the dissident group7 Consul
General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson
Special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges.
If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will try
get from Marines.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion 5o send in each
pouch one small size high fire power weapo.a7 as Dearborn
increasingly concerned lest momentum which group has now for
5ssassination7 decline result lack tangible or too slow action
on arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these people
increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day
more involved in the operatio27. Loss of one of ke o le
thru capture could lead revelation details ODYOKE (b)(1)
activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend (b)(3)
themselves against SIM."
18 March 1961
Chief of Station
met for the first time with Dr.
He cabled the results:
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"His group gl:ssassination7 plan now this: Group knows
identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once
week or once in two weeks. 0.Goes her apartment incognito and
lightly guarded. Group appzently has someone in building who
can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group
will go to entrance, distract guard with pretextl_ dispatch him
or them in silence, enter apartment and try do frssassinatio/27,
possibly including mistress, in silence.
"To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and
1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefight. Will
use quiet weapons for basic job fina:(b)(1)
position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch (b)(3)
or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by
other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can
count on only one group both receive arms and do 5ssassinatio7.
expects and willing risk chaos for period(b)(1)
of undetermined length after 5ssassinatioa7 mainly because for (b)(3)
security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to
get decisive agreement support before fa-ssassinatiog.
20 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations
against shipment of arms . . . Will deliver to the group's
representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible.
Coordinated with State Department."
22 March 1961
The station replied, in part:
. . . we realize permission does not now exist but
Chief of Station knows that he at last two posts received pistols
via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from
ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then
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please continue try get authorization for air drop of . . . arms
. . . or import arms by 5-the7 means. Completely negat'
for arms, whatever delivery method
will end cooperation
and probably by
(b)(1)
.*
(b)(3)
25 March 1961
The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable,
but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the
cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P
(Bissell) undertook to set
straight. The cable gives a fairly
complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and of
responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to
replace the Trujillo regime; we wish to avoid precipitate action if
planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine
guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the
dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters
is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by
the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government.
"If above clarifies Hqs position,
should proceed accordingly.
In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing
orders permit return for consultations."
(Comment: We do not know whethereplied to this cable
or not. We do not find a reply in the files.
did go to
headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot
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* It is apparent from the operational files that no arms were
ever
air-dropped or delivered by sea.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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establish that the trip was a direct result of this cable. There
is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in
connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine
guns.)
26 March 1961
Cable from the station:
"For request permission pass three semi- (b)(1)
automatic M-1 carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which availabl(b)(3)
consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs
nine 30 cartridge magazines for weapons. Request prompted by
note 25 March which says he cannot hold group (b)(1)
If
together beyond April 15 without arms delivery (b)(3)
(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology
at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were
actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of
who worked out the details of the assassinatio(W)
(b)(3)
and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly
were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have
no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting.
The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually
used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various
sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no
evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)
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27 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
"FYI, ref hardware he three pistols the station asked be
pouchel7 makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment.
Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package;
or whether split shipment preferable."
(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these
� revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not,
because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)
29 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
. . . Hqs inclined to favor passing ref (b)(1)
carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation (b)(3)
inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's
ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure
manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming
witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require
Consul General Dearborn's concurrence. Advise
Pouching . . . nine magazines . . . "
31 March 1961
The station replied:
"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act
in anyway. Plan file off serial numbers. Will handle packaging
after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is
Dearborn. Delivery to (b)(1)
depending on what (b)(3)
steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this
message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of
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good will to now. These items are not what he (W(1)
asked for but they are an investabent in operational continuity. (b)(3)
The security risk in his having these items is no greater than
his having similar items delivery which done by more complicated
and less secure cache or drop."
Headquarters cable to the station:
"gassing the three carbineg approved. Advise Hqs when
passing of this equipment completed.
(Comment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)
7 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"ghe pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbineil
contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines
as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine
magazines."
9 April 1961
Cable from the station:
It
[he three carbine/ to
(Comment: The files do not contain an account of how the
(WO)
passed
April 7. No complications(b(b)(1)
(b)(3)
carbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarters
subsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents.
Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the
submachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose
use essentially same technique as that for [he three carbineZ.
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(b)(1
(b)(3
7 April 1961
Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting
waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request
is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo has
requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 24-0
rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action
group to be used for self protection."
(Comment: The entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a request
for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station.
This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station was
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at headquarters for consultations. It is probable that he made the
plea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-
called "grease guns" of World War II) were pouched but approval was
never given the station to pass them to the plotters.)
12 April 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
"Equipment for LTubmachine gulag which subject(b)(1)
of Chief of Station conversations Hqs being pouched . . . 14 (b)(3)
April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hqs what scheme of
delivery proposed."
(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on
the 9 April entry.)
13 April 1961
An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn from
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
"The three Leica cameras, model M-1 he three carbine27,
with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day
or two With the small amount of equipment which they
are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places
and therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced and
the time factor considerably extended accordingly. With the
rest of the equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) Lthe submachine
gun,27 the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost
time greatly reduced."
14 April 1961
Extract from a note from
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Ldonsul General Dearborn]:
"The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands
of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras
in order to do a better and faster job. We hope that the memo
we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."
17 April 1961
Note fron
LTearbora7:
and
to (W(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
"The 1mite in the matter of cameras:
says that with the 3 Leica (W(1)
cameras already delivered it is impossible to do the photographO)(3)
job. He needs to have the rest of the equipment (the 4 M-3
Leicas) before he undertakes the job. The ones already delivered
he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he
needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is my
belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological
purpose also: the men involved have always been in doubt the
good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in
several months all they have obtained were promises. Now they
see that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing
is waiting for the heavy cameras."
17 April 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
repeat not
ft most important he submachine gung not/be
passed to without additional Hqs approval. Please (W(1)
advise when equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of (b)(3)
delivery."
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20 April 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
"gubmachine gung should be held in station custody t'll ,
further notice and not repeat not be passed to (b)(1)
This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum crea ed(b)(3)
by 5ssassinatio7 now bigger question than ever view unsettled
conditions in Caribbean area.
"Request station provide foil info soonest: Have
5he three carbineg been delivered to (b)
Details on an alternate plan to de2 iver Lsubmachine gung
1
I f
which would involve
(Comment: It might be noted that this cable was sent
just three days after the failure of the landing at the Bay of
Pigs.)
20 April 1961
Note to Dearborg from
"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not
only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery
of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and
disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing."
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
ku)C1)
(b)(3)
20 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"gubmachine gung here 19 April with no entry problems
whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can
be simplified even more.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Request Hqs advise when we may begin.
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(Comment: The precise nature of this "excellent basic
wrapping" is not further clarified in the file. Norman Gall,
writing in The New Republic, said that the weapons were shipped
to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us as if the sub-
machine guns were packed in food containers for pouching. If so,
we wonder how Gall learfted of this. We can state with fair
confidence that these submachine guns were never passed out of
the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination,
(b)(1)
sent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his passing(b)(3)
them. This sounds as if there must have been a leak from the
consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the submachine
guns.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
21 April 1961
Cable from headquarters to the station:
"gUbmachine gun g should be held in station_custodv_t111
further notice and not repeat not be passed to
22 April 1961
The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April
regarding disposition of the three carbines:
Tr
has given /The three carbineg
to intermediary who holding until picks up
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(Comment: This "intermediary" appears to have been
(b)(1)
The significance of this and the security problem it
(b)(3)
posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for
31 May.)
25 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"Foll from Dearborn: 'I believ8 political consequence of not
delivering submachine gung so serills I plan go Washington within
next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"
26 April 1961
Cable from the station:
t
told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la (b)(1)
Maza -plans try assassination between 29 April and 2 May. (b)(3)
possibly not yet aware plan. No solid info other (b)(1)
members assassination effort but probabl(b)(3)
will aid. Will use taeth1e carbines plus whatever else can Tn
get. De la Maza asks add the submachine guns if possible (u)(l)
(b)(3)
If
30 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"Following from
and
main mission was
believe in Dom Rep and
carbines, 4 to 6 12-
arms Action
1.1
� April 28 as emissa(b)(1)
(b)(1)
called on me with foll info: . . .
plead with me release submachine guns the.(b)C41)
under my control. Action group has 3 (b)(3)
e shotguns with 120 rounds and some small
entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal
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and few additional weapons could be important I replied
I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S.
controlled items which might be in Dom Rep could only be released
on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that
since the three carbines were made available Cuban incident had
occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study
rr
and assessment
2 May 1961
Cable from the station:
suggest Hqs review decision not pass submachine
guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly. inadequate
means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the
overthrow of the Trujillo regime."
2 May 1961
Draft cable prepared at headquarters:
Since it appears that EMOTH group has committed
itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with
fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal
defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to for (b)(1)
their additional protection on their proposed endeavor (b)(3)
(Comment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated
by Ray Herbert for J. C. KinE,and Richard Bissell coordinated on
it. It was forwarded to the DDCI for release. General Cabell
attached a handwritten buck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div.,
unacted upon.")
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4 May 1961
The Director, at a meeting of the Special Group, reported a
new anti-Trujillo plot, saying that we never knew if one of these
would work or not.
5 May 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
8 May 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
16 May 1961
Cable from the station:
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
"For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: call(b)(1)
on me night May 15. Stated he emissary from action group which (b)(3)
plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. (b)(1)
mission was urgently request me to furnish group with few machine (ID)(3)
ft
guns which it understood US agents have in Dom Rep
(Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incomprehensible
memorandum in the
files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and con(b)(1)
(b)(3)1
The transmittal dispatch makePA1)
(b)(3)
a meeting with
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it clear that the author was
This
is our interpretation of what
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
was trying to say:
Sometime during the second
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
week of May,
asked
to return
the
thrP)(1 )
(b)(3)
carbines had given
for the plotters.
at '13
first refused
but finally agreed. /Tresumably
them to Antonio de la MazaL7 On 15 May,
again saw
said he had the carbines back in
and his group planned to carry out the assassination
night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that
had been working with on behalf of the consulate.
then passePA1)
(MCI)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
his posses:03M )
(b)(3)
the following
arrived
while was stiib0
(b)(3)
After left,
asked if he
with
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Carbines back to
said he was
had given the
(D)(1)
(b)(3)
certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines and
to do the job did not know each other's identities. While
was talking with
the man to whom
had last
given the weapons dresumably Antonio de la Mazg arrived
to
was
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
carbin(b)(1)
(b)(3)
He replied that he had not that that, if she wanted(b)(1)
(b)(3)
asked him if he had returned the
confirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he
always carried them.)
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18 May 1961
There was discussion at a Special Group meeting of planning with
respect to the Dominican Republic. Chester Bowles said he thought
that an internal State planning paper outlining an ambitious
paramilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approval) exceeded
the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that
impression. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:
"General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were
pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in
U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the
feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be
passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary
position at this time." *
25 May 1961
The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed
discussion of "further guidanceto Dearborn re contacts with
dissidents." The minutes of the meeting, however, make no mention
of the subject.
27 May 1961
The station cabled:
"Department from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with
made no request for arms whicl(b)(1)
indicates group has accepted fact it must do with what it has. (b)(3)
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* The small arms to which General Cabell referred were the submachine
guns, which were pouched to the station but were never passed to the
dissidents.
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His only statement on this subject was that group has arms but is
somewhat concerned whether enough.
"He stated action group planning overthrow Trujillo for
past 3 weeks and representing anti-communist pro-democratic
elements of which he member remains on brink final performance
and determined as ever. Said he could give me no date because
action depends when Trujillo follows awaited pattern which
not known in advance. Group has arrangement for being informed
sufficiently in advance to get into assigned positions once
signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-
United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow
Trujillo.
"I replied . . . speed with which assistance could be
given would be increased considerably if we could have prior
info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities
involved and identity of proposed junta He replied
participants were not prepared give their names until afterward
and could not give time for reasons stated earlier
"Re timing stressed event could happen any day and (b)(1)
could in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that (b)(3)
necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize."
29 May 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
"For Dearborn from State We must not run risk
of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S.
as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This
last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful
situation You must request and receive further
specific instruction for any specific covert activity. At the
present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents
(Comment: Both 'Dearborn and the chief of station sent
cables commenting on this guidance cable. Their cables were filed
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in Ciudad Trujillo on 30 May but were not received in Washington
until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours
after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.)
31 May 1961
Cable from the station:
"State from Dearborn If attempt is made by U.S.
friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against
us and best we can do is see there is no proof. Greatest danger
point is He was given small number arms by (b)(1)
dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persor(b)(3)
dissidents obtained these items from consulate. told me (W(1)
same and I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know (b)(3)
and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents
I told him this impossible. . . . . . "
Cable from chief of station:
"Assume he 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn] isis
final word on present policy on which CIA work here must be based.
This for practical purposes retreat from previous policy.
However Hqs aware extent to which U.S. Government already
associated with assassination. If we are to at least try 'cover
up tracks,' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination
preparation must be withdrawn now If assassination
tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of
station, the operations officer, and the administrative
tr
assistant mandatory
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31 May 1961
Received in Headquarters Signal Center at 0341 hours,
Washington time:
FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO NUMBER 1. APPR 2.
SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (C).
SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL
WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO KILLED BY ASSASSINATION SAME NIGHT. AMERICAN
CONSULATE PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED ROADBLOCKS ON CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO
HAINA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 HOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY.
INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY
FEW OF WHOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS OTHERS WITH MACHETES. NO
CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 0600Z.
ZT200 Washington timL7
(Comment: The station's followlup operational cable
identified the source of Critic No. 1 as
who gave the information in person to Consul General Dearborn
and Chief of Station
Dominican time,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
at the consulate. At about 0100 hours,
telephoned Dearborn "to ask
cryptically whether we had the news."
details when he had them.)
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(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
said he would add (b)(1)
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3 June 1961
Memorandum for the record signed by J. D. Esterline, in part:
"The evening of 2 June, it was decided to immediatel
move out of the Domin can Republic the Station Chief and (b)(3)
Case 0ffi LLt was also decided that Administrative lo)lo)
Assistant should not return to Trujillo. Accord- (b)(3)
ingly, an operational immediate cable was sent to the station
the afternoon of 2 June issuing appropriate instructions."
9 June 1961
Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject:
1 "High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part:
"The meeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room
7514 of the Department of State. Among those present were Vice
President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer,
Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson,
Mr. Ed Murrow, Chief, USIA, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard
Goodwin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion
and Mr. Jameson.
"Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred to another message
from Consul General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to
the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of
arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked what
was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms."
(Comment: The message to which Vice President Johnson
referred is not in the
operational files. We did not
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake
Esterline, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination
planning, does not recall having heard of Vice President Johnson's
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query. The record suggests that he knew of it but does not now
remember. There is an unsigned memorandum in the file (b)(1)
(b)(3)
dated 6 June 1961 (the day after the meeting at State), subject:
"ODACID Views on Passage of Arms to Dominican Dissidents."
The memorandum summarizes State Department-Consulate involvement
in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. The routing and
record sheet attached to the memorandum shows it was originated
by
WH3/DR&H, and was forwarded to C/OPS/WH
(Esterline). Esterline initialed the routing and record sheet
and returned the memorandum to
This suggests to us
that J. C. King, upon returning from the meeting at State, asked
Esterline to have a summary pulled together.
J. C. King remembers the meeting at which the Vice President
asked about the delivery of arms. He does not now recall the
specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting
leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was
directed to one of the State representatives. He feels that,
if it had been directed to CIA, he would have made mention of
that fact in his record of the meeting.
A memorandum for the record prepared by J. C. King of a White
House meeting on the Dominican crisis on 7 June 1961 makes no mention
of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The meeting
was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.
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The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly documentary
account of U.S. Government involvement with persons plotting
the overthrow of Trujillo carries through the actual assassination.
Early in the report we explained why the coup that was to follow
the assassination never took place. Another essential part of the
story is the' roll-up of the assassination group and the discovery
of U.S. involvement with them. The consulate cabled through CIA
channels on 9 December 1961 that the 7 December issue of the
Dominican newspaper La Nacion carried a story
" . . . based on Huascar Tejeda Pimentel fs statement
to Judge of Instruction that Wimpy (Lorenzo A. Berry)
provided the caliber 30 M-1 Garand automatic carbines used
to kill Trujillo . "
(b)(
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(b)(7
(b
(b
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his wife, and their children were allowed to
leave the Dominican Republic.
visited Washington.
December 1961,
They went to Florida and subsequently
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
After amnesty was granted the plotters in
returned to Santo Domingo and resumed
They,
continued
to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch
supporters of the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin y Wessin faction
and were involved in the actions that led to the overthrows of the
governments headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.
To recap:
a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King
on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Government was prepared to partici-
pate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of
providing a small number of sniper rifles for the removal of
key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting
DCI, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Springfield rifles to
the Dominican dissidents by air drop or by sea. The rifles
were never delivered.
b. On 10 February 1961 the chief of station cabled a
suggestion that one small-size, high-fire-power weapon be
forwarded in each pouch. This suggestion was not acted upon.
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c. On 17 March 1961, the chief of station cabled a request
of Consul General Dearbon for the pouching of three 38 caliber
Smith and Wesson Special pistols for delivery to key members
of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch
the pistols but apparently did not do so. There is no indication
in the
pouched.
operational files that the pistols were actually (WO)
(b)(3)
The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken
by a subsquent request for submachine guns.
d. On 26 March 1961 the station cabled a request for
permission to pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines plus
ammunition to The carbines and ammunition (W(1)
(b)(3)
were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel.
The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Head-
quarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched
the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines was
released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said it would file
off the carbines' serial numbers. The station cabled that the
carbines were passed to
on 7 April 1961.
of the dissidents, gave the carbines to
temporary safekeeping.
(b)(1)
at the request(b113 1
(b)(3)
for
(3
the carbines from ((bb))(1
(b)(3)
who reportedly kept (D)(1)
(b)(3)
later recovered
and gave them to Antonio de la Maza,
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them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least
one of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination
by de la Maza, but we have no evidence that it was actually used
in the shooting.
(b)(7)(d)
e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April
1961, Chief of Station
evidently prevailed upon
headquarters, to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition
to the station. The submachine guns were pouched and arrived
at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station
on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to
the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite
repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul
General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass
them. We think it is safe to conclude that the submachine guns
were never passed to the dissidents.
A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not know the
motivations of men such as
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